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Lawfare Daily: What Israel's Gaza City Offensive and Airstrikes in Qatar Mean for the Region
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Podcast Host
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Dan Byman
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Dan Byman
Customers One of the consequences of Israel's actions and rhetoric is that Hamas has no reason to believe if Israel signs a deal that it will stick to a deal unless it's forced to stick to a deal that it agrees to.
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Scott R. Anderson
It's the Lawfare Podcast. I'm Senior Editor Scott R. Andersen with Dan Biman, Senior Fellow at the center for Strategic International Studies Joel Braunold, Managing Director of the S. Daniel Abraham center for Middle East Peace and Nathan Sachs, Senior Fellow at the Middle East Institute.
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Nathan Sachs
By setting back Iran's nuclear program and by Iran being hurt, its proxies being hurt, its reputation being hurt, the imperatives driving the Gulf states Israel together are actually diminished, which means the domestic political cost to the Gulf states, whose populations are very anti Israel, is much higher. Why pay it if you're dealing with an enemy like Iran that's diminished Today.
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Scott R. Anderson
We'Re talking about recent developments in the Gaza conflict and the ripple effects they are producing across the region. So I think it's worth saying up front because this is a fast moving topic. We're recording on September 16th, Tuesday around 11:00am on the East coast here in Washington D.C. as we're recording right now, if you look at the front page of most major newspapers, their Middle east section, their world section, there are reports coming about the latest phase of the Israeli military operation in Gaza, which is a renewed ground offensive focused around Gaza City. Large scale displacements purportedly justified on a strategic basis by the Israelis as an effort to keep Hamas from regrouping, aimed at undermining what additional limited continuing support and logistics they have in Gaza City, but also having pretty dramatic humanitarian displacement effects. It looks like there's about 350,000 people from reports I've seen people displaced from Gaza City, not just from Gaza, and a whole about a half million remaining in Gaza City during the military operation. This is from the Times that I'm pulling this number. Dan, talk to us about this military operation. What is it the Israelis are doing, what is it they say they want to do? And where does it fit into the bigger strategic arc of this conflict?
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Nathan Sachs
Ostensibly, Israel is trying to assert its control over Gaza to the point where Hamas cannot renew itself. And what we've seen for really Almost since after October 7 itself, several months after that, was when Israeli troops would leave part of Gaza, Hamas forces would pop back up. And this might be in a small way doing an ambush on any Israelis passing through, but it was a form of Hamas asserting its continued control and presence in Gaza. And Israel's war aim is the very vague Hamas must be destroyed. And so this has been a constant challenge. And I suspect we'll discuss that. There are a lot of other alternatives to Hamas in terms of government structures in Gaza, but Israel's against them all, or at least against the all rhetorically. So you end up with Israeli troops having to displace Hamas. And to do so, this requires a pretty massive troop presence. There are US Estimates for what are often called stability operations of the number of troops you need for the population. And it often varies between 1 soldier to 20 of the population versus 1 to 50. There's debate about that, but whatever the number is, it's really, really big. And Israel finds itself again and again having to go into parts of Gaza where it's been before and displace both Hamas but also the population. And as you said, there are hundreds of thousands of people who have left and even more are likely to leave. Those who don't are going to be in the line of fire. And we're going to see even more casualties in a place that's already seen horrific casualties. And this sort of operation, in theory, politically, could drive Hamas to the negotiating table. But I think we've seen the failure of that again and again, where if Israel's demand is simply Hamas give up completely. Hamas is more than willing to sacrifice another 5,000, another 10,000 Palestinians, some of its fighters, but a lot of civilians to defy Israel. And so seems like a movie we've seen again and again, even though each particular operation is different, this military operation.
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Scott R. Anderson
Is coming at the same time. It's, I think, two other big movements, developments in the Gaza conflict. One is the increasingly dire humanitarian situation. We had a formal famine declared, but a few weeks ago in Gaza, something that, because of the trajectory and momentum that comes of famine and the availability of resources, humanitarian relief, something that's hard to reverse. We know we've had a real struggle for months to get humanitarian assistance into Gaza, in part as a deliberate product of Israeli policy that changed a little bit a few weeks ago, at least in some superficial measures. But there are still challenges there. So that's kind of one angle. The other big intersection is that we were seeing last week another push by the Trump administration, essentially saying, hey, look, we've got to come to the table using the threat of a major offensive like this in part to try and bring Hamas, Hamas to the table. That was before, of course, something we're going to talk about in a little bit, a little bit more detail, Israel's very dramatic strike on Hamas leadership in Qatar, which needless to say, was a little disruptive in negotiations. But nonetheless, we still have Secretary of State Rubio today releasing statements I think probably made yesterday in the media today, saying we are really down to the last possible minute for a negotiated solution in Gaza. So obviously a real focus on some sort of negotiations there. Joel, talk to us about that broader Gaza picture. How does this military operation intersect both with the humanitarian piece, the much more immediate one, and the somewhat longer term. But if you listen to the Trump administration at least framed very immediately need for a negotiated settlement and progress in that regard.
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Dan Byman
Let's start backwards. The government of Israel's position vis a vis this is that Hamas needs to be defeated, not transformed. So Hamas needs to be killed and destroyed. How we go back to, again, many conversations we've had, Scott, how do you kill a political movement? I think this is a challenge that Everyone has been asking, but that is the current modus operandi. And by the way, Prime Minister Netanyahu and his main minister, Ron Derma, have seemingly successfully convinced President Trump himself that this also should be his modus operandi. If you look at even on his critical comments vis the Israelis in terms of the location of the strike, he agrees that Hamas should be destroyed everywhere. And so both the Americans and the Israelis belief is that the war will end when Hamas is destroyed and waves a white flag and that white flag is waved through its destruction. The region and the rest of the world, really, led by the Saudis and the French and their diplomatic initiative that we'll get into later, think that you need to offer a political horizon and then the entire region rejects Hamas as a governing entity in Gaza, that it must leave Gaza and it needs to disarm and go away and DDR and all these other things. And in order for that to happen, you need guarantors that will guarantee Israeli actions, that if they commit to exile, that they'll exile. And so far, the Americans haven't been willing to give that guarantee because they share the Israeli current perception that Hamas can be destroyed. So is this a pressure tactic to try and get Hamas back into the table? Well, if it is at the table, Hamas will require guarantees that should it surrender, that or go into exile and give up its guns, that they're not just allowing for permanent occupation of Gaza and that they're not going to sign their own death warrants. And until they feel that's the case, they're not going to surrender. So if it is a pressure tactic, the down ramp also needs to be clear. So you've got sort of competing objectives that you can claim this as a pressure to force Hamas to come back to the table. But if at that table, there's no guarantee that will restrain Israeli action should Hamas agree to something? It's hard because one of the consequences of Israel's actions and rhetoric is that Hamas has no reason to believe if Israel signs a deal, that it will stick to a deal unless it's forced to stick to a deal that it agrees to. So that's one on the first part, the humanitarian situation is dire. The IPC came out with its famine report. Israel's response was to do a massive public campaign to undercut the methodology of the IPC report. Israel claims that it's using specific determinations that it hasn't used elsewhere. The IPC pushes back and says it's not. You can go online and on social media and see the backwards and forwards and you can believe who you want to believe, but again, it's sort of Israel by itself against pretty much every international institution Israel will claim. Well, that's the bias it faces. And the prime minister yesterday said you're facing a flood of Qatari and Chinese now money to try and sort of set up these narratives. Also today, or I think actually it was overnight, you had the UN Independent fact finding mission that declared that Israel is committing four of the five acts of genocide according to the Genocide Convention. Israel again rolls its eyes and says more of the same, but you've got that. But I will point out, Scott, that when we had that interesting meeting at the White House a few weeks ago where you were going to have a policy meeting on the future of Gaza, A, Tony Blair was there. Interesting. B, Ron Dermer flew in emergency and didn't meet with Cindy McCain in Israel, which was something that we knew that he was climbing up. So this was an urgent meeting. And three, President Trump had indicated that he was going to get the humanitarian situation sorted. So regardless what happened, it would be expanded. And I'd argue on that file, we've seen no progress. At one point we were told that the GHF would expand to 14 sites. That hasn't happened. We have seen that Israel has now instituted a new NGO registration for INGOs that now need to go through an inter ministerial committee. So many of the traditional humanitarian actors in Gaza have been deregistered or lack registration. And you're seeing new actors, evangelical actors like Sumerian's Purse, operate. So Sumerian's Purse has started working with the GHF publicly and that's the first public, real major ngo. They're not a traditional NGO in Gaza who is working with the ghf. And we haven't seen any surge of humanitarian assistance. You know, one of, I think one of the major reticences or resistances that we've heard from, leaks of the Israeli cabinet meeting from the IDF chief of staff is if we take over Gaza City, we're going to have to be in charge of the residents there. And we're not humanitarianly prepared to do such a thing. So far we haven't seen a surge in humanitarian points of access or anything else. So I think the situation is you're adding onto already a desperate situation, 1.1 million people more internally displaced. That puts more stress on the very limited aid infrastructure that exists in terms of distribution hubs. And again, the question therefore becomes, is this a byproduct of a necessary military maneuver or is this the plan to push Palestinians into unlivable inhabitation and then say, you can leave or you can stay in unhabitable accommodations forever? And again, this goes back to the crux of what is the purpose of all of this? And the inability of anyone to trust what anyone is saying, that the purpose of this is.
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Scott R. Anderson
So a big motivator that we often see attributed, particularly those critical of the Israeli government and what they're doing here is that a big part of this is domestic politics. This is Bibi trying to keep his political fates alive, trying to keep his coalition together, or is otherwise perhaps hemmed in by his coalition that need to a much more hardline approach to Gaza. And while that may be a narrative that people may or may not believe in, that has problems or may have some ring of truth to it, it's certainly true. The domestic politics weigh really heavily in the government's calculus and how it's approaching this conflict, as it always has, kind of from the beginning. So Datan talks to us about that this government is in some ways at a very delicate moment. But Bibi Netanyahu has lived his life in delicate moments, and that's not nothing new for him. So talk to us about where he, his coalition is at the moment and how that's intersecting with Gaza.
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Joel Braunold
I've had quite a few conversations on just this question, and there's an interesting tension here. On the one hand, if you look at Netanyahu's coalition considerations, they're clear. They're on the right, and I would say far, far right. Metsali, Smoti, to a greater degree, much lesser degree, Tamar Benfil have really managed to push a lot of the line. It's not the full line that Smoti wants. And he will claim that Netanyahu is incapable of doing what needs to be done. But the line has been very severe, of course. And to Joel's first point in the Israeli psyche, there have been two declared and very important goals from the very, very beginning. And I think all of us have written on the tension. I remember Dan and I talking about this at the very early days of this war. On the one hand, destroying Hamas and on the second, releasing the hostages. And there was a tension from the very beginning. It's become a contradiction now with the remaining living hostages.
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Dan Byman
And.
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Joel Braunold
But what's changed is that Netanyahu and his officials and his family have made very clear that they've made a choice. If they were obfuscating in the past, you know, no, we mean to do both of course, but it seemed like they were preferring by far to destroy Hamas militarily as long as it takes. Now they're very explicitly saying it. The attack in Doha is also actions over words. But they've also said that very clearly they want to destroy Hamas. If that means the fate of the hostages is in dire, dire danger as it is right now, so be it. From a domestic political perspective, that's very important, much more than internationally, because that is an extremely emotive cause and issue for Israelis. Israelis know the names of the hostages. They know who is likely alive and who is not. They care about this tremendously. And I say this because if the coalition pushes Netanyahu far to the right in favor of not just destroying Hamas, but in Smoltic and Benville's vision, clearing Gaza, ethnic cleansing, and from their perspective, one day settlements, even not Netanyahu is there, but he's certainly going that direction right now. The Israeli public is not there. The Israeli public is in favor of a deal, even one that would end the war, even one that would currently guarantee Hamas remains. After all, this remains somehow on its feet, although greatly diminished, if it would free the hostages, allow Israel to breathe for a moment after the longest war in its history by far now, and regroup. And of course, the long war with Hamas would not end, obviously, but that's where the Israeli public is. And that's important politically for the obvious reasons, but also because we are about 13 or 14 months away from elections in Israel, even if the coalition does not fall. So Netanyahu has political considerations in both directions. I would suggest what we're seeing now is a clear choice of one over the other. It's not. He's not wavering. It means that he still is preferring his coalition and wants to keep that until the last day. But it implies more than this, which is that not everything is politics. Kissinger famously said Israel has no domestic politics. He probably didn't exactly say that, but it has no foreign policy, only domestic politics. But that's not completely true. And I think what we're seeing is that Netanyahu, from the moment he regrouped after a blow to his psyche on October 7, and by all reports, he was really shaken once he regrouped. I think he viewed this war as an opportunity to rewrite the many of what he views as the mistakes of the past 30 years, including Oslo. And so this vision, it's not identical to Smoltic's in terms of settlements, etc. But it's not that far. And this very Damaging, very robust, brutal approach. Strategy, I think, is Netanyahu's strategy, not only his politics.
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Scott R. Anderson
So there's another big part of the calculus has begun to come to the fore here. Obviously we've been talking about Gaza, the status of Gaza as part of this conflict the last several years. Behind that was the issue that before October 7th in a lot of ways had risen to be the biggest point of tension between Israel and the international community, even with the United States under certain governments. That is the status of the West Bank. But we know that that is back to the fore this week. Secretary of State Rubio is meeting with or has met with Prime Minister Netanyahu just in the last 24 hours or is meeting shortly thereafter. I can't remember exactly when their meeting is scheduled. We know that west bank annexation is on the agenda. The reporting from Axios, who I think Tenda has pretty good sourc on this, is that the Netanyahu government hasn't decided to move forward with annexation yet, but it's kind of testing the waters to see whether the Trump administration would be accepting of that as a possibility. Joel, let me come to you on this. Talk to us about how annexation is fitting into this potential strategic picture and where it fits into this timeline and relates to the Gaza conflict. I mean it is another front that's about to emerge that's kind of been simmering in the background among what is a very, very multi front picture right now. If you take into account Iran, Qatar, everything that's been happening the last few weeks and West Bank's a big new one, very close to the home front for Israel that has a lot of global ramifications. So talk to us about why this is coming up now and where we think it might fit into the broader picture.
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Dan Byman
I think to give this question the fullest answer, I need to go back to actually the beginning of this particular Israeli government. A lot of people have in their minds that the Bennett Lapid government was better towards the PA than this Netanyahu far right government. The irony is that the Bennett Lapid government was terrified about meeting and never really did it right. Despite some pushes during at the beginning with the change government, the self contradictories between Bennett and his other coalition partners never gave the confidence to do so. And the PA also rejecting Covid vaccines at the beginning, it didn't start off well and it got worse from there. The irony is that Netanyahu comes in and has no fear about having a formal process with the PA and they actually do the Akabasham process where Netanyahu sends Saki Hanegbi, his national Security advisor, to meet with Hussein Al Sheikh, who has subsequently become the vice president of the Palestinian Authority, to sit and agree, you know, what a process could look like. And Brett McGurk's there, and the problem is that Sakhi comes home and the Cabinet says, we never agreed to this. And you had a complete disconnect between Bezalel Smotrich, the Finance Ministry, which is critical with Israel's relationships with the pa, and he's also a minister in the Defense Ministry, where he has a specific plan to utilize his ministries to de facto annex the West Bank. Okay, that his entire vision is, how much can I get away with now? During the Biden administration, he was always worried, even after October 7 and even after the fact that there was security cooperation, everything else, that at what point when Biden was a lame duck, he would screw them. And so there were opportunities, and the US managed to maneuver some, like release of customs revenues and everything else. But the general review is that despite there being a formal process through Akabasham, it was never put in practice. And what was happening was a constant undermining of the PA through Jerusalem and basically through Bzala Smotrich's ministry, where everything that was normal was pulling teeth from interbanking relationships to cash surplus to, you name the issue of the technical stuff. And meanwhile, more and more settlements were legalized. The process for legalizing settlements advanced. It was moved far quicker away from MOD and towards traditional civilian apparatus, which would make the entire planning process go quicker and just to formalize settlements as a normal part of Israel. Okay, October 7th happens. The Israeli population claims that Abbas doesn't condemn. October 7th, prisoner payment issues come back on the forefront. Are you now going to pay the perpetrators? And, you know, Abbas misses the opportunity to vocally condemn it in a way that the Israeli population can hear. And so then you hear Netanyahu saying, I'm not giving Gaza back to either the PA or Hamas, and the PA can't be a future of this. The Americans disagree, but it doesn't seem to matter. It moves forward and move forward, move forward. Okay. While this nightmare in Gaza is unfolding post October 7, the PA gets sort of a rebirth of in the region. Even critiques of the PA like the UAE are willing to meet with Hussein Al Sheikh after he's appointed, with Mahmoud Abbas, he goes to Saudi Arabia, places that have traditionally been very critical as they realize the region, that the only future to move forward with an integrated Israel is that if the PA eventually post reforms, everything else can move forward and take back Gaza, whether that's post trusteeship, whatever, and that the PA needs to reform, and that if Abbas is going to be malleable and show that he can appoint a successor and that they can do reforms on prisoner payments, which they've committed to and publicly announced, then they're investible. Okay, so that's sort of ongoing. So as the Israelis continue to be unable to talk about what a day after could look like, Trump puts, you know, ethnic cleansing on the table, voluntary ethnic cleansing, as he would say, because they just want to leave. And the Israelis adopt that position. The region reacts incredibly terribly. And basically Macron and, and Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman pushed this. Look, we're going to be against maximalists. If Hamas's vision of the Middle east is one without Israel, we're going to lock in two states and in doing so, push out the maximalists. The problem is that for everyone in Israel, you can't have Palestinian Independence Day being October 7th. And this looks like a reward for Hamas, especially if it comes as unconditional recognition during a war. Right. And that Hamas thanking it and everything else. But in Ramallah, you know, Ramallah, President Abbas has felt that there's no one to talk to on the Israeli side. Akbasham never was, was implemented. And so I'm not going to try and make deals with the Israelis. I'm going to make, try and create what he says is irreversible steps towards a Palestinian state. And for him, that's international recognition. So he basically tells everyone what I need to get on board with. Whatever you want to do on the Palestinians in Gaza is recognize us as a state, because if we're locked in, in law in all of your countries and at the un, then no matter what the Israelis do, even if they try and annex, which I'm going to get to, we exist in everyone's own legal system. So Israel will have to deal with the consequences of annexing what other people recognize, not as disputed territory, but as another sovereign state that those countries recognize. And he wins over the French, he wins over the Saudis. They put pressure. And you've got this whole rolling mechanism that's coming up at the UN on the 22nd on Rosh Hashanah. Not by accident, by the way. So the Israelis can't respond to Palestinian recognition. And this document they put together we can get into later. It also has, you know, that Hamas can't be part of it. They need to disarm. But this is all part of a Package deal. The Israelis are apoplectic. Not only does the entire shouldn't say it's an 80% position in Israel that you shouldn't declare unilaterally a Palestinian state, absent of lots and lots and lots of other things. And so the Netanyahu government says, what can we do to respond? We've had recognitions from Sweden and others before. Well, what can we do to respond? And for them they're like, fine, you declare we'll annex, right? So the amen that Dermer said, apparently it leaked to the French. Like, if you do this, we'll annex parts of the west bank now. Which parts where it would seem from leaks, reports, analysis, the most likely response to French recognition could be annexation of the Jordan Valley, which Israelis will tell you that whatever two state solution, they would keep control of the Jordan Valley for their own security, for Jordanian security. So we'll just annex it and put to bed this mythology that the entire of the west bank is going to be there. And going outside the framework of bilateral negotiations has significant consequences. The UAE very worried about this. NBZ basically sends his ministers out and says, if you do that, that's a red line and we'll fatally hate the Abraham Accord. Accords, hurt the Abraham Accords. Does that mean that the UAE is going to cancel the accords? Does it mean if they annex 83% of the west bank, which is what Bizala put out Smotrich, does that mean that they'll do that? If they annex just the Jordan Valley, will they do that? If they build an E1, will they do that? If they do de facto rather than de jure, it's unclear, but from the Israeli mentality, they haven't moved forward on it because they want to try and still preserve space, that maybe there'll be a deess mash in a moment before the un, that they delay recognition in return for something and then they'll take annexation off the table. But they have loaded the gun and put it on the table. That should uncontrolled recognition move forward, then they've got this that they can play with. Now, does that mean that if Trump gives them a red light, they'll move forward? Probably not. But they could do things that functionally are the same as annexation. As Nathan said, they can can build completely up E1, they can flip areas from A to B to B to C so they get more security control and they'll negotiate with Trump something absent, that is formal annexation. And Trump will sell that into the region saying, well, they didn't annex now, what do you want? And so for the Israelis, this is a reaction to the Palestinians. And for the Palestinians, they're like, the only way we can lock in a political horizon is to get the rest of the world to agree to it, because the Israelis aren't. We'll get into, I think, later, the actual specifics of the UN move. But I do want to say, Scott, there are differences between, for example, what the French said and what Belgium said. Belgium said that they'd recognize a Palestinian state and they commit to it once the hostages are released and that the war is over. That is very different to saying, regardless, we're recognizing a Palestinian state today. Right. The Brits is a very confusing one. The Canadians seem to be on and off. So each one has their own variants. But there might be, might be a middle path that. Could you say that we're not going to make this a reward for Hamas, we'll do it only if hostages are released and the war has ended. Maybe that's a way to do it. Or could that elongate the war? Because Netanyahu knows that if he ends the war, then all these recognitions happen. So these are complicated pieces, but annexation itself from the Israeli parliaments is a reaction to unilateral steps to recognize a Palestinian state. And the Palestinian push to recognize a Palestinian state is a war ending maneuver to sort of move Hamas out. So they're completely talking past each other.
- [29:06]
Scott R. Anderson
I mean, that's a great illustration of the intersection of domestic and regional political forces happening at the international level and the domestic level and integration between these two and the fact that they're hard to disaggregate. And I think that really came to the fore this past week. We saw a very visual regionalization of the Gaza conflict in the form of a unprecedented Israeli military maneuver hitting a residential complex in Qatar that has been housing the Hamas negotiating team and Hamas kind of political leadership in their families and assorted other people, killing several people, although most members of the natural negotiating team appear to have survived the strike, contrary to initial reporting. And notably this took place obviously in Qatar, a country that is also home to US Military forces, a traditional ally. And it has its own tensions with the other Gulf countries, but not quite as big a separation as was a few years ago when they were kind of boycotting Qatar. So, Dan, talk to us about this. What do we know about what drove the Israelis to this big step and what do the ramifications appear to be? How is it echoing out regionally and frankly, domestically back at home so this.
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Nathan Sachs
Strike to me is particularly perplexing. It's perplexing in part because, if you will, the payoff of killing the target had it succeeded, in my view, was low to the point of really not being worth serious consideration. These weren't operational figures who were going to shape military operations in Gaza. The kind of justification Israel has used in the past when it's done these very high risk operations on the territory of especially US Allies, but also really de facto Israeli allies, like its attack in Dubai and its attack in the 1990s in Jordan has been, this is a huge target. But in this case, the targets were much more minor and obviously didn't even work in some ways. The target to me was the negotiation, that this was really a way of saying, look, look, we're always going to take the shot at Hamas people wherever they are. And sure, it derails negotiations. We do not care that this was very much a message, perhaps to the international community, but especially to Israel's own people by the Netanyahu government, that they are going to always be going after Hamas wherever they can. But this is an incredibly consequential strike, in my view. Qatar, of course, is a U.S. ally and a very important U.S. ally. It houses a huge U.S. military base that is vital for the U.S. presence in the region. It has served as an important partner in negotiations from a US Point of View. And I think even more importantly, this went against the wishes of Donald Trump, who very much personalizes his foreign policy. He looks like an Israeli stooge. Either Israel gave him warning and he wasn't able to stop a strike on a close ally, or Israel really almost dismissed US Concerns and barely gave him warning, in which case it shows a certain amount of contempt for Trump on the Israeli side, and there's no real way around that. And he feels personally close to Qatar and to the Gulf states. This is in some ways his happy place. The Qatar government, of course, gave him a new airplane, among many other things. And so this relationship is a very personal one as well as one that is strategically important to the United States States. And there is, I think, going to be even more caution by the Gulf states with regard to Israel. Now, part of this, ironically, to me at least, is because of Israel's success against Iran by setting back Iran's nuclear program, and by Iran being hurt, its proxies being hurt, its reputation being hurt, the imperatives driving the Gulf states and Israel together are actually diminished, which means the domestic political cost to the Gulf states, whose populations are very anti. Israel is much higher. Why pay it? If you're dealing with an enemy like Iran, that's diminished. That doesn't mean to me that they're going to abrogate the Abraham Accords or anything dramatic. But you can be more critical. You can not do cooperation. You can otherwise really not be there for the United States as well as for Israel when there is pushing on this particular door.
- [33:47]
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- [36:19]
Scott R. Anderson
With prices.
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Nathan Sachs
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- [38:49]
Scott R. Anderson
So I want to come to Natan and ask a little bit about what what Israel may be thinking, how this fits into that strategic vision that he described to BP's. Before I do though, Dan, two other military actions we should pull in here that have been happening recently. Well, one military action, one kind of ongoing state of tension. One Qatari is not the only Gulf country or country in the Gulf area that we've seen get hit by Israeli airstrikes in the last week. We've seen now two waves of airstrikes against Houthi targets, targets in Yemen, one, I think a day or two after the Qatar attack last week, one ongoing today, as far as I can tell, kind of as we're recording. And then we also have a challenging situation that has flared up over and over again over the last few months, I don't think recently in the last week or two, but as recently as within the last month or two in Syria, where we've seen Israel take pretty targeted military action, particularly against usually armed groups, groups that are associated with the governing regime, although not clearly like a branch of the governing armed forces of the new interim government operating out of Damascus, in part because they are engaging in some degree of sectarian conflict with Druze populations in Syria who the Israelis have a relationship with. Talk to us a little bit about what Israel is doing in both of these cases and how they fit into this kind of broader picture as well. What's driving that?
- [40:09]
Nathan Sachs
Sure. Well, let's start with Yemen. I think this is kind of a no win situation for Israel. Houthis have been launching a series of attacks on Israel. Most get shot down, but a few get through and cause real harm. But the United States has tried to go after the Houthis and failed. Saudi Arabia and the UAE have tried to go after the Houthis without much success. This is difficult because Yemen has been engaged in a massive civil war for many years. And so the addition of a few more dead Houthi leaders or Houthi fighters from Israeli strikes or the US for that matter, isn't really shaping Houthi risk calculations. They've lost so much that this is just not a serious risk to them. Especially when there are significant political benefits to the Houthis. It benefits them to be able to say, look, we are the ones standing up to Israel. That's a very popular cause in Yemen. The Houthis have been recruiting on this. Before all this began, they had been losing much of their appeal. And so they're willing to play this domestically, even if it means losses of civilian infrastructure, losses of some of their fighters, some of their leaders. That's a risk they're willing to take. And honestly, I don't see a good way around this either way. For Israel, it's understandable they respond when they're being attacked. That's, to me, perfectly reasonable. But there isn't a particularly effective response. I'm less sympathetic on the Syrian side. To me, this is very reflective of the new Israeli policy, which is just an utter lack of trust in any form of deterrent and an unwillingness to take risks. So they look at Syria and they say this was a hostile regime in the past. It has a new leader, Ahmad Al Shara, who has quite real ties to jihadist groups in this past and more than ties, leadership. And so this is someone, they say, how could anyone possibly trust this person person if he's on your border? And so they've been doing attacks in southern Syria, in particular, expanding their military presence in the formerly demilitarized area, doing some strikes on Damascus. And part of this is to help the Druze population maintain a degree of independence from the Syrian government. And part of it is also simply to keep the Syrian government weak, especially in the areas near the Israeli border. This goes against the wishes of the United States and of the Gulf states that have been trying to work with a new government. The US View, which I share, is that Al Sharra, surprisingly, given his past, is actually quite a pragmatic figure. He's authoritarian. I don't think he's doing a good regime within Syria, but he seems eager to have peace on his borders because the situation in Syria is so dire. The Gulf states are also eager to try to have some degree of stability in Syria. And I think it's against Israel's own interest to have a weak regime where there's a lot of chaos on its border. I think that's harmful for Israeli security interests as well as for the broader region.
- [43:23]
Scott R. Anderson
Yeah. And you could not get a more visual sense of the disparity between the US Position on this, which I think tracked with most of the international community and Israel than this past week when we saw CENTCOM Commander Admiral Brad Cooper in full dress whites visit Damascus with Tom Barak, the President's special envoy for Syria, I think, also U.S. ambassador to Lebanon, and have a series of high level meetings. Really, really striking visual moment for people who have been following the trajectory of Syria for the last decade and a half. And I mean, what a strong signal of a desire to engage by the United States the exact opposite of what the BB government is sending.
- [43:57]
Nathan Sachs
And we're seeing this divergence between the Trump administration and Israel on lots of issues. We saw the, that not only in Syria, but we've seen this in Yemen and I think really on both sides. The idea that of course you coordinate, of course you're joined at the hip and that the other's preferences restrict you, that's diminishing. And I think the Trump administration is in general pretty supportive of Israeli policy and is not going to condemn Israel. But they've shown they're not going to restrict their regional role based on Israel's preferences.
- [44:30]
Scott R. Anderson
So, Natan, I think that brings us back to this question of what Bibi and his government and those around him are envisioning. We've seen an aggressive, aggressive lean in the last year and a half, expanding the conflict that started in Gaza, mainland Gaza at a period to Lebanon, then more recently to Iran, Syria collapsing kind of in between the two as kind of a incidents or consequence to some extent of the Lebanon military operation at least certainly was perceived that way. At least I perceived it that way. We've seen a deliberate kind of restructuring of the regional status quo before October 7th, talk to us about where that vision ends and how much of it is Bibi's vision and how much of it is Israeli vision that's going to exist beyond the Bibi government.
- [45:19]
Joel Braunold
So I think it's a great question and actually I'll start in Syria because I have a slightly different take. So I think in Syria there's a combination of exactly some things that Dan mentioned and they're illustrative of a much broader approach. So here's where I completely agree. So first, one of the big lessons that Israel learned on October 7th or from October 7th, and I agree with Dan, although he didn't say it this way, overlearned is sort of to zero trust in deterrence or containing almost no margin for risk. And in some ways that's understandable, of course, but there's always a danger that you over learn it. And I think Israel and certainly certain instances, Gaza most notably has certainly over learned it. And in that regard, the Syria the operations in Syria have have a lot to do with that, I think, where I slightly disagree on Syria. And then I'll I'll go back to your your excellent question is that I think the Israelis are curious at least about Ashara. And although initially there was a very strong kind of reluctance to deal with anyone who used to be on Ashar, a member of extreme jihadist groups, they are very curious about the things he said. And we've seen Minister Dermer, who's as close as you can be to Netanyahu, at least at present, as long as he remains in government, meet officially, in fact and semi openly with the Syrian foreign minister, which is very remarkable from the Syrian side, but also very notable from the Israeli side, where the Israelis are very skeptical if is on Ashara's ability to control his own people and the jihadists that have helped him come to power, and especially how they relate to minorities in Syria. The Israelis care about the Kurds, but they care tremendously about the Druze. The Druze are a large minority in Israel, not large, but they are a prominent minority in Israel. They serve in the military and rise to very high ranks, including the General staff currently and previously. And there is sort of this sense of a covenant forged in blood between the Druze minority and the general Israeli population. So the support for the Druze in southern Syria, I think is genuine and is not likely to abate, but it does not necessarily contradict constructive and maybe even far reaching conversations with the Syrian president. The big unknown here is what degree of control Ashara would have have over his own people, assuming he means well. And of course, we may in 10 years look back and say, oh my God, Ashar was playing everyone and I think it wouldn't be playing anyone. It's rather clear that there is that risk, but it's a risk worth taking at the moment at least. But it does fit into your question, which is the broader approach. So when the Israelis looked at this, it's one, very low margin for error, very low willingness to take any risk. Two, it's distrust, distrust, distrust, and then also verify. Three, a very quick finger on the trigger. If there's a threat or an opportunity, go for it and sort of consequences be damned sometimes, and I think Qatar is an example of that. But four, and this is the more strategic question is an unwillingness to live with the regional order as it was before as part of this kind of containment and deterrence. And that is especially true about the Iranian act axis. So when Netanyahu and others, but especially Netanyahu, are faced with the world after October 7th, he starts talking about this as Israel's second war of independence and an opportunity from his perspective, to rewrite a whole set of things that have happened, as I said, in the last few decades. That includes the Oslo Accords and hence his complete unwillingness to bring the Palestinian Authority into the Gaza Strip to undo, of course, that Israeli disengagement from Gaza, hence his desire for full Israeli military occupation, the Gaza Strip, at least on the military side, but most likely at least initially on the civilian side as well. Construction in E1, the very important area for settlement, construction just east of Jerusalem that would essentially carve a potential Palestinian state in two, etc. Etc. But we saw it even on the Syrian border, entering into territory that Israel has withdrawn from in 1974 under the Disengagement agreements brokered by kissing danger and on and on. And most importantly, the dramatic degradation of Hezbollah really a transformation of Hezbollah's position in Syria and vis a vis Israel. The, consequently, the fall of the Assad regime, not only because, of course, of the fall of Assad of Hezbollah, but also because of that, then the strikes in Iran that proved Israel's ability to operate in Iranian airspace. One could, like Netanyahu or not like Netanyahu. One can also be vociferously critical of what Israel's doing in Gaza. And I am. But his success against Iran and the Iranian access is very real and has transformed not only Israel's position, but the position of many others, sometimes in ironic ways that, that Dan mentioned before. So all this fits into this very robust kind of view of what's happening now, not only as a terrible war between Israel and Hamas, but as. As a truly transformational moment in the Middle East. And they're not wrong in that regard. And in this context, they are also losing sight of what would be smart restraints. For example, the strike in Doha. From their perspective, one more strike against leaders of Hamas. These people are very senior. One of them, in fact, is the de facto really leader of Hamas and others that might have been there, I think that Israel thought might have been there. There are the sort of de jure leaders of Hamas and from the Israeli perspective, these are dead men walking. Khalil Haya, the main Target, knew about October 7th. He was the very close associate of Sinwar, the leader, the mastermind behind October 7. He left Gaza just before because of the attacks to coordinate things. This is a major kind of name. He's not a valuable target, I think, as Dan said, because he was not much in hiding and it would not be hard to hit at any point in time. Time. But in that regard, the Israelis see him as sort of a valid target and disregarding all the ramifications of striking in Doha, both in the context of the US Qatari relationship, but also of negotiations and where that sits for other Gulf countries, notwithstanding their tensions with Qatar, this is a sister Gulf nation. It's an image that investors do not like to see of smoke over a Gulf city. That's not something that the Emiratis or the Saudis would like, despite their very real differences with the countries. Obviously. One last point on this, I think that on the negotiations, I think Dan made a very good point, which is that this is a very strong signal to Israelis. When I first saw it, I was on the phone with someone in Israel and their. The first reaction was negotiations are dead now. Negotiations may or may not be dead. We shouldn't be Too fast to jump to conclusions. I'm not sure from the country or homicide they're necessarily and the Israeli argument has been made, I've heard it made in person, that in fact these were some of the most extreme voices in negotiations. If they were out of the negotiations, maybe negotiations could move forward. But this is a very convoluted kind of argument and logic to follow. This was by and large a preference over striking Hamas, consequences be damned, and especially consequences for the hostages from the Israeli perspective.
- [52:36]
Dan Byman
Scott, I just want to add two fingers on what Nathan just said in terms of the massive consequential strike vis the Iranian access. And I agree in terms of it's game changing and we've spoken before, can you take advantage of these military strikes? But one of the biggest challenges, and it's actually something that Yossi Cohen, the former head of Mossad, who is getting involved in politics, speaks about in his latest book, is that that the government of Israel and Netanyahu is not very good at communicating in the region. And that's even more so today. I wouldn't just argue it's around public relations to the populations, but to the elites. Is Israel doing this to get rid of the ring of fire, which you could argue how it's being done, why it's being done. There's consensus, you know, that Iran has been a malignant actor, right. And you know, regionally, people generally feel like that. Or is it trying to be the new Iran? And the irony is if you go to, let's say, to let's say Ankara and Jerusalem, you'll hear the identical conversations just in inverse. Israel will say, look, Turkey is trying to use the Al Shara government to surround us with hostile militias and Ankara is the new Tehran and they have new advantages and we need to think about that. And Ankara just thinks that Jerusalem's trying to be the new Iran, playing around with, with minorities, be they Druze, be they Kurds, to try and sort of upset other countries regional balances, sovereignty means nothing. And so for Israel to take advantage, even if they don't want to move forward on deeply domestically challenging questions around Palestinian statehood and others, even their ability to communicate in the region what is motivating them and where are their restraints and their inability to communicate their those is having dire consequences. The Egyptians are now talking about creating an Arab NATO against Israel, not against Iran. And you could dismiss all of that as rhetoric of the moment, but these things have a way of settling themselves in the minds, not just of the populations, but the elites as well. And so it's not just the inability to politically trust international institutions you haven't trusted before. It's the inability to communicate that we have common goals and rather that Israel says this is the language the Middle east understands and the rest of the Gulf saying we're trying to move beyond this and you're dragging us back to this. There are better ways to deal with jihadists. And the Israelis are like, no. And that's a fundamental tension point now I would argue in Israeli Gulf relations and could be, though not right now in Israeli US Relations, though I don't think we're in anything but a small space bat between the parties between D.C. and Jerusalem at the moment.
- [55:21]
Scott R. Anderson
Well, let's open the aperture wider then beyond the regional picture because we have seen this week again as we're meeting, some pretty dramatic developments happening at the international level with the United Nations. A few days ago we saw the General assembly adopt a, I believe French and Saudi backed resolution that kind of lays the framework that you mentioned earlier, Joel, that kind of intersects in various ways with the recognition positions taken by different European governments and by Canada and a few other governments, really underscoring the desire to use recognition to lock in a two state solution. This resolution similarly endorses a two state solution even as it does also condemn the October 7th attacks and condemn a lot of Israeli military actions in Gaza, particularly those affecting civilians. Then today we had the return of an independent commission of inquiry led by the United nations where they said what Israel is doing or has done in parts of Gaza does amount to genocide. Not an unprecedented position. We saw the International Criminal Court take that position before. The G word has hovered around the Gaza conflict almost from the beginning. But this is for many in the international community will be taken as a more serious finding. I know Israelis and others probably won't see it that way, but let me start with you a little bit on that first rule. Talk to us about these international actions, how significant they are and where they fit in the broader trajectory of how the international community is beginning to respond to these things.
- [56:44]
Dan Byman
You know, I don't want to reopen sort of the genocide conversation. I think it's, you know, the Israelis deny it international and the Americans deny it. The international institutions are coming to these conclusions. The ICJ has laid out provisional things. They haven't made a determination, they've laid out provisional steps. And it's an ongoing international legal debate that isn't going to stop. On the international moves with the U.N. i think that I laid out earlier what they are and why they're going on in the Israeli responses. I think moving forward, the question is, will this move at the UN be a war ending maneuver or a day after plan? So if it's a war ending maneuver, again, Hamas has to exile, we've heard at different points, exile, give up weapons. What does surrender look like? Okay, but who's guaranteeing that Israel isn't going to continue to go after them? So Israel has to agree, otherwise the war doesn't end. Right. And the hostages have to be released. Right. And recognition that happens before that might be part of a day after plan. But again, it's incongruent with where the Israeli approach is, I think to take this in a new direction in terms of where it is. I've said a few times, Scott, when we've had our different podcasts, that Israel received the peace dividend for Oslo early. So between 92 and 99, the economy liberalized. You had 39 countries came to normalization agreement agreements, China, India, others. Israel really benefited from them. What I warned at the time very strongly was that if Israel is responsible for foreclosing the political horizon for a Palestinian state, as we've heard the Prime Minister himself this past week in E1, there will never be a Palestinian state as he denounces new settlement building there. I said, you will have a consequence where that peace dividend is removed. And we heard yesterday one of the most remarkable statements I would argue Prime Minister Netanyahu has ever made in his entire political career. He stands up in front of with Marco Rubio and says we need to prepare for more isolation. He blames the Chinese and he blames Qatar and he says an economic isolation that will make us more of an, I can never pronounce this word, an Arakic state, a state that basically is self reliant, autarkic state. Thank you. I know it's not autocratic, but I just can't in my IR language, right? This is lit. And he says, I hate this. I don't want to be a nation of orange sellers. Right. And he tries to clean it up later saying, I'm just talking about end to end military, because if Democrats come back in, we don't want to be dependent on American weapons sales. The entire state of Israel is dependent on foreign trade. This concept that it can survive as an economic first world country detached from the Western world is absurd. And yet, yet Netanyahu paints this as now the fate. It's not a choice, it's fate. We are not going to allow a Palestinian state, we are going to do whatever we want, whenever we want, however we want. We are going to rely on a small sliver of the Republican Party that's currently in power to be my backstop. And whatever happens at the un, whatever Security Council resolutions pass, whatever they say, it doesn't matter. And yeah, we're going to get poorer. And by the way, how you can be a self reliant state when 20% of your population that's growing, doesn't serve in the army, doesn't pay taxes, you know, that's also on the political domestic agenda. But for Netanyahu to get to this point where he basically says it is worth it for us to economically demolish ourselves with tech, which is the most portable industry in the world, just re register somewhere else. Right, Leave. Right. To do that to the country because he says this is the political choices we are going to make make and this is the consequence. I mean, for the first time it seems the opposition finally found its voice in Israel and said what you're now promising, you know, this diplomatic tsunami is now going to destroy the stock. And the stocks were down 2% today and everything else remarkable. So all of this internationalization, this diplomatic tsunami that Ehud Barak promised, it never arrived and it was belittled. It is now here the Israelis are relying on, solely on dependency more and more on a mercurial last term president whose own party is riddled with conspiracy theorists. And especially after the tragic terrible assassination of Charlie Kirk within part of that coalition says was it because he was moving away from Israel, was it not? That's the conspiratorial theory that is infecting parts of the MAGA movement. So you're relying deeper and deeper on this MAGA move that doesn't really know how it feels about Israel anyway. And he's blaming mass Islamic immigration in Europe for the consequences. There's nothing we can do. It's beyond our power. It's basically because the Muslims hate us. That's literally what he is saying. And that the governments, even if they like us, they don't have the diplomatic in democracies to push back against it. He's saying this is now our new reality. This is the new reality that I'm creating. A reality of Israel alone and a reality of Israel that's poor and the reality that goes against every free market ideal I've ever believed in. But if that's what it takes to survive in this new Middle East, I'll remake it and we'll come out the other side. And so again you're international actors, and you're trying to help the parties out. All of this, I will say, Scott, is part of an escalatory cycle that we are in where each side is trying to trump up to each other. I'm going to go higher. I'm going to go higher. And for those who say, well, Israel, if you do this, you're not going to economically be successful, the prime minister says, fine, I'm the father of free markets in Israel. I'm saying I'll sacrifice that as well. It's all part of this one upmanship. And until we can start having a de. Escalatory ladder, a way to, like, calm it down, it's just going to keep escalating. And where that escalation stops, I don't think anyone knows. Because again, if you listen to the French foreign minister and you listen to the Saudis and you listen to those they are telling you day in, day out, in op eds, in Hebrew, in English, everywhere, we are doing this to try and help you be secure in the region. Your security is tied to a political horizon, to the Palestinians. If it is absent, you will always feel insecure. The region will never truly accept you. And this is your choice. And they are trying to make that choice as stark as possible to the Israeli population. Whether that is being heard very unclear.
- [63:03]
Scott R. Anderson
So, Nathana, I want to come to you for kind of our closing thoughts on this, because I think what Joel's just described captures so much of the trajectory of recent development we've seen in the international sphere, Israeli reactions, regional reactions, which does look more and more like a very vicious escalatory cycle on a lot of different fronts, with the people of Gaza potentially soon, the west bank bearing the brunt of it on a humanitarian level, and Israelis bearing the brunt of it on a military level because of an ongoing military conflict and the state of security they live in as well. So a big driver of this is the Netanyahu government's policy. They're increasingly in tension with everyone, the United States, the Trump administration, to some extent, certainly the international community. That's longstanding. And it is his approach to essentially say, we don't need any of these connections, as Joel said, this isolationist vision that really did seem to come to fruition, or at least become more clearly stated, dated in the last 24 or 48 hours, potentially as a preface, by the way, to us cutting security assistance to Israel, which seemed to me to be the subtext of what was actually why Rubio was part of this conversation, why they're related. So what does that mean for Israel as a country? And how will that be received? Because the constraint on Bibi is domestic in the end, like the most direct one. And we've all been operating on this assumption that he has outer constraints on what he can do. We know we have elections in a little over a year. Is that the only check that's on him? And how big a check is that? How is the rest of this going to resonate with Israelis in a way that he and his coalition members will have to take into account? Or does it look like they've got the Runway they need to execute these policies until that date and potentially beyond?
- [64:43]
Joel Braunold
Thanks. I think it's a very broad and difficult question. On the small side, I think it is a very big constraint. Of course, elections are the big one, and he is not doing very well in the polls. That's been true for years. So he could certainly come out either victorious or at least at a draw, which he's done before, and then he continues as a caretaker or temporary. So I would certainly not recommend counting him out. I did that once before and I will never do it again. But this is a very big check. And the opposition is disunited and has lots and lots of different problems. But the polling suggests they. They at least have a chance if they, after the elections, unite in some form or another and agree to a different government. Far from a given, there are elements in the opposition that might go with Netanyahu, in fact, but nonetheless, it's certainly possible. And so, as I mentioned before, there is this constraint. The constraint, there's a coalition constraint right now, but there is certainly the fear of what this does to the public. His uttering yesterday, he spoke about a super Sparta, and I think he misspoke in the sense of what he meant to convey. I think he tried to convey, like he explained. No, this is just about specific economic issues. And of course, the aid to the United States from the United States that may have to change given the mood in the United States. Let's be clear, the aid from the United States is not a major. It's very important. It's a lot of money, but it is not something that under rights, Israeli security. What really underwrites Israeli security is the ability to purchase American arms. So if Israel had to pay for it themselves, but could still purchase whatever they want, they could live with that. What they cannot live is if they were cut off from the. From the supply at all. All in terms of our ordinary Israelis, I think Joel made a very good point. Israel is, is an island to a large degree. It has relations with Jordan and Egypt, but they're very limited in the economic sphere. They had more relations with Turkey, which is not a neighbor of Israel, it's a second order neighbor. And those relations actually in the economic realm, finally now for the first time, have actually soured in the last two years dramatically. And so Israel is very heavily dependent, not only on trade, but on trade as an island, so trade not with its immediate neighbors. And in that regard, this kind of thing would be huge. Also moves in the eu, in the United nations, but more so in the eu, which is a giant trading partner. Because of geography, these things are major. And you cannot simply decide, I'm not going to be situated close to the EU anymore. Now I want to be situated in Asia, close to India. It doesn't work that way. Geography doesn't ask you. So this could be very major. I'll disqualify, however, for Netanyahu is a very, very smart person politically. He's smarter than I am at this. And he understands what he's saying. Secondly, Netanyahu has not promised a garden of roses, as we say. He's promised blood, sweat and tears. And it is Churchill that he is emulating in many, many different ways. And Israelis have heard that promise. And they do not think it's Netanyahu, or I should say fans of Netanyahu, do not think it's Netanyahu who delivers with the blood, sweat and tears. They, and most Israelis, in fact, would say, this is Hamas. This is the region we live in. This is the reality. Even those who don't like Netanyahu don't think he's the father of these problems. And lastly, the last two years, you know, when people abroad talk about what's happened in the last two years, they are seeing the images in Gaza. When Israelis think of what's happened in the last two years, they are still thinking of October 7th. It's really hard to overstate the difference here. They are still thinking about the hostages. They're still thinking about the stories that they're reading every single day about October 7th. Seventh, they're learning new details. And what's happened since then in Gaza in the last two years is a side story to that and something that they sort of are genuine, some of them genuinely bewildered as to why is the world so angry. And they understand it. Therefore, of course, it's because of bigotry, anti Semitism or something else. And so I would not underestimate Israel's ability, Israeli's ability to rationalize even enormous international pressure. And I'll say a lot of the international pressure is helping Israel a lot because there's an enormous amount of bigotry also feeding into this. And the result is that this kind of damage to Israeli's livelihood would have enormous long term consequences. But whether that translates into short term political consequences, I'm not so sure. We could see Netanyahu lose, certainly we could see him lose much worse if the opposition manages, as Joel said, to use this properly and to say, look what you've brought us to, but don't underestimate Israelis sense of siege against them, against themselves, and of unfair treatment, unfair understanding from the world. Some of it merited and a lot of it not merited and simply misunderstood by Israelis.
- [69:17]
Dan Byman
And Scott, going back to the original point when we said like, who's the new Iran? And stuff, I mean, when you listen to Iranian domestic consumption about do you drink from the poison challenge of international pressure? We're getting to similar conversations here and it's absurd. But I agree with Natan. I would never count out Prime Minister Netanyahu's political abilities, but I think that his statement yesterday surprised me so much because it demonstrates that there is nothing he's not willing to do to go on the escalatory ladder. He's like, don't you threaten me with this. I'll tell the population it's happening and blame you about why it's happened. You think you can aggregate against me, I'll aggregate against you and for everyone. And I say to my friends who read the Israeli polling really closely, Netanyahu hasn't started to campaign yet. I mean, everyone else has. He hasn't. And so, you know, the infamous poison machine, everything else. I think all of this is to say we're in a very, very difficult moment. And I think that to Nathan's point about bigotry and other points, there are people who are like, I don't want to, I want to morally feel refreshed by being unapologetically a pressure driven strategy. And I will. Pressure and pressure and pressure and pressure and pressure. And I don't care how it's received. This is the morally correct thing to do. The challenge is Israel is an undeclared nuclear state that is homogically pretty homogenous, right, in terms of how society acts and reacts in other parts. And, and it can survive as a super Sparta. All right, Sparta eventually collapse, but will it? Will it not? I'm not sure. And so a pressure alone thesis with a already nuclearized state is A very dangerous strategy to go down. You could impoverish it. You can push it away, but what then happens? And by the way, I think at the highest levels of the Elise, in the palaces in Riyadh, depending on the mood in Washington D.C. i think this is the challenge that people are struggling over. It's like, okay, let we've pushed them to the. And then what? Are we going to invade? No, like we're not going to ask. We're not going to have troops marching on a nuclear state. That. That's not real. Right. So. And I think that's always been the disconnect between all this, like, pressure will eventually work. And people want to now test that thesis. They really do. They want to now. They're like, no commercial flights, no Eurovision, no cultural events, no nothing. No university ties, no height tech, no investments. You know, when you speak to the Gulf, they'll tell you, we haven't even begun to pressurize Israel. Yeah, we're talking about, you know, you know, a Palestinian state. Like, what happens if we tell all of our sovereign wealth funds that we will not invest in any company that also does business in Israel? So then the US Will say, well, we've got laws on the books that protect U.S. companies. Okay, well, Trump hasn't enforced a TikTok ban and he's relying on a lot of Gulf money in the re. You know, coming into America. Is he really, is he really going to turn down the trillions just because of this? Of actions that he said, well, this was Netanyahu's choice. So you've got that on one side and on the other, you've got an inability for the Israelis to at all communicate what it is they're trying to achieve. And the loudest voices that are heard as we're doing this because we're foreclosing the horizon on the Palestinians forever. Because that's really the lesson of October 7th, and that is a very depressing place to leave it. But I think that's where we're up to with, what is it, 10 days to go to the UN General Assembly assembly, which is supposed to be historic. And we'll see if something happens in the next 10 days that shifts the map. But I'm not optimistic.
- [72:52]
Scott R. Anderson
Well, something tells me we will have lots of reason to revisit this topic in the future. But for now, we are out of time. Joel, Dan Natan, thank you for joining us here today on the Lawfare podcast.
- [73:01]
Joel Braunold
Thank you.
- [73:02]
Dan Byman
Thanks.
- [73:06]
Scott R. Anderson
The Lawfare podcast is produced in cooperation with the Brookings Institution. You can get an ad free version of this and other Lawfare podcasts by becoming a Lawfare Material supporter at our website lawfairmedia.org support. You'll also get access to special events and other content available only to our supporters. Please rate and review us wherever you get your podcasts, and look out for other podcasts including Rational Security, Allies, the Aftermath, and Escalation, our latest Lawfare Presents podcast series about the war in Ukraine. In addition, check out our written work@lawfaremedia.org the podcast is edited by Jen Patchup. Our theme song is from Alibi Music. As always, thank you for listening.
- [73:48]
Dan Byman
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