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- [00:04]
A
For exclusive interviews, bonus episodes, ad free listening, early access to series first look at live show tickets, a weekly newsletter and discounted books. Join the Declassified club@the restisclassified.com. What is the secret history of the conflict between Washington and Tehran and how did it give us Operation Epic Fury? Well, welcome to the Rest Is classified. I'm David McCloskey.
- [00:37]
B
And I'm Gordon Carrera.
- [00:38]
A
And, Gordon, I guess we should say just because this is a very fluid situation, that we are recording this on March 11th. The US is at the moment still at war with Iran and has been engaged in a war with Iran for a little over a week now, along with Israel, of course, the US began striking Iran on 28 February, killing Iran's supreme leader. We did a live stream the next day to talk about events as they unfolded. I did a little kind of mini episode with CNN's Clarissa Ward looking at some of the news that the CIA and Mossad might potentially be arming the Kurds. But I think, Gordon, with the war ongoing, we wanted to kind of step back and examine some of the secret history of how we got here in the first place.
- [01:30]
B
That's right. Because history is so important. The rationale for why this war is taking place has been, it's fair to say, a bit all over the place. Different motivations have been expressed, but I think at the heart of them has been this history of antagonism between particularly the US And Iran. So what is that history? How did we get here? We thought we'd pull it together across two episodes because really a lot of that history revolves to the things we talk about and have talked about in terms of the, the secret world and the world of clandestine operations and spies.
- [02:05]
A
Well, that's right, of course. Ever the historian, President Donald J. Trump, in his video announcing his truth, social video announcing the war, I mean, did put this, this history front and center. I mean, I thought it was really notable that Trump, and even in media appearances since Trump administration officials have really referenced and latched onto this history all the way back to 1979 when explaining the conduct of and the rationale for the current war. I mean, the truth. Social media video, she talks about the enmity that came out of the revolution, the taking of hostages at the US Embassy, talks about Iran arming and supporting terrorist partners and proxies who have killed thousands of Americans refusing to relinquish the right to a nuclear weapon. I mean, even on, on a 60 Minutes appearance, the Secretary of Defense, Pete Hegseth, when asked about why we've attacked Iran, said they've been attacking us for 47 years. So this history in the minds of the administration is very much front and center in why we're prosecuting this war.
- [03:10]
B
Yeah, and there's also a history of hostility and suspicion on the Iranian side, which arguably goes back even further. I mean, back to 1953 particularly, which we're going to discuss. So over the next two episodes we're going to try and give our take, aren't we, on the secret history of that confrontation, the covert operations and the shadow war that brought us to this point. This episode is sponsored by hp. Most people are not counterespionage experts, but that won't stop them getting targeted by some cybercriminals seeking to extract their secrets.
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- [05:16]
D
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- [05:46]
A
We have brought in a very distinguished Iranian historian to help us tell the story. Gordon it is none other than friend of the show Arasha Zizi, who is back to help us now. Club members may recall that Arasha was with us in January when the Islamic Republic was brutally cracking down on mass demonstrations in Iran. And he is back with us today. Arash is a historian at Yale University who has written extensively on Iran's modern history. He is the author of two books on Iran, both of which I would highly recommend to all of our listeners. One is called Shadow Commander. It's a book on the former IRGC Quds Force commander Ghassim Soleimani. And his other book is what Iranians Want. It is a book about the revolutionary movement inside Iran. He's also a contributing writer at the Atlantic and he'll be with us for this two part series helping us make sense of this history. And our club members will have a special treat because Arash will be with us for a Q and A on all things Iran for our bonus episode on Friday. So without further ado, welcome Arash, welcome back.
- [06:56]
E
Thank you. It's great to be with you guys. And yeah, it's a, you know, I couldn't think of two better people to, to delve in this two together. So I'm very excited for it.
- [07:06]
B
Well, thank you because it's, it's a busy time, busy time for everyone but especially I think for you, Arash, where should we start? I mean I, I mentioned there 1953, I guess that is an important moment in Iranian history. It's actually where we started our podcast, isn't it David? Back in our very first episodes we're looking at the, the effort by the US and Ukraine to overthrow the government of Iran in 1953. Give us a sense of the importance of that moment and how the buildup to it because it is we are then in the world of the Shah of Iran, aren't we? Who is a figure who still has some resonance today. But give us a picture of Iran in 1953, perhaps before in the lead
- [07:49]
E
up to the 1953. We can think of 1941 where Iran was invaded by Britain and Soviet Union and the Shah had been really put on his throne by them because his father had been abdicated. Although I have to say it's really Iran itself, the Iranian Prime Minister Furughi who decides and helps bring this about for the father to be replaced by his son in 1941. So after 1941, like the short version of it, you know, we're going to cover a lot of history. So I want to make sure I don't get bogged down into too much the mud of history, if you will. But look, what happened in 1941 was the Shah's father had been an autocrat. He was not overthrown by this foreign invasion. But of course, it was an invasion done in the name of, you know, fighting Nazism. And, you know, Iran joins the allies, right? So Iran doesn't just become occupied country, it joins the allies, which means it's the founding member of United nations, which means that there were relatively free conditions in the country. So for the, for the first time, really, for any sustained period, Iranians gets a parliament that is more or less freely elected. The foreign troops leave by 1945. Of course, that has its own story, but they leave by 1945. So by 1953, you have Mohammad Mossadegh as a democratically elected prime minister. He's elect. And this is, you know, there's a lot of online revisionisms about this every other week. The basic story is he's elected by Iranian parliament to be Iran's prime minister, and the parliament is democratically elected. So it is how it works in all parliamentary countries. And he is overthrown in 1953.
- [09:22]
B
Yeah, but it's interesting, isn't it? Because, I mean, I heard some people, I think, out of Washington recently saying Iran has no democratic history, but it did in this period. But the problem is, I mean, oil is at the heart of the story here, isn't it? And of what happens in 1953. And there's often talk about wars in the Middle east are always about oil. That's not true. But in this case, there was a coup which, which was partly about oil. And I'm afraid to say it was partly about Britain, wasn't it? Because Britain retained a massive influence in the country and particularly through what's now called bp, but was then the Anglo Iranian Oil Company had its biggest refinery, I think the world's largest oil refinery in Aberdeen, Abadan.
- [10:02]
E
That's right.
- [10:03]
B
And Mossadegh was nationalizing that. And that was the cause of the tension between the UK and this Iranian politician.
- [10:12]
E
Exactly. So, so, so Mossadegh nationalized the oil. You know, so he used the democracy for something. Right, That's. He has popular support. He had been, you know, elected, but they used it to nationalize the oil in 1951. And Britain was super unhappy about that because, you know, the Labour government, which was followed by Churchill in 1951. You know, they, they have many differences, but they shared that. This, this just considered this to be devastating for Britain and is this important moment in UK US relations also after the war where the US is not. So, you know, this is good to remember better sides of American history. US is not really interested in helping European countries keep their colonial entities necessarily. It's certainly Indonesia. It hadn't done that like in Indonesia. Basically. It helps Indonesia and independence effectively against the Dutch. So the idea was that people like Mossadegh looked up to America thinking that it would be the case here. But what a mistake it is indeed, turns out to be a mistake.
- [11:07]
A
Well, you were the devious ones here. As Rash is sort of, you know, he's, he's very politely saying this. I mean, because this is, this is the case of. The story is that you Brits decided to basically come to Washington once you had taken the idea of invading Iran off the table. And once an effort at sort of coercive international diplomacy failed. The, the guys at MI6 took their little covert action plan because they also got booted out, right, Because Mosaddex shut the British Embassy. And Mosaddegh also hates the Brits, right? Let's get clear. He hates the Brits. He's suspicious of the Brits, Arash, to your point, he thinks that America will, you know, our better angels will. Will compel us to help help Iran. And yet MI6 shows up and we have the Eisenhower administration, Cold Warrior, and this idea in the name of which I think was bogus. I'd be curious for your thoughts, Arash. In kind of the name of fighting communism or potential communist influence, the CIA gets involved in this covert action plan to essentially use MI6's support assets on the ground in Tehran to overthrow Mosaddegh. So it's. It's the Brits is what I'm saying.
- [12:20]
E
It definitely was. Britain was in the lead. Britain was in the lead. And, you know. Well, Britain had also helped build the CIA, as you know. I mean, the CIA was very new. And yeah, it's definitely Brits who are at the, at the lead of this curiously, you know, on the communism thing. You know, that's like one of my scholarly niches. I have an article in International Journalist and Studies about it. My short argument is that. No, it is. It is true in that the communism is an important aspect. Now, as I said, the field is sharply divided on this, but it's about the oil primarily, I would say. But the point is that the Communist movement in the region was also supporting oil naturalization. And the US and the UK really do want to put down communism, which is a growing force in the region. So it's not true that they would think the communists can come to power Iran. Mossadegh wasn't a communist, obviously, but there's a strong Communist party in Iran. So it's not true that the Communist party had any chance of coming to power immediately, and that's why they did it. But it is true that they're battling communism.
- [13:22]
B
We deep dived into this operation, didn't we, David, in our first two episodes of the Rest is Classified. But it is a pretty wild story, isn't it, with Kermit Roosevelt, grandson of President Teddy Roosevelt, who'd been on the Harvard history faculty, leading the operation from a villa that he sets up in Tehran using a fake name.
- [13:44]
E
Armchair intellectual professors should listen to this. And yeah, yes,
- [13:50]
A
you have a bright potential future if you're, if you're, if you're an adjunct, if you're an adjunct at an Ivy, I mean, you know, you could be, you too could be overthrowing countries all across the world. But you're right. I mean, the plan is wild. I mean, we should say, you know, we're kind of starting this two part series. I mean, we're, we're in the midst of a conflict right now that is ostensibly about potentially overthrowing the Iranian government. And this is actually the first time that the US attempted to overthrow the Iranian government. And it's, it's done by a armchair academic who flies out to Tehran, installs himself at a, at a safe house under an alias, drinks very heavily. I mean, he was pounding. And we talked about this in our series. I mean, he was pounding lime rickeys like you wouldn't believe. And they were listening to, what was it? Luck Be a Lady Tonight. Was that the.
- [14:45]
B
Yeah.
- [14:45]
A
Was that the song? They were airing show tunes out at this villa. And I guess essentially though, the plan was to create chaos, street action in Tehran that would polarize the country, polarize the city, make it appear as though Mossadegh was a communist. And importantly, I think this is the critical piece, one of the critical pieces. Convince the Shah to sign decrees that would dismiss Mosaddegh and install a more favorable military official as the prime minister. And so Corbett Roosevelt is kind of pulling all these different strings in really the summer, in particular August of 1953. And I guess, I mean, it does raise this question of the Shah. And he's an important character in particular in this episode and Rash, I wonder if you might, if you might set up the character of the Shah, who is this guy who is going to be so important to really the future of US Iranian relations.
- [15:55]
E
First also very briefly say that. So 1953 happens. The US and UK are able to organize this coup. And it's kind of crazy that it kind of works on its own terms. Works. Of course now we considered a fiasco in many ways. Obviously for Iranians is a fiasco, got rid of our democracy. But it's sort of, it's able to work on its own operational terms. That is, you know, it successfully changes the government, but it's kind of a fluke actually. You know, it's, it's not very easy to pull this off. Again, it becomes important. Although if you did want to change the government, coups have a much better chance of going, if you ask me, than, you know, airstrikes and hoping people will rise up and stuff. So I don't know why no one tries a coup against the Islamic Republic. There are many takers that I know, many plots happening, but they've never received any, you know, anyway, so I just, I wonder what happened to a good old coup, you know, as, as solution to political crisis. Okay, now the Shah, look, The Shah in 1941 is put on the throne, as I said, as a result of his father's dramatic expulsion from the country. He's like in his early twenties, Swiss educated son of a father who was kind of distant, had a few wives, as, as was common at the time. And you know, he has all these stories about him or you know, he goes to a. I mean, I don't think a lot of these stories are true, but like, you know, he goes to a bakery and the bread is too expensive, so he puts the baker inside the oven, you know, like he was supposed to.
- [17:25]
B
Wow.
- [17:26]
E
As an anti corruption measure, right. So he was supposed to be this kind of, this tough guy and it's kind of a distant father. And all of a sudden this guy in his early 20s, his father is shipped off to Mauritius islands and then South Africa. So all of a sudden he has to be the king in his early 20s, as I said. And Iran, as a result of his father's departure, has received some sort of a freedom of press political activity. So the society is full. The Communist Party is founded in 1941. It becomes a very big force. It organizes society. All these different politicians of, of the past come back, they organize their own forces. And the Shah is kind of a feeble character because, you know, he doesn't have much of much power. And, you know, slowly but surely, he tries to organize his forces, he tries to build a relationship with the military. He tries to build a relationship with different figures in the Iranian politics and political society. Yeah. So by the time of 1953, he's still not necessarily the driving seat. Let me just say this, right? In 1953, there's a coup. It's the guy who does the coup and becomes prime minister in lieu of Mossadegh is a call Fazdullah Zahedi, very interesting guy. He had kind of been close to the Nazis in Iran actually in the past. Because of that, he'd been arrested by the British before. So Zahili becomes prime minister. And it's not clear if you're. If you're in 1953, 1954, it's not clear that is the Shah who will end up becoming Iran's powerful strongman.
- [18:55]
B
Because it is interesting in that point in 1953, he does come across as a very weak character because I think at one point he actually. He flees, doesn't he? He flees Iran. He heads first to Baghdad and then to Rome. And he's watching this, the coup take place from Rome where, you know, Kermit roosevelt of the CIA's engineering things on the ground.
- [19:16]
E
This becomes a very important point. Yeah. So Shah flees, Shaw flees. A few years later, there's again a sort of news of a possible coup. He kind of gets ready to leave. And of course, in 1979, he leaves, you know, as soon as things get rough. Right. So Shah is a lever, let's say. Yeah, big difference between Shah and Ayatollah Khamenei. And he can put it in different ways. You can say, well, it's better. He's not kidding people. But he does leave.
- [19:42]
B
He eventually, you know, he's in Rome when the coup effectively takes place place when the uprising happens. There's this gun battle at Mossadegh's house. Mossadegh is arrested, and then the Shah thinks, okay, you know, things have gone that way. I'll head back. He wrongly interprets it, I think, partly as that the people actually like him and want him, when in fact, it had really not much to do with him. But what, I mean, what is the impact and the legacy of 53?
- [20:11]
E
Just.
- [20:12]
B
Just give us a sense for Iranians, how they see it in terms of viewing, I guess, the UK but particularly
- [20:17]
E
the US I would say, look, I'm a lefty, as you guys know, for. For. For a leftist like me. And for my generation, of course, this was, you know, the grand betrayal by the US and the uk. There's this beautiful song that calls it, you know, the Heavy August. So, you know, it's true that we did have the last time Iran had something like a democracy was 1953, right? There were different parties in the parliament, different newspapers, and immediately after the coup they closed them down, they arrest everybody, and this long night of autocracy begins that has come to this day. There's also this fact that the repression of Iran's secular and sort of socialist forces allows the Islamists who had been supportive of the coup, by the way, and I'll say a word about that, allows them a future and later on in 1979 is they who lead the revolution. So look, so, I mean, I still think it's a traumatic event in Iranian history. Obviously it gives rise to all these conspiracies because, well, after all, it is the US and the UK who helped overthrew the government in Iran. But I would say the fact of the matter is that it is also overplayed a little bit because it is a long time ago, after all. And the Iranians of younger generation have had plenty of reasons, you know, to hate the Islamic Republic. So it's not like every day they're thinking about, they have a much more negative opinion of, of the Islamic Republic, you know, than they do of the US and the uk. And also the Islamic Republic is one to talk. I mean, they have no legitimacy in claiming the legacy of the 53 in any way because the Islamists at the time support the coup. The most important Islamist, Ayatollah Kashani, supports the 50 coup. I'm not saying he's neutral. He fully supports the coup and the other big clerics are neutral. Khomeini himself is kind of neutral. You know, he's a kind of youngish cleric at the time. So for the Islamic Republic to claim that they hate America because of 1953 is nonsense on several grounds. Because first of all, as I said, they were on, on the other side. And, and secondly, they don't hate America because it helped overthrow democracy. It's not like they're democratic themselves. They hate America because they hate the west and because of really, you know, endemic reasons. I mean, they hate the Western civilization based on their own words. They hate the Western civilization, they hate what it stands for. So the 1953 is a bit of a talking point that they use in the west as sort of a guilt tripping average American. It also Is that sort of thing that makes you sound smart? If you sort of say it, you know, someone would say, oh, well, did you know we overthrew their government in 1953? You know, which is sort of, it's a very important thing. But it doesn't explain everything that has gone on since. And the Islamic republic kind of uses that. So I think it's good to be suspicious of that narrative.
- [23:05]
A
Well, maybe there. With Mosaddegh ousted and with the, with the Shah now I guess, more firmly in control. Let's take a break and when we come back, we, we will talk about the relationship between the CIA and the Shah's secret police.
- [23:24]
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- [24:29]
A
Well, welcome back. The coup against Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh has succeeded. And of course now if you are the CIA, you have a problem, which is you've just made a pretty significant investment in the Shah. How do you ensure he stays on the Peacock throne? And I guess I might stop there actually and just ask Arash, why is it called the Peacock throne, the seat of power of sort of the Iranian monarchy? Where does that come from?
- [25:01]
E
Yes. So there is actual Peacock Throne. Like that is the name of an actual throne, which I've seen a version of it, you know, when I, when I was younger in Iran, there, there are more than one version of it, but it was commissioned by the Mughal emperor SHAH JAHAN In 17th century, you know, Mughal Empire. This is the Persian of the empire ruling over India. Persian was their official language. So, you know, a lot of Iranians sort of look into so the original, the original Peacock throne was built by him and it was in Delhi, the Red Fort, if anybody visit there. But when Iran invades India in 18th century under the great Nader Shah, they take this throne and bring it to Iran.
- [25:47]
A
Interesting.
- [25:47]
B
And so give us a sense maybe of how, how the relationship with the US develops after 53, and particularly I guess, the importance of US intelligence in working with the Shah. Because it is vital, isn't it?
- [26:01]
E
So this is the Cold War. The US really cares about Iran not sort of going communist, as I said before, and there's, there's an important Communist party. And the CIA does help train Iran's security forces. So initially after 53, the intelligence is basically the intelligence section of the army, which the CIA works with. But actually, by the way, so, you know, I'm writing a book about Iran and Israel and the Mossad, Israeli intelligence agency has a big role in working to build up what is called SAVAK in late 1950s, which becomes Iran's secret police. And interestingly enough, a lot of Iranians who were working with Mossad at the time, they complained that one of the reasons they had to go to the Mossad was that CIA doesn't take them seriously enough and sort of doesn't give them good stuff and doesn't, yeah, doesn't give them what they think is worth. But the interest of the us, the UK and the west in general and Israel is in a very different way is to keep the Shah on the throne and to make sure Iran's socialist communist movements are not able to overthrow him. And there are also elements in the Iranian army who, Shah is suspicious of them trying to overthrow him by doing a coup. Because then you came to power with a coup, you think he can also go out of the power with a coup. This is going to be very important. By the way, the Shah to the end of his life is very conspiratorial. But anyways, the relationship with the Shah and the CIA is complicated in this way then that Iranian intelligence officers think CIA is not giving them enough and the Shahi is afraid and suspicious that they'll pull something against him.
- [27:32]
A
The suspicion, I guess in one sense is warranted and in another sense is kind of remarkable because I take the point that the Israelis step in in a big way and invest a tremendous amount in particular in the intelligence cooperation between Mossad in Israel and Savak in Iran. But in the 1970s, the CIA trains hundreds of SEBAK officers every year. There's, there's direct financial assistance provided to some Officers of the Iranian Secret Police, the National Security Agency NSA is operating listening posts and early warning radars in northern Iran which are very focused on of course, the Soviet Union. The Shah is the largest foreign buyer of US weaponry during the mid-1970s, spending I think in some estimates up to $16 billion over a four year period, which is like 130 billion today. And it's interesting because the, obviously the frame now when you think about massive US sort of weapons buyers and intelligence partners in the Middle east, you think about Israel, you think about Saudi Arabia, you think about Jordan. And in this period in kind of the 60s and in particular as you go into the 70s, it's really Iran that is almost the kind of a forward operating base for the US in the Middle East. It is the closest relation security relationship that CIA has in the region. Far closer I think than even, you know, the Jordanians or Mossad at the time.
- [29:06]
E
This relationship changes a lot. By the 70s, Iran, the US are very closer. Of course. President Nixon famously seats by the Shah and says, you, Majesty, protect me. And effectively what he means is that in the Middle East Nixon is going to rely not as traditionally had been the case on Iran and Saudi Arabia, but primarily on Iran. And in 1969 Britain declares that it's evacuating all its bases east of Suez Canal. So the order changes in the, in the Persian Gulf after 1971. That's why a country called United Arab Emirates comes to be by the thruchal states joining. But also Iran takes over these three islands that it disputed between crucial states and Iran, it takes them over and Iran finds a sort of very important role. The Iranian ships are now going to the Indian Ocean. But also on the weapons side. Absolutely. The Shah is kind of, he's basically addicted to, is like his, he loves military toys. I don't want to, by the way, I don't want to give you this caricature image of the Shah. To be clear. I think actually Iran's foreign policy under the Shah in 1970s is the best our country has ever had, I think. But in the, in the military, he loves different weapons and aircrafts and he loves his catalogs to go through them and buy them. And he keeps asking the US to, to allow more. But you know, unlike what the regime says, this wasn't some frivolous guy just buying useless weapons. You know, he was really trying to turn Iran into a region of power. And he had a very successful diplomacy. Iran had good ties everywhere and he was no one's lackey. You know, he was not a U.S. lackey.
- [30:34]
B
Yeah, no, no, it's interesting, but I guess you talked a bit about the foreign policy and the military there, but what about at home? Because the perception I have of this period is that savak, the secret police we talked about, you know, working close with this side, become increasingly repressive and part of daily life as the 70s go on and they become a pretty nasty outfit. Is that the right impression to have?
- [30:59]
E
For sure. So Savak, particularly under a guy called Nasiri, as the 60s go on, they become very repressive. They. They torture their opponents. The torture stops at some point in like mid-70s, I think. But. But they. They torture for. For a good part of decade. And not only they suppress. So the. The proponents of the Shahna loves to say, well, of course he was suppressing them because they were armed militant communist groups fighting against us, and they had to be supposed to suppressed. And yes, they were armed militant groups and they're suppressing them, but they're not just suppressing them, they're suppressing students. They're suppressing, you know, anybody who says anything is slightly suspicious, gets a visit from the Savak Gugush, the grand singer who is our. I hate using comparisons, but Barbara Streisand or. Or, you know, Beyonce, but yeah, not Taylor Swift. Much bigger. Much bigger. Bigger than Taylor Swift 100 at the time in Iran. And she's someone who sings at the Shah's birthday, right? She actually sings for the Iranian troops in Oman when Iran intervenes in Oman against the communist forces there, she sings there. But even someone like Gugush gets visits from the Savak when they don't like. Because of course, the people writing her poems are often leftist, right? Because this is. The culture and arts in the world is very lefty in the 60s and 70s. So even she can get visits from the Savak, or maybe don't read that line or. So Savak is very repressive and it cracks down on any sort of elements of opposition to the Shah.
- [32:31]
B
So you get a kind of mix, don't you, of a kind of modernizing regime, but which is also very repressive.
- [32:36]
E
So in the early 60s, Shah does what is called the white revolution. And this is. He grants the rights of the vote to women. He nationalizes the jungles. He does land reform, most importantly. And yes, these are modernizing moves, but yes, they're done in a very authoritarian way and it's very politically repressive. In fact, if you want to understand the 1979 revolution, I think the best sort of Understanding device given my historian Ervan Abrahamian, is that there is a dismatch between economic development and political development, right? So that economically Iran is growing, double digit growth rate in 1970s, good relations with the rest of the world, you know, a lot of exciting things are happening. But politically you're giving nothing to these people. So that, you know, an average Iranian sort of middle class person now can travel to Europe, can see how the world is, but inside his own country he has no, he has no political say and there's no elections for him to vote. There is nowhere to raise discontent. And of course Shah also does the crazy thing, you know, drunk with his power, he at some point, 1975 I believe, he shuts down the party system in Iran, effectively even that limited party system that existed in the parliament. And he builds one party, it's called the Resangerist Party or the Rastakhis Party. And he says at some point if you don't like the party you can leave the country. So he really becomes the autocrat of a higher order. And yeah, that, that doesn't help.
- [34:03]
A
I read an analysis of sort of the development of SAVAK in this period and I thought the author made an interesting conceptual point which was that the secret police enabled the Shah to become politically autonomous from his own society. And so I saw that SAVAK was called the Shah's Eyes. There's sort of this all seeing kind of panopticon.
- [34:26]
E
Let me give an example. My father who was a kid in some village in Iran, wrote an essay for his essay class. We're talking primary school and believe it or not, my grandfather got a visit from the Savak, you know, about the essay his son had written. My late grandfather after all, after the visit told my father, stop doing this. The gentleman who showed up from SAVAK was actually very nice and you know, so you know, he reminded him of the story later. But anyways, the point is that yes of course it was Shah's eyes everywhere and it allowed you to be autonomous from your society. And the other big thing that we can see a lot in Scott Anderson's recent book about the history of the revolution is that one of the terrible things the CIA does is that it doesn't do its own research basically about Iran and the Shah's stability because the Shah is freaked out about them meeting with anyone but the Shahs officers, right? Because Shah's think the CIA is trying to overthrow him. So he basically bans them from meeting opposition and others and they accept that. So the CIA does not know how feeble the Shah's rule can be in the late 70s.
- [35:39]
B
That's really interesting.
- [35:40]
A
It's relying on liaison reporting from Savak about what's going on inside Iran. Or maybe they're not even providing it, it's just a black hole.
- [35:48]
E
No, they are providing it and that's exactly it. They're always everything. Great, your majesty, everyone loves you. But it's obviously a big folly by the CIA because, you know, if you want a serious intelligence organization, you know, you have to, you have to know what's going on in the country. You can't just rely on this guy.
- [36:03]
B
So effectively they don't see what's happening, which is this building pressure, whether it's from the merchant class, whether it's from the clergy, whether it's from people who want democratic change that is growing in the country. So they're going to miss, I guess, the build up to where we should turn to now, which is 1979 and the Revolution, which is, I think, as we said at the start, perhaps the seminal moment in US Iranian relations. It's fascinating, isn't it, to try and understand. I mean, we could spend a lot of time doing it, but this issue, I mean, it is missed, isn't it, David, by the CIA, the notion that it's coming.
- [36:38]
A
Yeah. I mean, when you go back and look at some of the intelligence assessments that are produced in even the months before the shaflies, they're relatively embarrassing, I think, is probably, to put it kind of lightly. It's interesting, I think when you look back, there are, there are reports both from the intelligence agencies, CIA, but also from State Department officials that do comment, I think, on the situation in Iran in 78 and 79 with some real clarity and insight. But as I think we discussed this in January, those reports weren't making it to the actual decision makers in Washington in any kind of systematic way. And I think in general there was. And Arash, I'd be curious for your thoughts on this. It seems like the Carter administration and the, the agency, the CIA, there's just a general failure of imagination to conceive of a world in which the Shah was not ruling Iran, which in hindsight looks inexcusable given that it had been the CIA who had taken this kind of tottering, indecisive, frankly, Monarch, who's very prone to flee and help put him on the throat in the first place. But by, by the time we get to the late 70s, there was like a tremendous anchoring bias. The Shah's regime is stable because it has been stable in recent years and therefore it will continue to be stable. Is, is kind of how I think about it.
- [38:05]
E
But as you know President Carter, you know his most infamous statement is that a year and a half before the revolution he's in Tehran and he says you know, Shah today is an island of stability. You know, in didn't age well. Yeah, yeah it's, it's those, it's this, those kind of really unfortunate quotes.
- [38:24]
A
Right on that point too. I mean there's a CIA assessment five months before the shop Lees that said Iran was not at a revolutionary or even a pre revolutionary situation which also feels like a real, real Ms. That's a mission.
- [38:38]
B
Yeah. The mini McCloskey's, the analysts didn't get that right.
- [38:42]
E
But I will tell you this. Okay. I'll tell you a couple of points. First of all, you know, 1979 revolution, like all Iranians have always thought about how it happened, why it happened, you know, the reasons I gave you some. But it's very important to remember how much of a freak accident it also is right that yes you could have, you could have and should have seen the signs coming. But in no way was this inevitable and in no way. And it's really hard to predict events generally. I very keenly aware of it now because of course every show I am now these days, they're like they just the anchor looks at you and says so Arash, what's going to happen now? I'm glad you asked. I'll tell you exactly, you know.
- [39:21]
A
Yeah.
- [39:22]
E
Open your polymorph.
- [39:23]
A
Wait till the second episode of this series. We're going to, I'm going to look you square in the eye and I'm going to ask you the same question.
- [39:28]
E
So we'll be happy to get there. But look it's, it's really hard to predict. Who knew that Shah is going to flee so early. Who knew that the Iranian army would just throw its hands up. I mean how little resistance there was to this revolution. Who knew that this mullah from Iraq and then Paris can come down and lead the government. I mean all of this is not easy to predict these things.
- [39:55]
A
Impossible to say. It's actually impossible.
- [39:57]
E
Exactly. It's impossible to predict these things. And they really get. Iran gets really unlucky. If you think the revolution was a bad event like I do and these guys get really lucky. I mean sometimes in life you just get really lucky and the Shah has cancer. I mean there's.
- [40:12]
B
Yeah, I was going to say that was one thing wasn't it?
- [40:14]
E
He was.
- [40:15]
A
The CIA doesn't know. The Americans don't know. He's got lymphatic cancer. They don't know.
- [40:19]
E
Exactly.
- [40:20]
B
You mentioned the mullah from Paris, which is Ayatollah Khomeini. Why don't you just explain a little bit about who he was, where he came from, why he ends up playing such a big role.
- [40:31]
E
Ayatollah Khomeini was an important sort of religious authority who in the 1960s, he was. He was a cleric in Iran in the 1960s. He breaks to the tradition of clerics. Having been kind of politically quietist and, and, you know, loyal to the regime in some way, or at least really not activists, he breaks through that tradition and becomes a political activist. He very much instigates political activism. He protests against Iran's ties with Israel. He protests against the Shah. Although, let's not forget his first big political activity. You know what it is? His first big political campaign is against female suffrage in 1961, I think. I mean, he comes out against female suffrage when there's a proposal to give the right of the vote to women, and he comes out against it. This is very embarrassing for the, for the regime later, but. So they kind of dance around it, but, you know, it's very much there and, and incontestable. This is Khomeini's first big political act. As I said, for example, he is not active around the coup, like, you know, in the lead up to the queen. 953. He's not some big activist. He does not support Mossadegh, really. So Ayatollah Khomeini in the 60s rises up, but he has this quality, even though he's. He's obviously, his politics are very reactionary. You know, the fact that a cleric has risen up against the Shah's regime is a big deal. It would be like if you had a movement in Ireland led by the Catholic clergy. Right? So the clerics are very important in Iran society. They're widely respected. They're sort of seen as seats of some moral quality. So to have a major cleric, and
- [42:12]
A
here, the Ireland example is good because the Shia are the Catholics of the Islamic world. Isn't that right?
- [42:17]
E
There we go. We can. There we go. Well, well, debatable. Debatable. Might be Protestants or the. Or the CA. But SHIAs are more ritually similar to Catholics. This is true. Like the Shias are ritualistically more similar to the Catholics. So anyways, Khomeini is a major cleric. He rises up against the regime and for the opposition, for the secular opposition. This is kind of a curious and welcome development because now all of a sudden you have these clerics, you know, the clerics are against the regime. They can get the sort of following and the sort of networks that the seculars can't dream of. Also there's so much suppression. So there's a lot of stories here. People say, you know, why did SAVAK not repress the clerics enough? There is a trend everywhere in the world to use Islamist against communism. Right. And the Shah's regime also tries that a bit. They're hoping that, you know, different discourses of Islam and indigenous knowledge and Islam can help suppress the left and the secular left. So. And also they can't shut down all the mosques. So Khomeini is able to be active much more than the leftist groups because he has, he has access to all these mosques. But by the late 70s, he rises up to really be seen as, as this big leader. And again, accidents of history here are great. Play a very strange role. So he's kicked out of Iraq by Saddam Hussein because he's in his Shia. Saddam is obviously Sunni and we should
- [43:41]
A
say Khamedi had been exiled from Iran, I think in 64 and had been in Iraq for a number of years.
- [43:50]
E
He's exiled to Turkey first and then to Iraq.
- [43:52]
A
Okay.
- [43:53]
E
And he's there for like, you know, he's like there for 12, 13 years. Iraq is the major seat of Shia. So first of all, going to Iraq was good news for him because he's at the major seat of Shia, learning he meets everybody there. Everybody can go and meet him in Iraq. So all the Iranian opposition, different figures. And he's able to organize, right? He's at the Vatican of the Shia faith, basically, and he's able to organize. So it's good for him to be in Najaf in Iraq. And anyways, but Iraq kicks him out and then they kick him out. He tries to go to Kuwait, they don't let him in. He ends up in Paris. He's able to go to Paris because he's an Iranian citizen. Iranian citizens don't need a visa to go to France. So he goes in, shows his passport, gets in French immediately. Tell the Shah, we can do with this guy whatever you want. We can kick him out to Algeria if you want, we can send him somewhere, we can kick him out to Syria. His visa free stay is only for like three months or something, so we can't keep up. And the Shah says no. And which Tends to be another folly because Paris is great for the Ayatollah, not because he's hitting the nightlife or, you know, seeing the shows, but because there he can speak to media. So you have this figure who's a holy figure, who seems to represent a calm antidote to the Shah. He's a Gandhi, effectively, as far as the Iranian oppositionism is concerned. And they also think they can use him. It's a very important part of the story. The average Iranian opposition activist think they can use him. They're like, oh, Khomeini, you know, obviously he's not going to be able to rule because what does he know? He's an old mullah.
- [45:33]
B
And so you've got this period of unrest, I guess, strikes. And then, as you said, the Shah leaves, Perhaps surprisingly, in January 1979, he just flees. And Khomeini returns, I think, at the start of February, doesn't he? This kind of huge arrival. And that leads to something which people didn't expect, which is this turning into what many people didn't necessarily want or expect, which is an Islamic revolution.
- [46:00]
E
Well, yeah. So Shah flees the country in January. He gives it, leaves it in the care of a prime minister. He's appointed Shapur Bakhtiar, somebody who was an old pal of Mossadegh, was an ally of Mossadegh. He's from the same party as Mossadegh National Front, although the party kicks him out when he becomes prime minister. Bakhtiar is a social democrat. He was in France for many years. He had supported the Spanish Republicans in the Spanish Civil War as a man of law. So he's very much a figure of the center left in a way. So Shah hopes that under him and new government can have more legitimacy. But no people now are want to reject the whole regime, so they come out against him as well. And Khomeini comes to Iran in February and within 10 days there is a mass uprising that finally overthrows the Waktiyar government and the power passes on to the interim government that Khomeini had appointed. At this point, it's not clear what the future of this revolution will be. As far as everybody knows, it's going to be called an Islamic republic, but no one knows what that is. And Khomeini sort of, they think he's going to be some sort of a spiritual leader. Now there comes a time to write the constitution and decide the future of Iran. And, you know, very freaky incidents happen there as well. Very strange. You know, this course of events are also Strange.
- [47:14]
A
And to put a point on the SAVAK story, I. I was out of curiosity looking into what, what happened to SAVAK in the, in the revolution. And it, it looks like SAVAK headquarters, of course, one of the first government buildings that seized. And then this was, I guess, interesting to be the second, third and fourth chiefs of the SAVAK are all executed that spring on charges of sowing corruption on earth. The first SAVAK director, I was wondering what happened to that guy. He had fled Iran after falling out with the Shah and had been assassinated probably by Sabak itself back in 1970. So all of the heads of Sabah.
- [47:51]
E
For sure.
- [47:52]
B
For sure.
- [47:52]
E
That's. That's Taimur Bakhtiar, by the way. He was the cousin of this other Bakhtar that I spoke, spoke about. Shah's last prime minister. He was killed in Iraq, Taimur Bakhtiar. And yeah, under Shah had a lot of suspicion. Well, not just suspicion. Taimur was trying to organize their own opposition against the Shah. A lot of people there, including Khomeini, communists, you know, they were all in Iraq. And Taimur Bakhtiar was hoping to sort of lead them against the Shah, I guess.
- [48:16]
B
David, I mean, the other thing that happens in 1979 is, you know, another event which gets referenced, including by Donald Trump quite a bit and recently, which is this hostage crisis which happens at the US Embassy in Tehran. Now, I think we're going to look at that a bit deeper later in the year and do some episodes on it where we can really deep dive into the story. But it is important, isn't it, in terms of the legacy which, what we're really looking at, of mistrust and enmity between these two countries, that hostage crisis that takes place.
- [48:46]
E
Yes, another freak incident, you know. No, seriously, how much in the year 78 and 79 seem to be just contingent events that end up solidifying things is crazy because. Yeah. So what's the story? The story is that in November 1979, bunch of Islamist students stormed the US embassy and take it over. Now everybody thinks this is going to be a crazy thing that some people did and it's over in a couple of days, right? No, they keep U.S. diplomats, more than 50 of them hostage for it ends up becoming more than 400 days. Right. And this was really a bunch of students who had done it. And the government, the interim government, is led by Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan. Again, old Islamist, ally of Islamist, but very mild Islamist, but ally of Mossadegh. He's really from the National Front And Khomeini for whatever reason had appointed him as prime minister. Not his clerical lieutenants, you know, not more hardline Islamist by him, but him. So obviously he can't approve of this. Right? He wants to have diplomatic relations in the US he can't approve of this. He resigns effectively. And this is the end of the liberal period of the Islamic revolution. It ends in November 1979. The governments that follow are all going to be much more ardent Islamists. And Ayatollah Khomeini does something crazy which is that he approves of the hostage taking. So these students who had taught, you know, even themselves they had taught bro, think it would be over. I mean everybody thinks, you know, this is something. And people had even done it before. There was like some leftists who had stormed the embassy at some point. And people think it will be over. But Khomeini says this is great, keep doing it. And he calls it the second revolution. And it radicalizes things in Iran. Right. It is the age of radicalism. Radicalism in Iran, as I said, the liberal government of Bazargan, and I use the term liberal liberally, but mild Islamist whatever. So that government is gone and the change of the course of Iranian history really changes. And what is also fascinating is that Iran and the US do start negotiations at some point about this release. But of course they drag on and drag on and drag on. And finally the hostages are released during the inauguration of, of President Reagan and one of the other, you know, conspiracies that exist there, which many people believe in it's past. Most prominent defender of this theory is Gary Sick, who was a national security. He was in the National Security Council in the US at the time is what they call the October Surprise, which is to say that elements in the Reagan campaign conspire with Islamic Republic to prevent the release of hostages so that President Carter is hurt in the election year in 1980 and he's not elected. I'm not endorsing this theory, but there
- [51:34]
B
are more has come out to support that theory in recent years, actually, and people who were. There's an intermediaries. Yeah, yeah.
- [51:41]
E
There's an enable. And there are many prominent people have believed versions of it.
- [51:45]
B
And that leaves a lasting legacy, doesn't it, David, for the way the US sees Iran particularly.
- [51:49]
A
Yeah, I think it's worth putting a point on this as we close out this first episode, which is as we've been talking about the revolution, I think you put it well, Arash, I mean there's a whole bunch of different kind of contingent, almost freak accidents that create this, I guess, tendency toward radicalization throughout the process, but that at any point didn't necessarily need to happen. I mean, how, how do we end up post revolution with the US And Iran seemingly locked in this vicious dispute? I mean, the hostage crisis, you know, I mean, even in the way Trump talks about it, is sort of, in some ways the original sin of the current predicament that we're in with Iran. But as we kind of close out this first episode, how would we characterize kind of where we have gotten in this secret war between the two states?
- [52:44]
E
Khomeini in his path to power, one of the most smart things he did was try to reassure Americans that they have nothing to worry about him because he's not a communist. It's very important. And of course, this in the Iranian conspiracies goes to the level, oh, Carter put Khomeini on the throne. No, Carter did no such thing, of course. But it is true that President Carter did not think a overthrow of the shove would be such a bad thing. Necessarily, necessarily. Like at the very end where he saw it as, well, it's just happening anyways. He did not think it would be the end of the world. He says so in his diary. I think the exact phrase is non aligned Iran, you know, might not be such a bad thing. Something like that. He wrote, writes it in the diary in January 1979, right before Khomeini comes to power. So Khomeini had helped reassured the Americans, but that he's, you know, he has reassured them that he's, he's anti communist, so they have nothing to worry about him. So on the face of it, there's no reason why Iran and the United States shouldn't be able to develop good relations even under the Islamic Republic. But if it wasn't for hazardous crisis, he would have found other ways. And the reason is that he was a genuine, true radical. I mean, he was a real radical. He wanted Iran to be both against communism and Soviet Union and against United States and sort of the free world, quote, unquote, in the Cold War. He wanted to stake a radical independence from both of them, because he was a genuine radical in a way that he really rejected modern conceptions of politics. Right. This wasn't for him about left versus the right. He was a sort of a Sufi mystic who wanted a form of, you know, Islamic governance that went beyond all modern conceptions of politics. So it was inevitable that he would storm out against the US like he
- [54:35]
B
did so maybe there with the tension now set up between this new regime and the US let's end this first episode and we'll come back next time and really, I guess take it up to the present and how we get from 1979 to epic fury and events today. Just a reminder, you can listen to that straight away. If you're a declassified club member, do join it the restisclassified.com and you'll get access to to this special bonus Q and A that we're doing with Arash for our club members. So do join up. But otherwise we'll see you next time.
- [55:08]
A
We'll see you next time.
- [55:14]
C
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