Defence spending: too little, too late?

Summary

Podcast Summary: The Story — “Defence Spending: Too Little, Too Late?”

Podcast: The Story (The Times)
Episode: Defence spending: too little, too late?
Date: July 1, 2026
Host: Manveen Rana
Guests: Larissa Brown (Defence Editor, The Times); General Sir Richard Barrons (co-author, 2025 Strategic Defence Review)

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Episode Overview

This episode examines the UK’s long-delayed Defence Investment Plan (DIP), its implications for Britain’s military readiness, the political drama behind its release, and whether it does enough to meet urgent security threats and NATO expectations. Through discussions with Larissa Brown and General Sir Richard Barrons, the episode dissects the new spending commitments, the controversy over whether they are sufficient or timely, and the wider context of increasing global instability.

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Key Discussion Points & Insights

1. What Is the Defence Investment Plan?

[03:01–04:15]

• Larissa Brown explains that the DIP is “the blueprint for how the armed forces will be funded,” following a strategic defence review.
• This year, the DIP is unusually prominent due to its delayed release—over a year late—which built up expectations and scrutiny.

Quote:

“In the past I’ve covered these things, we’ve barely mentioned it. So it’s quite extraordinary really that we’re giving so much kudos to it at the moment.” — Larissa Brown [03:54]

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2. Political Delays & Controversy

[04:15–05:49]

• The DIP was delayed by political wrangling, most notably the resignation of two defence ministers, John Healy and Al Khans, over funding disputes.
• Defence and industry leaders were frustrated by the uncertainty, as contracts and jobs hung in the balance.
• Smaller defence contractors suffered, with some closing or shifting away from defence work during the delay.

Quote:

“I resigned for several reasons. Firstly, because I no longer believe the Defence Investment Plan was preparing for the wars we are most likely to fight.” — Former Armed Forces Minister Al Khans [04:47]

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3. What's in the Plan?

[05:54–07:25]

• £8.6bn allocated for Tempest (a new combat aircraft with Japan and Italy), more than expected.
• £5bn for drones, increased shipbuilding focusing on “motherships” for other vessels, and a classified 12% uplift to Special Forces’ budget.
• Military housing upgrades will proceed as planned.
• Cuts include cancellation of 34 Wildcat helicopters and dropping of Skynet 6 (a planned communications satellite system).

Quote:

“That’s sort of one of the big winners. We’ve also got announcements in more money spent on drones, which we would expect. That’s £5 billion over four years.” — Larissa Brown [05:54]

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4. Are We Meeting NATO and US Expectations?

[07:25–10:09]

• Current UK defence spending will reach 2.7% of GDP by 2030, up from 2.4% now.
• NATO wants 3.5% by 2035 on core defence, but the UK currently offers only a vague “pathway” to 3%, not 3.5%.
• Claim of 4.2% is misleading, as it combines 2.7% defence with 1.5% for loosely defined “security-related projects.”

Quote:

“Everyone that talks about this figure kind of laughs when they talk about it because it could be anything. So that’s a very easy figure to get to.” — Larissa Brown [09:07]

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5. Timing and Political Motives

[10:09–11:41]

• The plan was released just before the critical NATO summit in Ankara (July 7), so Prime Minister Starmer could avoid embarrassment and showcase increased defence spending.
• Nonetheless, the plan is not binding for the incoming government—Andy Burnham could revise it.

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6. The Security Context and Threat Assessment

[12:36–15:15]

• Gen. Sir Richard Barrons sets out a world of increased risk: the end of the post-Cold War consensus, the rise of China, global instability, and the diminished reliability of US security guarantees.
• The UK is “living in an uncomfortable world... potentially existential risks.”
• There is a “collapse of that post World War world… we’ve gone back to a world of great powers deciding what they need to do.” — Barrons [13:30]

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7. The Danger of Underfunded Forces

[15:41–17:29]

• UK armed forces have been shrinking and are “less ready,” lacking sufficient training, reserves, and modern equipment.
• Barrons stresses the cost of failing to deter conflict, referencing the ongoing war in Ukraine as a lesson.

Quote:

“If you fail to deter and we end up fighting, now it’s 50% of GDP. That’s the historical average. That’s the cost to Ukraine right now…” — Gen. Sir Richard Barrons [16:26]

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8. The Cost and Delivery Gap

[19:22–23:50]

• Despite the government accepting the 2025 Strategic Defence Review's (SDR) recommendations, funding has not been found to implement them at the required pace.
• Only £15bn of the £28bn need was granted, with additional delays and cuts inevitable.
• NATO expects 3.5%+1.5% (total 5% GDP) by 2035, but the UK’s plan is for 3% at best.

Quote:

“You can’t have a conversation about defence, say it’s not affordable, because what we’re actually having a conversation about is we choose not to afford it.” — Gen. Sir Richard Barrons [22:08]

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9. Potentially Unprepared for Conflict

[23:50–26:24]

• Barrons warns the UK military now ranks among the lowest in NATO for readiness:
  • “Army is definitely 32 out of 32.” [24:29]
  • If conflict started in 2030, the UK wouldn’t be fully ready until 2035.
• Other NATO members (e.g., Germany, Poland) are spending far more, much more quickly.

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10. Modernisation and What the Plan Gets Right

[26:47–29:38]

• Praises the move towards a “digital targeting web” (AI-connected networks of sensors and weapons, sometimes called a “digital kill web”).
• Commends the shift towards uncrewed and autonomous platforms for cost-effectiveness and modern deterrence, but emphasizes it’s all happening too slowly and at too small a scale.

Quote:

“At the heart of it in the review, it’s called a digital targeting web. Most of the world is less squirmy about this and calls it a digital kill web.” — Gen. Sir Richard Barrons [26:55]

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11. International Reception and the Importance of Spending

[29:38–31:52]

• Barrons expects NATO allies to welcome the UK’s transformational ideas but not its slow pace or inadequate funding.
• Other nations expect the UK to “be a major feature” but “you’ve turned out with fabulous opinions and not much stuff.”

Quote:

“…UK has great ideas but frankly nothing like the money, and other countries have lots of money and their ideas are a bit traditional. I wish there could be a better balance.” — Gen. Sir Richard Barrons [30:50]

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12. Welfare vs. Warfare and Britain’s Role in the World

[31:52–34:49]

• Without adequate defence investment, Britain’s global influence—earned via “hard power”— will wane.
• Barrons calls for a “national conversation” about priorities: “We just cannot envisage having less welfare for more warfare… that’s dangerous and also personally alarming.” [31:52]
• Warns that if Britain doesn’t “stand up for its interests” no one else will.

Quote:

“We have fallen into a position where our power in the world is much diminished and we appear to be just rolling with that.” — Gen. Sir Richard Barrons [34:28]

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Notable Quotes & Moments (with Timestamps)

• On the plan’s slow pace:

  “There are no prizes for effort in this game.” — Gen. Sir Richard Barrons [02:17]

• On misleading spending figures:

  “Everyone that talks about this figure kind of laughs… it could be anything. So that’s a very easy figure to get to.” — Larissa Brown [09:07]

• On existential risk:

  “We are living in an uncomfortable world... and there are potentially existential risks of security and prosperity and values.” — Gen. Sir Richard Barrons [14:35]

• On the dangers of not being prepared:

  “If the balloon does go up in five years, they are going to fight… The tragedy we’re setting ourselves up for potentially is that our sons and daughters… get sent to fight… and we all know we chose not to get them ready.” — Gen. Sir Richard Barrons [25:37]

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Important Segments (Timestamps)

• Introduction and DIP context: [00:34–03:01]
• Impacts of delays and resignations: [04:19–05:49]
• Plan specifics (winners & losers): [05:54–07:25]
• NATO and spending comparisons: [07:25–10:09]
• Military readiness and global context: [12:36–15:15], [24:11–26:24]
• Technological transformation & digital targeting: [26:47–29:38]
• Global stage and British identity: [31:52–34:49]

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Summary

The episode offers a sobering look at Britain’s new Defence Investment Plan—acknowledging points of progress and modernisation, but finding the effort undercut by slow implementation, funding shortfalls, and the looming risk of falling short in the face of world events and NATO expectations. The guests argue that while strategic thinking is strong, the lack of urgency and adequate spending leaves the UK potentially dangerously exposed, with fundamental questions about its role and reputation in a dangerous new world order.

Final thought, from Barrons:

“It’s beyond time the UK... asked itself the question, what do we have to be and what do we have to do in the world we find ourselves, ourselves in?” [33:35]

Transcript

[A]

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[A]

from the Times and the Sunday Times, this is the story.

[C]

I'm Manveen Rana.

[A]

More than a year late and after a colossal political saga involving not one, but two ministerial resignations and several stark warnings from the world of defence, it's finally arrived.

[D]

This plan represents our best judgment of what the country needs to meet this moment. And it is a platform on which I know my successor will build.

[A]

The long awaited Defence Investment Plan, or dip, has been unveiled.

[D]

We have reversed at last the corrosive hollowing out of our armed forces. And it's why we're transforming a defence program that frankly, for too long has been underfunded and unsuited for the threats that we face.

[A]

So are we now better prepared to face those threats?

[E]

This DIP is not just too little financially, it's too late. The drones Labour promised in today's headlines mainly enter service in the2030s, when the

[A]

threat we face is today mired in controversy, massively delayed. Will this investment plan meet the challenge of transforming defence to fight the walls of the future? We spoke to the general who wrote the Strategic Defence Review, which has been sat on ice for more than a year. Does he think this new plan will do enough?

[F]

It's got some really good bits. The transformative elements are exactly as they should be. They're bold, will make people uncomfortable, and that's okay. But the risk is still that it does the right thing way too slowly to manage the risks that we've identified. And there are no prizes for effort in this game.

[A]

Is this plan for modernization being scuppered by the budget? Will it win round our allies in NATO and will it do enough to make Britain safe? The story today, the Defence Investment Plan. Too little, too late.

[G]

I'm Larissa Brown. I'm the Defence Centre at the Times and I'm currently inside the Ministry of Defence in Whitehall.

[C]

Larissa, just remind us what this Defence Investment Plan is, is because, you know,

[A]

we're used to seeing strategic defence reviews every four, five, ten years. We did have a defence review, a strategic defence review, last year, but this is something slightly different. Just explain the process and why this is different?

[G]

Well, normally we have the Strategic Defence Review or some similarly worded document, and then what follows a few weeks later is the Defence Investment Plan, or again, something similar. In the past, we've not talked much about the Defence Investment Plan and this is meant to be the blueprint for how the armed forces will be funded. So you have the review, which will tell you exactly what the government of the day wants to invest in. Then you have the follow up Defence Investment Plan. And this time round, because we've waited for it for so long. So this is a year now, there's so much hype about it that it's become sort of its own document. You know, we're here in the MOD discussing it, going through every page, line by line. And in the past I've covered these things, we've barely mentioned it. So it's quite extraordinary really that we're giving so much kudos to it at the moment.

[C]

And Larissa, you're right, that's mostly because it's just taken so long to arrive.

[A]

What's behind that delay? And just talk us through some of

[C]

the political controversy that's sort of arisen around it all.

[G]

It's been a pretty extraordinary year. So we've had two defence ministers resign in the last few weeks and that's John Healy, who was the Defence Secretary, and Al Khans, the former Armed Forces Minister. And they both resigned over a lack of money. And Al Khan said that he, he had resigned because he also didn't think that the Defence Investment Plan was credible.

[E]

And I resigned for several reasons. Firstly, because I no longer believe the Defence Investment Plan was preparing for the wars we are most likely to fight.

[G]

We had wranglings between ministers behind the scenes, Healy arguing for more money and not managing to get it. Then we've also had problems with the defence companies because they've all been waiting for the MOD to announce what money they'll be putting into certain projects because obviously they want big contracts. Now, as they've been waiting, some of those smaller defence companies have already had to change tax, so they've stopped actually making weapons for defense and they've started doing other stuff and others have had to close completely and sack all of their staff. So it's been a really long year for defence. Defence chief senior military officers that I spoke to recently are just so fed up. They just really wanted this document out there. And I think today there's just like a general feeling of relief that we've finally got something, a document on the table that now the mod can follow.

[C]

So now that it is here, finally unveiled Larissa, talk us through the headlines.

[G]

There's quite a lot of headlines. So we've got 8.6 billion being invested in Tempest. That is the new combat aircraft that's being built by mainly BAA Systems with some other smaller companies, and that's being built with Japan and with Italy. Now, we were expecting about 6 billion to go into that. So that's more than we expected over the next four years. So that's. That's sort of one of the big winners. We've also got announcements in more money spent on drones, which we would expect. That's 5 billion over four years. There's also extra money for shipbuilding. We're not going to get new destroyers, but more money is going to be going on crude ships that will act as sort of control centers, motherships for other vessels. But we'll also be able to do missile defense, is what. Is what we've been told. Then we've got Special Forces, they're getting a big uplift. The details of that are classified, but we're told that they'll get an uplift of about 12% to their budget. There's also been a bit of speculation over recent days that plans for military housing would be paused, scrapped entirely. But actually they are being upgraded as planned and the military housing will go ahead as envisaged by John Healey, the former Defence Secretary. So, yeah, lots of different projects. There are some things that are being cut. Wildcat helicopters, for example. 34 of those, I think it is. As well as there's no longer any plans for Skynet 6.

[C]

I mean, there's a lot in this plan, clearly. You mentioned there's a huge uplift for Special Forces. You know, I remember American generals sometimes saying if that was the only bit we funded, they'd be perfectly happy. There will still be the big question, though, of how America feels about this plan. What's the big headline figure in terms of how much we're committing to? Given that NATO really wants us to be at 5% quite soon, I don't

[G]

think America's going to be too happy. So the headline figure is we'll be spending 2.7% on defence by 2030, and currently we're spending 2.4% and the US wants us to be spending 3.5%, of course, by 2035, which is that NATO commitment. We've said that we're going to be spending 3% in the next Parliament. But actually, the dip, the document, it says that a plan for how we get to that 3% in the next parliament. So this is after 2029, will be set out in the spending review next year. So currently there is still no clear pathway to 3%. Never mind that 3.5% NATO target by 2035. And all the military chiefs that I speak make it really clear that there needs to be a sort of an obvious pathway to reaching that. You can't just suddenly have tens of billions of pounds being spent in that final year. You need to have a, you know, a linear progress towards that. And that's not happening with this, with this document.

[C]

Larissa, in the sea of numbers that are being quoted today, there is talk of Keir Starmer committing to 4.2% of GDP UK's defence spending within 10 years. Does that hold up from what you've seen?

[G]

Well, I had a briefing earlier and that was the first question that I asked here in the Ministry of Defence. And it's a bit confusing because what that 4.2% figure is, is it's the 2.7%, which is what he said he'll be spending on defence by 2030, plus it's the 1.5% that NATO talks about, which is spending on security related projects. So that could be road. It could be basically anything, really. I mean, everyone that talks about this figure kind of laughs when they talk about it because it could be, it could be anything. So that's a very easy figure to get to.

[C]

But that doesn't change the mod's budget.

[G]

No, it doesn't at all. And that's, and that's the 4.2% out of the 5%, which is what NATO is asking for by 2035. But just to be clear, that 5% that NATO is asking for is 3.5% on core defence spending.

[C]

And so we won't have made that target.

[G]

We will not have made that target currently because there's currently only a funded plan to reach 2.7% that won't go

[C]

down well within the defence industry. A lot of this is supposed to be about transforming defence. This is a once in a lifetime opportunity to really modernize the way we fight wars. And yet it's being announced by a Prime Minister who's clearly on his way out. Why has he announced it now rather than waiting for Andy Burnham to come in and decide if he's happy with the plan?

[G]

I think there were probably several factors. So one of them is that we've got this NATO summit looming In Ankara, that's July 7, and that's going to be a big moment because Starmer will still be Prime Minister. He'll be going to this NATO summit. Donald Trump will be there. Trump wants to see how allies are progressing with their defence plans. And if Starmer was going to go to that summit without a defence plan and without any mention of how he's going to fund certain projects over the next few years, I think it would be extremely humiliating for him. And he obviously wants to make a big point of the fact that he is investing in defence far more than the Conservatives were in their final years. And he thinks that that is a point that he can touch upon, that'll be part of his legacy, because he has, to his credit, increased defence funding qu dramatically. It's just that he isn't increasing it enough would be what military chiefs would be arguing.

[C]

And is there a chance when Andy Burnham, presuming it is him, does come into number 10? He could. He could change any of this, he could row back on any of it, or potentially maybe even decide to spend more.

[G]

Well, it's strange, in the document, it talks about how defence will be the top priority of the government at the spending review, but actually, they can't really commit to that because nobody knows completely what Andy Burnham's going to do. Now, we have been told that Andy Burnham is aware of the plans and he's obviously not against the point that he feels like he needs to speak out now. So it is going ahead. But, yes, in theory, you know, Burnham could decide that he suddenly doesn't want to carry on with this particular program and there's nothing really to stop him maxing it.

[A]

That was Larissa Brown, defence editor at the Times. So why is there such pressure to spend so much money on the military? And does the DIP, or Defence Investment Plan, prepare us properly for this moment? We asked a general.

[F]

I am General Sir Richard Barrons. I was a lifelong member of the Army. I left 10 years ago. And I think I'm here because I was one of the authors of the Strategic defence review in 2025.

[C]

Richard, we've talked to you about the Strategic Defence Review in the past, but one of the things that it set out very clearly was the level of the threat, why we need to be worried about defence. So just paint a brief picture for us of what is the primary threat? How acute is it? What should we be worried about? What's on the horizon?

[F]

So it's a really important question, because the whole of the Defence Review rests on the thought that we spent about 35 years after 1989 in a really comfortable world of the post Cold War era, a single superpower, the us, a world that was generally going in the direction of the way the west had wanted it to go and the institutions created on the back of the Second World War. So imf, UN Security Council, all of those things. And some in Europe felt then that we had grown out of war, which was nuts, but it was popular and it was comfortable. And that world is over. And we now live in a world where we still have, obviously the US as a major superpower, but now we have the rise of China. And more than that, we have essentially the collapse of that post World War world where we tried to regulate our global security by consensus under the un. And we've gone back to a world of great powers deciding what they need to do. And what makes it tenser is it's occurring on this tableau of the dynamic instability of climate change, the proliferation of nuclear weapons, population growth, nudging 8 billion, and all the shocks of the digital age in combination in an unknowable way. And that feels pretty zero sum. And so if you're the uk, you're living in an uncomfortable world where if it's not managed well and it's not being managed well, there are potentially existential risks of security and prosperity and values. And the other aspect that's just become clearer and harder is that the US is not coming to rescue us any longer in the way that it has underpinned European security since 1949. They're made pretty clear that we're rich enough as part of Europe to look after ourselves, and that includes looking after Ukraine.

[C]

And Richard, having set out that level of threat and the fact that we can't really rely on our old allies in the same way anymore. We are going to have to work out how we can face that threat on our own. You set about trying to work out what defence needed to do. Just describe when you first went in and actually had a look under the bonnet, when you got to sort of see the state of defence right now. How bad was it?

[F]

It was as bad as we expected to find, because we do have the armed forces that have spent, of course, I was part of them, spent most of the last 35 years being made smaller and less ready. And less ready means less money for training and spares and logistics and reserves and all those things that really make armed forces not just ready to fight tonight, but, you know, necessary for a couple of years in the way that you see in Ukraine. So there was no surprise, but the basic strategic point is we have the armed forces we decided to have in the post Cold War when we really didn't need them big and ready. But those are the armed forces we've got in a world where we have to deter. And this is a really vital point because if you look at Ukraine, it's a failure of deterrence. I mean, Russia attacked again in 2022 in ways that Ukraine and we failed to deter. And so instead of having a national conversation about is it 3% or 5% of GDP? And by the way, it's 5% of GDP that we need to spend to deter, we don't have the conversation about, well, if we fail to deter and we end up fighting, now it's 50% of GDP. That's the historical average. That's the cost to Ukraine right now, plus all the damage to your economy and you're built environment, plus the scar of three generations of, you know, death and injury to military and civil population. So in this new world with the armed forces we've actually got, which we can understand, but frankly no longer accept, we have got to do better.

[A]

Coming up, will this new defense investment plan do better? And what does it all mean for Britain's place in the world? That's in just a moment.

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[C]

Richard, the fact that we don't look like we could put up a decent fight, you're more likely to be at war and you've just outlined the costs of that. You set about doing a strategic defence review. Took months. You put it together, a series of recommendations, the government accepted them and then silence for a full year. What do you make of that?

[A]

And why is that gap alone a disaster for industry and for defence?

[F]

So the first thing is people should be really confident that the direction of travel that the defence review established, and which the government agreed in the form of 62 recommendations, is still a really good prescription for what needs to be done to deter. Based on the credible ability to fight for war in the 21st century, it charts this transformation. The challenge is it's going to be hard work and it is definitely going to be expensive, particularly when you're starting from a really low base. And what we've seen over the last year was a wrestle between the Ministry of Defense and the treasury and indeed the rest of the government, about how to find the money to make this happen and to make it happen quick enough. And these are two different things. So the Defense review answered a second question, which is essentially what you get for this money over 10 years, and what you get for the desired profile is to a reasonably better place by about 2035, across an army, navy and air force. But as we all agreed then, and the Prime Minister has said so subsequently, actually the problem is Russia could attack NATO in 2030. That's what the Prime Minister has said.

[D]

It is our intelligence assessment and the assessment of other countries in NATO, that there could be an attack by Russia on NATO as soon as 2030. So you can see the urgency and the priority that we're putting behind this.

[F]

And so there must be a question about being ready for a fight in 2035, if your enemy can start the fight in 2030.

[C]

So, hang on, we could be at war at 2030 but not really able to defend ourselves for a full five years.

[F]

Yes, but to be ready by 2030, you'd have to implement the SDR faster, and that will require much more money sooner. And here we come to the drama of the last year. At its heart is not a question of affordability. The UK public sector in 2026 is £1.4 trillion combination of tax and borrowing, of which defence is in essentially about 67 billion pounds. And we spend more than 300 billion pounds on welfare and other things. In fact, we spend five times as much on welfare as we do on defence. We spend more on debt interest than we do on defence. So you can't have a conversation about defence, say it's not affordable, because what we're actually having a conversation about is we choose not to afford it because we are locked into spending a lot of money on other things that we have grown used to and prefer absolutely understand that. But it must be possible to make different choices, to be good enough to decide that we need to act and to act in the interests of our own defense and security. But the story of the last year is not the government and not the wider British people want to make those choices, at least not yet. So in the intervening year, this wrestle has gone on about finding more money sooner for defense than we've seen. The outcome today is it's a score draw. The demand for four years was 28 billion extra, and what they've got is 15 billion extra. So they're going to be delays and cuts and restrictions. And then more strategically, NATO wants its members to find 3.5% plus 1.5% of GDP by 2035. And currently the UK's planning figure is 3% by 2034. And the difference between those two profiles is billions. So we're not planning to fix this problem, either at the speed of our alliance NATO, or at the speed of the risk we've set out for ourselves.

[C]

So, Richard, I don't want to labour the point, but I just think for anyone listening, I assume they'll be as shocked as I am. Just to clarify, it does mean that we will not be meeting our NATO commitments by 2035, unless there is a hell of a lot of money coming in that final year. And it also means we could be at war by 2030 and not prepared for it.

[F]

Well, let's start with the current state. So there are 32 members of NATO, which the US is the major subscriber and going to do less. So we don't really know the pace of that. It's not a cliff edge, but it'll be a reduction. You can see countries like Germany that are spending and they have changed their constitution to do this. Huge sums of money, 377 billion euros shopping list and a defense budget of 150 billion euros by 2029. That's more than the UK and France combined. Poland spending 4.5% of GDP. So our European allies have decided that they need to act and act quickly. Now, the UK on the spending table, the UK is about halfway now, but the most Critical thing is, if you compare every nation's current capability against their contract with NATO, the capability agreement they said they would fill, the UK is now probably about 31 out of 32, and the army is definitely 32 out of 32. So we are not in a good place. We want five years, Grace, and we're relying on our enemies to forgive us for that. Grace. Many people like me have family members in the armed forces and they know perfectly well that they're not in great shape. They know what they need to do, but they don't have the money for equipment and training. And it's, as we've discussed, going to take a long time for it to turn up. They also know if the balloon does go up in five years, they are going to fight. They're going to have to go. There's no, oh, we're not ready, you know, we can't turn up. We've got commitments to make. And so the tragedy that was setting ourselves up for potentially, is that our sons and daughters, and they are somebody's sons and daughters, get sent to fight. And we all know that we chose not to get them ready.

[A]

Richard, your strategic defence Review was accepted by the government. They've taken more than a year to come up with their defence investment plan, which doesn't have the money that you required to meet all of the commitments that you wanted them to take on. They are changing the plan as a result. Talk us through the changes they've made and what you think of them.

[F]

So, you know, there's a lot to celebrate in those changes, because the defence review says, look, we're talking about war in the 21st century and we know what that architecture looks like. And at the heart of it in the review, it's called a digital targeting web. Most of the world is less squirmy about this and calls it a digital kill web. But essentially, in this new era, every form of sensor that you have that understands your operating environment, so satellites and ships and aircraft and tanks and mobile phones and databases, everything that allows you to understand your battle is connected into secure cloud data managed by AI. And that AI is connected to every sort of weapon that you have, and it translates what's sensed into target information and allocates them to weapons systems. Now, it's that system that's allowed the US to strike Iran a thousand times a day. And that's how Russia fights Ukraine and Ukraine fights Russia. And the review says the uk, as part of NATO, must have a digital targeting web. It doesn't exist yet. It's sort of coming and then the stuff that does the sensing and the stuff that does the shooting, everybody traditionally thinks of as ships, tanks, aircraft, you know, iconic platforms as seen in all the World War II films. And they still matter, but they are becoming the back end of a network of drones. And in the defense investment plan announced today, there are some really good examples across all three services of how they will evolve quickly into that model, because that's how you do 21st century conventional deterrence. So that is great news. And if the UK could only harness not just that innovative thinking, but its industrial base, it could drive export led growth. The challenge is it's happening really slowly and at a small scale because there isn't the money to really fire it up.

[A]

So, Richard, you're welcoming some of those changes to the plan that you'd set out, you're welcoming the loss of the frigates, but you do want them to be looking much more at the drones and the kill web, effectively digital kill web, and how that functions.

[F]

So the frigates aren't going. So what they've done rightly is sweep away the models that were in the program, which were slightly better versions of the thing they had last time. And what they have done really well is to say, no, we're going to have this crude, uncrewed and autonomous mix. So they still need ships, you still need ships not just to fight, but to do all the other things. You know, humanitarian stuff, coastal protection, all of the things you need a navy to do. But the ship with people on will be the back end of a network of cheaper, more effective, more durable autonomous and uncrewed systems. So that's the right thing to do.

[C]

But Richard, so you seem to be saying there are some really good programs in this defence investment plan. There is a sense of transformation, but there still isn't enough money coming fast enough, slightly too little, too late. Politically. We know that Zakir Starmer, in one of his last acts as Prime Minister, will have to face NATO in Ankara for this big summit. When he turns up, what sort of reception do you think he'll get? I mean, is this enough? Will this defence investment plan be enough to earn us a seat at the table without others laughing?

[F]

I think it's likely to be a difficult day. And although everyone else at the NATO summit may sense this is Keir Starmer's last moment on the international stage, at least for now. So I think they will applaud the transformational bits that we've talked about, because some of that is better than anyone else in Europe has got, for example, one of my challenges to the German spending is it's enormous, but too much of it feels like a tribute bound to war in the 1990s. They're buying a lot of stuff which I, you know, I'm familiar with and they, they wouldn't accept all of that criticism.

[C]

And Poland seems to be doing the same. Lots of slightly old fashioned platforms.

[F]

Yes, because militaries are innately conservative in most countries. And so if you like, there's a dichotomy where the UK has great ideas but frankly nothing like the money and other countries have lots of money and their ideas are a bit traditional. I wish there could be a better balance. But where I think the UK is going to be criticized is in the pace at which this change is being afforded because other nations are at three or three and a half percent of GDP and we are planning to get there in 10 years. Other nations expect the UK to be a major feature of the European part of the NATO alliance and they're going to say, and again uk, you've turned out with fabulous opinions and not much stuff and it's not good enough.

[C]

Given all of that, is this going to be a decent enough audition for Keir Starmer? If the rumours are true that he's quite keen on the Secretary General job at NATO? Do you think this is a plan, a defence investment plan that will get him a shot at the job or will he be laughed out of the room?

[F]

So you have to give today's Prime Minister Keir Starmer the credit for endorsing a review which charted the most profound transformation TO of the UK Armed Forces for 150 years. And it is a better plan than anyone else has got, frankly in the world. And the issue for Sir Keir Starmer is given that he's the head of a Labor government, is they're just not being able to find the will or perhaps even the competence to drive through those hard choices across the public sector. They just cannot envisage having less welfare for more warfare. And for people like me that's not just regrettable, that's dangerous and also personally alarming where I have relatives who will be sent to fight without the things they need. And in terms of NATO, big prizes for being transformative. But now you also have to drive through the spending to match the narrative.

[C]

And just finally you talked there about warfare versus welfare. You know, it does feel like it really is time for a national conversation about our priorities. And part of that conversation should really also be about, you know, post Brexit post our sort of general economic malaise, who we want to be in the world because our military power has often won us a seat at the table in places like the un, a very senior role in NATO, which, you know, if we are now falling to the bottom of the league, we just can't expect to be able to continue. Do we need to be adjusting our self image?

[F]

It's beyond time. When the UK as a country looked at itself and asked itself the question, what do we have to be and what do we have to do in the world we find ourselves, ourselves in? Because we've been running on the fumes of an era that has passed where we're very prominent in international organizations and on the global stage, partly because of our history, but mostly because we did have hard power. And of course we have astonishing soft power. I mean, the Premier League, the BBC, culture, law, banking, insurance, entertainment really all matter. And we have fallen into a position where our power in the world is much diminished and we appear to be just rolling with that. And for me, it matters a lot now because if we don't stand up for our interests, I mean, who else will?

[A]

That was General Sir Richard Barrons, author of last year's Strategic Defence Review. And earlier you heard from Larissa Brown, defence editor at the Times.

[C]

What do you think about the defence investment plan?

[A]

Is Britain investing enough in its military or should we be focused on other priorities? Do send us your thoughts and questions to the [e-mail] and we'll try to

[C]

answer as many as possible.

[A]

The producers today were Sophie McNulty and David Witty. The executive producer was Harry Stott. Sound design and theme composition were by Malicetto.

[C]

Thanks for listening. We'll be back tomorrow.

[D]

SA.

[A]

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