Diplomacy on the Rocks in Iran and North Korea

Summary

The New Yorker Radio Hour
Diplomacy on the Rocks in Iran and North Korea
Date: May 18, 2018
Host: David Remnick
Guests: Wendy Sherman, Susan Glasser, Victor Cha, Evan Osnos

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Episode Overview

This episode, hosted by David Remnick, explores two major diplomatic crises at pivotal moments in U.S. foreign policy: the Trump administration's withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal and the prospects for upcoming negotiations with North Korea. Through interviews with architect of the Iran deal Wendy Sherman and North Korea expert Victor Cha, the show provides deep insight into the intricacies and consequences of high-stakes diplomacy with adversarial nations.

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Key Discussion Points and Insights

1. The Iran Nuclear Deal: Inside the Negotiation and Fallout

Participants:

• Susan Glasser (Interviewer, New Yorker staff writer)
• Wendy Sherman (Former lead negotiator, U.S. Iran deal)

The Making of the Deal

• Sherman highlights the complexity and breadth of the negotiation, involving not just Iran, but also U.S. Congress members, think tanks, interagency colleagues, Israel, Gulf states, and global stakeholders.

  "I tease that I negotiated inside the administration... with Israel, with the Gulf states, with everybody who had a stake in Iranian oil, Iranian business in the world. And, oh, yeah, occasionally I negotiated with Iran." — Wendy Sherman [02:51]

• Both Sherman and John Kerry were prepared multiple times to walk away from the talks to ensure the best possible outcome.

• The final agreement was extensive: "This deal is 110 pages long. It's filled with technical details..." [06:48]

Domestic and International Challenges

• The deal faced intense domestic opposition, even mid-negotiation, with actions such as Senator Tom Cotton’s public letter undercutting Sherman’s authority.

• The Iranian negotiators frequently questioned the deal's durability, given the volatile U.S. politics.

  "My Iranian counterparts would constantly say to me, how do we know you won't undo the deal?... The deal has to be as good as it possibly can be. So it is durable and sustainable." — Wendy Sherman [04:25]

• On whether America can be trusted:

  "We are as good as our word, as our politics allow us to be. And the same is true for Iran." — Wendy Sherman [04:52]

Criticism of the Deal’s Scope

• Critics, especially within the Trump administration, claimed the deal was flawed for not covering ballistic missiles or regional Iranian behavior.
• Sherman argues bringing more issues onto the table would have resulted in dangerous tradeoffs, diluting the agreement's primary focus:

  "If you had them all on the table, what it might mean is Iran would say, okay, I'll do something over here on ballistic missiles. But that means I want to keep more centrifuges... So you're negotiating against yourself on the thing that matters the most, and that is Iran never being able to obtain a nuclear weapon." — Wendy Sherman [07:15]

European Response and Risks Ahead

• European allies remain committed to salvaging the deal, but Sherman is skeptical about success without U.S. participation.
• Sherman expresses deep concern that the U.S. withdrawal could escalate tensions and even lead to war:

  "...it appears that the President may lead us down a path toward conflict with Iran. War that is not a good outcome for the United States." — Wendy Sherman [08:33]

Unique Moments and Personal Anecdotes

• Sherman recounts breaking her nose in Vienna during negotiations, underscoring the stress and chaos of high-stakes diplomacy:

  "I went smack into that glass door. Blood all over the place... I put the ice pack on... had the conference call with Secretary Kerry. He didn't find out about this till months later. I went to... a doctor in Vienna. He walked out and said in English, 'shit happens.'" — Wendy Sherman [05:14]

Continued Dialogue with Iranian Officials

• Sherman maintains contact with key Iranian figures post-deal, advocating for U.S. security interests.
• She notes the politicization of diplomacy in the U.S. public sphere.

2. The North Korea Gambit: Risks and Realities

Participants:

• Evan Osnos (Interviewer, New Yorker journalist)
• Victor Cha (Former NSC official, North Korea expert)

Setting the Scene

• The scheduled summit between President Trump and Kim Jong Un followed a year of provocations and insults, but talks are under threat as North Korea cancels pre-summit talks with the South amid U.S. military drills.

Understanding North Korean Tactics

• Victor Cha interprets North Korean moves as strategic, using U.S.-South Korean exercises to apply pressure:

  “...they've canceled a process related inter-Korean meeting, which is really trying, I think, to lay down a marker that these military exercises are on the negotiating table as far as the North Koreans are concerned.” — Victor Cha [16:20]

• Economic sanctions are biting, fostering a new market mentality inside North Korea, which may be motivating Kim Jong Un to negotiate.

  “There is no denying that the market has taken over in North Korea. And that market mentality has created a desire both for the government and the people to do better.” — Victor Cha [16:59]

• The North Korean regime justifies shifting from threats to negotiations as a sign of strength, not weakness.

The Challenge of Denuclearization

• Total denuclearization is described as practically impossible to verify due to North Korea's concealment capabilities:

  “This is a country with thousands of miles of underground tunnels... if they have a dozen bombs hiding somewhere 50 miles underground... it's going to be very hard to know that.” — Victor Cha [18:28]

• Trump administration is unlikely to accept a deal allowing North Korea to retain any nuclear arsenal, a position reinforced by walking away from the Iran deal.

Lessons from the Iran Deal

• North Korea, Cha contends, sees the Iran withdrawal as evidence that U.S. deals may not outlast individual administrations, deepening their skepticism:

  “The last two deals that they negotiated with the United States, in both cases, administrations changed. These agreements sort of fell apart.” — Victor Cha [20:11]

Regional Fears and Diplomatic Tightrope

• There’s anxiety in Asia that Trump, eager for a deal, might compromise alliances or U.S. security posture.

  “I do sense that there is some concern about that... our policy with our allies has to dictate our North Korea policy. So yeah, I do sense some concern in the region about that.” — Victor Cha [21:27]

• China’s recent engagement with North Korea is interpreted as a sign of caution and an effort to assert influence.

Prospects for the Trump-Kim Summit

• Key metrics of success for the summit:
  • Concrete action on the intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) program.
  • A meaningful peace declaration for the Korean peninsula (requiring U.S. and Chinese participation).
  • Definitive North Korean nuclear commitment.

  “On the one hand, it could lead to something fantastic. On the other hand, it could collapse spectacularly.” — Victor Cha [22:21]

3. Comparative Insights: Diplomacy Styles

• Sherman contrasts the Iranian and North Korean diplomatic approaches:

  "North Korea's approach... is pretty transactional... Iran is a very complex negotiator. They are a negotiator of resistance, which is the mantra of their country." — Wendy Sherman [12:47]

4. Consequences and Takeaways

• The Trump administration’s actions reshape global expectations of U.S. commitments and reliability.
• Both Iran and North Korea see evidence that deals with the U.S. can be ephemeral, influencing their bargaining posture.
• The stakes—global security, non-proliferation, and regional stability—could not be higher.

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Notable Quotes & Memorable Moments

• Wendy Sherman recounts her nose-breaking incident during the Vienna talks:

  “He [the doctor] walked out and said in English, 'shit happens.' So he packed up my nose. I used a lot of good makeup and went on with my work.” [05:14]

• On U.S. reliability in diplomacy:

  "We are as good as our word, as our politics allow us to be. And the same is true for Iran." — Wendy Sherman [04:52]

• On Trump’s risk of pursuing a summit victory at any cost:

  “Not just from the South Koreans and the Japanese, who are allies, but also from the Chinese. I think that's one of the reasons why we've seen The Chinese have two meetings with the North Korean leader in the last 40 days when they had refused to meet with him for the last six years.” — Victor Cha [21:27]

• On the high stakes of the Trump-Kim summit:

  “It will be a real test of his negotiating skills and how well the North Korean leader can think and act on his feet. And I do feel like we are potentially on the brink of something quite historic. On the one hand, it could lead to something fantastic. On the other hand, it could collapse spectacularly.” — Victor Cha [22:21]

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Important Timestamps

• 02:51 — Wendy Sherman describes the complexity of negotiating the Iran deal
• 04:52 — Sherman on the durability of U.S. promises
• 05:14 — Personal anecdote: Sherman’s broken nose in Vienna
• 07:15 — Why the Iran deal couldn’t include other issues (missiles, regional behavior)
• 08:33 — Sherman expresses concern about war with Iran
• 16:20 — Victor Cha on North Korean maneuvering over military exercises
• 18:28 — Cha explains the practical problems of North Korean denuclearization
• 20:11 — The effect of U.S. deal unreliability on North Korea’s trust
• 21:27 — Regional anxieties over Trump’s negotiating stance
• 22:21 — Victor Cha on the possible historic nature and risks of the Trump-Kim summit

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Tone and Style

The tone is thoughtful and frank, blending policy analysis with personal experience and some moments of levity (notably Sherman's Vienna story). Both Sherman and Cha speak candidly about the limits of diplomacy, the realities of international trust, and the unpredictability of the current U.S. administration.

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Summary Conclusion

This episode offers an in-depth, behind-the-scenes look at the hardest problems in American diplomacy—from painstaking technical deals with Iran to the brinkmanship and unpredictability of the Korean peninsula. Guests Wendy Sherman and Victor Cha provide unique expertise and caution about the long-term implications of withdrawing from diplomatic agreements, warning that credibility, reliable partnerships, and hard-won non-proliferation achievements are all now at risk. The show ends on a note of wary anticipation for what might unfold in the next steps with both Iran and North Korea.

Transcript

[Wendy Sherman]

This is World Trade center bound. One World Observatory, straight up the block.

[Victor Cha]

For West Boulevard and make that right.

[David Remnick]

They didn't break that, but they have.

[Victor Cha]

Pretty good access to those people. Subconsciously mocks that lineage.

[David Remnick]

So that's happening.

[Susan Glasser]

It seems like an incredible story here on many fronts.

[Victor Cha]

From one World Trade center in Manhattan.

[Susan Glasser]

This is the New Yorker Radio Hour, a co production of WNYC Studios and the New Yorker.

[David Remnick]

Welcome to the New Yorker Radio Hour. I'm David Remnick. Today we're going to take a look at two huge disruptions in the state of the world. The consequences of our withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal on the one hand, and the possibilities for diplomacy with North Korea on the other. So Iran, what now? We've learned that in the President's inner circle, even among hawks like Mike Pompeo, there was an effort to salvage or at least renegotiate the Iran deal up until the last minute. Because whether you like the deal or not, withdrawing from it creates problems on a global scale. The deal itself seemed to be working. In exchange for curbing its nuclear program, Iran got relief from sanctions. But Donald Trump decided to keep the promise he had made all along on the campaign trail.

[Victor Cha]

This was a horrible one sided deal that should have never, ever been made. Therefore, I am announcing today that the United States will withdraw from the Iran nuclear deal.

[David Remnick]

The withdrawal will have diplomatic and psychological consequences, not just in the Middle east, but all over the world. Among other things, it will certainly complicate Trump's hope to get a deal done with North Korea. Wendy Sherman could fairly be called the architect of the Iran agreement. She led the United States in six rounds of talks with Iran and other nations. And she's also had firsthand experience of diplomacy with the North Koreans. Sherman went with Madeleine Albright to Pyongyang during the Clinton years. She spoke with Susan Glasser, who recently joined the New Yorker as a staff writer based in Washington.

[Susan Glasser]

So the Iran deal in many ways was the capstone of both what you were doing in the US Government in this last go round in the Obama administration. Of course, many people saw it as the signature achievement of President Obama's story. Now, I want you to take people a little bit inside the arduous, painstaking at times, I'm sure makes you want to scream. Agonizingly slow progress, years of your life and that of many other people it took to get to this deal. So before we talk about the impact of blowing it up, let's talk about how on earth you made it.

[Wendy Sherman]

I tease that I negotiated Inside the administration. I negotiated with the U.S. congress. I negotiated with think tankers in Washington. I negotiated, of course, with my interagency colleagues. I negotiated with Israel, with the Gulf states, with everybody who had a stake in Iranian oil, Iranian business in the world. And, oh, yeah, occasionally I negotiated with Iran. Iran. It's a complex process if you do it correctly, and you indeed have to be ready to walk away from the table. And John Kerry, who, of course, led this, and towards the end with Secretary Moniz from the Department of Energy, who joined us, brought extraordinary technical expertise. I did this with a core team of 15, but with hundreds, literally hundreds in the US administration. And Secretary Kerry was ready to walk away from this several times during the negotiation, as was I. But at the end of the day, we got a deal.

[Susan Glasser]

You then had President Trump almost from the very beginning, when he was just candidate Donald Trump, saying, this is the worst deal ever. You had in Congress. Enormous resistance from Republicans in the Senate. From the very beginning, they were publicly undermining it. You had Tom Cotton, for example, the Arkansas senator who's emerged as a close advisor to Donald Trump, organizing a letter of his right in the middle of your negotiations, basically saying, don't take them seriously. We're going to undo this. How seriously did you take that as a possibility while you were negotiating it, that it might not stick?

[Wendy Sherman]

Well, we certainly knew that was a possibility. And my Iranian counterparts would constantly say to me, how do we know you won't undo the deal? And I said, there's no way to know that, just as there's no way for me to know whether you will undo the deal. The deal has to be as good as it possibly can be. So it is durable and sustainable.

[Susan Glasser]

That's interesting, though. They were pressing you even at the time.

[Wendy Sherman]

Absolutely.

[Susan Glasser]

Saying America might not be good at its word.

[Wendy Sherman]

Absolutely.

[Susan Glasser]

Is America good for its word?

[Wendy Sherman]

Well, you know, we are as good as our word, as our politics allow us to be. And the same is true for Iran. It's true for any country.

[Susan Glasser]

So you broke your nose at one point in these negotiations. Like, that kind of reminds me of when my son got a concussion at science camp. How do you break your nose while negotiating with Iranians? I trust they didn't punch you.

[Wendy Sherman]

No, no, no. So what happened was our delegation room, the United States delegation room, it was on the top floor of the Palais Coburg in Vienna, and we had secure communications equipment there. And the elevator opened up into a foyer and then to a glass conference room. And generally that glass door was kept open. I was Rushing to get to a secure conference call with Secretary kerry at about 11pm 1. That door, however, was closed and I hadn't paid any attention. I went smack into that glass door. Blood all over the place. Some of my male colleagues said, call for an ambulance, get someone here immediately. I said, clearly none of you were mothers. When your kid bloodies their nose, there's a lot of blood, so get me an ice pack. I put the ice pack on a lot of Kleenex, had the conference call with Secretary Kerry. He didn't find out about this till months later. I went to, had a CT scan the next day and went to a doctor, an ear, nose and throat doctor in Vienna. He walked out and said in English, shit happens. So he packed up my nose. I used a lot of good makeup and went on with my work.

[Susan Glasser]

You know, you've heard over and over again, President Trump and those who are allied with him call it the worst deal ever, a terrible deal, an awful deal. You heard it at the time. Have you rethought any aspects of this in the wake of where we are now?

[Wendy Sherman]

Well, look, the President and the opponents now have said because it didn't cover ballistic missiles, it didn't cover their nefarious action. But what everyone needs to understand is when you're in the midst of a negotiation, this deal is 110 pages long. It's filled with technical details that if we had had all of those other issues on the table, which of course Iran wasn't willing to negotiate, but let's say they were. If you had them all on the table, what it might mean is Iran would say, okay, I'll do something over here on ballistic missiles. But that means I want to keep more centrifuges or I want to keep this underground facility on enrichment. So you're negotiating against yourself on the thing that matters the most, and that is Iran never being able to obtain a nuclear weapon. Because as bad as what they're doing in the region is now, if they had a nuclear weapon, their ability to project and to deter our actions and our allies and partners actions would be profound. So why would you have a negotiation where you would negotiate trades between a nuclear program and other issues? We needed to get the nuclear weapons off the table. All of the sanctions remained on their ballistic missiles, on their arms dealing, on their humans rights, on what they are doing in the region, and quite frankly, our efforts to get Americans who still remain in, in Iran detained and missing in Iran. We need to have that part of our negotiating frame going forward as well. There are ways one can do that. But if you have them all on the table, one gets negotiated against the other, and that is not in our national security interest.

[Susan Glasser]

Do you have any sense that the Europeans are willing to keep going forward in what seemed to be clearly not a real process?

[Wendy Sherman]

The Europeans have been quite stalwart in the last few days, saying that they want to try to keep the deal together without the United States. I think that's going to be very difficult to do. I applaud them for trying because I believe that the deal is in our national security interest. You know, at the end of the day, this is about what will keep Americans secure. And for the life of me, I've never figured out how allowing Iran to go back to enriching uranium and trying to get weapons grade plutonium to build a nuclear weapon is in our national security interests. But somehow the President seems to believe that it is. And John Bolton's becoming national security adviser. Secretary Pompeo, although I think he wants to now try to be a diplomat, he is still a hardliner when it comes to Iran. And it appears that the President may lead us down a path toward conflict with Iran. War that is not a good outcome for the United States. And in the short to medium term, Iran turning back to the possibility of getting a nuclear weapon is certainly not our national security interest. So, quite frankly, none of this makes any sense in terms of America's security. It only makes sense in the sense that the President said he was going to do this.

[Susan Glasser]

So have you kept up with the Iranians that you spent months and months locked in a room with?

[Wendy Sherman]

I have. You know, when you make diplomatic relationships, you don't give them away. And so I have, as many Americans have seen Foreign Minister Zarif when he's been in the United States, and he.

[Susan Glasser]

Was just here right before President Trump's decision.

[Wendy Sherman]

He was. And I did see him. And, you know, when I see him, I represent as a patriotic American that he should do whatever he can to stop the malign behavior in the Middle east, that it doesn't help to hold onto this deal, that he should continue the compliance to the deal, which the International Atomic Energy agency has confirmed 11 times is the case. So, you know, when we see foreign leaders, we are true to what is in America's national security interest. This isn't about politics. This is about our security interests.

[Susan Glasser]

Well, of course. Look, Wendy, I mean, unfortunately, it's become so politicized that even a conversation is now interpreted in different ways depending on which team you're on. But I'm interested in the putting aside the politics. You saw Javad Zarif, you've presumably talked with other Iranians as well in the run up to this. What are they telling you? What did they make of it? Did they have a realistic assessment in your view of President Trump?

[Wendy Sherman]

Well, I think they had a realistic assessment, but. And we've seen enormous diplomacy just after this decision. Foreign Minister Zarif went to China, went to Moscow, met with the European leaders in Brussels, along with the European Union. Certainly Zarif is nonstop in trying to find a way forward here. But I want to make sure to make one really important point. National Security Adviser Bolton has said that the Iran deal had to end because even though the International Topic Energy Agency said there was compliance, that he didn't believe that it was infallible compliance. And I would say to National Security Adviser Bolton, how in God's name can any verification and monitoring North Korea be infallible?

[Susan Glasser]

I can't think of almost anyone else who would have this unique set of experiences in the room, intensively in the room with both the North Koreans and the Iranians. You and Secretary Madeleine Albright actually traveled to Pyongyang and you met this current Kim, Kim Jong Un's father as part of that at that time. You, you are Secretary Madeleine Albraid's counselor. You are a very close advisor to her. You two are still working together all these years later today. So is there a North Korean style of negotiating and is it different than the Iranian style of negotiating?

[Wendy Sherman]

I see North Korea's approach to negotiations is pretty transactional. And in that way they're a little bit like the president in that everything is possible or up for sale and up for leverage. Iran is a very complex negotiator. They are a negotiator of resistance, which is the mantra of their country. Just as in North Korea, the mantra is juche, which is self reliance. And one has to understand those cultural frames for negotiations. Iranians are superb negotiators, very tough, very patient, see all the pieces on the table. And so it is a very complex kind of negotiating style, somewhat different than the North Koreans.

[Susan Glasser]

So Wendy, how do you see this hitting the Iranian economy and will we ever be talking directly to Iran again?

[Wendy Sherman]

I certainly think it'll have an impact on the Iranian economy. It's interesting the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, which is so responsible for what is happening in the Middle east and Iran's presence in the Middle east was never for the Iran deal because they had the corner on the black market when sanctions are in place. So I think they will be ecstatic that now all the gloves are off. Rouhani is trying to keep the deal together. I call Rouhani the hardliner and I call the IRGC the hard hardliners. So I think the hard hardliners are going to win out here. That's not good for the future of Iran. That's not good for the United States. And that gives me great concern and great pause.

[Susan Glasser]

Thank you so much, Ambassador Wendy Sherman.

[Wendy Sherman]

Thank you, Susan.

[David Remnick]

Wendy Sherman now works at the Albright Stonebridge Group. Susan Glasser writes about Trump's Washington for us every week. And you can find her [e-mail] this is the New Yorker Radio Hour. More to come. Welcome back to the New Yorker Radio Hour. I'm David Remnick. No American president has ever met a leader of North Korea, the dprk. But there are so many things that our current president has done that are without precedent. After more than a year of insults and schoolyard taunts, Trump and Kim now hope to reach a historic agreement. We will both try to make it a very special moment for world peace, trump declared on Twitter. But not long after that, North Korea suspended its talks with the south and has threatened to cancel the upcoming summit with the United States. So what is Pyongyang up to here? The New Yorker's Evan Osnos has reported from North Korea and he recently spoke with an American expert, Victor Cha. Cha was George W. Bush's top adviser on North Korea and he works at a foreign policy think tank in Washington. Evan Osnos reached Victor Cha last week in Seoul.

[Evan Osnos]

Victor, we're talking on a day in which North Korea has postponed talks with the south that were scheduled to begin and it's threatening to cancel the upcoming summit with Donald Trump. What do you think's going on here?

[Victor Cha]

Well, I wouldn't be completely panicked just yet. I think right now what we had is the restart of US Air exercises that the North Koreans clearly don't like. And so they've canceled a process related inter Korean meeting, which is really trying, I think, to lay down a marker that these military exercises are on the negotiating table as far as the North Koreans are concerned. But there are hardliners inside the North Korean government that are probably not as excited about this dramatic turn of events and probably are dragging their feet a little bit.

[Evan Osnos]

How do you make sense of it?

[Victor Cha]

Well, I think a number of US Experts have met with North Koreans in track two diplomacy, which is unofficial dialogue over the last two years where they had A single message which was, they weren't interested in dialogue. They were focused on their nuclear program. But now all of that has changed. And first of all, I think they really are looking for some sort of sanctions relief. There is no denying that the market has taken over in North Korea. And that market mentality has created a desire both for the government and the people to do better. And that could be another positive reason why they are seeking reform and negotiations with the outside world.

[Evan Osnos]

And so when they need to explain to people that they've gone from a year of the talk of fire and fury and of threats and so on, which did feature in the North Korean media, and it was part of the propaganda, they will now frame this as an opportunity to develop the country, to rejoin the world. Is that how it's framed to the public?

[Victor Cha]

Yeah, I mean, I think it is. I think they tried to define what is happening now in terms of success of the leadership in their nuclear program and the world coming to them now that they are a great power, a great country.

[Evan Osnos]

So the US has talked for months about the need for full denuclearization. Is that in the realm of plausibility now?

[Victor Cha]

Well, I think the whole concept is an important principle, but practically and logically speaking, it's very difficult to confirm now and into the future that North Korea will never, ever develop, either give away all of their weapons today or develop ones in the future. They still have the technical expertise. This is a country with thousands of miles of underground tunnels. And if they have a dozen bombs hiding somewhere 50 miles underground in a tunnel somewhere, it's going to be very hard to know that.

[Evan Osnos]

Do you think the Trump administration would settle for a deal that would allow North Korea to keep some of its missiles and nuclear capability?

[Victor Cha]

I certainly think that rhetorically and in terms of policy statements, they would never acknowledge accepting something like that. And the most obvious piece of evidence in that regard was the decision to walk away from the jcpoa, the nuclear deal with Iran. From President Trump's perspective, that was probably seen as something that signaled to the North Koreans that an Iran type deal, as you just described, that would acknowledge them being able to keep a portion of their programs is not on the table.

[Evan Osnos]

So, as you said, the US Pulled out recently of the jcpoa, the Iran nuclear deal. The obvious implication would be, does Kim Jong Un have any reasonable assurance that if he enters into an agreement with the United States that that will survive this administration and maybe not even survive this administration? Do you think that this casts a shadow over his ability to sign A.

[Victor Cha]

Deal with the U.S. i think that's a very fair question from a North Korean perspective. I mean, they, the last two deals that they negotiated with the United States, in both cases, administrations changed. These agreements sort of fell apart. And so I think from a North Korean perspective, there probably is concern that a deal with Trump, if he's not there two years from now, might not stick. Having said that, I do think that North Koreans believe that if they make deals with Republican governments on security issues, that's more likely to stick. I think the North Koreans also understand this is the most unconventional president that we've seen perhaps in history.

[Evan Osnos]

One of the concerns that people have about the negotiations is that as the President gets into the room, he's got a lot riding on his ability to make the deal, to come home with a big success. There's concern among some analysts that that could lead him to give things away, that the United States should not give away its security posture in Asia, its commitment to South Korea, to Japan. Are you sensing that there's concern in the region that. But Donald Trump, in his determination to get something in this summit, might give away more than he should?

[Victor Cha]

Yeah, I do sense that there is some concern about that. You know, when I was in government, the one sort of cardinal rule we always told ourselves is we can't let our North Korea policy dictate our broader policy in Asia, particularly with our allies. Our policy with our allies has to dictate our North Korea policy. So, yeah, I do sense some concern in the region about that. Not just from the South Koreans and the Japanese, who are allies, but also from the Chinese. I think that's one of the reasons why we've seen The Chinese have two meetings with the North Korean leader in the last 40 days when they had refused to meet with him for the last six years.

[Evan Osnos]

So when you look ahead to the day, maybe June 12 in Singapore, when they're scheduled to get together, Kim Jong Un and Donald Trump, what should we be looking for that tells us this thing has worked on its own terms?

[Victor Cha]

There are a couple of things. The foremost issue for Trump has been the intercontinental ballistic missile program. These are the long range missiles that are believed to be able to reach the entire United States. So I think it's very important that something happen on that issue. The second thing has to do with some sort of peace declaration on the peninsula. The inter Korean summit that took place last April already laid out an ambition that the two Koreas would no longer be at war with each other, that there should be a peace regime but that cannot happen without the United States and China supporting that and agreeing to that. So that would be the second thing. And then the third thing would be something definitive in terms of the nuclear weapons program, something that looked more like commitment to abandon this program. Now, getting all those things is not going to be easy. It is a high bar, but unfortunately it is the bar that the president has set for himself. It will be a real test of his negotiating skills and how well the North Korean leader can think and act on his feet. And I do feel like we are potentially on the brink of something quite historic. On the one hand, it could lead to something fantastic. On the other hand, it could collapse spectacularly.

[David Remnick]

Victor Cha, A senior advisor at the center for Strategic and International Studies, Cha was in Seoul last week when he spoke with the New Yorkers. Evan Osnos, I'm David Remnick. Thank you so much for joining me today, and I hope you'll sign up for our newsletter and subscribe to our podcast so you never miss a thing. This is the New Yorker Radio Hour, and I hope you'll join us next time.