Loading summary
Transcript144 lines
- [00:02]
A
Guess what day it is. It's French Friday. It's French fry day. So grab your fries and say hooray. David French is here to play on French Friday. It's French fry day. Hey, everybody.
- [00:18]
B
Welcome back to the Sky Pod. We have a French Friday episode because David French is with me. Hi, David.
- [00:24]
A
Hey, Scott. How are you? I'm all right.
- [00:26]
B
So the last time we did one of these, it came out on February 27, about 24 hours before the Iran war really kicked off on the 28th. Yeah, so, I mean, we talk once a month, so there's always a lot to talk about. Because events move so quickly, I was hoping we were not going to be talking about a new war in the Middle east, but here we are, right?
- [00:45]
A
Yeah.
- [00:46]
B
Okay, so big question to start things off with, and I've been reading different folks on this and trying to do my own research on it, and it seems pretty muddled. You are an attorney. You know the Constitution. You've practiced law, you teach law. You are a journalist who deals with politics all the time. You have a fantastic podcast on legal questions, particularly regarding the Supreme Court with Sarah Isger, advisory opinions like, I can't think of anyone better to ask this up. And you were a JAG attorney. Like you were in the military. So did the Trump administration adhere to the law and the Constitution in its decision to attack Iran?
- [01:28]
A
Absolutely not. It did not adhere to American constitutional law. But this is a weird one. Sky. Because this is a war, that would be just if it were legal. But because it's legal, it can't be.
- [01:43]
B
Just hold on, let me put my brain around that for a second. If it were legal, it would be just.
- [01:50]
A
Yes, but it is not legal. So therefore it by definition cannot be just so. In other words, there was reason to initiate armed conflict or to continue actually more properly, an armed conflict with Iran. In other words, under traditional international law, just war principles, which have been essentially codified in the UN Charter, which is you cannot launch aggressive war. Aggressive war is unlawful under the UN Charter. Aggressive war is unlawful under just war theory. And I'm going to use these two quasi interchangeably, because the UN Charter essentially, when it comes to the decision to initiate war, just ad bellum, it really does pretty much codify just war theory, and that is really war is only acceptable under one of three conditions. Defensive self defense of others, collective self defense. Think NATO Article 5. If Russia attacked Estonia, we would have just cause to defend Estonia. Or to prevent the never again calculus, to prevent crimes against humanity, genocide. But that's Supposed to be done genocide, ethnic cleansing. But that's supposed to be done under the auspices of the UN or you know, so the UN Security Council is ideally supposed to, for example, like it did in Libya in 2011, issue a security Council resolution authorizing members of the United nations to engage in armed force to stop crimes against humanity. So massacres of civilians, ethnic cleansing, genocide, things like that. So those are the three conditions under which, really broadly speaking, under which war is just and lawful. We are a signatory to the UN charter. We have, I believe we ratified it 89 to 2, maybe back in the 1940s, so overwhelmingly ratified it. We're a signatory to the UN charter. And so in those circumstances, that's where under international law you can go to war. Now, international law and American law are not the same thing. So under American law we should only be going to war when there is reason to go to war under the UN Charter and we have complied with domestic law and the Constitution in the process of going to war. So you have to do both of those things. For example, if Congress said authorized an invasion of Mexico just because we wanted Mexico, not Canada, to be the 51st state, that would be an unjust illegal war, even though authorized by Congress because it violates the UN Charter.
- [04:38]
B
Got it.
- [04:39]
A
So but if you, and if we had, let's suppose there had been cross border attacks from Mexico to the US and the President went to Congress and said I want authority to invade Mexico and Mexico, and Congress said no, even though Mexico had attacked us. Under American constitutional law, we're not supposed to then invade Mexico because we Congress has said no suit. That's what I mean about drawing out the two things. They both have to be in harmony under American law and under international law for a war to be lawful.
- [05:09]
B
Okay, so then let's break this into a couple different parts. Let's put the legality and the constitutionality and the process question aside for a second. We'll come back to it.
- [05:18]
A
Right.
- [05:19]
B
When you just look at Iran and its behavior, could you have made a case that this war is justifiable?
- [05:29]
A
Yes, on all three grounds.
- [05:31]
B
And so that gets to the question I have, which is there's no doubt for 47 years Iran has been engaged in all kinds of horrific behavior, both toward its own people, even recently in its killing of its own protesters, and internationally with its funding in support of various terrorist groups, different actions against U.S. troops and bases around the world, terrorist things, all kinds of nonsense. The question I have though is was it an imminent threat so that the Status quo of say, February 27, 2026 required us to go to war on February 28th. I'm not saying the status quo was great. It was clearly not great. But did it necessitate the actions of this administration in going to war on February 28? Because the question is not do we, Is it an ideal situation? No, it's not. It hasn't been ideal since 1979. Right. But that status quo was kind of baked into the reality. What triggered this administration to say, no, no, no, no. At this point, the status quo has changed so much that we have to go to war because there's no other legitimate option for us.
- [06:41]
A
Okay, so this is where it gets very squirrely sky. Because imminence is basically the only argument in these circumstances you can make to justify doing an end run around Congress. So, so if a president receives information that say, for, let's say, for example, I'm just, I'm just making this up. Let's suppose you receive information that you see massive movement in Iranian missiles to their launchers. You receive intelligence that Iran is targeting, going to be targeting in American troops, that maybe you have Iranian jets sort of painting, to use a term, American jets with fire control radar or Iranian surface to air missiles painting American jets in international waters with fire control radars. In other words, there's a lot of signals going, something is about to kick off. Or let's take another. What if Ukraine saw all the Russian troops moving to its borders and decided to strike first? That would be justifiable. Ukraine could do that because Russia is. You don't have to wait for the blow to land if you know that you can see the blow coming. And so that's a very narrow circumstance where a president seeing a blow about to land can deliver the first blow, but under the War Powers resolution should go immediately to Congress. Right. You know, even if there's imminence and you, you ha. You order to save American troops who are going to land that first blow.
- [08:10]
B
So it would be, this attack's about to happen. I don't have time to go to Congress if I'm the President.
- [08:14]
A
Exactly.
- [08:14]
B
I'm going to authorize the military to strike first. And almost immediately I am going to go to Congress and say, this is the action I've taken. This is why I've taken it. Please authorize for further action as needed to pacify this threat. But none of that's what happened a month ago.
- [08:29]
A
None of that. So this is where I say it gets really squirrely sky. This is what is one of the factors, that makes me say there's just no way this was constitutional. So the argument seems to be this, that once Israel made the decision to go, we believed that Iran would respond to an Israeli attack by attacking us.
- [08:56]
B
This is what Marco Rubio essentially said.
- [08:58]
A
Yes, yes, this is the Marco Rubio argument. So, so it's not that we went to war because Israel attacked, it's that we attacked at the timing we attacked because Israel was going to attack, that we were going. So this is where it gets so muddy. So if, if we were going to go to war with Israel anyway, then, and there's no immediate, imminent, immediate strike of Iran doing a first strike, then there's no reason not to go to Congress at all. Okay, so there's no imminence. But let's suppose, I think what Rubio and this is complicated and that's why I keep using the word squirrely, if I understand him correctly, Israel and America said, yes, we're going to go. And then Israel says, and we're going now. And we go, okay, we're going now because if you go on the operation we've both agreed to go on, then we're going to get attacked also. But conceptually, sky, this makes very little sense at all, right?
- [10:03]
B
It sounds to me like the United States decided that it is strategically advantageous for us to strike with Israel first, because if we don't and Israel strikes, Iran's going to retaliate against our troops or ships or whatever might be in the area. So why would we give up that strategic advantage where we know we're going to get hit anyway, but we're not going to get hit because Iran is saber rattling. It's because our own ally is saber rattling.
- [10:29]
A
Right? Our own ally is about to strike Iran and Iran will strike us back now. And then that would mean that we would be pulled into the war anyway. So we're going to join Israel now is sort of the way. However, again, sky, when you unpack this, if you give it a moment's thought or scrutiny, it all falls apart. Because let's just suppose, for the sake of argument, Israel was going to go anyway on a particular day. Well, there's another option we could do other than building troops up if we don't want to fight. It is taking troops out of harm's way, right? Or taking steps to remove civilians, you know, move troops into hardened bunkers, things like that that you can do. Remove, remove jets and ships from range of missile fire, et cetera, and sort of essentially, you know, the. For the first Israel fought a 12 day war already. And for the first 11 days of that war, we were not involved at all. We had troops and civilians in the region, and we only got involved for sort of a coup de grace strike in the very end of it all.
- [11:33]
B
Well, this is.
- [11:33]
A
And so it is not the case that it is inevitable that Israeli conflict with Iran would pull us in in the way that the administration's talking.
- [11:44]
B
And this has been a pretty loud critique coming from some formerly MAGA voices on the far right, whether it's Tucker Carlson or others. And it gets, this is. Talk about squirrely. This gets really weird really quick because what starts out as a critique of one of America's most important allies and its most important ally in the Middle East, Israel can very quickly slip into anti Semitism. And I don't want to go there, but it seems a little odd to a lot of people observing this that America's the stronger power here. We are the ones who are supplying Israel with much of its military might.
- [12:25]
A
And it felt a little bit like
- [12:27]
B
the little brother is dictating the terms here. And couldn't the Trump administration have said to Netanyahu, hey, listen, I understand you want to go after Iran right now because they're weak and you're going to do this on your timetable, but we're in charge here and we're going to dictate how this goes. Or you're on your own, Netanyahu. You go do this, we're backing out, and it's on you. It just feels like we rolled over and showed our belly to an ally that's actually dependent on us.
- [12:53]
A
Yes, that would be the case if you believed what Marco Rubio said.
- [12:58]
B
Right.
- [12:59]
A
So I do not believe what. I do not believe this administration story. I think this is a joint and a weird. And the way the administration spun the story out was terrible for Israel. Right.
- [13:12]
B
Because it does open the door to that kind of anti Semitic rhetoric of their secretly controlling America's foreign policy and things.
- [13:18]
A
Yeah, yeah. This is America going to war for Israel. America going to war on Israel's timing. And so I just sky I have a hard time. I will just say I flat out don't believe it. Okay, here's what I believe occurred. What I believe occurred is that I do think that Netanyahu lobbied Trump, but Trump made his own decision. He's a grown man. He made his own decision. He's not Netanyahu's puppet. And he and Netanyahu decided to strike Iran. And then that's when we began building up forces. And you saw this unfold for days and days and days and days. And I think that we struck on the day that we struck because of the target of opportunity with the Ayatollah.
- [13:58]
B
Right.
- [13:59]
A
Not because Israel was going to strike anyway and we had to join them. No, I think there was a target of opportunity, the Ayatollah that actually was a, you know, if the reporting is to be believed, was American CIA intelligence told Israel that he was there. Israel goes ahead and strikes. It was an IDF strike, an Israeli air force strike, but it was with American intel as part of rolling out the whole ATTCK package. Okay, so, yeah, so I just don't believe that story, to be honest.
- [14:32]
B
I think what you're outlining there makes total sense. I have no problem buying into the narrative that you just articulated. And I don't. I agree. I wouldn't just say we were on a. Puppets on a string that's controlled by Bibi Netanyahu or something. I don't buy that either. But if the narrative you just outlined is the correct one, isn't that still illegal and immoral? Just because you have a target of opportunity to attempt to overthrow a regime that's technically not at war with us, and you don't have congressional approval and you don't have the UN behind you and you don't have your NATO out, the United States kind of looks like the bad guys here. And I'm not saying Iran is a good guy, but it's not the American way to just say we are going to, at a moment of our convenience, blow up a home with the entire ruling regime of a foreign government.
- [15:27]
A
I don't have any problem with a decapitation strike in a declared war. You know, so.
- [15:32]
B
But that's the key phrase, a declared war.
- [15:35]
A
Yeah. So my issue is not with the decapitation strike. My issue is with the declared. The lack of a declared war. Exactly. And, and even if, Even if you're going to say, well, David, you. I mean, if you have a target like that, I'm like, no, no, no, no, no. That is not the way this works. It does not say Article one does not say Congress declares war unless there's a really juicy target for the president.
- [16:01]
B
Exactly.
- [16:02]
A
And also, by the way, this target emerged only after weeks of buildup. Weeks when we could have been making. He could have been making his case to the American people. He could have been making his case to Congress. He could have been making his case in the UN Security Council. Look, I know a lot of people A lot of listeners are not necessarily big fans of George W. Bush in the Iraq war. But he did it right, okay? He did it right. And in fact, and this is a thing very few people know, honestly, more people should know it. His own Department of Justice had advised him that he didn't need to go to Congress or the U.N. his own department of justice, the Office of Legal Counsel, told him he had the authority to strike and attack and depose Saddam without Congress. Which is what I mean, what is the Department of Justice doing? And he said, no, I could read the Constitution. And so what did he do? He spent months preparing the American people, convincing Congress, rallying a bipartisan majority, convincing the UN to issue. So he went to war with the UN Security Council resolution. He went to war with authorization for the use of military force. He went to war with two thirds to three quarters American support. Now, we know that the way the war went, a lot of public support drained out relatively quickly. But that's the way you do it. He got a declaration of war or an authorization for use of military force after 9 11.
- [17:31]
B
Right.
- [17:31]
A
And nobody doubted we could have hit back after 9 11, just instantly on the President's command. But he went and he got an AUMF. After 9 11, his dad went and got Security Council resolutions and authorizations for Desert Storm.
- [17:44]
B
And this is the part that, I mean, some of our listeners are probably not old enough to remember 2002, 2003, in the run up to the Iraq war. I certainly am old enough. And we can look back on that and say, well, where were the WMDs? And was all the rhetoric honest? And was the tactics they were using to persuade the American public and Congress and the UN all above board? That's all debatable, but the process itself was admirable. And what I appreciated about what W did in that season, even though I was not a supporter of the war at the time, what I appreciate that he did is he was trying to maintain America's moral authority by saying, we are not just a vengeful people that are going to attack those who we believe attacked us in the case of Afghanistan, or we're going to preemptively attack those who we fear may attack us. In the case of Iraq, instead, he said, we follow, we believe in the rule of law, we're following the Constitution, we're persuading the people, we're winning over the representatives, we're going to the United nations, we're rallying our allies, we're making our case. There was Colin Powell holding up the little baggie of whatever that substance was that he was holding up in front of the UN Security Council. There was global persuasion at work. Yeah. And none of that happened this time. Nothing like that happened. And now nothing. The other case.
- [19:04]
A
Worse than nothing. Worse than nothing. And we can talk about how it was worse than nothing.
- [19:08]
B
The other thing I want to bring up, though, is there was no doubt back in 2003 that what President Bush was asking for was authorization to go to war.
- [19:16]
A
Yes.
- [19:16]
B
What some people are saying in this case is, well, it's not really a war, so you don't really need authorization. And they will go back and cite Obama in 2011 not seeking congressional authority to strike Libya with our NATO allies. And so how does that factor into this? Do Trump or his advocates have any leg to stand on by citing that example in 2011 as an end round around Congress? And why not then?
- [19:43]
A
So two. No. That's a double no. So here's the primary no. The decision of a prior president to violate the Constitution does not erase the Constitution. So if a prior president has engaged in an unlawful conflict, that is not legal precedent for you to engage in an unlawful context. I think that there is only one way. It's fascinating to me how Maga argues. 90% of the arguments MAGA engages in begins with what about?
- [20:17]
B
Sure.
- [20:17]
A
And going. You know, so if they do something wrong, they're going to look at the last five administrations and they're going to find, you know, somewhere somebody you don't like our tariffs. What about student loan debt cancellation? You know, the what about is just constant. And so it's been, what about Libya? Well, let's just presume for the sake of argument that Libya was exactly analogous. If Obama did that the wrong way in 2011, that's not carte blanche for Trump to do it the wrong way in 2026. But it's not the same because Obama had a Security Council resolution authorizing the members of the Security Council to use force. Authorizing use force to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe and disaster. I don't know if you remember the exact setting, but there was. Gaddafi's forces were advancing on. Essentially, we looked like we were about to have a massacre in Libya on the scale of the massacre that actually happened in Iran, where tens of thousands of people were slaughtered, murdered. And so there was a UN Security Council resolution. Now, the American constitutional argument for why that would be enough is very similar to when the UN Security Council, when there's a UN Security Council resolution that triggers treaty obligations in the same way that an attack on NATO triggers treaty obligations. These treaty obligations have been Senate ratified. And so we're participating in a democratically ratified international security process. And that's the argument of the Obama legal team, was we already had the authorization with the Senate ratification of the UN Treaty. And when you have a UN Resolution, then the US can operate under that umbrella.
- [22:09]
B
Okay, so in other words, I'm not
- [22:10]
A
sure I totally agree with that.
- [22:11]
B
But their argument is Congress, who the Article one gives the right to declare war, essentially made that decision when they ratified these agreements, these treaties that we were a part of. So it isn't like Article 1 authority has no role in this. It had that role. It's just.
- [22:27]
A
It had already been exercised. Right, right.
- [22:30]
B
So whether you buy that argument or not, it doesn't apply to this situation at all.
- [22:34]
A
It does. It's apples and it's, It's. It's not at just apples and oranges. It's apples and bowling balls.
- [22:40]
B
I mean, well, they're both round.
- [22:43]
A
They're only. They're both round, but they're, they're both not fruit. You know, it's, it's the, the situation is very. The, the closest analogy would be really that the Clinton operations in the Balkans. That would be a close analogy. Yeah.
- [22:59]
B
Yeah. Okay.
- [22:59]
A
Yeah. And that's going back to the 90s, and it was very controversial at the time. Sky, I'm older than you. I remember the controversy around that use of force.
- [23:09]
B
I was a college student. I remember it.
- [23:13]
A
Yeah, you're a young whippersnapper. Scott,
- [23:16]
B
there's a sad reality that when these military operations are relatively or wildly successful, people tend to forgive the way in which they were engaged. Right. It's when they become a quagmire or there's terrible loss of life or whatever, the bad outcome occurs that everyone looks back, go, well, they did it wrong. And that's where you might be held accountable. So let me ask you this. If you were advising senators, Republican, Democrat, doesn't matter if you're advising senators about their proper response to what we've seen in the last month, what would you be telling them? I mean, we saw some of them freak out after this happened, saying, this is illegal, it's unconstitutional, the President's acting without authorization. But essentially it feels to me that Congress kind of just rolled over and said, oh, well, what would you tell them they should be doing?
- [24:10]
A
They have to assert control over this conflict. And so.
- [24:14]
B
But they don't want to own the outcome, so why would they?
- [24:18]
A
They don't.
- [24:19]
B
There's no political interest for them to do that.
- [24:21]
A
No. And they will not do it. And, and, and let me give, let me tell you reasons why they won't do it other than just your standard garden variety, you know, cowardice in the face of Trump, which is like the, just the normal standard garden variety. But why is it that Congress has been very bad at asserting its authority when presidents have unilaterally taken us into conflicts and because it has happened. It has happened. You know, you've got Clinton and the Balkans. You, what did Congress do in, you know, 2011 with Libya? We've had shorter, sharp, shorter conflicts where there's been no congressional role, you know, at all. But why not? And I'll tell you the reason why the structure is supposed to work the way it's supposed to work with Congress saying yes, and then, and only then the president bringing the troops into battle is because once the troops are in battle, it can become very dangerous and deadly to prematurely extricate them from the conflict.
- [25:27]
B
Right?
- [25:27]
A
And so there's sort of this diabolical evil genius element to just going ahead and plunging the troops into combat in a democracy, because at that very moment that you plunge the troops into combat is the moment where you raise the danger of disengagement to such a level that members of Congress don't want American troop, American blood on their hands when you order sort of a wind down or a stand down, because a retreating army is not the strongest army, a retreating Navy, that they're not in the best posture. Right? And so, so what happens is the way the system should work. There's very little remedy, effective remedy once it fails. The only really effective remedy once it fails is honestly, truly impeachment and conviction, which we know, ha ha, I mean, come on, that doesn't happen or serious penalties at the ballot box. And that's what happened to the Republicans in 06, even with the authorization use of military force, the way the war went badly, there were WMDs in Iraq, but not the WMD program that we thought. And then also the war bogged down, especially in 04,05, the early part of 06, there were thousands of American casualties. There was a lot of discontent with the war. And so in 06, the Republicans were hammered. In 08, the Republicans were hammered. And for years after, the Bush administration was like, oh, we don't want to do that again, was the public consensus, Right? And so it was. The war in Iraq became a cautionary tale for a lot of people.
- [27:17]
B
And ironically, Donald Trump built his political coalition partly on saying Iraq was a huge mistake and he would keep us out of foreign wars.
- [27:25]
A
Totally. I mean, I like to say this, sky, when I voted for Kamala Harris, they told me that there would be another war in the Middle east and the President would try to break the filibuster. And they were right. Sky, I voted for Kamala Harris and there's a war in the Middle east and the President's trying to break the filibuster. Just the different president.
- [27:48]
B
Okay, let's pivot to some of the political implications of this, because you're talking about the political fallout from the previous war in the Middle east under the Bush administration. We're seeing some pretty influential MAGA voices like Tucker Carlson and Joe Rogan and some others come out pretty strongly against this war, criticizing the President, kind of saying he's betrayed his promises, things like that. But the polling thus far shows it's like 90 plus percent of Republican voters
- [28:16]
A
believe MAGA in particular.
- [28:18]
B
Right. MAGA voters are in lockstep with the President here and they are believing whatever it is they're being told through the, their algorithms and media bubble that this war is moral, justified and legal. Why do you think there's a split between the MAGA influencers and the base? And do you think that's going to persist or will there. Is this the beginning of erosion? Is it rotting from the head down as the MAGA influencers are bailing, or is there nothing that will ever shake that base?
- [28:47]
A
I'm going to use this analogy again, and I can't remember if I used it on a French Friday or not, but it's an analogy I'm growing very fond of because, and I think it has a, it has a, an analogy that, that's, it's, it's very true to what we actually see happening. So if you look at the Trump approval rating, it was slightly above 50% to start this second term. And then it's just slowly eroded. It's just gone down. It's not plunged, it's just slowly eroded. And that's the dynamic right now. And the dynamic is, imagine, you know, like sky, we're in Chicago and you know how Chicago. Well, I'm not in Chicago at the moment, but we, we're, we live in the greater Chicagoland area. And you know how you get on the freeway, it's choked with people. And then with, on rush hour, and then every exit, a few people get off, a few people get off the exit. That's what's happening to Trump right now. It's not that he's facing a collapse in support. It's that every day he gives his supporters a new off ramp. He will do something every day, every week that you can say, well, I was with him. And then, and so this is what you're seeing happen is there's this big MAGA stream of Republican voters and they're all on the highway and then you look up in front of you and one or two cars has on their blinker and they exit off and then there's just slightly less traffic. And then the next week or day or month, you see a few more cars flip on that blinker and exit off the MAGA freeway. And so the MAGA freeway is getting smaller and smaller and smaller, but it's still the MAGA freeway. And so they're still going to say it's going to be overwhelming support from a smaller and smaller group of people. So do you think that that's why this is a little deceptive?
- [30:42]
B
Right. So you're saying that the polling that shows 90 plus percent support is because it's self selected, because the people who got off the highway aren't included in that poll anymore?
- [30:51]
A
Well, because you're gonna be asked, are you MAGA Republican? Right. And a lot of these polls are trying to sort separate out Republicans and MAGA Republicans. And if you're saying I am present tense a MAGA Republican, I would be, I'm stunned. It's not 100%. You know, if you're, if you're, if you are saying to a pollster, I am currently present tense maga. But I do think that there are a number of people would say I'm not Maga.
- [31:18]
B
Right. So it's, who did vote for him. It's 90% of a shrinking number of
- [31:21]
A
people, 90% of a shrink. And that's what you'll see as long as he is in office is he's going to have an overwhelming majority support of a shrinking pool. And it's not that the polls will necessarily say MAGA Republicans have turned on Trump. It will be, MAGA is faithful to Trump, but Trump is at 34% now, 33% now. MAGA just gets to be a smaller and smaller universe of people.
- [31:56]
B
What do you think it will take politically for more Republicans in Congress to actually take the exit and say we're not? I mean, you see a tiny bit of this with like Marjorie Taylor Greene getting off with the Epstein stuff and a few others on that issue. That was certainly an exit that some of them decided, I'm out. But My hope was back in 2021, on January 6th, you were going to see a lot of political leaders on the right take the exit and say we're done with Trump. And they initially did for like 24 hours and then they all got back on right away. But if between Epstein and now this war, not to mention inflation and gas prices and all the other craziness that's been going on, is there anything that will break the Republicans in Congress from supporting Trump in a significant way? Is it being tested right now with this Save America act? That's being debated. Is that going to be a telltale moment for this whole coalition?
- [32:55]
A
It will be a moment. It'll be, you're seeing little bitty, you're seeing small moments and maybe even moderate sized moments. So if the Republicans in the Senate say we're keeping the filibuster, that is a significant stant. The filibuster really does matter. When the House and the Senate voted to release the Epstein files, that was a significant stand. That really didn't matter. So you're not going to say it never happens. But even the people who vote say to release Epstein's Epstein files or vote to keep the filibuster, they're not going to come out and be against Trump or they're not going to become never Trumpers or say he's lost his way and all, you know, I'm off this. They're going to vote against him and then kind of hope that they stay out of his crosshairs, you know, stay out of his political crosshairs. Because when you go through the list of Republicans who have legitimately defied Trump, it's just a, like, it's a long list of ex office holders, right, or retiring politicians. And, and I will tell you the first time, the time when I think that you will see Republicans start to stand up is when I can see Republicans stand up and keep their career. That is something that we have not seen except in Georgia, in Georgia state electoral office. Brian Kemp is still governor and he stood up to Trump in 2020. You know, he beat off, he, he defeated a, excuse me, he defeated a MAGA challenger, you know, to, to remain governor of Georgia. But that has not translated. He is like Harry Potter, the boy who lived, you know, the, you know, Voldemort. He, Voldemort couldn't strike down Harry Potter. And, and Brian Kemp is sort of alone down there in Georgia as the Republican who stood up to Trump and survived. And, and that's the problem that the, you know, everyone around outside of the Republican Party, who is saying, stand up, stand up, stand up. Everyone inside the Republican Party is hearing, sacrifice my career. Sacrifice my career. And I'm sitting here going, sacrifice your career? Yeah, like, guys, do the right thing here. But that's a big ask, you know, it is a heavy lift. It's a big ask that you're making, maybe.
- [35:14]
B
But they all also put their hand in a Bible and swore an oath to uphold and defend the Constitution of the United States. So on some level, it's like, this is what you signed up for.
- [35:24]
A
But I will say this. I will say it is easy for people who have never faced a threat to their career to tell somebody else, risk your career.
- [35:33]
B
Of course.
- [35:33]
A
Right, yeah.
- [35:34]
B
But, okay, let's putting that aside, the courage that we wish were true of our elected officials, the political reality is the reason they are risking their career is because the perception is that the majority of Republican voters will punish them if they go against Donald Trump. So they're, they're waiting to see when are the voters going to sour on Donald Trump and not punish me if I go against him. And that's why I was started with this question about why are 90% of those being polled still supporting this guy when he, you know, hasn't fulfilled his promise about inflation and the economy. He hasn't fulfilled his promise to keep us out of foreign wars. He's broken one thing. He hasn't released all the Epstein files or clear. But I guess there's two. This is an oversimplification, but two interpretations of that beyond your exit ramp stuff that I think is a good explanation. One is they just don't care that he's a hypocrite or he's backing out on his promises, or he's violating all these things because it's just a cult of Trump and they're with him no matter what he does. That's one option. The other option is they do care, and they would care, but they're engaged in media silos that are not actually informing them of what's really going on. So I have talked to people who, who genuinely believe that the Epstein files have completely exonerated Donald Trump, because that's what they've been told through their algorithms.
- [36:57]
A
I know.
- [36:57]
B
Or they believe that this war with Iran was absolutely necessary because if he hadn't done it, I don't know, there was going to be a warhead dropped on New York City tomorrow. So they believe this stuff. And so why would they abandon him when they have been told that everything he's done is absolutely great.
- [37:15]
A
Well, so there you're really also, you're hitting on a couple of things that I think are really, really important. So number one is a lot of these influencers are trying to make MAGA something other than the support of a man, Donald Trump. And so they're trying to fashion an ideology of MAGA I.e. nothing that Donald Trump has actually like really been core to his belief system.
- [37:40]
B
Right.
- [37:40]
A
And so, so a lot of this magazine, sky, when I was, when I was being debated, people were debating me. During the run up to the election, I had Iran hawks who were in sort of the Republican Party saying, don't listen to any of this anti war stuff. He'll deal with Iran. He's going to do something about Iran and Kamala Harris won't. Which was the exact reverse of this sort of MAGA influencer saying, Kamala Harris is going to take us to war in Iran and Trump won't. Right. I had Trump supporting Republicans saying, Trump is going to deal with Iran and Kamala will not. So really, this was a coalition that was full of contradictions. You had pro vaccine people and anti vaccine. You had pro Iran war people and anti Iran war. But the one unifier was the red hat was supporting Donald Trump. And I had a debate all the way back in 2016, I debated Trumpism at Notre Dame with a fellow from Claremont. And I said, Trumpism. Why are we talking about it as an ideology? It is the ambitions and goals and will to power of one man, Donald Trump, that is Trumpism. And I think, truth be told, the vast majority of the support for Donald Trump was not ideological, it was personal.
- [38:55]
B
Which is even more bizarre to me because I find there to be absolutely nothing appealing about this man Same.
- [39:02]
A
And which makes it to me indicts Christians who support him even more. Because what is becoming very clear about a lot of evangelical support for Trump, it's unconditional. You know, he makes the GOP more pro choice than it had been in 40 years. Okay, that's fine. He defunds Christian ministries that serve the poor that the same evangelicals celebrated the government funding under Bush. I mean, Bush's first executive order was faith based initiatives that helped bring hundreds of millions of dollars of federal funds into some of the best Christian relief organizations in the world to save lives. And then Trump cuts it off and evangelicals are like, yay, hey Trump. I mean, and so you, you really had a situation where this. And does it even need to be said now, year 10 of this, that there is an ideology behind it. No, it's personal devotion. And the off ramp happens when for completely subjective reasons that just are unique to each individual, he personally disappoints them. And it, it might be because of something he said on Truth Social or it might be because of something he did with Iran that just pings them where it's finally over. It's finally over. But that's not most. That's not the vast majority of the gop. And it will not be the vast majority of the gop. I think if present trends continue, it will be enough of the GOP that the GOP gets walloped in the midterms. But even that's not entirely certain. But I do think everyone, and you've seen this again and again, sky, like Trump will do something and an influencer or a pundit or a commentator, whatever, who's been traditionally MAGA will write the essay and they'll say, I was wrong. I thought that this X, Y and Z. And I'm thinking, why did you think that? Why did you think that this man had some sort of coherent ideology? I mean, yeah, he loves tariffs and he hates immigration. Out of that. Outside of that, what is there at all that is real and genuine and a coherent philosophy instead of beliefs? Heck, he doesn't have a coherent philosophy of the war he just launched.
- [41:15]
B
Right? I mean, okay, but you're not making me feel better, David. Not that.
- [41:19]
A
No, I'm not.
- [41:20]
B
That's not why you're here.
- [41:21]
A
But part of the nor am I
- [41:23]
B
part of the reason I'm drawn to the explanation that people are in media silos where they're not really being told the full truth is because honestly, it's my way of trying to protect my perception of many of the people in my life where I can just say, well, it isn't that they're devoted to some lunatic narcissists, authoritarian reality show guy. It's that they just don't know because they're not being told what's going on. But what you seem to be saying is most of them just don't care.
- [41:53]
A
They screen it out. So I think it is not just that they're not told, but that is a part of it. So you do have to understand that if you are a very committed, partisan Republican, and this is not true necessarily of sort of your normie Republicans, but like you're very committed and partisan, there's two pieces of news that you get about Donald Trump. Donald Trump is right. It's news item number one. And number two, Donald Trump is being Unfairly attacked.
- [42:22]
B
Right.
- [42:23]
A
And so you just constantly get that, you know, so, for example, if you hear somebody like me say he should have gone to Congress, and they'd say, well, where was David in 2011 with Libya, you know, and so that would be, that signals he was, he has been unfairly attacked. Well, in 2011 in Libya, I wasn't a journalist full time, but Obama should have gone to Congress. I mean, I'm happy to say that he should have gone to Congress. Right. And so this is, this is the way the news information, the news diet works. But after so many years, after so many years, it's almost impossible to cocoon yourself and bubble yourself so much that none of these scandals, serious scandals, leak in. And normie Republicans, by the way, are less bubbled. Sure, they're less bubbled. So they might listen to NPR some, they probably watch network news or local news, or they might, you know, hey, sky, they might even actually be a subscriber to the Times. Imagine that there are a lot of Republican subscribers to the Times. And so there's at this point, 10 years in the I'm in the right wing newsmax. Oan bubble is of diminishing utility to describe why so many people are still with. It certainly describes why some are.
- [43:53]
B
Yeah. But that's why I'm curious when you do have a Tucker Carlson or some of these other voices, voices that are very recognizable, that have large followings in the MAGA ecosystem, when you start seeing them break away, I'm going, how much influence is this going to have? How many people will have their loyalty to Tucker Carlson tested and their loyalty to Trump tested and say, I'm sticking with Trump, or are they going to break and are they going to go with Carlson when those kinds of fissures open up over a thing like Iran, sadly, those fissures didn't open up earlier on things like being pro life or things like Epstein files for a lot of people, whatever. And. But this one seems like you can't bury your head in the sand about Iran. Like, it's so big and you have big voices out there saying, this is wrong. This is a betrayal of what Trump promised us. Is that actually going to make a difference? And answer that? And then before we wrap up, I want to come back to the war itself and where this might all be going.
- [44:47]
A
So I'm getting deja vu to a particular moment in early, early 2016. And it was the Against Trump issue of National Review, and it was a cavalcade of conservative influencers. Just, it was battleship Row sky of the biggest conservative influencers of the time saying, not this guy. And guess what? It was that guy. And, and so, you know, I've been through every iteration of this. I've been through the 2016, we're not doing this, are we? From the conservative leader class. Followed by like, oh, wow, look at all the people going to him. Followed by the 2020 or 2021 post. January 6th, we told you he was a destabilizing, out of control, dangerous force. And then what do we see happen? But we watch, we watch virtually every Republican decide that after January 6th, it was Mitch McConnell and Mike Pence that they didn't like anymore, rather than Donald Trump. And so again and again, you've had people with big audiences with big constituencies say, I'm done or don't do this or don't, or I'm out now. And no. And very few people go with them. And then they either come sort of slinking back into the fold. If you look at that list of the against Trump issue sky, it is demoralizing because a lot of those people became maga maga maga maga maga. So they either slink back into the fold or they find themselves like a never Trumper like me, like, looking around going, where'd all my political friends go?
- [46:37]
B
Is it sort of a sunk cost fallacy, especially 10 years in now? Like, they're just, you can't run away or walk away because it would be admitting you were wrong.
- [46:48]
A
I do think there's a big part of that. And I also think it's an identity issue for a lot of people. So a lot of people in Trump world, they are feeling like, if you're going to be sort of empathetic and sit in their shoes and like, see what is it that they think about themselves and the world, they're going to say, we have been. He has been unfairly attacked for years. I have faced scorn from family and friends for years for supporting this man. I, it is part of who I am now. I am, you know, I am a Trump supporter. I have endured slings and arrows. I have endured mockery and condescension, and I have stuck with him. And the reason why I stuck with him, it was totally vindicated in November of 2024. Because for whatever reason, this man knows how to beat the Democrats and other Republicans do not. And if I don't like wokeism, I don't like the left. I don't like abortion rights on demand. This guy, this guy can stop it. And I'm sticking with this guy. And I have stuck with him through thick and thin. And you can see the telltale evidence of this guy in the polling. What's fascinating about the polling is Trump still outperforms Trump. Trump the politician outperforms Trump the issues. So in other words, the Trump's approval rating is higher as a person. Just Trump's approval rating is higher than the approval rating of 90% of the issue areas that he's been working from the economy to. You name it.
- [48:31]
B
Which is amazing because it lends credence to the argument that this is a cult of personality, that it is his personal charisma that affects some people that can endure any scandal, any hypocrisy, anything. They will stick with it.
- [48:46]
A
I just think the cult of personality's point at this point is just beyond debate. I mean, you know, what more evidence do you need that it's a cult of personality?
- [48:56]
B
Okay, before we wrap up, I want to come back to Iran and where things currently are and they shift from day to day. We're recording this on Tuesday, March 24, and by the time people see this on French Friday the 27th, who knows where we are?
- [49:12]
A
But most recently, we could be at war with Cuba.
- [49:15]
B
That's the next one. See you next month, David. We'll talk about Cuba. So the Straits of Hormuz are severely restricted right now by Iran, and very little is getting through. And there's been a couple of things that have happened which just seem so bizarre to me. So, okay, a little bit of background. During the Obama years, the Obama administration negotiated a treaty with Iran to try to limit its access to to nuclear weapons. And Trump hated this deal. He tore it up the moment he entered office in 2016. But there were severe embargoes placed on Iranian oil coming out of that. And Trump just recently lifted the embargo on Iranian oil, which seems like a reward to Iran for. What I'm getting at is, is there a possibility that whenever this conflict ends, Iran actually comes out on top?
- [50:21]
A
It's possible. So, I mean, sky, we're through the looking glass here.
- [50:27]
B
Exactly. That's what I mean.
- [50:29]
A
It's crazy. It's nuts. It's hard to put into words how nuts this is, because all of that's happening with the scrambling about the oil is downstream of not going to Congress. Okay, so if you go to Congress, you say to Congress, if we do this, it's highly like the Strait of Hormuz will be closed. We're going to pay more at the pump. So that's why, here's what I want to do. I want to absolutely reinvigorate the Strategic Petroleum Reserve in a massive way. I also want to prepare the American people to pay higher gas prices at the pump. But this is us sacrificing together because this is an enemy regime that has killed hundreds and hundreds of Americans, et cetera. You make the case that there will be blowback, there will be negative events that occur in the war that Iran gets. The enemy always gets a vote, you know, is the old saying, and that you prepare the people to endure hardship. Well, none of that occurred. None of that occurred. So now Trump's in a position where he's trying to fight a war on the one hand and keep the Dow elevated on the other hand and gas prices low because he knows he has dao no public support for this. So those are not the compatible goals all the time. He's giving Iran $14 billion in this oil relief, sanctions relief, which is far more than Iran was going to get out of the Obama right treaty.
- [51:54]
B
It's like he can't see two steps down the road. And so everyone expected that if there were a significant conflict with Iran, they would shut the Straits of Hormuz, choking off 20% of the global supply of oil, which would raise oil prices and create economic stress for the whole world, especially the United States. So now President Trump has said to Iran, if you don't open up the straits and allow foreign ships through there again, the United States military will be authorized to attack power stations throughout Iran. Now, I've read conflicting reports here, but is that if the United States were to target and destroy power stations in Iran, is that a war crime?
- [52:35]
A
Yeah, that's a great question. So the, the question would be, is there military necessity, military necessity for destroying the power plant? So if the power plant is powering, say, a city and a military base, if the power plant is providing direct power and resources to the Iranian military, then there has long been sort of a, or is providing power to arms manufacturing plants. It is. So the, the, the question under the law of war is one of military necessity. If you're going to target an object, what is the military necessity? And military necessity can never be, I'm going to punish the Iranian people or I'm going to punish, I'm going to make the Iranian people suffer. The military necessity has to be, I'm destroying Iranian military capacity. That has to be the reason for a strike. So even a, you know, when, when in World War II, we bombed ball bearings plants, you know that and These were some of the deadliest raids, the deadliest daylight raids of the war, where when we were flying in broad daylight over Germany, we were bombing ball bearing plants. Well, ball bearings have civilian uses, for sure. They are also indispensable military for, you know, if you could shut down ball bearings production, you could shut down tank production, aircraft product, you know, you could. So there has to be military necessity, but the military necessity can never be. We need to punish civilians. We need to punish. We need to punish Iranians. And so it really is a case by case. But if you issue a we will destroy all Iranian civilian infrastructure, then guess what you are, you're Vladimir Putin. Right?
- [54:22]
B
Okay. But even if you can make a case that there's a military reason for wanting to do this, is this where Colin Powell's Pottery Barn policy falls into effect? Right. You break it, you bought it. If we go in there and destroy the civilian infrastructure of a country and maybe we end up destroying the regime as well, well, then you have this completely incapacitated 90 million population country. Are we then under obligation, moral and legal, to go help rebuild Iran?
- [54:52]
A
Well, you know, this is where the lack of planning and the lack of vision and a lack of ability to control what happens next is horrific. So a lot of people critique both Bush and Obama on different grounds. So they obviously critique Bush for seizing Iraq, for invading Iraq, for deposing the regime, replacing the regime. But that is one way to control an outcome. You control an outcome through force. In other words, you, you, you don't just remove the leader, you replace the leader, and then you start to rebuild civil society. That's the colon pail. You broke it, you bought it. Well, that has obvious perils. We watched it all unfold. Yep. It's hard, it's violent, it's bloody, it's. It's got. It is a hard, hard road that the American people, the vast majority, don't want to go down again. Okay, well then what's your option if you don't invade and secure regime change and guarantee that the new regime is going to be an ally? Well, you reach an agreement with an enemy regime, and the agreement will always involve compromise. Okay. And so that meant that part of the jcpoa, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, that the Obama treaty, not treaty, but Obama agreement, was that Iran got some stuff out of it. They got some money, they got some goodies out of this deal, which is what happens when you reach a peace agreement with an enemy without deposing the enemy. You have to give a little to get Something. So what Trump is trying to do is, is he's trying to have his cake and eat it, too, by using extreme force and then just sort of hoping for the best. So he's going to use force in such a way that he's wanting to not get involved in a quagmire, but by not using the level of force that Bush did, he can't control what happens next. So that could be total chaos. It could be any number of things that could happen as a result of which then, if the chaos gets bad enough, guess what we'll see. Boots on the ground, not dissimilar to Iraq. And so he's doing this in such a way that he's just smashing Iran with a hammer. As if the fact that we can smash Iran with a hammer is all the national interest we need here, when everyone knows, and we watched this happen with Syria, by the way, that when Syria broke to pieces, that was a catastrophe, and we're still dealing with that catastrophe. It destabilized Europe. The mass migration wave of refugees destabilized Europe. When Libya happened, it also further destabilized Europe. Iran is bigger than Syria and Libya put together as far as its consequences for potential migration crises and all of this. And we're just mashing it with a hammer with no ability to dictate the outcome. And it's extraordinary to me what we're seeing.
- [57:53]
B
So it feels like, I mean, this is a unfair oversimplification. But again, to just make it simple, two possible outcomes. One outcome is you actually obliterate the Iranian regime, but at enormous cost. The country's infrastructure is obliterated, and then you have a humanitarian crisis on your hands with possible. The refugee thing like we saw from Syria, or the need for an enormous amount of American treasure to go in there and try to rebuild a country once again after a terrible war. That's one option. The other option is Trump wants to cut bait and run here and try to recover his political base and the economy and the price of oil and all those things in the Dow. And so he leaves. The Iranian regime is still in place. They've shown that they can control the world's oil prices. They have obliterated the stability of the more moderate Arab states on the other side of the Persian Gulf. And now they are incentivized better than ever before to get themselves weapons of mass destruction, especially nuclear weapons, knowing that that's our only deterrent to prevent this from happening again. So you've taken everything that we didn't like about Iran and given it steroids to make it even worse. So I know this is, again, an oversimplification, but those two options are both, in my mind, way, way, way worse than the world we knew a month ago. So what's the benefit here?
- [59:22]
A
Yeah, I mean, sky, let me phrase you the dilemma we're in right now and the way the Institute for the Study of War put it, and I think this is done, this states it about as well as it can be stated. It says a weakened regime that remains in power after this war would be able to disrupt shipping whenever and for however long it pleases with little effort if its current relatively limited campaign causes the US And Israel to cease the war. So a failure to demonstrate the will and ability to deny the. The ability to disrupt traffic makes it harder to deter Iran in the future. So in other words, if Iran survives, and it survives in part by closing the Strait of Hormuz, even though its missile forces will have been demolished, even though its nuclear program will have been set back for an undetermined amount of time, even though it will have lost a lot of its leaders, at the end of the day, it will have, in its own view, confronted the superpower, prevailed, and know how to keep doing it.
- [60:25]
B
Right.
- [60:26]
A
And to know how to keep doing it. And so then that puts America in the strategic dilemma. Because if your goal going in was, if we had announced on the front end, let's suppose the front end goal, they received congressional approval for strikes to end the. Or as much as we could damage the nuclear program. And that's it.
- [60:46]
B
Which is what I thought we said we did back in June, which we
- [60:50]
A
thought it was obliterated in June.
- [60:52]
B
That's what the administration told us then
- [60:55]
A
you have a different strategic calculus. But here, this has been a war to end the nuclear program. It's been a war for regime change. It's been a war for unconditional surrender. It's been a war to cut off the Houthis and the proxies. It's been a war for. To degrade the ballistic missile program. Yet those are all different wars. Which war are we actually fighting now? And Iran, by contrast, has a very simple plan. Survive.
- [61:19]
B
Right.
- [61:19]
A
And how does Iran survive? Primarily by shedding the Strait of Hormuz. But it doesn't even necessarily have to do that. It can just hunker down and, and survive. And if Iran survives and it has created all of this economic pain, it has created all the strains in the alliances, it's very unclear to me necessarily who in the long run has prevailed here in the long run. Who's prevailed? Whereas from Israel's perspective, there's a very interesting poll sky that I think shows some of the tension here. About 80% of the Israeli public supports this conflict and about 35% of the American public supports this conflict. And that reflects the very different interests of the two nations.
- [62:00]
B
Right.
- [62:02]
A
It is in Israel's interest to just smash Iran with a hammer. I mean, Israel, under no circumstances was it ever going to occupy Iran. If Iran falls into chaos, that's fine with Israel. Just the way it was fine with Israel when Syria fell into chaos. That took an enemy off the board. Syrian refugees weren't coming to Israel, so it wasn't destabilizing Israel. So Israel has a real interest in just smashing Iran with a hammer. Iran has attacked Israel directly. Its proxies have massacred Israeli civilians. I mean, it's just a different deal for them than it is for us. And when you have two allies with such different incentive structures and such different ultimo, ultimate, you know, global interests, then it starts to, makes you start to wonder how will this alliance hang together when you have such very different interests. And what I'm concerned about, sky, is just we're going to end up with this kind of creeping, you know, creeping escalation. Where it's first is we gotta, we gotta seize some islands in the, in the Persian Gulf to secure safety of the waterways. Then we gotta secure maybe some of the border areas of Iran and the, you know, the beaches and, and, and close in the coastal regions of Iran to protect our soldiers on these islands from artillery fire. And then once you seize the coastal regions, well then all of those soldiers are in peril. And it creates an escalation ladder that at some point You've got the 101st Airborne in Tehran and, and I don't think that's going to happen. I don't think Trump will do that. I think Trump will at some point declare victory and end this thing. But once again, I just keep making this point because I was recently speaking to a group of conservative, of predominantly conservative young men and I was saying, guys, this is why the requirement for Congress to declare war is not just a technicality. It's not an I dotting T crossing. Because when you go to Congress, you have to do this. You have to say, what is our objective? You have to say, what is our plan to achieve our objective? Not that on 0,400 hours the first brigade of the 101st Airborne is going to breach that. No, you don't do that. You describe what's our objective, how are we going to achieve it, what kind of leadership do we have to do it? And if you have a lawful. It's a lawful request for the use of force that's in the American military capacity, that is well led with a good plan, maybe you can convince Congress, but they just launched this thing. And so now we, we don't know what the goal is. We don't know what the end stage is. I don't think Trump knows what the end stage is. And we're. And I'll tell you, this guy, this is what bothers me. This is what worries me. And I don't. I don't think this will happen. But for the first time since the end of the Cold War, I'm getting nervous, and that is, I'm getting August 1914 vibes in the recklessness and irresponsibility of our leadership. And why would I single out August 1914? Because that was the moment when a collection of world leaders essentially stumbled. And now some historians will fight me on this to some degree, but I don't think you can make a clear argument that the war unfolding, that World War I unfolded according to plan. One thing led to another, led to another, led to another, and next thing you knew, we were in a global conflict. So here, think about this guy. We have Ukrainians now in the Middle east helping China train Americans to react to Iranian drones that have been raining down on Ukrainian cities for the last four years. And Russia is providing Iran with intelligence assistance to target Americans. The two big wars right now in the world are interconnected already to some
- [66:05]
B
degree, and that doesn't even factor in the reality that most Iranian oil is going to China. And with American forces stretched thin right now, who knows what China does with Taiwan. And if that opens up another front, we're in completely uncharted territory.
- [66:23]
A
This is the point of. On August 1914, you could point to a lot of world leaders who are pressing on the gas, and you could not point to very many who are pressing on the brake. And right now, who's pressing on the brake? Europe is pressing on the brake. Europe is pressing on the brake. To Trump's enormous frustration, which could result in even greater rift with. With NATO. But not many of our world leaders are pressing on the brake. We got a lot of world leaders pressing on the gas right now, Sky. And it really makes me nervous.
- [66:53]
B
You know, there's. This isn't what Jesus intended, but there's that saying where he talks about a king before he goes to war, checks his armies to see does he have enough soldiers to fight the war or not. And if he doesn't, he makes peace before going to war. And it. You go back to the early 1990s and the first Gulf War and President George H.W. bush or George W. Bush in the second Iraq War, and in both cases, they spent months and months and months talking to and coordinating with allies to see that we had the forces and the cooperation needed to finish the job. Trump didn't do any of that. He kicks off this war, he realizes, perhaps he was told in advance, I don't know, that Iran was going to close the Straits of Hormuz. And then he goes to the Allies and says, hey, hey, hey, you need to send your troops in here and your ships to open up the strait. And the Allies are like, no, we're not. This is your mess. You clean it. But this is exactly why you do that work in advance. And to your point, this is why Article 1 matters. It's why you go to Congress and you persuade the representatives of the American people of the need for a war. And, but it's also why the temperament and character and intelligence of the commander in chief matters. And we need to remember that the next time we're electing a president. And we need our political parties to not put unqualified people on the ballot, and we need to reform our electoral process so that we aren't stuck with somebody that I think, what was it, 17% of the American people actually, or less than that, voted for in the primaries. Like, our system is so broken that it presented us with this person who's not capable of commanding the most lethal force the world has ever seen. It's just not how it's supposed to be.
- [68:42]
A
Yeah, I could not agree with you more. And historians will look back and be utterly baffled that millions and millions of Americans said character matters less for the person in the Oval Office than the person who manages their local Walmart or McDonald's or runs their own companies. Because one of the things that I've done is I've asked my more MAGA friends, and I, you know, it's. I, I probably say, you know, I, I don't know. For, for the ratio, New York Times columnists who have more MAGA people in their lives, I might be leading the pack. I don't know. We haven't done.
- [69:21]
B
It's a low bar, though, David.
- [69:23]
A
Yeah, but, but my neighborhood, in November 2024, voted 85% for Trump. So that, that's a pretty, pretty Substantial. So I, I've never not had my finger on the pulse, you know, but again and again I will ask, you know, a, a MAGA person, if your boss was found liable for sexual abuse by a jury, would you want them to continue to be your boss? No. If, if like a dozen or 14 or 15 women had accused your boss of sexual harassment and, or sexual assault, would you want them to be your boss, the CEO of your company? No. Would you want them to be the principal of your kids school? No. Why do you want him to be president? Well, what about Biden Obama and Biden Obama, Clinton? It goes into all those things. But we all know we were, we were around. We know there are primary elections. We know that, you know, even if you just take Trump versus the left and say, well, you're going to choose Trump over the left, that wasn't the choice in the Republican primary.
- [70:23]
B
Right, Right. But that's what I mean. The primary system itself is broken if it gives us this result from a small minority of voters chose the candidates. And we've been saying cycle after cycle after cycle, really this is who we get to choose from. The system's broken. And that's another podcast for another day.
- [70:42]
A
Few things illustrate this than two numbers. 17 million and 78 million. 17 million are the number of people who voted for Trump in the primary. 78 million. The number who voted for him, 77. 78 million. The number who voted for him in the general election.
- [70:57]
B
Right.
- [70:59]
A
So think how few people, what a small percentage of America, participate in that primary process.
- [71:06]
B
That's the point exactly. But this is what it gets us. This is what it gets us. And I don't, I think, I'm hoping that after the Trump years, we are going to enter into a season of real reform in this country and not to throw out the system we've inherited because I think it's incredibly brilliant in many ways, but to fix its shortcomings and stay true to the spirit of the Constitution and what the founders wanted this country to be. But when 17 million people can determine not just the future for America, but in this case, perhaps the world, something is seriously broken and can bypass Congress in something as consequential as a war in the Middle east like this, we need reform. All right, David, we're out of time, but thank you for your insights, wisdom and perspective. Appreciate it every month. Thanks for being a part of French Friday and thank you all for tuning in. We'll be back next Friday with another episode of the Skypod. French Friday is a production of Holy Post Media Featuring David French and me Sky Jatani. Music and theme song by Phil Vischer. This show is made possible by Holy Post patrons. To find out how you can become a Holy Post patron and to find more common good Christian content, go to holypost. Com.