The New Yorker Radio Hour: Extremists on the Ballot, and America’s Endless War in Afghanistan

Date: February 9, 2018
Host: David Remnick
Guests: Andrew Hall (Stanford Political Scientist), Amy Davidson Sorkin (Political Columnist), Steve Coll (Author, Journalist)

Episode Overview

This episode tackles two deeply relevant issues as of early 2018:

1. Extremism in U.S. Political Candidates: A conversation with Stanford's Andrew Hall explores the rise of ideologically extreme candidates in both major parties and the practical consequences for American democracy.
2. The War in Afghanistan: Pulitzer-winning journalist Steve Coll discusses his book "Directorate S," unpacking the roots and ongoing failures of America’s longest war by probing the complex relationship between the U.S., Afghanistan, and Pakistan.

Section 1: Extremists on the Ballot

Main Theme:

An in-depth examination of why both Democrats and Republicans are increasingly nominating extreme candidates, what “extremism” truly means in politics, and how this dynamic shapes electoral outcomes and party identities.

Key Discussion Points & Insights

Defining Extremism and Moderation

• Hall uses statistical models primarily based on campaign contributions to gauge a candidate’s ideology relative to their party peers.
• Extremism isn’t about rhetoric but about substance: “If you're in a Democratic primary and you're farther to the left than the other candidates, then you're more extreme. If you're farther to the right, you're more moderate and vice versa for in a Republican primary.”
  — Andrew Hall (01:44)

How Contributions Reveal Ideology

• Hall explains that by examining who donates to a candidate (and who those donors have historically supported), researchers can infer ideological positioning—especially for first-time candidates.
  — Andrew Hall (02:20)

Electoral Penalty for Extremism

• Extremist candidates tend to win primaries but perform poorly in general elections:
  “When you nominate… these more extreme candidates, they tend to do very badly on average in the general election… the more extreme candidates outperform the more moderate candidates in the primary, but it's quite modest and it's swamped by the general election penalty to these more extreme people.”
  — Andrew Hall (03:52)

Why Don’t More Moderates Run?

• The practical and psychic costs of running for office—especially fundraising—deter moderates.
  “The number one reason, I would say, is the difficulty of campaign finance. So if you want to run for the House today, you need to be prepared to spend most of your days dialing for dollars… That… makes it very difficult to make that choice.”
  — Andrew Hall (05:47)

Party Brand and the Open System

• America’s open system means parties can’t tightly control who runs under their banner; therefore, party ideology can shift rapidly depending on who chooses to run.

  “Anyone can run for office and say they're a member of whatever party they want. And that gives the party a lot less control over their own brand than most other democracies.”
  — Andrew Hall (08:44)

Impact of New Candidates and Gender Shift

• 2018 saw a surge in first-time candidates, particularly women—something Hall predicts will be a “huge story” for the election cycle.

  “The identities of candidates matter a huge deal... Historically, that has been one of the biggest obstacles to getting women into office has been that they don't run at as high a rate. And we're seeing, I think, changes in that direction.”
  — Andrew Hall (11:16)

Notable Quotes

• “So in a way, the real mistake is sitting around saying the Democratic Party should be doing this, should be doing that. Really what the Democratic Party needs to be doing is figuring out who wants to run as a Democrat and how that person connects with voters, either in a district or in the country.”
  — Amy Davidson Sorkin (11:49)
• “It's just not that fun to be a member of Congress these days.”
  — Amy Davidson Sorkin (12:23)

Important Timestamps

• Definition of Extremism: 01:35–02:13
• Contribution-Based Analysis: 02:20
• Primary vs. General Election Extremism Penalty: 03:52–05:18
• Why Moderates Don’t Run: 05:20–07:25
• Parties’ Loss of Brand Control: 08:44
• Rise of Women Candidates: 11:16

Section 2: America’s Endless War in Afghanistan

Main Theme:

A sobering recounting of how America's longest war became so drawn out and futile, focusing on the strategic missteps and misguided alliances that locked the U.S. into perpetual conflict, as discussed by Steve Coll.

Key Discussion Points & Insights

Open-Ended Objectives & Early Mistakes

• America lacked a clear vision post-Taliban-overthrow, torn between “minimizing presence” and “rebuilding” Afghanistan. The short-term focus—especially due to the Iraq war—compromised long-term stability.

  “We just keep making the same mistakes over and over again and expecting different results… we really did not see the Taliban come back coming.”
  — Steve Coll (14:56)

The Pivotal Role of Pakistan (ISI and ‘Directorate S’)

• Pakistan’s intelligence service (ISI), especially its clandestine wing (Directorate S), worked to support the Taliban for pragmatic national interests, especially after the U.S. favored India with a nuclear deal and signaled disengagement from Afghanistan.
  — Steve Coll (16:27, 17:43)

Counterfactuals and Lost Opportunities

• Coll suggests that not invading Iraq might have allowed a more focused, realistic approach to Afghan reconstruction and reconciliation—including integrating “defeated” Taliban fighters, rather than alienating them.

  “If there was a time we could have done a lot better... it was in that period, 2002 to 2004.”
  — Steve Coll (18:49)

Torture, Detention, and Strategic Blindness

• The U.S. resorted to torture and dystopian prison regimes out of ignorance about the enemy; but by 2003, most detainees were no longer al Qaeda, but rather Afghan guerrillas.

  “By 2003, it was evident that there was really no Al Qaeda left in Afghanistan... So what justifies, really, even a serious operation around that, but never mind torture?”
  — Steve Coll (20:37)

Osama bin Laden’s Disappearance and Pakistan’s Complicity

• Despite bin Laden’s presence in Pakistan, ISI leaders claimed ignorance—insisting incompetence, not conspiracy.

  “Their answer was, we really are that incompetent. … If we had known, we would have gone after them because they were killing us. We were really that blind.”
  — Steve Coll (22:38)

Karzai, Paranoia, and American Influence

• Afghan President Hamid Karzai persistently blamed U.S. inaction toward ISI for instability, eventually adopting conspiracy theories about American motives.

  “He really began to believe… America wants ISI to destabilize Afghanistan so it can justify having military bases in the country for as long as it wants them, that it was a conspiracy theory.”
  — Steve Coll (24:25)

Sanctions, Aid, and Strategic Stalemate with Pakistan

• Even Trump’s attempt to cut aid to Pakistan for harboring terrorists is unlikely to change ISI’s behavior, as China’s role in Pakistan now outweighs U.S. leverage.

  “There have been other attempts to use sanctions to change Pakistan's conduct, and none of them have worked.”
  — Steve Coll (25:50)

The Cycle of Military Escalation and Hope for Diplomacy

• Despite repeated military surges and commanders claiming “there is no military solution,” diplomacy remains neglected, yet it could meaningfully reduce Afghan suffering.

  “There is negotiation and diplomacy that could potentially reduce the suffering... Let's not just bomb the way out of our problem. You know, we don't talk alongside the security strategies that we have.”
  — Steve Coll (27:05)

Notable Quotes

• “You figure out a way to incorporate the defeated in the political order that follows. Otherwise they're just going to go back to war.”
  — Steve Coll (19:13)
• “Yet again, we're sending more troops. I mean, this is the contradiction that recurs… new generals go out... they all say there is no military solution… and yet [we] prioritize military action, as if doing the same thing is going to lead to a different outcome.”
  — Steve Coll (26:31)
• “Winning looks like a reduction of violence… It's frustrating because, you know, we do that in other settings... but it really hasn't tried in Afghanistan.”
  — Steve Coll (27:05)

Important Timestamps

• Afghan War Origins & U.S. Strategic Confusion: 13:35–16:00
• Pakistan’s Support for Taliban/ISI Role: 16:00–18:21
• Missed Opportunities (2002–2004): 18:49–19:13
• Torture and Detentions: 20:25–21:21
• Bin Laden in Pakistan: 21:21–22:38
• Hamid Karzai’s Distrust: 23:02–25:25
• U.S. Aid, China’s Role, Strategic Deadlock: 25:50–26:30
• Enduring Contradictions; Diplomacy vs. Force: 26:30–28:16

Memorable Moments & Quotes

• On politics becoming unattractive:
  “It's just not that fun to be a member of Congress these days.”
  — Amy Davidson Sorkin (12:23)

• On strategic mistakes in Afghanistan:
  “We just keep making the same mistakes over and over again and expecting different results.”
  — Steve Coll (14:56)

• On the futility of current U.S. policy:
  “Yet again, we're sending more troops… as if doing the same thing is going to lead to a different outcome.”
  — Steve Coll (26:31)

Conclusion

This episode provides a deeply insightful exploration into the dynamics driving extremism in American politics and the intractable complexities of America's war in Afghanistan. From campaign funding woes shaping who runs for office, to the chronic failures and repeating cycles in U.S. foreign policy, the conversations grapple honestly with why moderate voices are rare, the limitations of military solutions, and the importance of trying new, more diplomatic approaches—urgent lessons for both America’s democracy and its place in the world.