← WW2 Pod: We Have Ways of Making You Talk
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A
Thank you for listening to we have ways of making you talk Sign up to our Patreon to receive bonus content, live streams and our weekly newsletter with money off books and museum visits as well, plus early access to all live show tickets. That's patreon.com we haveways. Hello there, it's Al Murray here, co host of WW2 Pod. We have ways of making you talk, the Second World War podcast of choice. Now, do you want a sample of what it's like being a Patreon Club member, or do you want to get excited about the amazing history talks we have on offer this September at we haveways fest6? Perhaps you even came to the festival last year, but you couldn't get to hear every talk you wanted to hear. That certainly happened to me. Well, we here at We Haveways headquarters are hard at work putting up the last batch of talks on our Patreon page in a collection just for subscribers. We've just uploaded a fantastic array of talks from 2025's HQ tent with some of the world's most engaging historians and world war buffs such as James May getting nerdy with The Focke Wulf FW 190, Saul David on the battles of North Africa and the best general of the Western theaters in the Second World War is decided once and for all and definitively. Now is a great time to subscribe at 33% off for the summer and get lots of extra content. You can enjoy ad free listening, priority access to new series and ticketed events, regular live streams, a weekly newsletter with book and model discounts and bonus episodes. All that and more@patreon.com we haveways as a taster, we've prepared an extract of one of the talks we've just uploaded. Listen as Anthony Beaver and James Holland talk about the last hours of the Second World War in Berlin in May 1945.
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B
And you know, this is the 80th anniversary year, so of course it's entirely appropriate that we we discuss that awful, truly awful battle and with the daddy when it comes to this subject matter. So, Anthony, thank you very much for coming, but we're going to start a little bit earlier, aren't we? We're going to go back, give it a bit of strategic overview.
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C
First of all, let me say I was incredibly lucky on timing and let's face it, writing books is a bit like love. You know, if the timing's good, you've got an advantage. And I was lucky. I was lucky on timing because a Based on Stalingrad The Russian archives had just opened. They'd been, who was the minister of the archives under Yeltsin, had forced the army to open their archives. And the Russian army didn't really know how to handle this. And that was a huge bonus. But I was also lucky for Berlin because there were still some of the players around. And as I will mention, I mean, it was a strange sensation shaking these hands, which had all shaken Hitler's hand in the bunker, because there were still several people who'd been in the bunker with Hitler right at the end. And that really gave you a feeling of what it was like at the time. But as James rightly said, we're going to start a little bit of a background, just purely to give you the context in December. Remember, the British and above all the Americans were taken by surprise on 16 December with the Ardennes offensive. It was a massive shock. They simply and certainly Bradley had refused to acknowledge the possibility that they could have prepared two Panzer armies with two other armies in support to suddenly cross and up the whole idea, going all the way up to Antwerp to cut off the British and the Canadians from the Americans, and they thought they could actually knock the Canadians and the British even out of the war. But the whole thing, of course, did grind to a halt, even though Hitler had been warned by his own generals that this was not going to work. And by Christmas Day, when suddenly the weather changed, a Russian high came in, that is freezing cold, clear weather. And of course, that was when Allied air power was able to interven
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A
was
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C
going to be saved and all the rest of it. The key point was that Stalin then realized this was his chance and he knew from weather forecasts what was going to happen in January. And so he tried to pretend that he'd stepped in early. He brought forward his great January offensive, which was to attack all the way from the river Vistula in Poland all the way through to the river Oder, only 60 miles from Berlin. And he said, you know, oh, basically I'm trying to imply he saved the British and the Americans in the Ardennes. Absolute rubbish. Because as I say, by Christmas Day there was no chance of the Germans winning or really breaking through to Antwerp. And he also was going to be very, very manipulative and dishonest in the way that he passed on Red army intentions in the coming months. And what the plan is, it's just
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B
one lie after the other, isn't it?
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C
It was one lie after the other. In fact, it came to a head, in fact, slightly jumping ahead of myself at the End of. Well, no, no, I think I will come to that in the right order. I'll try and stick to the chronology.
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B
Yeah, yeah, sorry, I'm trying. I'm Frank curveball.
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C
I know, I know, I know. You ticked me off last time about this and now you're quite right. Anyway, so the key date was suddenly what happens? The Americans get across the Rhine at Ramagen. Now Eisenhower hadn't expected to get across the Rhine until May 1945. I mean unbelievable, but he was really very pessimistic. But anyway, there they were, they were across. Patton gets across too, in the palatinate and Hitler of course, once executions all of the officers involved. Stalin gets the news from General Susloparov, his representative at Allied headquart, the Allies are across the Rhine. He immediately summons Marshal Zhukov back to Moscow and Marshal Konev and says right, get planning Berlin operation. He does not want any opportunity of the Allies getting to Berlin first. And this is where he really starts lying to the Allies. And it even gets to the point where Eisenhower very naively because of course you've got to remember the Americans were not interested really in the post war settlement. They wanted to finish the war in Europe, get out and then finish the war with Japan, which in many ways one can understand. And when one thinks of sort of American anti communist paranoia and all the rest of it, all of that came much later. It did not exist really under Roosevelt and Eisenhower.
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B
Well, Roosevelt was hoping at one point that there would be a post war order which would be shared.
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C
Well, Roosevelt with tremendous arrogance thought that he was so charming that he'd be able to charm Stalin to becoming his friend. You know, make Stalin your friend. I mean you might as well make a tiger your friend. I mean, you know, and Churchill of course was more realistic in that way. Churchill was unrealistic in others. But anyway he was more realistic about the real threat of what Stalin wanted, which was of course to impose a coral sanitaire. And this was the origins of the Cold War ever since that shock of 1941 where he had actually gone to pieces when he had refused to believe that the Germans were going to invade. And and so he was determined from then on that never again would the Soviet Union be surprised by an attack from the West. And that was why he was determined to control Poland and all of central Europe as a barrier, so that they wouldn't be surprised again. So anyway, come March there's Eisenhower who picks up on some rumors which came from some interviews that the Germans are going to plan a last ditch defense in the south, an Alpenfestung, an Alpine fortress. And Stalin wants to encourage this idea. So when Eisenhower, to Montgomery's horror and Churchill's horror, decides to give the Russians all of their plans ahead without even telling the British, he didn't even tell Tether, his chief of. His sort of chief of staff, what he was doing. And he told them that, oh, well, actually, we're not going to go for Berlin, we're going further south. And Stalin encourages this and he said, oh, no, Berlin's lost all of its importance. We might send some reconnaissance troops against Berlin. Hang on a second. You know, this was two and a half million men reconnaissance in force. I mean, for God's sake, altogether there were 6.7 million men on that front between the Baltic and the Adriatic. So, I mean, it gives you an idea of the sheer size. Well over twice the Nazi German force invading the Soviet Union in 1941. So suddenly, in this famous SCAF, 252 supreme command, allied forces, 252, Eisenhower tells. Eisenhower tells Stalin exactly what our plans are. And Stalin says, you're quite right. Brilliant. Quite right. We want to split the Germany and to attack further south and concentrate there. Berlin's lost all interest. Well, actually, and this was my scoop, which I thought was the great scoop at the time in the Russian archives, thanks to a secret archivist there, they parsed us this material, which was still classified and not revealed at all, that actually Beria, the chief of the secret police at the nkvd, was in charge of Operation Borodino, which was the Russian plan to create a nuclear weapon, because they'd been getting spies in the Manhattan Project to give them information. And their idea was to surround Berlin with and then use NKVD troops, frontier troops and security troops to secure Dahlum, which was where all of the nuclear research was carried on in the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute. And this was absolutely sort of vital for them. What they didn't realize was actually that most of the nuclear material and most of the scientists had actually been sent down to a Hygelec in the Black Forest. And so they missed them, but they got a certain amount because they didn't have any uranium or very little. And actually it was the uranium which came from the Belgian Congo, which the Germans had captured and then which the Allies captured, which they made into the first of the bombs dropped on Japan, which, funny enough, most people seem to have sort of overlooked in a way, which is a strange thing. But anyway, this was their plan. So their vital thing was to surround Berlin and make sure that the Allies or above all the Americans didn't break through to Berlin. So this is where we get to by March and then, and then You've
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B
got the US 9th army on the Elbe.
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C
You've got the US 9th army which actually gets up to the Elbe. They even get across and they get across right at the beginning, very beginning of April. April. And they're in a position. You've got Patton's, some of Patton's old 2nd Armored Division. Second Hell on Wheels. Hell on wheels indeed. And others ready to go. And the interesting thing of course is that the Americans could easily actually have got through to Berlin. And this comes into a sort of, sort of one of the what ifs of history.
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B
Well, because all the Germans were surrendered to them.
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C
Well the Germans were longing to surrender to them. You only had the 12th army facing them and they were sort of young guys, they were very enthusiastic in many ways but they simply didn't have the anti tank weapons. And I was able to interview, I mean this is amazing at the time I was able to interview the chief of operations and the chief of staff of the 12th army still alive there. And what did they say? Well they said, they said listen, we wouldn't have lasted 12 hours if they really had made a push. But actually Eisenhower, by refusing to carry on to Berlin made the right decision for totally the wrong reasons. What he did was he realized that actually with the European Advisory Commission already most part of Berlin and all of the eastern Germany right up to the river Elbe was going to be handed over to the Russians anyway. So why waste American lives when we were going to have to hand over that territory?
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B
And also you've got the war against Japan.
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C
To war against Japan, there isn't an
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B
atomic bomb at this point.
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C
But Churchill and especially Montgomery. But Churchill was appalled because he said, but listen, for God's sake, we want to, and this is his phrase, we want to shake hands with the Russians as further to the east as possible. That is, you know, reduce the amount of Central Europe occupied by the Soviet Union. And this is why he was begging Eisenhower to send Patton's army on towards Prague and all the rest of it. And in Prague actually it was the Russian heavies of General Vlasov's pro German army who'd actually risen in revolt hoping to save themselves at the last moment. Risen in revolt against the Germans joining up with the Czechs in this battle. But that wasn't going to save them. I mean Stalin was going to have his vengeance on anybody who'd put on German uniform in any form at all. So you can imagine what happened to them. And Vlasov himself was tortured and then strung up when he was captured. He was captured as poor bastard hidden under a blanket in the back of a car trying to get out of Prague. Anyway, leaving that one aside there, you have, as I say, this moment when the Americans could have got through. But there's another irony here as well, which one can argue with Soviet or former Soviet historians and Russian historians, and certainly with Putin, who tries to claim that actually there was never any chance of Russia could have won, or the Soviet Union could have won the war without any help from the West. That's rubbish. You've only got to see what Stalin himself had said, what Zhukov had said, what Khrushchev had said. Without American help, we could never have survived, especially in 42, 43. And above all, got to remember the lease lend nearly half a million military vehicles, the Studebakers, the jeeps, everything like that, totally transformed.
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B
Well, Chukov turns up to when he takes over at Stalingrad, he arrives in a jeep.
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C
Exactly, exactly. And this was sort of the first time you started to see jeeps all over the place and all the rest of it.
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B
Well, he was a uranus as well. 75,000American vehicles.
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C
Well, it was just under half a million vehicles altogether. And that transportation transform the mobility of the Red army for those incredible advances of 43, but above all, 44. And in fact, that's the irony. You know, without those American vehicles, the Americans would have been in Berlin long before the Red Army. But that's another, another, another story. But anyway, you can imagine, here we have the Red army all the way along the Oder and The Neissa, these two rivers facing inwards towards Germany, towards Berlin. They're only 60 miles away. And the fear of the civilians in Berlin is considerable. Above all, the fear of the women, because they've had the stories from the east of what's happening, and not just to German women, also to Polish women, to Hungarian women and all the rest of it. I mean, it was just simply, totally irrespective, almost of nationality, the Red army was out of control. I mean, this in a way is an aria, because one thinks of Soviet society and Stalinist society as totally controlled. But in fact, you know, when the guys were drinking in the evening before they went out hunting, as it was said, you know, their soldiers, the officers, didn't dare control them, otherwise they'd be gunned down themselves by their own men. And that quite often happened. But it didn't mean, obviously that every single Red army soldier was a rapist. I mean, there were some and there were, for example, particularly some Jewish officers. I mean, I came across a lot of. In the Russian archives, we came across a lot of anecdotal evidence showing that actually quite often Jewish officers who might have had more reason for wanting revenge than anybody did more to try to prevent their soldiers from taking revenge on German women. But anyway, that in itself, I'm afraid, is a big debate itself. And I had that debate with many different historians on the subject of how to what degree rape in war is a weapon of war or is not and what circumstances and so forth. But there's no doubt about it, with over 2 million German women alone raped during that awful period of early 1945, it was probably the worst example of mass wear rape in modern warfare.
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B
But there is also with the Red army troops, I mean, you know, life is very, very cheap then, wasn't it? I mean, you know, the casualty figures.
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C
It's also psychologically also it was because they were treated so badly by their own officers and commissars. And we've seen this in Ukraine, and we're seeing this in Ukraine as well. I mean, I'm afraid this is one Russian tradition. And I remember when I was researching in MOSCOW in the 90s, you know, there were 5,000 suicides a year amongst the recruits because of the way that they were hazed, tortured, bullied or whatever on joining the Russian Army. I mean, 5,000 is a lot, isn't it? I know, I know, it's terrifying. And they thought it was a joke. I mean, I remember the British ambassador went to see General Lebed, who was a famous character who actually died in a helicopter crash afterwards. And Lebed greeted him with a joke about the whole thing about sort of, he'd invited the local general in Siberia to dinner and he said, tell me, General, what's your problem? He said, well, it's the weather, General, of course. And he said, well, of course it's the weather. We're in Siberia. What do you mean it's the weather? And he said, well, you see, he said we had so many soldiers committing suicide during the winter that as soon as this thaw came, I had everybody out digging graves. And do you know what? Half of them deserted. Ha ha ha. They thought this was his dining out joke, to give you an idea. So, I mean, I'm afraid there is this total contempt for their own people, for their own soldiers. And this is.
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B
Do you think that is completely endemic? I mean, you know, is someone like Rokossovsky a little bit better than Zhukov, or are they all.
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C
Oh, no, Rokossovsky was better, but Rokossovsky also was Polish.
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B
But even in the Ode Vistula campaign, there's something like 600,000 casualties or something, isn't there?
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C
Yes, of course there is. But I mean, I'm afraid this was the Red army thing. You know, you just did. You were. They talk about the steamroller, but in fact, you know, it was basically. I suppose, actually it wasn't so much of a steamroller. It was basically an armored hearse. I mean, you were just crushing the enemy with your own casualties.
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B
I was rather sort of likened it to a sort of battering ram. Because you see. You see these patterns, don't you, that you have these incredibly violent, intense offensive, and they last six weeks, two months, whatever, then they all have to pause again because they've got to create another sort of 80 divisions or whatever.
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C
Yes.
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B
And then it swung back and then in it goes again and it's just repeat, repeat, repeat. So they're never fighting the whole time. There's always these.
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C
Oh, absolutely. Remember, in between Bagration, the great operation which destroyed Army Group center in 1944, and the Vistula odor operation of January 1945, you know, there was almost five months or whatever, but it was certainly. It was enough for them to round up up local populations and just forced them into the army. They didn't even record their names. The only times that the names of ordinary soldiers were recorded was when they were suspected of treason to the motherland.
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B
It is very hard for us in the West, I think, to get our head around this.
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C
I know it is democratic confirmation bias. We cannot understand the mentality of a totalitarian dictatorship.
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B
But even that, there's no practical sense. I mean, forget sort of democratic bias. I mean, there is no practical sense to just be that profligate with people's lives, because every time you go to another person, you've got to quit them, you've got to give them another rifle. You've got to start all over again. Well, wouldn't it be better to trade?
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C
Things don't seem to have changed very much, do they?
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B
No, that's my point.
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C
I know, I know. It's staggering.
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B
This is staggering.
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C
It is staggering. That's the way it is.
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B
Anyway, so the plans are built up for the battle for Berlin, right?
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C
So anyway, they line up their guns. I mean, literally, it's axle to axle, and they fire 2 million shells on the first day.
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B
This is 16th of April.
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C
This is 16th of April. Exactly. And this is in the Oderbruck, which is the marsh plain of the River Oder, below the Selo heights. Now, the trouble is Zhukov, who usually was very good in doing his sort of recce beforehand. He seems to have rather lost his.
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B
Yes, he has this absolutely nonsensical idea to use searchlights.
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C
Well, he first of all tries to do what Monty did, you know, of moonlight, you know, artificial moonlight or whatever, using searchlights, which actually silhouetted his own troops.
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B
Well, also, as everyone knows, you know, when you're in fog, you dip your headlights.
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C
Precisely. But, I mean, it was amazing that they made that mistake. They also, even worse mistake. There was that, of course, with this massive artillery bombardment, it had plowed up the ground. And the idea was, of course, for the infantry to clear the way, and then the guards, tank armies, would smash through. Two guards, tanks, armies ready to go. Well, he panicked, because, of course, what's happening is Stalin is pulling the strings in the background of rivalry between Marshal Zhukov and Marshal Konev. And he's a.
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B
We should just. Just explain that there's three fronts, which is what we would consider an army group along this.
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C
Right, this front line. In the north. In the north, you've got Rokossovsky, who's been clearing what was called the Baltic Balcony, which was basically Pomerania, but he's been delayed. And so Stalin, worried that the Americans might break through, says, right, we can't wait for Rokossovsky. You're going to go. That is you, Zhukov, and you, Konev. Zhukov in the middle. Konev to the south on the line of the Neissa, anyway, which is a
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B
tributary of the Oder, isn't it?
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C
More or less. Yes. Yeah. Yeah, exactly. They do join up. Anyway, the point is that Zhukov, as I say, starts to panic because Stalin is on the telephone to throw him, saying, how are you doing? You know, basically saying, koneff is doing very well to the south. Well, he had actually quite a lot. Much easier. But he handled it very well of crossing the river and then pushing right through. But Zhukov was facing the bulk of the German defenses, and Zhukov started to panic, and he made the terrible mistake of changing his plan on the first day of the battle, which caused chaos. He pulled back the army, the infantry, armies, basically, to push through the guards, tank armies. Well, you can imagine there was absolute, absolute chaos. And with the ground all churned up and all the rest of it, they had underestimated how steep the Zelo heights were. And you know, as a result, then Stalin gave Marshal Konev's, you know, full permission to go flat out and to attack Berlin from the south. And the idea was then for Konev to come in round the side, round the south, while Zhukov came in round the north. Interestingly, again, this whole thing to envelop Berlin, to make sure that the Americans couldn't get through, even if they changed their mind at the last moment.
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A
Ah, fantastic stuff that, isn't it? And to get someone of Antony's caliber along. Ah, top notch. Right. If you want to hear the rest of the talks, as well as hours of other exclusive member content, subscribe now@patreon.com we haveways. That's patreon.com we haveways. And we'll see you in September for We Haveways Fest six.