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Ladies and gentlemen, welcome to the Weekly Show Podcast. My name is Jon Stewart. It is a lovely day. It is May 19th. It is Tuesday. I'm actually on Colbert tonight, so if any oh well, this will be airing tomorrow. I'm actually on Colbert yesterday. That's a strange way to promote that. It's my sadly final appearance on the Late show and I just can't wait to spend some quality time with my friend, hopefully to the pleasure of the audience that will be watching. And so I urge all of you, if you are within the sound of my voice, please do watch. And not just that, watch on Wednesday and watch on Thursday and and enjoy. Celebrate what has been a remarkable run of a person and remove it from the melancholy circumstances by which it occurs because his career in broadcasting and it's not over by any stretch of the imagination, but it deserves to be separated from whatever black hole of perverse corruption snuffed it out in in the first place. And I think that's what I'll be going there to do tonight. And that's what I hope that that everyone will be doing over these next few days. Just truly a once in a lifetime broadcaster performer. And I can't wait to see him and give him a big old hug. So but on the way to that, I would be remiss if I did not also discuss the Taiwan Ship War. This may be the worst segue I've ever done in the history of this program, but it is an important the President of the United States has just returned from his historic trip to China, where he got what's the Chinese Word for bupkis. We got bupkis. And we don't really know. We got into a trade war with no real plan. So out of character for this administration. And we're going to see what ends up happening. And who better to help us understand the parameters of what might possibly happen than someone who's written about it for many years? So we're going to get to that. Our guest today is Professor Chris Mailer. Ladies and gentlemen, we are delighted to be joined by a gentleman by the name of Chris Miller. He's the author of Chip War, Not Doritos, my Friend. It's the Fight for the World's Most Critical Technology. An American historian, economic history, international relations. Chris, you're a professor? Yes, International history.
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That's right.
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Tufts University.
B
That's right.
A
Beautiful. And this is not your first go round as an author. Putinomics and the struggle to Save the Soviet Economy. And we shall be masters. Thank you so much for being here to talk to us. You, you wrote Chip wars in when, 2022.
B
That's right, yeah. Four years ago.
A
And that came out and then like a month later, ChatGPT launched.
B
Yes, that's right. And it's been a wild ride in semiconductors since then.
A
I mean, the chips almost became even more seminal and more important to the world economy 100%.
B
Because as we roll out AI, we need bigger and bigger data centers full of the most advanced semiconductors that we can make today.
A
And so the basic premise of chipboard kind of it talked about how Taiwan and in combination with, I guess, some Japanese technology and some Dutch technology, became the leading edge, the cutting edge of all of the most specialized chips that are used in this technology today.
B
Yeah, that's right. So the key chips, they're designed still in Silicon Valley by companies like Nvidia or amd, but when it comes to AI in particular, they're almost all manufactured by one Taiwanese firm, a company called tsmc, which has the vast majority of its manufacturing capabilities in Taiwan. And so it's this partnership between Silicon Valley and Taiwan that makes the most cutting edge chips possible.
A
And what is, what is Silicon Valley? What do they give to Taiwan? Is it the software that they give
B
to them was really the designs of the chips. So if you take a piece of silicon like you'd find inside of your smartphone or in a data center, they've got billions and billions of tiny switches called transistors that are etched into the silicon. And different designs produce different capabilities. So an Nvidia chip's designed differently from a AMD chip. And these designs are what enables progress in the semiconductor industry. And so these design files are essentially emailed over to Taiwan. And the Taiwanese do the manufacturing of these designs and put them into the silicon.
A
I mean, it. It's an incredible technology with advances that take place in terms of hours, not in terms of sort of epochs. So how did you reason the. The reason that I think it's important to talk today, especially to somebody with your expertise. President, United States has just come back from China. China obviously has designs on Taiwan, an island that is very close to their mainland. They always have felt that it is part of, you know, since, I don't know when it split. 49 was a Shanghai check in. 49, that's right, yep. Okay. So they split off from China. China's always had designs to get it back in the same way, I guess, that Russia would have with Crimea. The President, the United States has always been sort of the implicit and sometimes explicit protector of Taiwan. The President, United States came back and said, maybe I'll use our military support and weapons to Taiwan as a bargaining chip with China, I guess saying, like, if they would agree to buy more soybeans, we would let them have Taiwan. What was your read on the President's messaging and. And the future of Taiwan as this on the vanguard of 21st century technology?
B
Well, I would say first off, the US has been getting more and more nervous, not just under Trump, but over the last decade, about China's capabilities. So China's wanted to seize Taiwan, as you said, since 1949. But it's only in the last couple of years where Chinese military capabilities have grown to the point where they might now be able to succeed in doing so. If there was a war right now, nobody knows how it would play out. And that's increased concern in Washington about does China have both the intent and the capability to do something around Taiwan? And that's happened just as Taiwan has gotten more and more important as a partner, enabling Silicon Valley to produce all of the chips that we need in data centers, in smartphones, in computers. And so right now, Taiwan is really at the absolute center of the AI industry. And the US can't do AI without chips from Taiwan. Which means that on the one hand, we've got to treat the Taiwan question very carefully to make sure that we defend Taiwan. But on the other hand, we also got to be ready for China looking very carefully at Taiwan, both in terms of achieving its long term strategic aim of seizing Taiwan, but also in terms of realizing the more pressure China puts on Taiwan, the more pressure it puts on us and our AI industry because we're dependent on importing chips from Taiwan
A
too, now is the idea. So the chips that are made in Taiwan, are they also. Is that. Where. Where does China make their chips?
B
Well, that's a. That's a great question. China would like to import the most advanced chips from Taiwan, but the United States doesn't let them. So for the past couple of years, we've said to the Taiwanese, you can't sell the most cutting edge AI chips to China, and China can't produce these chips domestically at any scale that matters. So for cutting edge AI chips, China's in a bind. The most advanced production is in Taiwan. China thinks it owns Taiwan, but it doesn't. And the US does not let Taiwan sell to China because we want our companies to have access to the most advanced AI chips, not China.
A
What is the relationship politically between the leaders of Taiwan and Xi of China? Is there a world where this isn't a military operation, but a transactional operation where Taiwan cuts a deal with China to do just that in exchange for. For not, you know, militarily invading them?
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The short answer is. Is no.
A
That is the short answer.
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You know, the Taiwanese have been very clear. They've repeatedly voted for presidents that have said they don't want to be integr China, that they want to be an autonomous country, ideally even independent. Poll after poll of the Taiwanese population says that they think of themselves as a separate political entity. And I think what's key here is that if you did a poll a generation ago in Taiwan, you would have found a lot of people who would have said they're part Chinese but part Taiwanese. If you do that poll today, what you find is that as the generations change, Taiwanese think of themselves increasingly as a separate country, a separate society. And so there's not much interest at all in any sort of integration with China.
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And even economically, forget about, you know, political independence or integrating in that way, they have no interest in saying to the United States, look, we love. We love your chips. We love your sweet, sweet silicon transistors by the billions. We'd like to cut a deal with these guys. Economically, we think it'd be beneficial for us. We think it would ease the pressure on us, you know, in terms of them threatening to invade us. Is that even a possibility?
B
There's some more nuance there. There are some people in Taiwan, especially in the business community, who make that argument and say if we have closer economic ties with China, the political situation will be more stable. But I think the dominant view in Taiwan is to say, look, our population is a tiny fraction of China's. There's no hope of an equal economic relationship. And in fact, a lot of people in Taiwan worry that the closer the economic ties, the more China will smother them, given its size. And so if you look at where Taiwan's been investing, where Taiwan's been diversifying its trade over the last decade, it's been trying to turn away from China because it's afraid that economic ties are a beachhead for political influence.
A
What are the other. So in Taiwan, you've got this incredible chip industry that is dominant. They are, you know, the monopoly in terms of. Of this kind of manufacturing. What else do they do? Is it a Saudi Arabia, you know, oil economy situation? And now they've suddenly decided to diversify. What. What is it all electronics and circuitry? What do they do there?
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Yeah, there's a whole range of manufacturing, from machine tools to plastics. But the electronics industry is by far the dominant player. And it's. It's not just chips. It's the chemicals that go into plants. It's. Once you take a chip, you put it on a printed circuit board, you wire it together with other devices, you can make almost anything electronic in Taiwan. And they're the leader not just at the chip segment of the supply chain, but at many other segments, too. And it's been a great business for them. It's why they're one of the wealthiest countries in Asia, despite that two generations ago, they were a country doing nothing but farming.
A
It's an incredible story. Where are they getting the materials for this?
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Well, the materials are easy to dig out of the ground. There's silicon everywhere. The challenge is getting the materials refined to the level of purity that you need. And so when it comes to manufacturing chips, you're manufacturing at essentially the atomic level. And so your materials have to be purified basically to the atomic level as well. And so in the chip industry, they talk about eight nines of purity. So 99.9999999 is the level of purity you'll need for certain types of chemicals or gases.
A
Well, that's like dial soap. That might be the only other substance as pure as that. How so? When they talk about. Because there's all these things floating around. So they say that Silicon Valley provides the silicon which is embedded with the billions of transistors. What do the Japanese do in this supply chain?
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Yeah, so today, Silicon Valley doesn't do much silicon at all. They just do the designs first and foremost.
A
Oh, so they're just doing, they're sending out blueprints. It's just, they're emailing you. Here's how you want to, here's how you want to draw your little maze because they all, they, they seem to look like little mazes.
B
That's right, that's right. Yeah. Yeah. That is most of what Silicon Valley does today. There used to be actual silicon in Silicon Valley. That's why they named it Silicon Valley. But not.
A
And it was a valley.
B
And it was a valley. That's right. Yes, that's right. So today it's actually the Japanese that are the world's leader in making the wafers, ultra pure silicon wafers and many of the other chemicals that you need to manufacture chips.
A
And then what? The Dutch do something. I don't know if it's the icing. What, what do the Dutch bring to this process? Because that's the third leg.
B
Yes, that's right. Yeah. So if you want to pattern where each of the transistors goes on a chip, so put your design file actually into silicon, you need a tool called a photolithography tool. And the Dutch have the world's leading company, really the world's only company that produces the most cutting edge versions of these tools.
A
I have to tell you, as I hear it described, I can't help but feel a sense of pride for humankind that anyone I can remember. Professor, My father worked at RCA, this is in the 60s, late 60s, and he brought home in 1969, maybe 70, a calculator. And the calculator that he brought home was the size of a desk. And it added and subtracted and multiplied and divided and we played with it for hours, but it was the size of a desk. And I imagine it's the exact same principles as what is now going into these supercomputer AGI chat bot models. Is it all the same principle?
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It pretty much is. You're carving little circuits into silicon. And the difference is that compared to the 1960s, you're carving a billion times more circuits than was possible then.
A
And that is what gives it the ability to make as many calculations as it does at the speed that it does.
B
Yeah, that's. That's right. So if you think of all your files, all of your text messages, all your Instagram likes are all just long strings of ones and zeros. That's the entire digital world. And each of those has to be reflected by a switch in the silicon turning on and off. And that's why for the Most cutting edge chips, like those inside of your phone, you need 10 billion or 20 billion of these tiny switches all carved into a chip the size of your fingernail.
A
And doesn't this sum up the human experience? It is our expertise and scientific advancement that allows for this technology. And it is our, I want to say, conceitedness that is that we use it for Instagram likes like this. It's almost shocking. Hey folks, you know I asked you this question a lot of times. Where do you, where do you get your news? From me, I'm a town crier guy. I like to go outside in the street, see if there's, you know, a young person in knickers with a giant bell telling me what's happening. But I know that dude, he's from my neighborhood. But most of your news, you don't know where it's coming from. You don't, you don't know the biases involved with these people. That's for Ground News. Do you know Ground News? It's an app, it's a website and it helps users see beyond whatever single narrative they're getting. Subscriber funded by the way. No corporate incentives that are influencing what you're going to see. Aggregates are reporting from 50,000 plus news sources worldwide. It compares how these different outlets frame the same story. And I think as you can see, they frame it differently depending on which Murdoch they're working for. You know what I'm talking about? About. We don't need to, I don't need to spell this out for you people. To get unlimited access to the Vantage subscription, go to ground news.com stewart subscribe to get 40% off the discounts available only for a limited time. That's groundnews.com stewart or you can just scan the QR code on screen and don't Forget to get 40% off ground news@groundnews.com Stewart. But I want to get back to. So you've got this little supply chain. What is China's role in all of this? Why do we care if they're not involved in this? Or is it what are they providing into this chain that we need them for?
B
Well, it's a key question. If you look in terms of dollars, almost all the money goes to companies outside of China. Us, Taiwan, Japan, Netherlands. But the thing that Chinese do provide are some of the basic materials that go in. So rare earth ele, for example, are needed in certain parts of the chip making process and those are mined and processed largely in China, in some cases almost exclusively. In China. And so for the past couple of years, China's been choking off the export of these critical materials, which has caused problems for the entire semiconductor supply chain.
A
Now, when you say rare earths, because you just said silicon is the main ingredient, and that's not rare. That's everywhere. It's sand, I guess it's. It's sort of. It's everywhere. It just needs to be purified. Are they actually rare or are these materials everywhere, but we just haven't dug for them?
B
They are everywhere. What is rare is deposits that have enough concentration to make it economically viable to mine them and to process them.
A
What kind of materials are we talking about? Let's.
B
Well, you got to take out your periodic table and rewind.
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I have it. Hold on.
B
So they get pretty obscure pretty quickly. Yttrium, dysprosium, terbium. Things you would never think about, but
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just made up words, basically.
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Well, you know, a lot of these materials were only identified in terms of how do you actually mine and process them in the last half century. So they are pretty new materials in terms of manufacturing, but they become critical to the entire electronics supply chain.
A
So you have detailed in your book, and I think brilliantly. And it's so interesting how Taiwan became the leader in these kinds of chip assemblages and chip production. And if we could just briefly walk us back, because it was not. It was not a fait accompli that Taiwan was going to be the leader in that. There was a gentleman from Texas Instruments who had that expertise and took it to Taiwan. Yes.
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Yeah, that's right. So the chip manufacturing industry started in Silicon Valley and in Texas, with Texas Instruments being one of the key players, including in the calculator industry, like your father was working on.
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Right.
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And for a long time, it was the US that was the dominant manufacturer of chips. But in 1987, this gentleman, Morris Chang, was passed over for the CEO job at Texas Instruments. One of the greatest mistakes in American history. And he went to the Taiwanese government and said, I'd like to start a semiconductor manufacturing company. That'd be different than any other company that came before it, because before that point, companies designed and manufactured chips in house. You did both the design and the manufacturing. He said, I only want to manufacture. I want to be sort of like what Gutenberg was for books. Gutenberg didn't write any books. He only printed them. Morris Chang didn't want to design any chips. He only wanted to manufacture them. And that's the origins of Taiwan's dominant position in chip Making today.
A
So he went over there to do that. Why was it that in the United States with this at their hand, that they weren't able to do both? Was it that they just didn't see the future? They didn't see it coming?
B
Yeah, I think that's, that's, that's the primary explanation. You had these big companies like ti, like intel at the time, which were doing well. They believe their existing business model of both design and manufacturing made sense. And there was this pretty disruptive idea that Morris Chang came up with. At first it wasn't clear it was going to work. And it was only over the last decade or two that it became obvious it was the best possible way to manufacture chips. Because you can not just manufacture for yourself, you manufacture for the entire industry, for Nvidia, for amd, for Apple. And you have these huge economies of scale that result from that.
A
How is it the story of manufacturing has always been sort of to create efficient assembly line methodologies? How did they miss this in such an advanced industry? If Ford is the one who figured it out for automobiles so that you could democratize this process and make a product that would revolutionize travel available to people at a scale that made the pricing make sense, how is that not obvious to everyone in this nascent computer industry?
B
Well, you know, I think in hindsight it certainly looks obvious. But if you go back to the time Morris Chang went to his colleagues at TI and said, let's make what he called a foundry. This company that would just manufacture, not do any design. And they asked, who are your customers customers going to be? And he said, well, there aren't any customers today because there weren't any companies that only designed chips then you had to have your own in house factory. He said, if I build it, they will come. And that was a risky bet at the time, but it proved right. And just as he was setting up tsmc, in part because he set up tsmc, you had companies like Qualcomm or Nvidia founded at the same time that never manufactured. They just designed and sent those designs to Taiwan.
A
See what I find so interesting about that, Professor? And I don't know. So if you think about the creation of the industry at large for computing, it was founded on the idea that like Microsoft, we're not going to make the hardware, we're just going to make the operating system. And if our operating system is embedded in everything, we have a monopoly. And if that's how they were viewing software, I'm surprised that they weren't also Viewing that for the brain of whatever it was that they were going to create, that they would. They would not only own the operating system, but they would own the physical brain for all of these.
B
Yeah. Why? I think the other dynamic is financial, which is that the closer you are to the customer, the more you can charge. And so you look, today, TSMC is a $2 trillion business. Nvidia, which relies on TSMC for almost every single chip it manufactures. Nvidia is a $5 trillion business. And so if you say, would you rather be TSMC or Nvidia? The answer right now is clearly Nvidia. And that's just one of TSMC's many customers. And so here's the paradox is that Silicon Valley made the right choice financially. The US has by far the most valuable chip firms in the world, an ecosystem that everyone is envious of. But it was only possible to get that because we had this reliance on Taiwan, and it was a rational choice to outsource the manufacturing to Taiwan. The only problem is that as we were doing that, China's military threats and capabilities were growing.
A
So who are the companies? When you talk about. So in Silicon Valley, you've got chip design. That's Nvidia. Who else is on the cutting edge of that? Intel.
B
So Intel's a bit of a different case because they still have some in house manufacturing, but set them aside. Nvidia, amd, Qualcomm, Apple, Google, Amazon, all of these companies design chips and manufacture almost all of them at tsmc.
A
See, this blows my mind because if you think about, you're telling a story of specialization.
B
Yep.
A
In Silicon Valley, it was important for them, financially and otherwise, to specialize, so they're going to do that. Then you have a company like Amazon who is saying, okay, yeah, we're going to specialize in that, but we're also going to send you books and energy bars to your house. Like that almost seems antithetical to the entire premise.
B
Yeah, yeah. Well, and that's been a big change the last five or 10 years is that all of the big tech firms used to just buy chips from chip designers. Now, because they're running these vast data centers, which is a new thing. It's just the last decade that Amazon and Microsoft have become these massive cloud computing companies. They've realized that if you're going to own this many chips, you're better off if some of them are specialized to the specific types of calculations that you're undertaking. And that's why today the big tech firms are among the biggest Buyers of specialized chips.
A
So now let's take it back into sort of that geopolitical arena that we're talking about earlier. You've got these firms in Silicon Valley who are absolutely crucial to the future of any technology that's going to be utilized anywhere. And they have the greatest designs and the best silicon transistor specs, and they're sending it out to these other places. Did anybody in the government or within those companies think, but, you know, we're going to need a lot of uridium and Paladin and all these other things that we are not in any way mining or refining. None of
B
sounds crazy, but the answer is not really everything.
A
It's. I like it. How it's always in hindsight. Yes, it does sound crazy.
B
Yeah. I think two things happened. One is that companies were late to really realize how problematic the US China relationship was going to get. They were constantly hoping, well, the next president's going to make it better or Xi Jinping is going to change his mind. And it never happened. It's just been more and more conflict over the last decade, and companies were slow to realize that. But the second thing is that even if you're one of the biggest tech companies on your own, it's hard to solve a mining problem since you are miles away from mining in the supply chain. You're not buying yttrium or dysprosium. Your suppliers aren't buying it. It's the suppliers of your suppliers of your suppliers, which are often in different countries or different continents. And so these big tech companies often struggle themselves to understand how much yttrium is in their end product.
A
Oh, they don't even understand downrange what is required to. To make their product.
B
They've been spending the last couple years trying to get up to speed, and it's a hard set of questions.
A
You know, what they should do is plug it into chat GPT and it'll just come out with a whole list of dysprosium where you can buy. When did the first. Because it's. I'm having trouble wrapping my mind around it because it's so bananas to me. It's sort of. It reminds me of, you know, we have cars, but you know what we're going to need for those cars? Tires and vulcanized rubber. Oh, yeah, but we don't have rubber. Oh, well, we better figure that out. Imagine people going, no, hey, man, I just designed the cars. I don't know what go. You know, I didn't realize we needed rubber.
B
Yeah, no, it does sound like a total failure of supply chain management. And I think that's fair. I think in the defense of the tech companies, here's what's different from cars. So when Henry Ford was around, the number of suppliers he had was small, and all of them were in Michigan. Today, if you're putting together a smartphone, you've got thousands and thousands of suppliers, both the ones you're buying from directly and their suppliers. And they're on every continent in the world. And the number of materials that goes into a smartphone is in the dozens.
A
But what I would say is I'll almost give a pass to the tech company because I know, you know, they're focused on the one thing who I won't give a pass to is the United States government. How you have an industry that is so crucial to, I mean, right now all the discussion is we're not allowed to put any guardrails on AI, we're not allowed to regulate in any sense, because if we slow them down for just a moment, they will be passed by China and America will no longer be a superpower. If that is the stakes that we're dealing with. Their inability to plan this out in some measure is almost feels unforgivable.
B
It's certainly led us to a pretty tough situation. And I think here's the real dilemma is that governments know less than companies. If you ask the government, explain the supply chain for an AI server, their first step is to call the companies that design the AI servers, because how would the government know who are the component suppliers for this or that piece? And so you'd like to think the government should be in charge, but then you realize the government knows less than companies do.
A
Right. And they're not putting together a strategic planning board that reaches out to Silicon Valley and says, how can we make your industry more resilient and how can we safeguard your supply chains? When was the first supply chain disruption in this industry? Was it 2010?
B
Yeah, 2010 and 2011. China first started cutting off rare earths to Japan, which had implications for the entire tech sector. Then China rolled it back and most of the industry basically forgot about it, hoped that it would never come again. And that should have been our wake up call, but it wasn't.
A
But it was a wake up call for Japan.
B
That's right. That's right.
A
And what way. So, so how did Japan deal with when it first hit in 2010? So remember, this is 16 years ago. What did they do at that point?
B
So they started investing in rare earth mines and processing Facilities outside of China, so a big one in Australia, processing in Malaysia. They didn't solve their problem, but they took some meaningful steps to mitigate their risk. And in the United States, we did essentially nothing.
A
I'm sorry, it's not funny.
B
That's tragic.
A
But it's funny foreign. You know, the funny thing about the, the ads, the commercials that are happening, these, I don't know where, I don't know where they occur. This could be the first ad you're hearing, this could be the last ad you're hearing. This could be in the middle of the podcast. So my point being, I don't know if you're sleeping, I don't know where you are. I don't know if you're driving, I don't know if you're driving and sleeping. But the point is, wake up. We got a lot of interesting things going on here. You cannot fall asleep during the podcast. You can only fall asleep after you've heard about our latest sponsor. They're going to change your sleep game forever. Avocado Green mattress. Look, these Avocado mattresses, they're designed similar to an avocado, to provide comfort and proper support. Very people know that about avocados. The Avocado is designed to provide comfort, support and guacamole. And not that you care, you selfish bastard, but it's good for the planet. They use certified organic materials that are responsibly sourced, not irresponsibly sourced, not just willy nilly sourced, responsibly sourced. And they last longer. And if you last longer as a mattress, there's less waste. You know, the oceans are filled with mattresses, just floating mattresses. The fish can't use them. They don't sleep. They can't. I don't think. I'm not a marine biologist. Avocado products are made, not manufactured and thoughtfully crafted with real materials to deliver lasting comfort and support. Go to avocadogreenmattress.com/TWS to check out their mattress and furniture sale. That's avocado green mattress.com TWS. We did nothing. And so here's what I hear about doing nothing. That apparently doing something takes a long time and it's kind of expensive. They say, you know, for you to do any of the refining or even the mining, it could be 20 years before something comes online and is really significant. So here's what's crazy about that. What was the year again that they disrupted the supply chain?
B
2010.
A
And what year is it now?
B
We're almost there. We should by now have the mines ready. Yep, that's right. That's right.
A
If we had in that moment said, oh, this isn't now, and I don't know this, and maybe this is something that, that you don't know either, but let's just say geologically, surely there are places in the United States where these elements exist in a concentrated enough form that we would be able to mine them effectively. I don't, I think refining them is, is a much different process. And I, from what I understand, it's, it's, it's not particularly pleasant.
B
That's right. But your intuition is correct. There are places in the US as well as in South America and in Africa and elsewhere that you can find the materials you need. And the processing is not easy, it's sometimes not that clean, it's not cheap. But it's also not rocket science.
A
How much have the Chinese monopolized this industry? And is any of their forays into Africa also involved in the rare earth industries? Any of their belt and road investments, in other words? I guess what I'm getting at is they very clearly have an industrial policy. How much has their industrial policy? We're still ahead in making the specs, but how much have we built this industry on the tenuous edge of Iraq? That's teetering. And that how much of the foundation of these industries do they now control?
B
So for certain of the rare earths, especially what's called the heavy rare earths, their processing share is almost 100%. Almost all processing today is in China of rare earths, of certain types of rare earths. Everyone has a different type of processing, but certain ones, it's basically all in China. Now, that's not true for the mining in some cases, and everyone is different, but there's a literal monopoly for certain types of materials.
A
So why in God's name would we start a trade war with them?
B
I think the administration very clearly wasn't expecting, but should have expected China to retaliate using exactly this tool, the one
A
tool that our most important industry is based on. What did you make of, did you follow? I thought it was really unusual that when they went to the summit, they brought basically our entire tech industry with them. I mean, Qualcomm, Apple, Nvidia, Tesla, SpaceX, Boeing, and then obviously the financial guys from, I don't know, Goldman Sachs and Blackstone and all that. What did you make of the presence of those companies and individuals? Was it, I can't wrap my mind around, was it a show of strength or was it in some ways a show of deference.
B
I think the dilemma we face as a country is that China is both our number one economic competitor, but also a huge market for our most important companies. And for companies, they are laser focused on keeping access to the China market so important to their sales and financial performance. Which means they're constantly pushing the US Government to make sure that China policy is made with a focus on company sales in China in mind. And so Most of the CEOs that were visiting, they wanted to make sure they could keep selling into China, A, that the US would let them keep selling and B, that China would keep taking their products because they need the market.
A
But it strikes me as such a fundamentally backwards way then of demonstrating strength and leverage is to bring with you the most powerful business leaders in our country to basically genuflect as opposed to demonstrate resolve.
B
And China knows that it's got a really powerful tool in terms of its ability to cut off access to our companies whenever it wants to. And it's done that on a regular basis.
A
So what, what was the greatest strength then for America? It's clearly now not our materials, our manufacturing process. What is it? Is it our allies?
B
Well, you know, even when you look at materials, I think it's, it's a nuanced picture. So China produces a lot of the basic materials, but if you look at the, the high end materials that those basic materials are based on, a lot of that R and D still happens in the United States or in friendly countries like Japan. So we're great at taking the stuff that China produces, doing R and D on top of it, and selling it for a lot more money to the rest of the world. Like if you look at rare earths, does China make any money off of rare earths? No, almost none.
A
Wait, really?
B
It's a tiny business, tiny industry.
A
Rare earths is an industry that, crucial to the technological progress of humankind is, is a bad business.
B
It's a bad business. And the reason that China dominates it is because Chinese firms produce and then sell with little to no profit. And so they undercut any other company that wanted to enter the market because you can't make any money because China's producing at very low prices.
A
So what they're understanding is this isn't a money maker. This is a strategic sledgehammer and it's worth it to us. You know, they used to call this in the business a loss leader. You know, they, they, it's like when you'd go by the, I can't remember what it was Hickory Farms and they'd have the little plate with the little cheese cubes and you go on and go, you're not making any money on this, you're just giving it away. And they're like, right, but we got you in the store, didn't we? Is. Is that their methodology for this?
B
Yeah, that. That's a hundred percent right. And it's worked. It's worked. It's got us in the store, it's made us dependent on their materials. And right now we're in a position where even our most expensive products, our most advanced chips, we can't sell them unless we can get these materials from China.
A
Well, now let's, let's complicate it a little more. Let's get away from. Because right now we're just talking about sort of the advantage that China might have for the very beginning of our supply chain, right? They've got the mines, they refine the materials and then they send them out for all our brilliant engineers and technologists to make. The Dutch come in, they buff it up a little bit. The Japanese do their thing. What we've learned about manufacturing in China is they invited Apple in, let them pay workers, much less, let them take advantage of the freer regulations and all that. And all they had to do was bring their expertise. But what did the Chinese have them do? Train all of their people on their expertise. And so now they have industries that are competing with that. Are they doing the same with these chips?
B
For a long time, the answer was yes, and they were making progress and catching up. But then in 2019, the US and the Dutch and the Japanese began restricting sale of certain of these advanced chip making tools to China. And so right now, the asml, the Dutch tools we were talking about, you can't sell them to China at the most advanced levels. And it's really cut off a lot of the progress that China had been making. And it's meant that for the most advanced ships, almost all of them, including all the R and D, is happening outside of China, in Taiwan and Japan and the US and in Europe. And it's only because of these controls that that's the case.
A
But let me ask you, knowledge travels. I mean, it's one of the things that we're seeing now, you know, if we take it outside of a trade war and put it into a real war, it's one of the reasons why, you know, things are so fraught in Iran. We obviously have nuclear knowledge and technology that far exceeds theirs, but they're getting enough of it that they can compete and that they can make. They've got the centrifuges now, they've got the other stuff. What is preventing China from developing the kind of expertise and knowledge of bringing in leaders in that industry to educate? I mean, I can't imagine that they're not planning for that.
B
They're certainly trying, but I'd say different types of knowledge travels at different speeds. Nuclear weapons, you mentioned nuclear weapons were invented now in the 1940s. They're so straightforward, even the North Koreans can make them. And so the level of complexity in nuclear weapons is a tiny, tiny, tiny fraction of the level of complexity in one of these Dutch tools that's used for making chips. You've got the most complex engineering ever done, hundreds of thousands of components manufacturing happening at the nanometer scale. That's virus size. And it's got to happen accurately every single time. And so, yeah, China's trying to copy it. The Dutch media have repeatedly reported of different ways that Chinese hackers have broken into the Dutch company to try to steal the blueprints. That's all happening, but it's really hard stuff. And it's now been almost a decade that China's been trying to copy this machine and they haven't made a lot of progress.
A
How much of a moving target is this expertise? In other words, if they were 10 years behind and they're slowly catching up, how much more advanced are, you know, are we still disappearing past the horizon or is it a little bit more of a fixed target and they're going to be able to, to find their way to it?
B
Yeah, no, that, that's, that's a key point. And, and because technology moves forward so rapidly, it's a very, very fast moving target. And the reason why you've got companies like Nvidia or like TSMC that have this dominant market position is precisely because their R and D is so capable, every year they're delivering a much, much better manufacturing process or a much, much better design. And so if you're sitting in China, you're not trying to catch up to 2026 level. If you hit 2026, but it's already 2030, you're light years behind. And so you've got to catch up to this moving train. It's been very difficult to do.
A
Will it be, in your estimation, is it easier for us to catch up on the raw materials end or for them to catch up on the high tech refinement end?
B
I would rather have our problem than their problem.
A
Okay, well, listen, I Don't know how far into the podcast we are. We could be an hour. We could be two hours. I don't really know, but I just heard a glimmer of hope. I just heard a little flash of sunshine that just came out there. You'd rather have our problem. How would you attack our problem?
B
Here's why. Here's why. First, the mining of the materials, that can happen in a bunch of different countries. Not easy, but we know the materials are out there.
A
Is it happening in a bunch of other countries?
B
It's starting to happen. It's starting to happen.
A
So some of these mines are starting to come online.
B
That's right. That's right. Yep. That's. That's the first. The second is that the processing, it gets better over time, but the rate of improvement is nowhere near the rate of improvement in chips, which means that we can figure this stuff out. And a lot of the key processing steps were invented in the US or in Japan or in Europe. So, again, this is. It's not simple, but it's not rocket science either.
A
You're talking about the refinement of the. The raw materials, the rare earth metals that they're pulling out.
B
Exactly.
A
We actually invented that process for certain types of them.
B
Yes. Invented in the United States and then decided.
A
But we. We don't want to do it. That would be too easy. We're. We're not gonna. We're not gonna bother with that.
B
Yeah. That. Most of the key rare earth magnets, for example, these chemistries, were invented in the United States, often in US Military labs, before we got out of the business. And so can we learn that again? I think the answer is pretty clearly yes.
A
Right now, my understanding of the trade war is, to some extent, it's being levied to force the corporations to repatriate some of the manufacturing base that we lost when China joined the WTO and globalization sort of hollowed out our base. Would that be accurate?
B
Yeah, I think that's right. And that's how the President sees the dynamics. But I think I would say a lot has changed in the last 30 years. The way you make a car then versus now is totally different. Then we didn't have cars that could drive themselves. Today, we're on the cusp of autonomous driving in a big way. And so we shouldn't be trying to rewind the clock to 1990, but we should be asking ourselves, how do we manufacture the things that we'll want to be producing at scale in 2035? And those are two very different questions.
A
Now, is that what, when they had passed the CHIPS act, was that intended to address the issue that you're talking about?
B
I think partly, but I think also the CHIPS act was laser focused on, on the Taiwan dependency that we started our conversation with, which is that if your entire tech sector relies on one provider and, and China keeps threatening to blockade or invade them, that's a huge strategic challenge too.
A
All right, professor, this is where the rubber meets the road. I hate to come back to rubber again. Vulcanized rubber, by the way, the processing of the rare materials of rubber. You have the opportunity to be Silicon Valley for our manufacturing, our manufacturing process or base in America in the sense that I want you to think about the specs, the blueprint. If you're designing a process between government and these companies and a strategy to make America more resilient and yet still remain at the forefront of these technologies, what would you do? How would you design that?
B
Here's what I'd say. Our problem is not innovation. Our problem is dependence on China for critical components. And so that's it.
A
It's as simple as that.
B
Simple as that. Our companies are the most innovative in the world. We've got no problems on that front. It's that we're too dependent on Chinese inputs for all the innovative products that we make. And so I think that's a problem that's solvable. Part one is to say we've got these allies in Japan, in Canada, in Europe and Australia. They've got great geology, they've got great manufacturing capabilities. Let's work with them, not against them. That's part one.
A
Okay, Professor?
B
Yeah.
A
I've got some bad news for you.
B
It's been a complicated couple of years.
A
When we launched the trade war, you may not have noticed, we didn't do it just to China. So again, and I hate to come back to the part where my brain hurts, but the first piece of strategy, and we'll get back to the rest of the strategy. But the first piece of strategy you laid out is our strength is in the alliances we have with these other countries, like Canada, it. And we're absolutely obliterating those relationships.
B
I, I, I would not have put that at the start of my strategy. Totally agree.
A
So that's so, so let's say that those relationships are good.
B
Yeah.
A
What are you, how are you leveraging those relationships to make us stronger?
B
So all of these countries have a similar version of the dilemma. They're becoming more dependent on China, too. Every single year, China's competing with their industries. They need Chinese rare earths and other inputs. And so we ought to work with them to lock out the Chinese from our market and say, we can't have more Chinese rare earths, but we can source from among these friendly countries whoever's got the best geology for this mineral, that mineral, whoever's got the best component for this manufactured good or that manufactured good that ought to be. This strategy is band together with your friends.
A
Would you invest. How would you sweeten that pot? For places that have, you know, for instance in China, because they're much more focused on central planning. They look at the future and say, well, the real problem here for us is going to be electrification. So we might have the rare materials and we might have that, but if we move towards where everything is moving towards AI and cloud computing, we're also going to need, in the way that, you know, they're trying to build data centers here, they're going to need giant data centers and they're going to need a ton of water. And they can just go out to the rural areas of China and go, we're. We're doing it here. And the populace can't go, not in my backyard. You know, how, how are we going to, how are we going to do that? How do we, how do we incentivize these other countries? Keeping an eye on the electric, you know, with our, with our eye down the road?
B
You know, I think there's a lot of different tactical ways you could target this industry or that industry. But we have one superpower that we haven't used enough, and that's the size of our market. If you add up the US Economy plus the European economy plus the Japanese economy, you're already at two and a half times larger than China. And companies collectively, we're much larger than China. The problem is we've been dividing ourselves into different parts rather than aggregating it all together. And if you're a company that has to choose, do you want access to that market or the Chinese market? That's a small fraction. The choice is obvious.
A
How would China react to. Would they see that as hostile, or would they seek to come up with something that's a little bit more. Would they seek a compromise in that scenario?
B
I think they would see it as hostile, but they also need access to our market because their entire manufacturing base is geared towards exporting to us, to the United States, to Europe, to Japan. We're buying all the products that they're producing, and if we threaten to close that off and cause immense problems for their entire industrial base, I think it's a lot more likely that they're going to come to the table.
A
I don't know what you do on your computer, but chances are you don't want me to know what you do on your computer. Not that I'm in any way suggesting that your searches are untoward, if that's even a word. But see our sponsor today, Surf Shark vpn, they will secure your connection and protect your privacy while you're browsing online. Again, no accusations. I'm just suggesting that this will hide your online activities from third parties trying to collect your data, maybe intercept your connection. And surfshark, it gives you a way to secure your digital life. The VPN ensures your location doesn't even dictate what you can see or do online. Again, no judgment. Single subscription allows you to install and run Surf Shark on an unlimited number of devices simultaneously. I don't even know how many devices you have. You could have one, you could have two. You could be some sort of device hoarder. You could have 20 devices for all I know. I don't even know what counts as a device. All I know is you really should get Surfshark VPN. That's all I'm saying. No judgment. Go to surfshark.com John Stewart and use code Jon Stewart at Checkout to get four extra months of Surfshark VPN at Surfshark.com Jon Stewart and use code JOHN STEWART to get four extra months. Do you think, and this gets back to something else, but do you think one of the unintended consequences of this trade war is not only have they in the way that Iran now recognizes the power they have over the Strait of Hormuz, China recognizes now the power they have in terms of rare earths, but almost equally, as importantly, they recognize that they can diversify their export base. Because when we leverage, and I'm. Forgive me if this is the wrong information, but my understanding is their exports went up after we levied those tariffs. Not to the United States, they just pushed them to. They just developed more resilient supply lines elsewhere.
B
Yeah, and the exports went to Europe, they went to India, they went elsewhere. And those are exactly the countries we should be trying to get on our team, working with us to build one collective market that China has to negotiate
A
access into, they just, I think BYD just got into Canada.
B
That's right. And I think that's, you know, I think that's an error on the part of Prime Minister Carney up in Canada, but I think that shows that if, if you're going to bully your friends, they're going to diversify their partnerships.
A
Why would you say it's an error? Because you think it's going to crush Canadian electric car markets or just their car markets in general?
B
I think both. Also, it's going to be a major issue in the relationship with the United States.
A
Although I imagine at this point for them, they probably feel like, well, what else are we supposed to. I mean, they're so reliant on the United States. It feels like this trade war has forced everybody to look elsewhere.
B
Yeah, I agree with that. And I think we should be doing the opposite, forcing them to look towards us, aligning their policies with us, and tackling the Chinese challenge collectively.
A
Now, this is probably going to be outside your area of expertise, but I'm going to ask you to weigh in on it like you're an expert anyway, and I want you to talk with certainty and just say that, you know, you can't be wrong because you're a professor.
B
All right?
A
I know you have the diplomas. Now, this is the metaphorical nuclear weapon in the conversation. So our actions alienating our allies while not making inroads to our rivals in terms of the resilience of our supply chains has forced people to look elsewhere in the world. But our one final card to play has always been that we are the reserve currency, whether it's petrodollars or dollars, or that that is our final weapon that we deploy. Is all of this weakening that. That last bullet we have in our. Our gun as well?
B
You know, I think it's. It's the right question to ask, but I think the answer is not yet. Okay, first, if you look at the value of the dollar versus other currencies, you haven't seen a major movement. You'd expect the dollar to fall in value if everyone was selling their dollars. Not happening.
A
Hasn't it fell, though, in the past two years? A bit.
B
But currencies move up and down, and nothing that suggests a dramatic change.
A
Okay. Nothing that you would think is like, oh, this is a permanent change. How much of it, though, besides the value of it, is the strategic play that in the way that Canada may not look at bringing BYD in as a great strategic move, but they feel like it's their only move. Do you think other countries might look at it like, if this is the way the United States is going to behave, we have to do this?
B
The second question is, if you're not going to buy dollars, what are you going to buy? You know, there's only so many Argentinian pesos in the world. Swiss franc. Small country.
A
Well, the Chinese currency perhaps.
B
Well, and so this is the key question because one of the reasons that Chinese manufacturing is so competitive is that they control their currency by not allowing the free exchange of renminbi into other currencies. And if they were to ever open that up, it would create potentially significant economic problems for them. So rather than internationalizing the renminbi, they've been actually trying to lock down the flows in and out of China because they want control over that.
A
And they, I mean, are generally accused also of manipulating the value of. And the reason why I didn't name that the Chinese currency is because I can't pronounce it Remnimbi. I always, I always add another M. Rem nimby. How does this in your mind result? You know, we have so many open ended conflicts that feel like we stepped into with a lack of kind of strategic vision where we're, we're fighting these different areas on different fronts. How does this unwind? Or are we all just white knuckling it to kind of see where, what, what incentive does China have right now to do anything other than exploit their advantage?
B
Well, I think China's gonna exploit their advantage. But I also think that if you're sitting in Xi Jinping's chair, not everything looks perfect. You're worried about the energy shock from Hormuz, you're probably worried about your economy slowing, youth unemployment rising. You're clearly worried about your military. You just purged all your top generals and who knows what other conspiracies are at work inside of the Communist Party. You're a paranoid guy. And so, yeah, on this particular issue, you look pretty strong. But I think a lot of other metrics, China doesn't look nearly as strong as it would like to look. And Xi is clearly nervous about his domestic control, his economic position. And so he's not as strong as I think his position in rare earths might suggest.
A
So you also obviously have a great expertise in Russia. I want to ask you, when you think about Putin and Xi, we were under the mindset that if we were to engage Russia in perestroika and detente and open up their economy, that they would be leading a more peaceful and cooperative and that they would join, you know, the nations of the world and we would all live in a rules based environment. And he took that and invaded Crimea and then attacked Ukraine. So we clearly didn't understand the kinds of historical grievances that were occurring there, and his vision of recreating whatever empire it is that he thinks is their birthright. How much of that can be also applied to Xi and China?
B
It seems to me like a lot. Okay, if you look at China's foreign policy, we think of just the US China relationship. But look at the China Japan relationship. China's caused one of its largest trading partners to turn increasingly anti China because of the rare earth dispute in 2011 and a series of territorial issues. Look at the Korea China relationship. Koreans have really turned against China over the last couple of years because China's been imposing economic sanctions on Korea. Look at the Philippines China relationship. They're constantly clashing in the South China Sea with the Chinese Coast Guard and the Philippine Coast Guard ramming each other. Look at India. China launched a small war against India and the Himalayas in 2020 over some disputed territory. You look around China and you find there's a whole lot of countries that have a bad and deteriorating relationship with Beijing, and that's because China's trying to rewrite all those relationships in China's favor.
A
Does that give us a strategic opening? And look, I know this is all complicated. I mean, clearly, you know, there was a summit between Xi Modi and Putin, and everybody was holding hands. So, you know, you can't tell how much of it is the two of them or three of them enjoying watching the United States squander whatever international goodwill it had. But if you were. If you were playing the odds on all this, it sounds like that's a huge strategic opening for the United States.
B
I think that's right. And you've seen all of these countries take steps to build their military capabilities, to defend against China, to increasingly work together. Even if not working with us, it's the Philippines and Japan or Japan and India working together to try to constrain China's rising capabilities. And so even if we're not cooperating with them in the ways we probably should be, they're cooperating with each other to try to mitigate the impacts of China's foreign policy if we were to
A
rebuild those types of Western alliances that we were more accustomed to having and then including South Korea and the Philippines. And do you think that would be a successful bulwark against whatever China's ambitions are and against whatever Putin's ambitions are, although he seems somewhat frozen in whatever quagmire he's gotten himself into?
B
Well, I go back to where we were a couple minutes ago. In our conversation, you add up the US Plus China, or, I'm sorry, Plus Japan, plus Europe, plus India. You've got a huge share of global gdp, a huge share of the economy, a huge amount of military power. China doesn't want all these countries working
A
together, and so that's there. How concerned are you about the Putin and Xi Summit?
B
Look, these guys have been working together closely for years. They celebrated birthdays together. They describe each other.
A
Are they really?
B
Yes, yes. Putin's birthday.
C
What?
A
Because according to Donald Trump, it's really a special relationship that he has with you. Is he trying to make us them? Is he trying to create. You know, I read something today that he had said that Russia, China, United States should get together and end the International Criminal Court at the Hague.
B
I think there are folks in the administration who have an idea that's not crazy to say you don't want China and Russia together, so you're better off splitting them apart. In theory, that logic makes sense, but the reality is that if you move closer to Russia today, Russia is still going to find China to be its most reliable partner. And so the likelihood that we split them apart in the short run seems to me to be pretty implausible.
A
And so what I don't understand about that is he seems to be. The era of trade and goodwill that we created, this world order of the past 80 years was at our behest. The idea that any of this occurs without our patrolling of the seas and without our trade rules and without our dollar sort of being the foundation of it all. And now we're saying, no, that was exploitative of us, and so we have to become like Russia and China, a great power that takes things because we're great powers. Is that our plan now?
B
Clearly, Trump is going to be much more transactional in relations with allies. Now, I think, to his defense, it's true. Were the Germans free riding on defense? Absolutely. Was it necessary for the Japanese to spend more on defense? 100%.
A
But wasn't that. Again, that was kind of our design. We're the ones who said, you're not allowed to have those things anymore.
B
Well, I think that was the design at first. And then over the last couple of decades, a series of presidents, Democrat and Republican, have urged the Europeans to do more on defense, and they haven't done much. So I think I understand the source of Trump's frustration, but I also think that the medicine has been just as painful as what we're trying to cure.
A
So do we now, is Europe still our greatest ally, or are they now kind of just another rival power? And maybe they are. Maybe the the single largest liberal democracy block going, because Trump seems much more comfortable wanting a situation more like what Putin has in Russia or what she has in China.
B
I think five years ago, the answer to the question was obvious. Today, I think both in Washington and also in Europe, there are people that really question whether the word ally makes sense. When I zoom out though this headline or that headline, it's easy to fix it on. You zoom out and say, what are the interests? What are the interests of these blocks? And it seems to me there's still a lot aligned. Neither the US Nor Europe want a stronger Russia that's expanding militarily, neither wants a China that is threatening their industrial base. And on those two core issues, I still think that there's a lot of alignment, despite all of the complicated and controversial headlines that we see.
A
So in your mind, this isn't a game of risk where the United States of America, rather than being the head of the allied powers, is saying, look, there's three axis powers. There's us, there's Russia, there's China, and we're going to divide up our spheres of influence, and if that hurts, I don't know, the European Union or Great Britain, so be it.
B
I think the debate is really about what's the definition, what's in our interest. There's the short term transaction. I want what I want tomorrow. And there's the long term. Let's build a relationship that will last over decades, involve mutual trust, involve mutual development. And that's what we had built in Europe.
A
Europe, okay.
B
NATO was in our interest and in Europe's interest, and we built it over time. Not every single step of the way was in everyone's interest equally, but the net benefit was good for everyone.
A
Do you still believe in. In NATO being a viable institution for kind of holding that alliance together and keeping Russia at bay?
B
You know, I think that it's been a complicated 18 months for sure, but the key question is, do the Russians think NATO is a viable institution? And I would say they certainly haven't tested it yet.
A
Oh, that's interesting. So you're in your mind. They would like it not to be, but they still feel that it's got enough teeth that they don't want to push what they really do. I know this is off topic in terms of the chips and stuff, but I'm curious and, and this is your. Obviously an area of expertise that you've written on quite a bit, but would Putin move beyond Ukraine, you know, if he had the opportunity? Moldova and Poland and I mean, would he reconstitute.
B
I think if the opportunity presents itself, he's going to try to maximize his power and influence over the region. Now, that doesn't mean he's going to be reckless and dive into a war with NATO, but if the door is open, he's going to walk through it.
A
Do you think he's as vulnerable as people are talking about?
B
He certainly thinks he's vulnerable. He's certainly paranoid. He certainly. The last couple of months, there's been regular disconnections of the mobile Internet in Moscow. So you can't order an Uber, you can't use doordash, you can't check your email because the Internet's been shut down for smartphones. That's a sign of just how worried he is.
A
So as China and the United States battle for the supremacy over the 21st century AI and AGI technology, Russia is deciding to make it so you can't have an Uber. It sounds like they're floundering and they're falling much further behind.
B
And Ukrainians have now fought them to a standstill. Ukraine's a third of the population of Russia. Most people would have said much, much weaker than Russia when the war started. But now it looks like on the question of who can win territory, the Ukrainians are just as strong as the Russians.
A
And in your mind, and this is sort of like as a wrap up to put the whole thing, and I so appreciate your time, but also your expertise in all of these areas, that it's very hard to get what I like to think you're providing, which is a nuanced picture of all these competing dynamics that are occurring, it feels very clear that if cooler heads prevail and we get through these sort of turbulent waters, it's in everybody's best interest. Look, even when we talk China and Taiwan, the idea that, you know, we always say, like, oh, China will just take them militarily because they can. But as we see with countries like Iran and Ukraine, it ain't so easy. And Taiwan has certainly got the technology to produce drones and weapons and all kinds of other stuff. And if, as you said, and the temperature on the island is much more nationalistic than even what it was 20 years ago, why would China risk putting its economic progress and technological progress at such harm to even make that move?
B
I think you're right that if you were solely focused on economic and technological progress, you'd stay away. I think where I worry is that it's not clear. That's where Xi Jinping and the Chinese leadership are primarily focused. Their economies have been slowing the last couple years and they've let it happen because they're thinking both about economics but also about power politics. And that's why I think it's so important that the US and its allies present a united front against China and say if you move on Taiwan, the cost will be catastrophic.
A
And you believe they might, they might understand that. Or is it as it was in the case with Putin and Ukraine? No, this is ours from a thousand years ago and we're going to make ourselves whole, whatever the cost may be.
B
I think if Putin had known what the cost would be, he would made a different decision in February 2022.
A
Oh, wow, that's really interesting. Is he someone that is reflective enough in a way that maybe our president is not to understand that, to understand that mistake?
B
Well, I would say he's now four years into the war. It doesn't look like it. It doesn't look like it.
A
Thank you so much for joining this. Been absolutely fascinating. Thanks for all the insights. Chris Miller, author of Chip Warren the Fight for the World's Most Critical Technology and obviously a historian, economic history, international relations and the professor at Tufts University. Thanks so much for being here.
B
Thank you.
A
This is an intervention. Stop being a control freak and doing everything yourself. At work. You're busy, you're multitasking. Hire experts. Upwork makes it easy to hire freelance expert specialists to get the jobs done that maybe you don't want to do or don't have the expertise to do, but don't admit you don't have the expertise to do it or don't have the time to do or you want to focus on other parts of the business. Upwork is a one stop platform. You know a lot of these other places. How many platforms are there? 2, 3, 4, 5? This is a one stop platform. You find, hire and pay expert freelancers across web and software development, data and analytics, marketing, more. And by the way, posting a job is easy. You know, here in New York, the way you do it is you go by what we call light poles and you just put a piece of paper up there. Generally it's for guitar lessons and then you'll cut little strips and then people will come by and take. It's not efficient. Upwork is efficient. So visit Upwork.com TWS right now. Post your job for free. It's Upwork.com TWS to connect with top talent ready to help your business grow. That's upwork.com TWS do it now unless you're scared. Let Me tell you something about professors. You know, never bring a sledgehammer to a nuance fight. These professors, they don't want nothing to do with broad statements. Every time I jump in, they were like. And then you got, you know, how does the United States not force it? Well, to be fair. Yeah, to be fair to the United States. You know what? To be fair to China, to be
C
fair to Trump, he was fair to a lot of people.
A
Right. Imagine knowing so much that you have to be fair to everybody.
C
I can't imagine.
D
That is no fun talk shit.
C
I don't want to live in that world.
A
Whatever happened to knowing just a little
C
bit and being fair to no one?
A
Thank you.
E
I think that's still in vogue. Honestly, not knowing very much is still
A
happening, and I am on the leading cutting edge of not knowing enough to be fair to anybody.
C
Somebody's got to do it. It's hard work, but somebody's got to do it.
D
Why? We love you.
A
Who's back? Quick, quick, quick question. Who's backing down first in the. I still can't figure out the end game on any of this. Russia, China, none of it. Like, how is it in 2010, that was the thing that blew my mind the most was, you know, they talk about, well, you can't really start mining your own rare earths. You can't really do any of that stuff because the lead time is so long. Well, in 2010, they pull the plug on rare earths in Japan, and now it's 16 years later. If we had done something then, we would not be in the position we're in today.
C
And worse, we have a CHIPS act that our current president thinks is horrible. Horrible. He doesn't even want to. We have a plan. Now we have something, and he hates. Hates it.
A
Well, because it's. It was signed by auto pen.
C
Yes, it was. Exactly. It's invalid, in fact.
A
Yeah, that's right.
E
I think some of the details that have come out about the trip make me not so sure that there is a plan. Like the idea that she gave Trump these, like, rose seeds, and there was no real reaction to it.
A
Wait, what did he give him?
E
It feels like a burn. No, he gave him rose seeds. It just felt like, oh, did you just destroy a rose garden? Here's, like, some seeds.
A
Oh, is that what he did?
D
He was being shady?
E
I don't know. Maybe I'm reading too much into it, but after King Charles gave him a bell, I was like, something's going on here. I think people are just making fun of him.
A
That's so fucking funny.
C
I did see that the People's Republic bands played ymca, which I was like, he's so easy, you guys.
D
Like, did he dance?
C
I feel like we should be able to manipulate this man more easily for our own purposes.
E
I actually was reading some of that, like, what some countries have done to make him feel at home. And I think it was Korea, where they just served him steak with ketchup, a burger.
A
I'm telling you, man, our problem is we're so disturbed by the cat that we can't do the things that would. Like. The Republican Party has no problem kind of buffering his ego to the point where they can get some of the things that they want. Like, all China had to do was throw a couple of four year olds out in front of him to sing a song. He's like, this is our greatest rival on this, you know? And then the minute he shows up, they're like these children, they're singing to me. Whatever you need.
D
They love me.
A
I think you're right, though, that they're. They're fucking with him. Like, I do think they're. I think the lack of respect that they all like. I think they are all privately enjoying this. They are enjoying seeing the United States, a country that, let's be honest, holds itself up in a slightly arrogant fashion as a shining city on a hill. I think they're loving seeing a little bit of schmutz on our shirt.
E
Or even. Did you see the Marco Rubio story that there were sanctions? Like China had sanctions against Marco Rubio from the time he was a senator. And then in order for him to attend this trip, they did some finagling with the transliteration of his name to overcome the sanctions so he could go on the trip.
A
There are sanctions against Marco Rubio to
E
travel, to enter China from his time as a senator. So they did some tinkering with his name. It's all hanging by nonsense.
A
It is hanging by nonsense. Do you guys hear whistling?
C
That's definitely the construction on my street. I'm very sorry.
A
Wait, so the construction workers just sit outside your window whistling at you?
C
I don't know. I feel like it's like a leaf blower or something. The sounds have been incredible.
A
Lord knows I have been around many construction sites in my life. Even worked on a couple. We never had a whistle machine.
C
I'm being catcalled by three stories up. Yeah.
A
All right. Brittany, what do they got for us this week?
D
Let's do it. John, if you had to vote for
A
one Nixon or Trump Nixon, if only to get the epa.
C
Yeah.
A
I mean, Nixon at this point would be considered a gay communist in today's Republican Party. Yeah. Watergate is now Watergate.
B
Yeah.
A
Like, wait a minute. You hired a couple of guys to break into a thing? That's adorable. I mean, Nixon. And by the way, Spiro Agnew. Spiro Agnew went down because of a slush fund. And it was just a little hint of a slush fund that Nixon was using to fund other things. And I think Agnew got into, like, tax trouble because of it. I'm sure I'm mixing the realities of those things, but think about that. In comparison to $1.8 billion of taxpayer money, at least I think Nixon slush fund was donors, all bribes. Yeah, it was all. At least. It was straight up bribes.
E
At least it was bribes.
A
This is fucking our money. I mean, it's. Do we even have a Congress?
D
No.
A
Or a court?
C
Did you see that? The. The actual amount, too, is 1.776.
A
Well, it's because.
C
And, and they're too cute.
A
It's. It's all Orwell. It's all a you troll. Everything they're doing is a you troll to us. This is against the weaponization of it, and it's patriotic. They're trolling us. His entire career is a troll.
E
What do you think's going to happen? Nothing with that fund.
A
They're going to give it to people that sprayed mace at police officers and pretend that they're rewarding patriotism.
D
Yeah. The list of people sent a chill up my spine.
A
Yeah. By the way, it's not transparent. They don't have to tell you where they're doing it, how they're deciding it, who's getting the money, none of it.
E
It just feels like one of the more egregious things that's happened recently. And so I guess the faith in this system still exists somewhere in my body, because I'm like, this can't stand. Surely there will be a. A hearing at least.
D
I don't know about that.
E
No.
A
You've seen those hearings, right? You know, it'll devolve into grandstanding that gets it nothing. Or they'll just bring Pam Bondi to come back with her book of slams to be like, you know, you've got a lot of nerve. You're from Delaware. The small. You know, she'll. Dude, we're. We're in the Upside down and everything that you thought that there would be at some point, it really. You know what? It reminds me of you ever see those videos where like a horde of teens flies into like a cvs?
D
Yeah.
A
That just starts taking shit.
C
Smash and grab, smashing.
A
And everybody's just standing around like, is anybody going to call somebody or are we just going to like, that's what we are. The Trump administration is a smash and grab on the American public, on the taxpayer. It is the most corrupt, just utterly unsheathed unleashed on us. And they are just grabbing whatever they can and pretending that it's remuneration for some victimhood that they faced. That's all fictitious. It's nonsense. Wild smash and grab.
C
Yeah. It fills me with white hot rage, doesn't it? It really does. It's like this, this, this week, this news, like I, like Lauren said, it's like sort of reminds you that you still have like a barometer because you're just like, oh my God.
E
I guess also, yeah. Like the pace of news, you wind up pairing it with other stories. So today there's also the story about how many people have dropped out of the ACA because they can't afford it and then stop paying their premiums.
A
Millions.
E
And you're just watching like that. We're going to hand out a billion dollars to people for fun.
A
You know how hard we fought to get nine, 11 first responders, some health care for the thing and they always told and that was not much more. And these guys just drop it down. And the thing that is stunning to me is like, I don't think we even know who to turn to. Where you see this level of corruption and this lack of transparency and you really are looking around like, I don't even know who to call. There's no 911 for this. No one's coming to the rescue. This is all about electoral politics. These guys gotta go electorally because it's totally legal.
C
And the people that are supposed to be guarding us against these interests have no responsibility. Congress, theoretically, when people created these laws, they thought that Congress wouldn't allow a president to take advantage of it in this way and instead they bow at the altar of him. It's ridiculous.
A
That's right. And you won't be able to go to the Supreme Court because they will find a way to twist. If it's based on precedent that doesn't fit, they'll make it fit. If there's a precedent that says you can't do it, they'll overturn it. They will just enable his corruption in the baldest way. He is a meme coin of a president. He is a Pump and dump scheme of a president.
C
So long as all the right people keep getting rich off it, they'll be fine with it.
D
Amen.
A
That's right.
D
Yep.
E
Guys, in an attempt to reach for some optimism.
A
Yes.
E
Today is a big primary day. Midterms are coming up. New people, new. I don't know.
A
No, that was one of those. I'm gonna reach for some optimism. And then you just. You take the blinds and you just go.
E
I opened the jar. It was just some dust puffing out.
A
I feel you. What's. What's. What's the last one? Brittany?
D
All right, last question. Yeah, John, what question do you always get that annoys you?
A
I mean, none of them. It's. It's always nice to be asked questions. Oh, it's like, yeah, yeah. How do you get annoyed by questions? I don't. You know, I'm not asked that many questions. I'm trying to think, okay, okay, I've got one. I've got one. Will you make my bagel.
D
I know who asked that one.
A
Yeah, I get that at home.
D
Does he live in your house?
A
He does sometimes. That's the only one I get where I'm like, what? They're already made.
D
Roles are reversed.
A
Yeah, that's exactly it.
D
I can think of a couple for you.
E
Yeah, me too.
A
Oh, you got. Okay, which questions do I get that annoy you?
D
Oh, well, none of them annoy me, but I think the one you probably get the most often is, well, are you gonna run for president? How do you find hope?
A
Oh, yeah, that's it. But I never get annoyed at that. People are genuinely. People that ask questions, are almost always, invariably polite and kind, and the interactions are quite pleasant, even amongst people, quite frankly, that very clearly are not aligned with me politically or almost always, unless they've been drinking and I'm out with my family. And then it gets a little tense sometimes. Other than that. Brittany, how do they keep in touch with us?
D
Twitter. We are weeklyshowpod, Instagram threads, TikTok, blue sky. We're your weekly show podcast, and you can, like, subscribe and comment on our YouTube channel, the weekly show with Jon Stewart.
A
Fantastic. And as always, we couldn't do it without you guys. I just want to thank producer Brittany Momedovic, producer Gillian Speer, video editor and engineer Rob Votola, audio editor and engineer Nicole Boyce, and our executive producers Chris McShane and Katie Gray. And, oh, I seem to have forgotten one person. Our lead producer, Ms. Lauren Walker. Lauren.
E
Yes.
A
It is Lauren's final episode with the Weekly show podcast. She is moving on to greener and greater. And I just can't tell you how much I've appreciated your expertise and experience in the world of journalism and news. I have always found, so just grounding, you know, it's similar to how I feel about Professor Miller. Like, I just want to go like black and white, two dimensional caricature. And you always bring a nuance and a shading and an experience to the conversation that is utterly invaluable. And I, I thank you.
E
No, thank you. Thank you for trusting me. It's been so nice shaping your really important work. It's an honor. And yeah, thanks for listening to my relentless opinions.
A
That should be the title of the book, Relentless Opinions by Lorne Walker. So we appreciate it. We'll miss you. You'll stop by again for our chats and we wish you nothing but the best. And we know that that is what's going to happen. So thank you again. And other than that, man, onward. And do we have a show next week?
D
No, no episode next week. We're back the following. And this is the last episode of season two for us.
A
Oh, is that the case?
D
It sure is.
A
Look at us. We were babies. Now we're out of the terrible twos and we're into the terrible threes. All right, very cool. We'll see you guys later. Bye. Bye. The Weekly show with Jon Stewart is a Comedy Central podcast. It's produced by Paramount Audio and Busboy Productions.
F
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B
Paramount podcasts.
Episode: America, China, and the Tech Cold War with Chris Miller
Date: May 20, 2026
Host: Jon Stewart
Guest: Professor Chris Miller (Author of Chip War; Professor of International History, Tufts University)
In this episode, Jon Stewart sits down with Professor Chris Miller to unpack the rapidly evolving dynamics of the global tech cold war, focusing on the centrality of semiconductors—especially those produced in Taiwan—to both the American and Chinese economies, and how the U.S.-China rivalry over advanced technology is intricately tied to economic, geopolitical, and military pressures. Miller provides nuanced historical context, walks listeners through the complex semiconductor supply chain, and explores the implications of trade wars, rare earth dependencies, and shifting global alliances.
[04:12–06:02]
[06:02–11:22]
[13:07–21:01]
[21:01–24:46]
[26:26–27:51]
[28:40–32:26]
[32:26–36:56]
[36:56–38:21]
[43:34–46:18]
[50:54–54:44]
[56:41–58:47]
[58:56–61:24]
[62:17–66:36]
[66:11–71:18]
[71:18–73:26]
[74:45–75:40]
"It's this partnership between Silicon Valley and Taiwan that makes the most cutting edge chips possible."
— Chris Miller, 04:57
"If you did a poll a generation ago in Taiwan, you would have found a lot of people who would have said they're part Chinese but part Taiwanese...today...Taiwanese think of themselves increasingly as a separate country, a separate society."
— Chris Miller, 10:07
"It's a bad business. And the reason that China dominates it is because Chinese firms produce and then sell with little to no profit...it's worked. It's made us dependent on their materials."
— Chris Miller, 41:30
"Our companies are the most innovative in the world. We've got no problems on that front. It's that we're too dependent on Chinese inputs for all the innovative products that we make."
— Chris Miller, 51:02
"If you're sitting in China, you're not trying to catch up to 2026 level. If you hit 2026, but it's already 2030, you're light years behind."
— Chris Miller, 46:18
"Japan's been investing in rare earth mines and processing Facilities outside of China...they didn't solve their problem, but they took some meaningful steps...and in the United States, we did essentially nothing."
— Chris Miller, 33:18
This episode is a masterclass on how advanced technology, global supply chains, and geopolitics have become tightly interwoven. It highlights the dangers of strategic shortsightedness, underscores the urgent need for renewed alliances, and dispels simplistic narratives about China’s invulnerability or US decline. While the risks are real, Miller offers the pragmatic optimism that with coordination and investment, the US and its allies can solve their material vulnerabilities and remain at the forefront of innovation.
For listeners who missed the episode:
You'll finish this summary understanding not only how a handful of countries and companies make the "brains" of the modern world, but just how delicately balanced—and exposed—the whole system is to grand strategic moves in Washington, Beijing, and beyond.