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Audible subscribers can listen to all episodes of the Spy who ad free right now. Join Audible today by downloading the Audible app. 1974. Amsterdam, the Netherlands. Fritz Wiermann steps out of the brick factory building he works in and into the drizzling rain. He unfurls his umbrella and hurries towards the nearby bridge over the canal. He looks back to check no one's following him. Then he checks again. Wiermann works for a company called fdo. It designs components for ultracentrifuges that enrich uranium. These advanced centrifuges are mainly used for nuclear power, but they can also produce uranium for nuclear weapons. And that's why FDO's designs are classified. Verman reaches a street with a smattering of shops and approaches a phone booth. He checks he's not being tailed once more, then steps inside. He calls a number he's jotted down on a scrap of paper. A secretary answers. Director's office Yorenko. Yorenko is FTO's biggest customer. A nuclear technology consortium founded by the British, German and Dutch governments. I need to speak to the Director. He's busy right now. I must speak with him. It's very important. Well, he's unavailable. I can take a message. Vehement isn't sure what to do. He's not even sure he should be making this call. But if his hunch is right, the world is in danger. Sir, are you still there? Yes, yes. I work at FDO as a technical photographer. And. Shall I ask the director to call you there? No, no. Listen. I am concerned about a colleague of mine, Dr. Abdul Qadir Khan. He does things. Things I don't think he should. I don't follow. Vehement gulps he's going to make him say it. Say what? Was until now only a private thought. I don't know how else to put this, but I think Abdul's a spy. A spy? Yes, For Pakistan. A spy for Pakistan? Yes. You must tell the director this. Vehement hangs up his emotions now, a sea of relief and horror at what he's just done. Khan is his friend, one of his only friends, and the only FDO scientist who treats him with respect. Wiermann wonders if he misread the situation. He hopes not. But he also hopes he has. Because if Khan is a spy, then he's stealing advanced nuclear technology. Technology that could make atomic bombs. And if that happens, the risk of nuclear war will become even great. You know that moment when you order food and suddenly everyone around you gets very interested in your dinner. Yeah, that's what GrubHub does. Gives you deals so good you'll have to guard them. Gold Days of grubhub plus is here. Four weeks of grubhub's best offers all month long in May, only for Grubhub plus members. And if you're not a member, you can sign up now for just 99 cents a month for six months. That's 90% off Grubhub plus membership, auto renews and terms apply. Sign up now on the app or@grubhub.com plus gold. Don't miss it. I'm Raza Jaffrey and this is the Spy who An Audible original Beneath the veneer of the everyday lurks the realm of the spy. It's a dank, murky world full of dark corners, sinister motives and corrupted morals. A place of paranoia and infiltration, sabotage and manipulation. In this series, we tale Abdul Khadir Khan, the Pakistani scientist spy who sold nuclear weapons technology to Pakistan, North Korea, Iran, Libya and more. In his homeland, A. Q Khan became a national hero, the man who gave Pakistan the bomb. Elsewhere, he's seen as one of the most dangerous men who ever lived and devious enough to leave Western intelligence struggling to shut down his atomic bazaar. What you're about to hear are dramatized reconstructions of events based on the information that's been made public. But remember, in the shadow realm of the spy, the full story is rarely clear. You're listening to the spy who sold nuclear secrets to Iran. This is episode one, the Seeds of Revenge. A few months before Fritz Wiermann's phone call. May 1974. Amsterdam. A Q. Khan wanders a canal side with Wiermann. They're work colleagues and on their way to get lunch. Wyrman's an awkward man, shunned as a child because of his German mother and still living with his parents despite being in his 30s. He's an outsider, just like Khan. Khan came to Europe from Pakistan a decade ago. He planned to study metallurgy, then go back. But fate intervened. He completed his studies, married a Dutch woman and took a job at fdo. He and Wiermann met on his first day at fdo, and they bonded over a shared interest in photography. Now they often spend their lunch breaks together chatting. But today, Khan is anything but happy. And that's because India's just tested its first nuclear weapon. How can the world stand by and allow this to happen? I fear for my country. Nobody there is safe now. It's not good. But India is Saying it's a peaceful test, a deterrent. Peaceful? Indian liars. They hate Pakistan. They want to destroy us. Surely not. The newspapers say the test was more about sending China a message. You don't know the Indians like I do. You don't know what India is capable of. After partition, my family and millions of other Muslims like us were driven from our homes. Villages were burned, women abducted, trainloads of ordinary citizens massacred. I understand, but. No. No, you do not understand. When I left India for Pakistan, their border guards robbed me of the pen my brother gave me for no reason. It wasn't valuable. It was only of sentimental value. The Hindus are crooks. They cannot be trusted with a nuclear bomb. But every nation wants security. And what of Pakistan's security? Vehement doesn't reply. It's clear he wants to change the subject. But as they walk in silence, Khan feels inspiration dawn. Maybe he, the scientist with access to advanced nuclear technology, is the answer to Pakistan's security. Five months later Al Mello, the eastern Netherlands Khan follows his manager through the Urenco's uranium enrichment plant toward a small metal structure set apart from the main facility. It's a secure office area known as the Brain Box. The Brain Box holds highly classified designs, such as details of the G2, a new centrifuge that can enrich uranium to weapons grade. Khan isn't cleared to be in here, but his manager seems unconcerned. He pulls several box files from a shelf. This is the documentation for the G2, but it's all in German. I need them translated as quickly as possible. Kahn is one of the few scientists involved with your Renko who knows both Dutch and German, and his manager is willing to bend the rules to get the G2's documentation translated faster. Kahn gets to work translating the documents page by page, but he realizes this is also an opportunity to learn all about Europe's latest top secret centrifuge. Bismillah. He takes a sheaf of paper and begins making additional notes in his mother tongue. Urdu. A passing colleague stops and peers at the script on the page. What's that you're writing? What language is that? Khan looks up. It's Urdu. It's a letter to my family in Pakistan. I'm so busy I rarely have time to write to them, so I thought I'd skip lunch. Do it now. Khan smiles at the colleague. One thing he's learned in Europe is that a smile is often all it takes to gain someone's trust. The colleague smiles back and walks away. Two months later Islamabad, Pakistan Pakistan's Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto strides down the corridor towards his office. An aide keeps pace beside him. The next meeting is with Dr. Abdul Khadir Khan. Butto slows slightly. The scientist from Amsterdam? Yes sir. The one who wrote to you claiming he can help our nuclear program. So he checked out? Yes. Our people in Europe confirmed he's genuine. Bhutto enters a meeting room. Khan is sitting, but rises instantly on seeing Bhutto. Prime Minister. Please sit. I understand you believe you could help Pakistan. I know I can. I work in the Dutch nuclear industry. I have access to the latest centriview technology vital to weapons grade uranium enrichment. And I have already taken detailed notes about that technology. Bhutto's interest sharpens. Two years ago he started a secret nuclear weapons program following a decisive defeat in a 13 day war with India. But it's enormously costly for a nation where many go hungry and progress is slow. Bhatto is interested in anything that can help. Khan sits forward in his chair. I wish to return to Pakistan and apply my knowledge to our program. Dr. Khan, I am grateful for your visit, but you must stay in Europe. But why? I understand more than your scientists here. And you can increase that knowledge by remaining in Amsterdam. You're in a unique position. The information you have access to could save us many years of work. Staying where you are is how you can best serve your country. One month later January 1975 Brussels, Belgium inside Pakistan's embassy, Khan sits with Sadiq Bat. Officially, Bat is a Pakistani diplomat. Unofficially, he runs Pakistan's secret efforts to procure what it needs to make nuclear weapons. And now he's also running Khan as a spy. The designs you are getting are extremely useful. But acquiring materials and equipment is just as critical. What I need are details of what is needed to build a uranium enrichment plant. A shopping list if you like. It won't be straightforward. There are export controls. Nothing that a few front companies and false end user certificates won't get around. Maybe. But my specifications will be exact. Centrifuges are precision instruments. A microscopic flaw in metal thickness or a tiny vibration imbalance and the whole machine will fail. And orders with that level of precision will attract attention. We have been doing this for some time, Dr. Kahn. We take care to work with suppliers who don't understand the end use and those who will look the other way for the right price. Khan knows this is risky. If Pakistan's front companies start placing precise orders based on Yorenko's designs, it could be traced back to him. But it's a risk he's prepared to take to protect his country. A couple of months later. Spring 1975. The Town of Zwanenberg, on the outskirts of Amsterdam. In Kahn's house, Fritz Vehement sits at the dining table, finishing the last of his fried chicken. He smiles at Khan's Dutch wife, Henny. That was excellent. Would you like more? There's plenty in the oven. Vehemen is full, but he needs a moment alone with Khan. He spotted something in the corner of the room that shouldn't be there. Centrifuge components? Yes, please. I'd love some. It's been more than a year since Vehemun called Yorenko about his fear that Khan might be a spy. Yarenko never called back, and Vehement convinced himself he was imagining things. But in recent months, he's noticed something amiss with his friend. He's often on the phone, speaking rapidly in Urdu. He once spotted him sealing rolls of film inside an envelope at work. And another time, at this very table, he saw documents that should never have left the brain box at El Mello. He said nothing. But these parts, he can't ignore them. Abdul, why do you have centrifuge components here in your home? Them old pieces, discarded. I like them as souvenirs. Reminders of good work. I wonder what's keeping any. Khan gets up to go to the kitchen, but Vehement stops him. It's not the only thing. Last time I was here, I saw classified documents. My dear friend, I had permission. And he helps me with the translation. What are all these questions? Don't you trust me? And here she is with more food. Yeah, Allow me to serve you. Vehemen forces a smile as his plate is filled. He's made the opening move in a game of chicken, but it's Khan who's made him swerve. Foreign Basel, Switzerland the Nuclex exhibition is underway. Engineers, salesmen and buyers from across the nuclear industry are here. And so are two surveillance officers from the Dutch Security Service bvd. One of them hovers near a stand, browsing a brochure of vacuum pumps while watching his target, Dr. A. Q Khan. He came to the BVD's attention after a Pakistani diplomat tried to order specialist metal foils from a Dutch supplier to the nuclear industry. The specifications led the BVD to Khan. Now he's a person of interest, someone under suspicion but not formally accused of wrongdoing. Khan is at an exhibitor stand, chatting to a sales rep. The BVD officer feigns interest in a display of industrial metals. To get within earshot of Kahn, the steel will need to be strong enough for use in ultracentrifuge bellows. What strength to weight ratios can you deliver? Depends on the length of the tubes. What kind of RPMs are we talking about here? The BVD officer doesn't understand the details, but knows super strong steel is needed to stop uranium enriching centrifuges from breaking apart if they spin. He also knows that Khan doesn't handle procurement at fdo. So there's no reason to be asking suppliers these questions. If you needed to perform under that level of stress, we need precise specifications. But I can arrange a quote for you. Thank you. Perhaps we can arrange a meeting. Do you have a card? Khan takes the salesman's card and then moves on. The BVD officer has hangs back for a moment, then follows. A few days later, the Hague, Netherlands. In a government office, a senior BVD officer is updating representatives from the Foreign Ministry and Economic Affairs Ministry on its investigation into Khan. We believe Dr. Khan may be engaged in espionage. Classified materials have been seen at his home. He displays an unusual level of curiosity, well beyond his remit at fto. And he's had repeated meetings with the welding company salesman. Already on our radar. At the Basel Trade Fair, he sought out suppliers of highly sensitive components. The Foreign Ministry official interjects, what kind of components? Ultra thin metal foil. We've also identified a failed attempt to purchase such foil by a mysterious buyer. The specifications exactly match the foil Khan developed for Yorenko. Then we need to arrest him. The Economic affairs representative cuts in an arrest would tell the world that a spy infiltrated one of our country's most sensitive industrial projects. A scandal like that could be disastrous for the science and technology industry. As would a rogue procurement network. A representative from the Foreign Ministry turns to the BVD officer. Did you consult the Americans? Yes. And the CIA would prefer we continue watching Khan. They believe arresting him now would squander a chance to learn more about Pakistan's nuclear procurement network. So we let him carry on and hope for the best. We could have him promoted to a position where he no longer has access to sensitive information. The Economics affairs official nods. I think that's a good solution. Tackles the problem without causing reputational harm to industry. The Foreign Ministry official relents. He just hopes that Khan's not already got what he needs. Two months later, the village of Sahala in Pakistan, 16 miles southeast of Islamabad. Outside a concrete warehouse, Khan shakes hands with the caretaker. His Dutch colleagues Think. Khan's in Pakistan visiting relatives with his wife and daughters. But he's also using the trip to see the progress being made. Using the equipment and information he's helped Pakistan acquire. The Caretaker leads Khan inside the warehouse and turns on the lights. This is where everything is stored. Khan looks around in silent disbelief. Dozens of shipping crates are stacked neatly against the walls. Some still have their seals intact. This is it. Yes. Everything is here. Khan walks slowly between the crates. He knows what is inside. He knows what it could become. But he was expecting to see people already building a uranium enrichment plant. Why hasn't assembly begun? We're waiting for further instructions. Khan closes his eyes. He risked everything to give Pakistan all it needs to accelerate its nuclear program. But nothing's moving. January 1976. Islamabad. It's several days since A. Q. Khan visited the warehouse. Now he's in the office of Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. Prime Minister, I visited the warehouse at Sihala and nothing has been done. The equipment is still in shipping crates. Months have been lost. With respect, Prime Minister, the program is being mismanaged. Strong words. I have absolute faith in the director of the atomic program. Sir, he lacks the expertise required. He only has a master's degree. He's treating the nuclear program as a bureaucratic project. It is not. It's the most complex engineering challenge Pakistan has ever attempted, and one vital to our security. As you are aware, our efforts to build a plutonium reactor are being thwarted by the international community. Which is why I've been saying that uranium enrichment is the answer. We have uranium deposits here in Pakistan, and I can source the equipment needed without detection. The program's director is ignoring the solution that is staring him in the face. You seem very confident with reason. I have the designs, the supplier lists and the experience. If you let me run this program, we will be enriching uranium to the levels needed for nuclear weapons in five years. You want me to fire the head of the nuclear program and put you in charge? Why not? I know more than him. But if you don't make use of me, I might as well go back to the Netherlands. I cannot simply sack the head of our nuclear program. But there may be another way. I'm listening. What if we started a separate uranium enrichment program headed by you? Two programs chasing the same end goal. I would need adequate funding. He will have it. I will also need total control of the program and its facilities. If you give me that, I will not disappoint. Pakistan will have its own bomb. I'll Give you my word. September 1976. Kahuta, Pakistan It's 10 months since Prime Minister Bhutto put Khan in charge of Pakistan's secret uranium enrichment program. On getting the job, he immediately sent FDO his letter of resignation and got to work. Now Khan is hiking the sub Himalayan foothills. He is less than an hour from Islamabad, but a world away in terms of geography. Here there are no paved roads, no power lines and no signs of industry. Just a few goats and shepherds sheltering in rundown shacks. Khan reaches the top of a ridge, gets out his binoculars and surveys the area. In the valley below, there must be at least a hundred acres of forested land hidden by hills on all sides. This is it. Khan has spent weeks looking for somewhere to build his nuclear research laboratory. And Kahuta seems perfect. Close enough to the capital for power and supplies, but far enough to stay hidden. It's four months later and in the Alpine village of Haag, Switzerland, Kahn is dining at the home of Friedrich Tinner. Tinner's young sons, Marco and Urban, play nearby. Tinner is an engineer and export manager at Vacum Apparatus Technique, a manufacturer of vacuum tubes and valves for centrifuges. And Khan wants to place an order. I'm told your company makes the best valves in Europe. They are precise, reliable. Precision is everything. The flow must be exact. The valves Kahn wants to buy are vital for Pakistan's nuclear program. They control the flow of gas into the centrifuges that enrich the uranium. And Tina is keen to sell. Khan's order is worth tens of thousands of dollars. But that money comes with risk. Khan wants to know if Tinna's willing to accept that risk. What about exporting them? Are you able to ship these valves to us? Tina lowers his glass, clearly aware that this deal could violate export controls on nuclear technology. I've been in touch with the Swiss authorities. I believe I've found a way around this. Yes, it is legal to export centrifuges, but not the individual components used to make them. So exporting our valves is okay, then? We have a deal. As long as it's done discreetly. I'm a respected man and don't want trouble. But the way I see it, building a pistol doesn't make someone a murderer. Only pulling the trigger does. Khan is used to hearing similar justifications from the other suppliers he works with. They're willing to supply the parts and take the money, but also anxious to absolve themselves from their potential use. Khan smiles at Tina. Don't worry. We don't want to draw attention to this deal either. Two years LATER Pakistan Army Headquarters, Islamabad Pakistan's senior generals are gathered around a large table for a crisis meeting. At the head of it sits President Muhammad Z Al Haq, who deposed Bhutto in a military coup. Next to him is Khan. A German TV documentary has just exposed how Khan stole Yorenko's centrifuge designs to aid Pakistan's nuclear ambitions. And that's left Khan on the defensive. This is a smear campaign. They cannot accept that a Muslim country has mastered the science, so they invent lies about me. But this is bigger than Khan. There is growing instability in neighboring Afghanistan and the Soviets are trying to increase their influence there. In response, the US has forged an uneasy friendship with Pakistan by offering economic aid. Revelations about Pakistan's nuclear weapons program jeopardizes that alliance. President Ziha locks eyes with Khan. The Americans are threatening to withdraw economic aid. Britain is talking about tightening export controls to cut off our supplies. Let them. Who made these American and British bastards the God given guardians of the world? They stockpile nuclear weapons by the tens of thousands. But if we pursue a modest program, we are called devils, Satans. President Zia raises a hand and indicates for one of the generals to speak. Dr. Kahn, will this delay our nuclear program? No. We are on schedule. By 1981, we will be producing significant quantities of enriched uranium. Even if there's a crackdown because of it. Please explain. The publicity has acted as an advertisement. Suppliers now know we are buying. They now come to us, begging us to buy from them. Believe me, I've worked with these people. They will sell their mothers for money. But President Zia remains concerned. America believes our program threatens Israel and that may cause them to act. We need to convince them the program is peaceful. They won't believe us. Belief is not required, only delay. The Americans want to keep us on side. They want a reason not to act against us. So we give them a reason. We deny this is a weapons program. We tell them all we want to do is generate electricity and hope it gives us enough time for you to complete your work. Six months later the State Department Washington, D.C. in a meeting room on the seventh floor, officials from the State Department, military and CIA are discussing Pakistan's nuclear program. A CIA analyst stands by a projector and brings up a spy satellite picture. This is the latest image of Pakistan's nuclear research center in Kahuta. It has grown considerably since our last meeting. There's new construction here and here. And this is new. What we have here are French anti aircraft missile batteries indicating that this is definitely more than a nuclear energy program. A military advisor leans in for a better look. That will make a preemptive strike much riskier. What's the current official line? All eyes turn to the State Department's representative. The White House wants to keep Pakistan on side, especially if the Soviet threat to Afghanistan comes to a head. So we should rule out any talk of military strikes. So we're looking at sanctions then? Realistically, sanctions are unlikely to change anything. Pakistan's program is driven by fear of Indian aggression. India already has nuclear weapons capability, so Pakistan feels it needs that too. And publicly. They will of course continue to deny this is a weapons program. One of the CIA officials clears his throat. There is another option. We remove the man behind the program, Dr. AQ Khan. The. The room falls silent. The idea of assassinating Khan has been floated before, but it sits uncomfortably between them. The State Department official breaks the silence. Facts. The site expansion shows the ambition is clear, but what we are looking at is buildings. Uranium enrichment requires advanced technical knowledge and equipment. Does Pakistan really have access to that? The CIA analyst responds. Our view is that they don't. And they are decades away from developing a bomb. They may want India to believe otherwise and the site and the anti aircraft batteries may do the job of deterrence. But the agency view is that they have a long road ahead. They can continue to monitor the situation. There's no need to act now. Eight years later January 1987 Tehran, Iran Khan emerges from a private jet wearing a tailored suit and clutching a briefcase. An Iranian delegation greets him on the tarmac and ushers him into the back of a waiting car. The small motorcade pulls away and races through the suburbs of Tehran, heading south to the surrounding countryside. An hour later, Khan arrives in Barchin, a military industrial complex dedicated to weapons development. Khan is led into an Iranian intelligence safe house. Inside, a large portrait of Ayatollah Khomeini, Iran's supreme Leader, presides over the room. Khan nods to the image, then greets the Iranian officials who've been awaiting his arrival. Welcome, Dr. Khan. I trust your journey went smoothly. Very. Thank you for arranging it. The pleasantries continue, but everyone understands why Khan's here. Iran is wounded. It's been at war with Iraq for six years and the Iraqis use of chemical weapons has heightened the Iranian regime's interest in acquiring nuclear weapons. Iran hopes Khan can help with that, as does Pakistan. President Zia wants to build an alliance with Iran against the us, India and the Soviets, who are occupying Afghanistan. Khan opens his briefcase and removes a clutch of sales brochures. We can provide you with everything you need to enrich uranium. The official starts to read. Iran has uranium but lacks the technology needed to enrich large amounts of weapons grade material. P1 and P2 centrifuge components, high strength rotor tubes, electric drive equipment. And you are willing to sell this to us? Absolutely. And we offer more than technology. We offer expertise too. Blueprints, equipment, assembly instructions. In short, everything you need. The official turns the pages slowly as if unimpressed. But Khan knows he's a bluff. No one else will offer Iran this. This is technology no one wants you to have. America, Russia, Israel and India can threaten the Islamic world with their nuclear bombs and they will do all they can to stop us having the same weapons. We offer protection for your people. The official points to the multi million dollar prices listed in Khan's brochures. At some cost we will need to discuss figures but in principle, yes, we are interested in this offer. Pukta Khan. Khan smiles and rises to leave. He is no longer just a scientist. He's now a proliferator of the world's most dangerous weapon. A few months later, Dubai In a modest 8th floor apartment, 28 year old Buhari Seyed Abu Tahir watches his uncle show a delegation of Iranian nuclear scientists two centrifuges. Tahir is a slight shy Sri Lankan with dark curly black hair and today he's assisting his uncle in closing the deal arranged by Khan. His uncle keeps talking as the Iranians inspect the devices. These centrifuges are manufactured using designs and components sourced from trusted suppliers in Europe and beyond. Tahir's uncle nods at the two German businessmen seated on the low sofa. Like his uncle, they are among Khan's most trusted associates. They've been secretly supplying Pakistan with nuclear technology for years and now Khan's brought them in on his lucrative deal with Iran. Tahir, pass me the file. It's Tahir's cue. He steps forward and presents the Iranians a document. Tahir's uncle smiles. This document, gentlemen, offers step by step details about how to cast uranium metal into hemispherical forms. Essentially how to construct the core of a nuclear bomb. Now please take your time and decide what you wish to buy. Tahir. Yes, Uncle. Please bring our guest refreshments. Tahir slips into the adjoining kitchen. He dislikes his uncle. He dominates his entire family. Tahir wanted to study accountancy in London. His uncle vetoed that and made him his assistant. Tahir returns from the kitchen with tea and sweet pastries to find his uncle and the Iranians discussing prices. Fine. The two centrifuges and technical documentation will cost US$10 million. So we are agreed then. After the Iranians leave, carrying suitcases containing the nuclear secrets they've just bought, Tahir listens to his uncle and the Germans as they discuss how to share out the money. Most of it will go to the suppliers in Khan's network, but his uncle will pocket $2 million, as will Khan. Tahir vows that whatever it takes, he needs to get close to Khan and make himself indispensable. Shortly after Khan Research Laboratories, Kahuta, Pakistan Khan paces his office, waiting for a call. Dr. Khan speaking. Ah, Farouk. Yes, that is good news. And everything went smoothly at the bank? Iranian friends were happy. Excellent. Khan smiles to himself. His deal with Iran isn't official government policy, but he's doing it with tacit approval. And he knows that President Zia will be delighted at how Khan is bringing Pakistan and Iran closer together. And no one in the know will care if he profits on the way. But now he's had a taste of how lucrative selling nuclear secrets can be, he wants more. Yesterday he was a civil servant on a modest salary. Now he's a millionaire businessman in charge of a secrets global network of supply suppliers that stands ready to sell nuclear technology to whoever has pockets deep enough to paint. Follow the Spy who On the Audible app or wherever you get your podcasts, you can listen to all episodes of the Spy who ad free by joining Audible. You have been listening to the Spy who, an Audible original. Have you got a spy story you'd like us to tell? Email your ideas to thespywhooudible.com a quick note about our dialogue we can't know everything that was said or done behind closed doors, particularly far back in history, but our scenes are written using the best available sources. So even if a scene or conversation has been recreated for dramatic effect, it's still based on biographical research. We used many sources in our research for this season, including Catherine Collins and Douglas France Books, the Nuclear Jihadist and Fallout and Peddling Peril by David Albright. The Spy who is hosted by me, Raza Jaffrey. It's a Yellow Ant production. This episode was written by Lizzie Enfield and researched by Louise Byrne, with thanks to Inner Bruce, Dee Cook and Paula Richardson. The senior producer was Jay Priest. The sound designer was Joshua Morales. Music supervision by Scott Velasquez for Fris? N Sink for Yellow Ant. The story editor and executive producer was Tristan Donovan. For Audible. The executive producers were Estelle Doyle and Theodora Leludis.