D (2:58)

talk about JD let's do Vance first. It's less important, honestly. And it's still interesting. As you say, very revealing. But invasion thing is a longer. Yeah, it's a real. That's, that's big. Yeah.

C (3:09)

So I mean it in a way you could. There are a bunch of ways to read this. One of which is this is. This is the Iranians trying to stick it to the Israelis by finding like the most Israel skeptic person in the administration to plug into this job. Another way you could read it is as Trump trying to screw Vance by forcing him to have his fingerprints on

D (3:33)

the war,

C (3:35)

which can only hurt Vance. I'm sure Vance will try to spin this as like, you know, I ended the war. I, you know, I, I solved the war, I got the deal. But if we're going to get a deal, I think the deal will probably be reasonably favorable to Iran, frankly. It has to be in order to get them to open the strait. They're going to need sweeteners. And also. But I do think it does provide the best chance for an exit and the best chance to get us out of here quickly is to have somebody like J.D. vance who's going to be. Not pro Iranian exactly, but is going to be more incentivized to give whatever needs to be given to just get out. And so if you. So from the perspective of America, if you think that the, the least worst scenario for us is ending this very poorly conceived and executed war as quickly as possible because we cut our losses, then this is like good for America, I guess. I don't know. I've teed you up along three lines here.

D (4:44)

You did. So my question for you. I've been up in Boston and been running around quite a lot and I'm actually pretty up to date, I think on the invasion stuff. Seven on the phone with people on that. But is Vance actually been designated the negotiator or is that more Seems to

C (4:56)

be Axios reporting this morning with our friends Mark Caputo and now Steve Witkoff is now saying that it was his idea to push.

D (5:05)

Well, that's a good sign. So I think, I guess, yeah, I think you've sort of suggested possible reasons Iran would prefer Vance. I mean, Iran's savviness about the US Is something, I guess it's a little surprising at first until you think for a minute they've been involved in many, many, many. They're an enemy of ours, I think it's fair to say, a terrible regime and I'd be thrilled if they got overthrown. Having said that, their top officials and even their second and third year officials have been dealing with US Governments for a long time. We had years of negotiation under Obama, but under Trump as well, including in the first term and certainly in the last few weeks, in months. Right. I mean, they were literally negotiating in wherever that was somewhere in Europe, I think, or Oman, I don't know, you know, until Trump boarded the bombing, so a month ago. So they know America well and they, they read the American press and they follow it. They don't have an embassy here, but they have many, many people they talk to. So, yeah, I think it's, it's, you're right to take it as more than just trivial or just random, I guess I would say, I think they think Vance could deliver. Maybe they're not so certain about Witkoff and Jared on that he's the vice president and they know that he's America first and anti foreign wars and probably was against this nerve to say this to Trump, but he was probably against this war. So, yeah, they've got a good, they've got a negotiator who wants to get Trump out of this, not who wants to get America more deeply into it, I would think. And as you say, that is good for America in my view, since I think the downside of the escalation scenario is much greater than the downside of the tacoing out of it scenario, though both are negative, both will be bad for America, but both are bad. What is really bad and what is maybe manageably bad for now or in accord with other bad things Trump has done, but doesn't sort of cause a disaster. We'll get to get to that in a second. But yeah, so I think you're right to show. But it's also a sign this regime has been. They lost their top four, that 40 of the top officials on the first day. Israel continues to bump off very senior people. The others presumably are having difficulty communicating or in hiding or you know and they're still functioning pretty well. I mean I hate to say it this way but pretty effectively it looks like the military stuff they drove to down the first 10 days and now ramp back up and on this sort of public diplomacy and actual real diplomacy side like who do we want to negotiate this? Able to send messages and to deal with other governments and communicate what they want which is again, I don't know. They, they were, I guess they were more prepared for this than, than one thought I think.

C (7:40)

So do you have a sense as to what the Iranians want to get out of this? I mean I think the, the clearest thing is they want a removal of sanctions which have been removed. So they've already gotten that right in a weird way. Trump removing the sanctions on Iranian oil allow. See we're not, we're just the status quo. This is, you know, we just want to stay with the status quo Here they have a bunch of silly asks like you know, US bases out of the Middle East. I assume those are just negotiating points to then for them to give on. The thing that I'm the most interested in is whether or not they want to make a serious run at ending the petrodollar system. And so the way this works or for people, you know this bill, other people will not coming out of the oil crisis in the early 1970s, I think the first oil crisis we moved to a global system where oil is sold in dollars. And that's just how all the oil commodities are done. It's called the petrodollar system. And this winds up making the US dollar the world's reserve currency. The fact that everybody needs to have dollars on hand in order to make purchases of oil makes it so that the dollar is the default backstop currency for the entire world. We have been undergoing sort of if you pay attention to financial stuff, what is referred to as de dollarization at a slow moving pace for the last several years, sped up over the last 18 months with Trump. And if you really wanted to take a shot at at speeding that up even more, you would try to fork the petrodollar system and do what? There's a big Deutsche analyst about paper about this. You would the petro one and so the idea would be oil moving through the Suez is sold in one and that is how Iranian oil is sold right now. And and so one of the things Iran has proposed is having a toll on oil going through the Hormuz that is not in their long term interest I don't think because if you do that you incentivize the building of like, pipelines and you try to, you incentivize people to cut that passage out. And they need that as a strategic choke point in a weapon. But it, you know, it might be. I think the Chinese would be absolutely interested in an arrangement like this where all of a sudden the one. I mean, it would require, for complicated reasons, some rejiggering of the Chinese financial system, but I think they'd be open to that. It would dramatically weaken America's position in the world. It would make our deficits very, very hard to sustain because borrowing costs would go up markedly for the U.S. you know, as we try to deficit finance our way through our entitlements. To me, that's like the, the single biggest risk of this entire war is that you wind up blowing up the petrodollar system. But what do you. I'm just sort of rambling here. What, what do you think Iran wants out of this? Like, how much do you think they, how strong do they think their position is and how much do they think they can get?

D (11:14)

I don't think they think it's quite as strong as it would have to be to actually make a huge move against the dollar. I think you could do marginal things like collecting a toll from whoever is willing to pay it or in, in, in Chinese currency. And I think the Chinese would be very interested in this project and Iran would be happy to be a part, a player in it. But I'm not sure that they're a big enough player, honestly, in the international oil market or in international financial markets certainly to really make a huge difference compared to the broader difference they would like to. Well, so let's. What do they want? They want the regime to survive, number one. And in that respect, they are. They, they have had a good month. I mean, they've had a bad month. They've lost a lot of their top people, which will have some effect, presumably. And who knows what's happening beneath the surface. And these regimes look strong until they aren't strong and so forth. But so far, if you had said, you know, a month at this level of bombing, mass of bombing, of killing and also of targeted assassinations, then the regime seems, the IRGC seems pretty solidly in control. You'd be, I think, a little surprised. And so that's an achievement of theirs. That's the most important thing, obviously. Two, they, they've established the principle that they can close the straight. I don't know how much they care about getting the tolls or about you know, particular changes in the way the strait operates. I just think they've, they would, they've, in a way there's nothing we can do about that victory of theirs. Right. They've, they've established the principle. Even if they now open it, I mean, let's assume Trump bombs the hell out of them for three weeks. They decide, okay, this, we just can't take it anymore. We will open it in return for the end of the bombing, which I've always assumed would be sort of the, the end game here, basically when you get rid of all the bells and whistles. I thought the, that agreement might come much earlier. That's still a victory for them, I'd say. And I would say on that front, I've struck talk as a foreign policy over the last few days. That's where the only reasonable case for Trump to escalate before de. Escalating is that that's a tough victory, that's a bad, that's bad for us. I mean, that is really.

C (13:17)

Yes.

D (13:17)

I mean every outcome is bad for us. No one will think we're, we're, we don't look very competent and we certainly don't look confident in planning the war. We have an erratic president who went to war without doing any of the most obvious preparations. He hasn't conducted it particularly well. The military is extremely impressive, obviously, but, but the overall political, military, geostrategic effort has not been impressive at all. Our allies are in the state all over the world and have lost confidence in us short term. Gulf states want us to demolish Iran because now they've. Otherwise they are left at a weaker position. I mean, the reason that MBS and everyone are so now just, you've got to finish the job is because if we don't finish the job, they know how much of a blow this is to anyone who's been an ally to the US and they're all going to be recalibrating in that direction. That's why it's such a defeat for us, I think, and I don't know that we can finish the job or let's put it this way, finish what is finishing the job. Which really would mean, I think destroying maybe not regime change exactly, but destroying the state structure of Iran. I mean, just chaos and you know, disintegration fails make turning into a failed state for quite a while, which is

C (14:23)

clearly what Israel wants, I think.

D (14:25)

Yeah. And what MBS wants. And I think by now the Gulf neighbors don't want Iran to. The less powerful, the better, period. They don't care about the people of Iran. They don't care. So I don't know that we can do that. I mean I suppose so I don't know that we can do that. To do that obviously in any probably takes ground troops. We're moving a whole lot of troops to the region. Maybe Trump can get talked into thinking that he needs that outcome so as not to look weak. I think Trump is entirely drift to the degree that Trump will escalate which I'm now much more fearful of. I think you and I have been similarly doubtful that he would early on and now worried that he will it's entire not because of geopolitical considerations Henry Kissinger types telling him that this is such a defeat for the US you have to escalate first but rather because Trump will thinks it'll make him look weak and he doesn't want to look weak.

A (15:18)

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E (15:49)

Hi, this is Alex Canceroitz. I'm the host of Big Technology Podcast, a longtime reporter and an on air contributor to cnbc. And if you're like me, you're trying to figure out how artificial intelligence is changing the business world and our lives. So each week on Big Technology I bring on key actors from companies building AI tech and outsiders trying to influence it, asking where this is all going. They come from places like Nvidia, Microsoft, Amazon and plenty more. So if you want to be smart with your wallet, your career choices, in meetings with your colleagues and at dinner parties, listen to Big Technology podcast wherever you get your podcasts.

D (16:24)

The question for me is can he bomb for another week, claim he's not looking weak, claim that Iran's opening the strait? Which Iran will, you know, sort of have an implicit deal with various third parties, Pakistan or Iran or Japan or someone, you know, working out, you know, lots of back, you know, channel arrangements and we sort of get out of it without too much humiliation for Trump personally and too much humiliation for the United States, which is the much more serious thing. But either way, I just want to emphasize how much damage is done in terms of our allies and our standing in the world. I mean, if you go to war like this, you either need to wait, you know, you need to win, or you need to fight it in a way that people thought, well, you know what, they stuck in there for quite a while and they didn't win. They were too ambitious in their goals. This would be Iraq. But, you know, this still says the US is a pretty impressive power. I don't know. I think the degree to which this is going to do real damage is an Iraq. The damage, obviously, but this choosing a war like this out of the blue, no consultation and huge boasting, and then not being able to, and then leaving the regime in place. Whatever happened in Iraq, and God knows I'm not going to defend it at this point or anything, we did remove the regime. I mean, there's a certain amount of people who thought, oh, well, they kind of went in there and got rid of Saddam. That's not nothing, you know, if you're a dictator somewhere else right now. By 2008, it was looked unlikely we would do it anywhere else, and we didn't in Syria. And that had its own catastrophic consequences, et cetera, et cetera. But to begin this and then not. And then leave the IRGC in place and able to fire the missiles and the, and the drones and probably able to rebuild some of the stuff. I mean, it's bad. It's really. I'm more shaken by how much debt. I mean, how much damage is that final point. I've gone on too long. But I mean, a lot of this damage was already happening because of Trump. I'd say most of this is accelerating things. Trump had already underway, put underway allies not being able to trust us, the US looking reckless and sort of totally unpredictable and not willing to be the anchor of a global system. What everyone thought of Iraq, again, it didn't. No one thought, well, the US Is giving up its role as the anchor of the world's geopolitical and geostrategic system. People thought we were too ambitious in a way, in what we thought we could do as that, as that anchor. But no one thought this was the end of 80 years of the post World War II system. The Singaporean foreign minister, and they're friends of ours, Singapore, they're massive beneficiary of the last 80 years, is quoted this morning saying, just saying, it's over, it's over. This system is gone. So what? He knows that byproduct of that. But what, what aspect of that would be the kind of dollarization you're talking about. But I think that's the bigger picture and why it really is such a, so unbelievably reckless and irresponsible with Trump again, in a, it's in line with what he's been doing, but it accelerates the bad effects of what he's been doing.

C (19:24)

Another of the failures here, and this is something I've been thinking through a lot, is so this war has proven that the Strait of Hormuz is a strategic weapon. This had always been the theory. Nobody's surprised about it. But, but it's different, right? It's one thing to like say I have a nuclear bomb, but no, I'm not going to test it, right? Because, and then there is some ambiguity about well, do they, are they really nuclear capable or are they not? And that's a, essentially the position the Iranians were in with the strait. They said, well, we could close it, but we had never seen it happen. Now they have proven the viability of the strategic weapon, which has the knock on effect of making their nuclear program less important to them. Right. The idea of a nuclear program, I mean, there's twofold, right? The Israelis were worried and the other regional neighbors worried about offensive capability. And you know, well, we don't want Iran to be able to, to first strike and deploy nukes. But the other part of that is like, well, it's deterrent and it means that we can't go into Iran, we can't attack them. Right? There is the deterrent effect and that deterrent effect of like do they need nukes as a deterrent? That importance to them lessens now that they've proven the viability of you closing the strait as a, with, as a strategic weapon.

D (20:50)

I don't know. I think from their point of view, having nukes would have meant Israel could not attack them twice within nine months. And for them that's pretty important. So I think, I think nukes were deterrent or possible offensive weapon against Israel and, and against the Gulf states whom they are also pretty big rivals with and Saudis and the Saudis and all that. And I don't know if it was ever really meant much for us. I mean, but they think, you know, no one's attacking North Korea and they're attacking us. So I think they do want to rev up the nuclear program. But I agree, I mean the one thing on the straight, I would say, though you may be overstating slightly, how big a weapon. It is only in this sense. I mean oil is much less because of the oil embargo 50 years ago in part because of the fact that everyone realized this is a bad thing to be totally dependent on the Middle East. We're all much less dependent on a wireless and energy source that we were 50 years ago and less dependent on the Middle east as an energy source than we were 50 years ago, I believe And I suppose the same will happen with the Strait. There'll be a lot of workarounds and it will be like the Russian dependence on Russia in 2020 and by from Germany and so forth. Harder to fix with so much of the oil does come from there. But you're right, I mean they will have shown that they can. It's just showing that you can close it and it has real world effects now don't you think? A lot depends though on again if they and in a way this, this does incentivize them to keep it closed for a while. Right. Because the truth is if it opens tomorrow, it's a blow to the economy. It takes the, the ripple effects will be real, could cause a recession. The knock on effects on supply chain don't go away suddenly. On the other hand, if it opens, I think most people think, you know, three months from now we could be back to basically, you know, it would be a bad shock to the economy but not a, not a real fork in the road 2, 3, 4 months of this thing being closed. I mean you're talking I think real,

C (22:37)

it's very bad, real global economic effect, very, very bad.

D (22:40)

Which is their strongest card, Trump's strongest card and Israel's is just continual pummeling of them from the air which Israel clearly there's a leak from Israel a couple of days ago that someone pretty close to I think the security services there saying a little nervous about these ground troops the Americans are talking about they should just pummel from the air. I think the American military probably correct thinks that couldn't do the job. But honestly I wonder if Trump doesn't default to that. I mean well, how far has he gone in his megalomania or it is I don't know what thinking he can do any. Whatever he wants. The US military could do whatever it wants or that he is going to do something I do think he never would have planned to do until the second term certainly or until maybe you know, the megalomania got out of control after Venezuela, which is to actually reduce ground troops.

C (23:30)

I don't think he would have done it after Going into this war, if he had realized he would have had to use ground troops, I don't think he would have done it.

D (23:38)

Well, and that's clear. It's only just for the fact that we didn't have any prepositions. I mean we're busy steaming them from Japan and stuff. So do you think now he's overcome, so to speak, that that was a pretty deep predisposition of his and advances. And again, whatever you think of it, it was, you know, it was based on a certain analysis of history. And so for depressions from history, what do you think? Do you think he's overcome that? Because he just feels like otherwise he's humiliated and the military keeps telling him the way. And also he thinks a little bit of a kind of Douglas MacArthur Iwo Jima. This is what Mount Rush war. You don't get Rush war just from bombing. You get a Mount Rush war by a kind of dramatic military operation. What do you think?

C (24:19)

So that's why I think the most likely outcome if he were to go this route is Karg. And so he. You take Kharg Island. I've been writing about this for like two weeks now. I wrote about this before we went to Texas. Now the problem is you can't keep your troops on Kharg alive for very long. It becomes very, very hard. So a quick like you seize the island, you take your pictures, you strike a deal the next day and then you get out.

D (24:51)

Yeah, but it doesn't open the strait. I mean Karg is 350 miles.

C (24:55)

The only per. The only purpose of it is to use it as a hostage.

D (24:58)

Right. It's, it's the ultimate Iraq. It cuts off Iran's oil, which they still are exporting unbelievably into this war. They're exporting war all through the straight than they were before the war. You know, it's. But I mean if it cuts that off, that's. Or cuts off their ability to find the oil which they're whatever or process. I don't even know how the oil that they're exporting.

C (25:16)

Well, there's a lot of infrastructure there that will cost a lot of money and take a lot of time to rebuild if we blow it up or they blow it up now again, I, I think the Iranians have demonstrated that they are willing to absorb punishment. And so like it would not, it would not surprise me at all if like we took Karg in. The Iranian response was to send massive drone storms. And who cares what they blow up

D (25:39)

as long as they think that's really an important point. I mean, I think taking carg is the way you put it is a kind of another in the step. It's sort of massive bombing plus. Right. I mean it's still the same idea. It's twisting, it's tightening the noose and, and increasing their incentives to for a deal. It's, it's a hostage taking, as you say, or whatever, but. And then we gradually start maybe blowing up a couple of things on carg and say, oh, this is what, this is going to happen for the next month. Unless on the other hand, they have shown this. Someone reminded me of this yesterday. I was talking about the degree to which they took punishment in the 80s with Saddam and they wouldn't stop the war, even though people tried to bribe them basically to their neighbors too. And it was like, nope, we got to fight for national honor and for Islam and all this and for Shia Islam, I guess. I don't know. I don't know how deep that goes. I mean, at some point you think just the pulverize the bombing is going to have some effect and the threats will have an effect.

C (26:32)

But the Supreme Leader just lost his dad, his wife and his children.

D (26:36)

Yeah, you know, like, no, I mean

C (26:38)

it's seems personally willing to accept, absorb

D (26:41)

a lot of punishment whether everyone else is willing to go out, whether the IRGC doesn't look up at some point, say, you know what, we still want to have some ability to make a lot of money off this regime. We can't. And if the country becomes rubble, we're sort of all screwed. I think that's probably Trump's strongest card. And that for me does push more towards this massive kind of Christmas bombing of, of. Of North Vietnam type situation. No, I thought about this. I mean, I think the historians differ whether that actually brought North Vietnam to the table, whether that was Nixon's way of going out. Sort of like Trump, honestly of a kind of with strength, peace through otter, you know, peace with honor. Straight this. We're, we're strong, we'll do anything. And it came to the table and the North Arabes implicitly was sort of fine, if you want to do this.

C (27:23)

We took Carg Island. Look at that picture of our boys raising the flag there. Right.

D (27:28)

But I mean the degree to which, and you've written about this so well, the degree to which that the unanticipated consequences of that and of if they, we blow up some stuff, they kill some Americans, suddenly America can't let that be the last act of the war and suddenly we're, I mean the fact he's got a lot of troops going to that to the region, a lot more apparently ready to go. The troops that are going are the typically would be the advance guard, the advance team of a much bigger deployment. I mean these people, that's what these, those troops, the muse and the 82nd Airborne usually would be typically used for. I mean apart from very discreet special operations here. So I don't know. I mean the escalation ladder I think is very. So scary that I hope Trump sees that and just in his. That it is from his own point of view it's real catastrophe. But I mean again, how much he is unwilling to accept a little bit of embarrassment and even humiliation at the thing not having gone well in a kind of crummy peace deal which we hope gets us back to the status quo ante. Really. You know, I don't know. I, I sort of hope he could talk himself into that.

C (28:36)

Honestly, if you want to be optimistic. I suspect he is very confident that he can sell any deal as his master negotiating. Look how much we won. Yeah.

D (28:48)

Right.

C (28:48)

And, and frankly the Iranians will be able to sell that within Iran to their supporters as well. Like these are two totally different cultures with. I mean, I think it is very easy to construct a deal in which both sides are leadership in both sides are able to claim that they won't. You think?

D (29:08)

I, I can't judge on Iran. I think in Iran probably. I mean at least it's not going to weaken them internally and maybe 18 months from now it does.

C (29:16)

I don't mean popularly. I mean like in the elite power str.

D (29:19)

In the ic.

C (29:20)

Yes.

D (29:21)

They hung on and they got, they, they ended up getting the US to stop. That's that for them. That's just the key in the regime.

C (29:27)

Huge maintaining the regime combined might of Israel. The United States came after them and they walked away.

D (29:33)

I mean just Trump it is hurting in the war. It is unpopular. Is he that he's bad at accepting sunk costs and just. Well, he's not always bad at it, I guess. Right. To be fair to him. Right. Maybe just decides they should walk away from Greenland. Well, for now. Yeah.

C (29:52)

Right.

D (29:52)

Yeah.

C (29:52)

Walked away from Liberation Day tariffs. Right.

D (29:55)

Well, that's it. That's the taco argument. Right. And they're the markets. He cares about the markets. Does he care? And, and the markets now are telling him the same. Well, are beginning to tell him the same thing. I guess that's the strongest argument for us for him Doing a sort of escalation to de escalate, as that idiot Besson put it. But I assume Bessant, who doesn't know anything about this, I believe heard that somewhere. I mean, that's actually the kind of phrase you don't just use if you're Secretary of the Treasury.

C (30:22)

I mean, somebody said that to you.

D (30:23)

Someone said that in some meeting and oh, and Trump was like, oh, yeah, okay. You know, so yes, I feel like that's, I just hope they don't talk them escalate to the escalator is a classic escalation trap, though, where you end up escalating and then escalating some more. Because ultimately, of course, I mean, look,

C (30:40)

all of our escalation, eventually, all of

D (30:42)

our escalation in Vietnam was ultimately for the sake of stopping North Vietnam and de escalating. It's not like we were, you know, we didn't want to conquer North Vietnam.

C (30:48)

It's, it's you, you can go, you

D (30:50)

can go down a very bad path with escalating to de escalate. I hope he understands that the first like off ramp, which of course he's had a couple and he has one right now, in my opinion, but that he takes. Maybe the, the troops show up and, and, and Iran and they get a deal, you know, and the negotiations move ahead a bit and Trump sort of says, see, we threatened with the troops. They just, they weren't willing to do. You know, I hope it's that rather than let the landing of troops is such a. I think a. Well, it just has such possible ripple consequences, I mean, God knows for the troops themselves, but here and around the region, it makes the defeat, the ultimate backing down, so much more costly, I think, for the US So much more. Warren.

C (31:34)

The other thing is it can't go on for all that long because we will run out of munitions. I mean, at the fire rate that we've gone, I think the estimates are that we've got like six weeks left right. Of munition. Like, so this can't go on for forever. Like, there are, there are natural endpoints in here. I, I wrote about how there are, there are different gates at which economic damage becomes baked in for the rest of the year. One of them is like day 45. Day 45 is when the spring planting window closes. And so, you know, like it. I don't know. I, I tend to think like, we will climb down from this. There will be a great deal of damage. That damage will take at least 10 months, maybe 24 months. To unwind. But so long as like the petrodollar system remains intact. Right. Like those are things that are not long term damage to the, the United States's ability to maintain its way of life, you know, like, well, there are, there are possible outcomes here that would put that in danger. And one of which is the Iranians say, yeah, no, no, the strait is open to anybody who is willing to sell their oil in one. Well, I mean, at that, like that's a, you just imagine that as a, as a proposition. Right.

D (32:56)

And, but the other sort of ways in which it does escalate, it's a little harder to, as you say, to climb down with, with real but somewhat limited damage. You know, it's just other, you know, Putin Xi people decide, you know what, this is a moment of unbelievable U. S Weakness. And I've wanted to take the ball. I wanted to invade the Baltic states, I've wanted to do Taiwan. I mean, hope that doesn't happen. The only. So I agree with, I think you've put it well and I think that's, I think we ultimately have a climb down again. The damage, though, leave aside the petrodollar thing for a second and let's assume the economic stuff is back to where it was in a year or something or six months, even the damage that's been done. But this is the final blow to the US alliance system, really the US Global leadership. It's done. It's done as the Singaporean foreigners said, as others that the Germans have said and as others said. And certainly I think one thing that Trump has been signaling in the last few days, very much with all the emphasis on NATO, we think about it for a second. Why is Trump. This was never supposed to be a NATO operation. We didn't ask NATO to be part of it. We asked NATO beginning. They didn't literally, we didn't consult with NATO. So why is Trump suddenly screaming and yelling about NATO? He's always hated NATO. He wants to do something dramatic. I think one dramatic thing he does three, six, nine months from now. He pulls on Saturday though. He really just. And he says, I'm the guy who did it. So incidentally, all those America first people who are unhappy about going to war, he says to them, see, this is the NATO is the example of what we hate. This treaty that commits us to Europe, commits us to intervene if other countries are attacked. I'm not intervening if Lithuania is attacked. Forget it, Sonia. More likely, I guess than Lafayette and, and they're on their own and they've Been sealing, you know, taking advantage of us for 25 or 50 years. And this is the, this is true. America first. I think he'll find that politically attractive at home. Maybe it is attractive incidentally to parts of his base, including the ones who are not, who are anti war. So I think. And then someone somewhat smart people here are going to say, well, Congress passed a law that you can't get out of NATO without going to Congress. And Trump will say for screw you, I don't care. And, and I can get out of whatever I want to it. I'm not, I'm just not no longer committed to Article 5 to, to, to, to defending our allies, what Japan thinks at that point. And this is where I think the whole. So this is an, this will be. Historians, I fear, will see this as not the moment, not the, the, you know, it's not like necessarily the decisive moment, certainly not the beginning of the first moment, but a key moment in the disintegration of the US Led world order.

C (35:25)

Trump's second election is the key moment in the disintegration of the US Led order. And it was obvious to anybody who wanted to see it at the time that it would be like, I mean it was just there. But yeah, this is, I mean, you know, the long term damage is stuff like massive nuclear proliferation.

D (35:43)

Yeah, right, absolutely.

C (35:44)

And the Japanese and the South Koreans all go nuclear very quickly. Right, because they have to.

D (35:52)

Yeah.

C (35:52)

No, it's all terrible.

D (35:54)

You know, it's interesting about the election. Since we began advance. Someone pointed this out to me. I had totally forgotten. I did, I think Ariel Melbourne's TV show the day Vance was selected or maybe the day after, something like that. Right, right at the beginning of the Republican convention. And everyone was like looking at the, you know, understandably the domestic politics and this and why Vance, don Trump, John Jr. Likes him. And I will say I said, I think something like someone said, told me, I said, and I, maybe I did that this is important because it really signals what the second term is going to be like. It's not Mike Pence. I mean he could have gone in a, not in a Mike Pence literal way, but in a Mike Pence way. Right. I mean, sort of, you know, someone who would have still been Desantis way. Right. Or in a Rubio at the time way and so forth, you know, and, and he went with Vance and so that then he wins the election, then the appointments obviously of Hexath and everyone else and the kind of total collapse of the Mattis, you know, Mark esper sort of midi firewalls there within the administration. No. So you're right this. But this war will be a pretty significant marker along the way of the collapse.

C (37:01)

Yeah. I mean this plus the Liberation Day tariffs, plus the Greenland.

D (37:06)

Yeah, I agree with that.

C (37:09)

You saw the reports, right? That the the Danes sent their troops, you know, with, with bombs to blow runways and blood because they assumed they would need to transfuse and treat people who had been shot by Americans.

D (37:22)

Yeah, horrible.

C (37:23)

I mean that that is the end of an alliance. Right. Anytime one it doesn't matter what the formal, you know. Well, the piece of paper still exists. Once once the allies are planning to shoot each other and deploying troops with the intention of having getting shot by them like that, it's over. Okay, I I have a bunch of stuff with more I want to talk about. I want to talk about no kings. I want to talk about Trump putting his signature on US Dollars and I want to talk about your appearance on the know your enemy podcast. But we're going to do all of that after the break. So if you want to join Bulwark plus guys, this is the time to do it. Come be with us. Come support us.

A (38:04)

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F (38:35)

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