← WW2 Pod: We Have Ways of Making You Talk
Loading summary
Transcript150 lines
- [00:02]
A
Thank you for listening to we have ways of making you talk. Sign up to our Patreon to receive bonus content, live streams and our weekly newsletter with money off books and museum visits as well. Plus early access to all live show tickets. That's patreon.com wehaveways.
- [00:24]
B
So good, so good, so good.
- [00:27]
C
New markdowns up to 70% off are at Nordstrom Rack stores now. That means so many new reasons to
- [00:34]
B
rack cause I always find something amazing.
- [00:36]
D
Just so many good brands cause there's always something new.
- [00:39]
C
Join the NordicLub to unlock exclusive discounts. Shop new arrivals first and more. Plus buy online and pick up at your favorite Rack store for free. Great brands, great prices. That's why you rack.
- [01:04]
A
All the leaders asserted their right to decide Japan's fate by initiating a war, while paradoxically insinuating that they had no ultimate control over the date of the country they led. Above all, they were eager to absolve themselves of the responsibility for whatever consequences might follow from their tortured decision, sensing that they would be truly devastating. The Imperial Conference, a ceremonial pseudo religious rite meant to depoliticise huge political decisions, ensured that no one party or individual would be forced to shoulder the enormous burden of Japan's grave future. And that's historian Eri hota in Japan 1941 Countdown to Infamy. A fantastic book that leads you through the labyrinth of Japanese decision making intention and the terrible business of saying one thing to one person and saying another to another one. EtateMay this idea that you've got to say the right thing at the right time, regardless of whether it's the truth at the right time. In our last episode, I think we underlined that the real tangle that the Japanese have got themselves into with deadlines for war, preparations for war, while everyone's saying, but of course we don't want one. The American Growing American exasperation with this endless business of proposal and counter proposal where the Americans have remained consistent in their position and the Japanese have just slid about trying to backpedal, trying to reverse. If you were Secretary of State Cordell Hull, you'd be within your rights now to think, oh for God goodness sake, how do I deal with these people?
- [02:35]
B
Yes, it's not as if the Americans are acting like, like bulls in a china shop, is it? I mean, they're actually being quite measured, they're being quite, they've, they've been quite conciliatory repeatedly. They've been firm in, in the oil embargo and so on. You know, they've also been Quite approachable, really. But. But all of that has been shot back in their face every single time. I used to think that Roosevelt was made a mistake not to meet Kanoa when he had the opportunity, but actually, I kind of. I've changed my mind on that. I think the Americans have done exactly what they should do and what is the right course. It's the responsibility of the Japanese to show a little bit of concessions, and they've shown none. Anyway, Tojo is not going along with withdrawing troops from China under any circumstances. And yet, you know, the doubts are starting to creep in, even with him, you know, because the Navy's opposition to war starts to wear off on him a little bit. And even he concedes that. Oh, that if the Navy is not confident, we must reconsider it. But again, with Tojo, how much is this. What do you say to Iwakawa, and how much is he thinking privately? You know, he's an ultra nationalist. That's the truth of it. And withdrawing from China is something that you just can't bring himself to do. So he says to Oikawa, we've lost tens of thousands of lives over the China incident. I mean, again, this kind of weird, autocratic approach to putting euphemisms in front of what is a war. It's a war with China. It's not an incident. Anyway, he goes to withdraw. Seems an unbearable option. And yet, if we do go to war with the United States, we will lose tens of thousands more. I'm thinking about withdrawing troops, but I just cannot decide. I mean, tens of thousands is the least of it, frankly.
- [04:16]
A
Well, and the destruction they've caused in China, the sheer cost of all of this.
- [04:20]
B
Yeah, of course.
- [04:21]
A
Yeah. Well. And as you say, the irony is that soldiers on the ground, officers on the ground in China are saying, please, can we avoid war with the Americans? Americans, like, can we not. Not get into this? But the deadline that has been imposed is the 15th of October, of course. So on the 12th, Conaway reiterates to Tojo, the Prime Minister says to these Chiefs of Staff, Tojo, Oika and Toyoda, he says. He says he's got no confidence. Confidence in a war such as this. If we were to start a war, it has to be done by someone who believes in it.
- [04:48]
E
I mean.
- [04:49]
A
And Tojo, he says, well, that's. He basically says, you surprise me. What do you mean you have no confidence? Isn't that something you should have brought up when we decided on this, the proposal from September 6? So in other words, it's this is one Atata Tate Mai right there. No one is being honest about their position. Every. The whole thing is a relentless sliding floor, isn't it?
- [05:11]
B
Yep, completely. And that's why it's so frustrating even talking about this, to be honest. I mean, you know, it just should have been otherwise. But anyway, Tojo is reaching his limit with the Navy and with Kanae and. And despite the Navy's obvious opposition to war, Okawa is too cowardly to explicitly articulate this and admit the Navy's weaknesses. So this then puts the onus on the army to be the ones to admit that they too, are too weak to fight a successful war. And this, of course, only massively aggravates Tojo. And he thinks that Kanoya and his Cabinet has to go, you know, because we're not partying to this kind of weak nonsense. And Tojo, of course, is, by the way, part of his Cabinet, but he feels that it needs a change at the top for any progress to be made. So leaders are now conceding that the September 6 proposal has to be reversed. And despite Tojo's hardline militarism, his position on the war is growing more nuanced and complicated. And it suggests, and he suggests to Kido that Higashi Kuni should replace Kanoya as pm. You know, so it's all kind of musical chairs and back chat, isn't it, and kind of political maneuvering and so on.
- [06:28]
A
Konoye throws in the towel. He resigns on the 16th of October. And I think what's interesting about this is not because of the progress of policy and this sort of double bind he's got himself in, it's because there's this scandal of the. A spy, Japanese spies, been working for the Soviets called Hotsumi Ozaki, who was working with Richard Sorge, who's the source we saw in the last episode, that Stalin's relying on him to know what Japanese deployments are on his eastern flank. And that the problem is that Ozaki is a close. You know, Hotsumi Ozaki is a close confidant and advisor to Konoe. So. So the scandal takes him down because Ozaki's been arrested. Yeah, yeah, he's been caught. And so Konoe. Konoe resigns and he's probably going to go anyway because he doesn't want to be in charge of Japan as they go to war. But basically this last year of dithering ambivalence, letting his subordinates run out of control. Another analogue you could use here, people often Talk about when Hitler comes to power, there's this idea or when he's brought into government by the right wing in Germany, this is idea that they can control him, right? They'll bring him into government and they can control him and use him. It's the, you know, the way things go for Hitler when he comes into power. And of course they're wrong. Conor isn't even trying to do that. He's not trying to control these people, he's not trying to co opt them or anything. They're just out of his hands. There is no backstop in the, in the Japanese constitution because the emperor who supposedly has this sort of divine casting vote is uninclined to use that because there's no precedent. So why not? Well, why not create one, my friend? They all think there's no precedent so he's not allowed to do it. When you needed someone going, uh, no, that's not happening, that's been absent. And he's, and he's made let the situation curdle and get worse and worse as it's gone over the last year. So Tojo is then called to the Emperor's palace the next day and he thinks he's in for a bollocking for having cornered Konoe. But Hirohito actually nominates him as the new prime minister.
- [08:31]
B
I mean, amazing, isn't it?
- [08:32]
A
Yeah.
- [08:33]
B
And if it was Hirohito, he was saying, oh, I'm not sure about this, you know, where are you getting your three months from when the Pacific is even larger than China? He's the one who then chooses Tojo, who is the biggest hawk of all. So what the heck is going on? Yeah, it's a decision that defies belief frankly, or any kind of logic. But anyway, it happens and Tojo assembles a new cabinet, appointing himself as army Minister like before. And as Home Minister he also gets in Shigenori Togo, not to be confused with Tojo, he's appointed as foreign minister and this is interesting because in his patriotism he's neither pro Anglo American or pro access. He's definitely a better choice than Toyota. But Tojo's attempt to accrue popular public opinion gets off to a very, very peculiar start because he starts a routine of checking normal citizens bins on his morning strolls stunt to make sure that ration system is working properly and that everyone has had enough food to eat. And he'd look for signs of good food waste like fish bones. I mean, you know, so something. Well this is great, you know, he's in touch with the people. But others, obviously it's a. It's a excuse to mock him, isn't it?
- [09:51]
A
It's a big joke.
- [09:51]
B
His new nickname for many is Dumpster Minister. I mean, you know, if it wasn't so, so serious, it would be risible.
- [09:59]
A
And because Tojo is now in charge, he can. He can speed things up, can't he? So in late October, he basically gets the key issues that his predecessors failed to deal with onto the agenda. So a feasibility of total war and the impact of war on Japan's economy that they all know the answers, don't
- [10:18]
B
need to do this, don't need to do this.
- [10:20]
A
But they're going to do it anyway. And this includes the Finance Minister, Kaya, Cabinet Planning Board Director Suzuki in the meetings, which Konowe hadn't done previously, and Nagano, who's the pro war Navy Chiefs of Staff. He expresses impatience at the continuing decision. You know, is it war or is it diplomacy? He says, we've passed the October deadline already. Every hour we're expending 400 tons of petroleum. The situation is urgent. You must decide quickly whether or not we are going to war. Curiously, the army is in agreement on this. Sugiyama, who's his counterpart in the army, he says, yeah, you're absolutely right. We're going to have to. Basically, shit'll get off the pot. But the problem, of course, is that the pro war argument doesn't stack up.
- [10:59]
B
Not at all. Not remotely.
- [11:01]
A
Yeah, because if war is the way forward because negotiations aren't working out for the Japanese, fine. But once war begins, the Japanese will need diplomacy to get themselves out of it quickly because they've only got a short war in them.
- [11:14]
B
Very questionable numbers are presented, of course. Again, this reminds you, as you pointed out in the last episode, about the start of planning for Operation Barbarossa. And they go unchallenged. So the pro war argument is constantly being bolstered to the detriment of more sensible views, which is that we can't afford it and we're going to lose. But anyway, for example, in late October, the Navy estimates absolute enormous losses. And the chief of the Army Ministry's resource office, Nakahara, is particularly shocked by them. He knows he can't present these in any liaison meeting, so he just sort of shovels them under the carpet. The next day, though, the Navy comes back with new estimates more to the senior military figures liking. So again, in an ape of General Paulus going off and producing better figures just so that everyone's Happy. The US has a far greater capacity to replenish and rebuild much stronger war industry and much better training infrastructure for new pilots, for example. So in terms of industrial outputs, Japanese research in 1940 finds that the US produces 5,000 times more oil, 12 times more iron, 9 times more steel and copper, and 7 times more aluminium than Japan. And, you know, frankly, that's putting a good spin on it.
- [12:37]
A
Yeah.
- [12:37]
B
So the average industrial output for the US is 74 times higher than Japan's, and the army had estimated only 20 times more. Well, you'd have thought 20 times more would be enough to reason enough further talk. But. But surely this is enough to make everyone, even Tojo, go. Hang on a minute. But no. So the idea of delaying a war until March 1942 is floated in a conference on 28 October. The idea is that by this point it's likely the US would then be at war with Germany. So this would give Japan time to see how that conflict plays out and plan accordingly. But nope, that's no good. Warmongers oppose this, think that the longer Japan waits to strike, the worse their material situation become, which it will.
- [13:24]
A
Yeah. I think by now our listeners know how so much of this story is like. It's extraordinary. They're banging your head against the brick wall with these people. And so Nagano and Sugiyama, the army and Navy, are in accord. They say the start of the war has to be November. By October 31, we must decide to go to war. And this is a conference on 28 October. This isn't one of those things you put in your diary for next year that you think basically will never happen, will never come round. You know those things that go in your diary, Jim?
- [13:49]
B
No.
- [13:49]
A
And you think, you think, well, I'll never. And then suddenly they're upon you. This is like in three days time
- [13:54]
B
talk I promised to do in November.
- [13:57]
A
Exactly, exactly. And even though, even despite this, Tojo is still insisting that diplomacy should be prioritised above war.
- [14:04]
B
He doesn't mean that, does he?
- [14:05]
A
No, of course not. And, and, and he receives a harsh response to this. They are prioritizing diplomacy, but at exactly the same time as planning like mad for war.
- [14:15]
B
And how is their planning for diplomacy playing out? That's what I want to know. I mean, what are they doing? I can't see they're doing anything.
- [14:21]
A
They've been really bad at the diplomacy all year. So the idea that suddenly they're going to, like, do some more, that will work for them. Togo and Kaya who are the really the what's left of the anti war faction in the cabinet? They're, they, they don't like this. They're disgusted by it, find it deceptive and dishonest. And of course one of the things to remember is the Americans are inside Japanese diplomatic ciphers. So they know what's going on anyway, don't they? Yes, yeah, yeah, yeah. So come the 30th of October, the Japanese leaders decide that they will stay in the Tripartite Pact which is of course hugely aggravating to the Americans. Right. If you want diplomacy with the Americans, that's one of the things you just drop it, Just drop it.
- [15:00]
B
What benefit is it to be in the Tripartite Pact?
- [15:03]
A
None. They're getting nothing out of it. There's still on the table Cordell Hulls American Secretary of State's four principles. And so Togo drafts up a kind of way to try and accommodate these but without actually committing to them. So plan A is a troop withdrawal, free trade in China if first applied to the rest of the world, maintenance the Tripartite Pact.
- [15:26]
B
So you know that's not going to be accept.
- [15:28]
A
Exactly. Plan A is going to full of things that aren't going to go down. Well, Plan B is drafted a couple of days. A few days later Japan and the US would refrain from military adventures in advances into the South Pacific, would cooperate, skewer needed materials to the Dutch East Indies, would revert commercial relations to pre July arrangements. So before the asset freeze of Japan and the Americans would let Japanese have oil again. What having done nothing sounds a bit
- [15:49]
B
one way traffic, doesn't it?
- [15:50]
A
It does, yeah. They also commit that Japan will relocate troops from south to north Indo to north of Indochina. Japan would withdraw entirely once peace with China or the Pacific was secured. So the Japanese proposals are for the moon on a stick essentially. Togo is at least trying to take diplomacy seriously, but that their diplomatic position is so deteriorated. Where they're starting from is, is a non starter. The anti war faction has been sort of has been reduced. There's a big step towards war here and what's going to happen? Yamamoto, Admiral Yamamoto who throughout these episodes has been basically deeply skeptical about what could be got from war. Though at the same time saying but if we've got to do it, we're going to do it this way. Right. And I think in our first episode I said well isn't this just a professional soldier? Being a professional, professional sailor. Being professional sailor where in the end what you have to do is say yes, I'm sure, we can work out a way of doing that, because that's what soldiers and sailors and airmen do. They go, well, right, sir, if that's what you'd like me to do. So he gets cracking planning the Pearl harbor strike with his close confidant Kamato Kuroshima, and they get their plan approved by Nagano, despite the naval general staff who don't like it because they think they're using too much, too many naval resources, because after all, they're short on resources that they need six of the 10 aircraft carriers that the Japanese have got. Yamamoto's partnership with Kirishima is absolutely central to the, to the Pearl harbor plan. The way it turns out, Kirishima is a sort of eccentric fellow who is prepared to disagree with Yamamoto. And I think people might be relieved to hear that someone's disagreeing with somebody in the Japanese setup here, both publicly and privately. Yes.
- [17:33]
B
Yeah.
- [17:34]
A
The problem is Pearl harbor is the result of that. The thing is, is the Japanese Navy have very much been looking at air power and how it's an extension of what they can do and how torpedoes, torpedo assault is the way to go about this stuff. There's been a couple of proofs of concept over the other side of the world with Taranto, for instance, and ships being ships being sunk by torpedo. So Konigsberg is sunk with a torpedo, isn't it? So there's, there's this. There's the fact that it's doable and they've figured out how to deal with torpedoes not working very well in shallow water. Their pilots are training to fly at low altitudes to prevent the torpedoes from plunging too deep and that. And they're getting cracking on it and, you know, they've laid down their tracks that take them towards Pearl harbor from September and into October. The pilots are training more. They don't know what for, but they don't need to, do they? And the army is still banking on the diplomatic plan B, which is, of course, never going to happen. Yeah, yeah, yeah.
- [18:34]
B
Which is. Which is refraining from advances into South Pacific.
- [18:38]
A
Yeah.
- [18:39]
B
And so on. And, and reverting to commercial relations to the pre July arrangements, blah, blah, blah. The diplomatic deadline is set for the end of November now. So yet more deadlines. And if no resolution is reached by zero hour, the first of December, then Japan decides it's going to strike. And Togo, who is the new foreign minister under Tojo, is massively uncomfortable with this. A secret ultimatum, which is what it is, an imminent deadline that the US was told it was working to and he considers resigning, which wouldn't cause a resolution to collapse, but would, I guess, I suppose it would would be a jar, wouldn't it? To the whole Japanese workings, I suppose. But he's discouraged from doing this by his advisors. He said no, no, you can't possibly do this. You should continue pushing for a diplomatic breakthrough. So December 7th is set for the Pearl harbor attack, right? Dun dun dun.
- [19:37]
A
So there's about a month to go. Little more than a month to go. Is there a way back? Join us after the break to find out whether someone can grow the stones to stop this. I mean everyone knows the spoiler here, Jim. They know the result. But join us off the break anyway.
- [19:51]
B
Foreign.
- [19:56]
E
It's crunch time at work and you need to bring wings to your workday. Visit redbull.com gettingitdone and answer a couple questions about your work style to get a Spotify customized playlist tuned to your productivity. Plus score a can of Red Bull on us while you go from to do to done. And remember, Redbull gives you wings. Supplies are limited. Terms apply. Visit the website for more information.
- [20:22]
D
TaxAct understands you haven't memorized the tax code. That's why Tax act has live experts to help. TaxAct can even do it for you if you prefer. It's the easiest way to know you're doing it right. Well, other than going back to college and obtaining a bachelor's degree in accounting with a minor in finance, then interning somewhere and becoming fluent in all tax forms. But that might be hard to accomplish before tax day. So maybe just stick with TaxAct Tax Act. Let's get them over with.
- [20:56]
A
Welcome back to we have ways of making you talk. This is the last part of our four part Japan's Road to War series. Of course, nothing's inevitable, James. Let's let's not forget that when studying history, one must remember that the protagonists always have a range of options on the table in front of them. They also have a range of futures in front of them that they have no idea of what may be the outcome. Though it's pretty clear that lots of people in the Japanese establishment think the war is a terrible idea, that they will lose it, that they may do well to start with, but they're gonna come undone. But that war's a great idea anyway. They should do it anyway.
- [21:34]
B
So well, it's amazing because on the 2nd of November, Emperor Hirohito is feeling a bit sad. Boohoo Nagano and Sugiya, then Sugiyah present the war plan to him and he reiterates his preference to diplomacy. So why did you appoint Tojo as prime Minister then? None of this makes any sense.
- [21:53]
A
But he doesn't put his foot down. He could say, I'm visibly sad. So we're changing course and I'm firing Tojo.
- [22:00]
B
I'm firing Tojo and I'm going to get in a dove.
- [22:02]
A
Yeah.
- [22:03]
B
Who's going to pursue the diplomatic situation a bit better anyway? On 5 November, Togo, who is the dovish foreign minister? I mean, ish, ish, ish, ish, ish, ish. Fair point. Fair caveat. Makes a speech at the Imperial Conference to explain the prospect of successful diplomacy with the us and despite his anti war opinions and his efforts to avoid aggravating the US and avert a war, his rhetoric plays into a blame game and taps into a nationalistic sense of indignance. Of course it does. We have been engaging in unofficial negotiations concerning the normalization of relations. He tells the conference, the Imperial government has been honest and just from the very beginning, desiring the stability of East Asia and world peace. Horseshit. If things go as they are going now, I regret that the negotiations do not have any prospect of a quick resolution. So that's his tatami talking there, isn't it?
- [23:07]
A
Yeah. Yeah.
- [23:08]
B
And not his honor, in a way.
- [23:09]
A
What else can he say? They're so in deep now, aren't they?
- [23:13]
B
I'll tell you what he can say. He can stand up and go, we're all doomed. We're doomed.
- [23:18]
A
Their economy is that much bigger than ours. Even 20 times bigger. Is the army estimate? Well, yeah, but even if it's just 20 times bigger, that'll do it. That'll do for you. Right. So now we. We let's.
- [23:32]
B
Yeah.
- [23:32]
A
What's happening on the other side of the Pacific? Well, in Washington.
- [23:36]
B
Well, what is.
- [23:37]
A
An experienced diplomat called Saburo Coruso has been sent out to help Nomura, the ambassador there, Japanese ambassador to Washington for negotiations with Cordell Hull and with Roosevelt as a special envoy. You know, Nomura and we. I think in the last episode we said. I said I feel quite sorry for him because everything he does gets undermined every time he makes it. Every time he goes with an olive branch, the Americans, or every time he tries to pave the way to something different, he's undermined by his government at home and he's been working really, really hard. But Tojo, of course, thinks he's weak because he's not adequately pro war and that Curacao needs to sort of be that he sent him there as a stiffener. Curacao on the 3rd of November, is woken up by a policeman in the middle of the night in Tokyo. That's always good when policemen wake you up in the middle of the night, Jim, isn't it?
- [24:21]
B
Or crack of dawn.
- [24:22]
A
Exactly. And he's asked to meet the Foreign Minister to immediately gets up and attends the meeting and then he's told he's going to Washington the next day. So he spends the next 20 hours looking all over everything, all the conversations, all the documents exchanged between the US and Japan for the last six months. And he's absolutely clear, he can see the, the issue, the turning point is the Japanese occupation of southern French Indochina
- [24:47]
B
and then the oil embargo, the consequent
- [24:49]
A
oil embargo that follows. And I think what's interesting about that is that that suggests after all that the Americans have moved on China and they did move on China, they did offer a different position on China and that. So he actually has pinpointed the problem here. So he goes to see Tojo the next day for the first time, who's ditched his car key in for a kimono. Yes, yes.
- [25:12]
B
Tojo used to have a habit of having a bath and he'd be naked in his bath and changing and stuff and his aides would be there and they just have to kind of slightly aver their eyes. Who's really a very peculiar man as well as staring into people's bins.
- [25:26]
A
Yeah.
- [25:27]
B
Nothing he liked more than getting his tackle out in front of everybody.
- [25:30]
A
So he's a bin dipping nudist. Okay. It's just going to end well then, isn't it?
- [25:34]
B
Basically, yeah. Yeah. I've seen his cigarette case. Actually, it's in it because Cornelius Ryan picked it up at the end of the war from his desk after he, after Tojo had committed seppuku.
- [25:47]
A
Right.
- [25:48]
B
And, oh, did he commit sepuku or did he just get hanged? I can't remember. Anyway, he died.
- [25:52]
A
He went to the gallows.
- [25:53]
B
He went to guys. Yeah. And he got, and he got his, his cigarette case, which is now at the university in Athens, Ohio with that amazing archivist. Yeah.
- [26:03]
A
So do you think he's dressed in a Corona rather than uniform? Middle to go. Look, I'm the. I'm not a soldier here telling you what to do. I'm the civilian head of state. Right. Or not head of state, but the civilian head of the government that there's an attempt to maybe. I don't know, Maybe. But anyway, he says he thinks chances of Successful negotiations with America, about 30%. He also thinks doesn't the Americans are ready or willing to go to war. Public opinions against it. They need rubber and tin from Southeast Asia, so they're pulling. They won't jeopardize their access to the region via war. And. And anyway, Japan can't concede on the point of troop withdrawal, which after all is the thing that Curacao has identified as the absolute, the stone in everyone's shoe that needs dealing with. And the last point is made more categorically than Tojo actually feels because actually he thinks it's okay if in the end it comes to it and they avoid war, then fine, but, you know, whatever. And Kuruso then asks Tojo, if you're back in agreement, that includes withdrawal if it means negotiations progress. And Tojo says, yes, surely I will. I mean, I'm really going off these people. So Kuroso and Nomura then get going, negotiating together. And they're aware of this diplomatic deadline that the Japanese have a place the Americans are ignorant of. And Roosevelt's in no hurry, is he? He's got enough on his plate dealing with the situation with Germany and whether that's going to escalate well.
- [27:28]
B
And also the longer they wait, the more strong America will be.
- [27:32]
A
And Nomura and Caruso, they need a definite response from Roosevelt and from Cordell Hull regarding Plan A, their initial plan, which is the basic status quo and thanks very much, which they present to the Americans on the 7th of November. The Americans say, well, actually, we need time to consider this. Which given, actually, given it's given what's in Plan A, the Americans could have just said no immediately because the reciprocal bearing of what the Americans want. And Nomura at this point doesn't know about the military concessions that, that the Japanese prepared to make in the plan. In Plan B, he's unaware of them because Turgo thinks this is something to be kept up their sleeve and only used in the last resort. Cursor is, however, aware and it's been given specific instructions on how to present slightly different versions to the White House in different specific scenarios so not to have an actual position himself that he has to stick to. So essentially what it means is Namura and Cursor have been micromanaged. They have no freedom of action. They have no scope. The whole point of diplomacy is that you're allowed to bend. You resort to words to bend your way around things and you're allowed to chisel and change your position and they're not allowed to. Nomura Says to Togo, can we please extend the deadline that they're working to. That of course the Americans don't know about? Togo says, no, sorry, deadline is as the deadline does. Curacao, Nomura then do. They do meet Roosevelt at the White House on the 17th of November. It's the first time that Cursor has met the President. Curaco asks Roosevelt to see the situation for Japan's frame of mind. And Roosevelt, Jim, offer us your FDR for this.
- [29:13]
B
There is no last word between friends.
- [29:15]
A
And these are carefully chosen words.
- [29:17]
B
Yeah, they absolutely are.
- [29:18]
A
This is very interesting, isn't it? Because this is a phrase that was used by Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan 30 years, nearly 30 years previously to Suteme Chinda, who was Japanese Ambassador to the us this is when Chinda had brought cherry trees to the US to be planted on the banks of the Potomac as a symbol of Japanese American friendship.
- [29:36]
B
So I know. Can you believe it?
- [29:38]
A
Roosevelt knows exactly what he's saying there. He's picking those words extremely carefully.
- [29:44]
B
Yes, Caruso admits to reviews. He says a troop withdrawal is going to be very hard to prove, but if a general understanding between the two countries could be found that that would outshine Japan's involvement in the Tripartite Pact. In other words, he's giving him a glimmer here, isn't he? Yeah, but Hull, Cordell Hull, the Secretary of State, he doesn't. He's not up for accepting anything less than Japan's complete abandonment of the pact. Japan doesn't appreciate it.
- [30:11]
A
Just.
- [30:12]
B
They just don't get it, do they? They don't understand the ideological hatred the administration has for the, for the Nazis. They're just not seeing it through that, that prism. It's this issue rather than the troop movement from, from withdrawal from China that becomes a stickler. And, you know, it's so mad, isn't it, because Japan leaving Tripartite Pact would be so easy and the climb down would be literally nothing.
- [30:36]
A
No downside at all. Hitler will rage against, you know, weak Asiatics who can't be relied on, which he's probably doing anyway. So what?
- [30:45]
B
Yep.
- [30:46]
A
And it's very rare in diplomacy. There are things you can do that have no downside. It's very unusual in these sort of situations. And yet they can't, they can't grab it. Hull says, says to Nomura, he says, it's going to be hard to make the people of this country and the people of all peaceful nations believe that Japan is pursuing a peaceful course if they stay in the tripartite Pact.
- [31:06]
B
It's a brief.
- [31:07]
A
Yeah. And if America, Japan reached agreement while the former was still obligated to Nazi Germany, Hull said he might as well be lynched.
- [31:17]
B
Yeah, well, he's got a point. I mean, I don't. What I find so hard is why the Japanese don't understand this, why they can't. They can't see. See it. Hull generally views Caruso and Imura with. With a huge dollop of suspicion. And it's. This isn't hell. When Caruso declines a new invitation to continue discussing the Tripartite Pact. You know, if you're, if you're serious about peace and serious about finding a solution, let's have a, let's have a further chat about the trade. Let's at least have a chat. And he reflects in. Later. He reflects in 1948 that he fell from the start that Caruso was deceitful. Yeah, well, you know, he's been sent there by Tojo, hasn't he? And Togo as to stiffen Nomura. So, you know, a Pacific escalation is clearly developing here. And to destabilize things further, the US start to notice Japanese leaders making belligerent public speeches because, of course, they're all over the Japanese press and everything. You know, Tojo is declaring on national radio and TV that the US freezing Japanese assets was an aggressive and hostile action tantamount to an armed conflict. Well, it's not. It's to try and leverage some kind of negotiation, isn't it? You know, all this, this, this chat by Tojo and these pronouncements and the Japanese media is really undermining the work of Nomura and Caruso in, in, in Washington and makes their efforts seem deceptive, even if they're not. I mean, I think. I think Caruso is a little bit, kind of honor to Tatamay, But, But Nomura is genuine, isn't he? I mean, he's lived in America a long time. He's much more simpatico. But obviously, how can Japan claim to prioritize peace whilst at the same time making these really provocative, ultra nationalistic, very aggressive kind of militaristic claims on state radio and so on and in the newspapers?
- [33:04]
A
But, I mean, Jim, I'll tell you what's an aggressive and hostile action tantamount to an armed conflict. The invasion of Southern Indochina. Right?
- [33:14]
B
Yes. Yeah, it's a fair point.
- [33:18]
A
Right? An oil embargo is an oil embargo. Right. But it's pretty clear that Japan, from the American perspective, Japan looks like it's decided to go to war. But Roosevelt, Roosevelt's not on that same page. Even though we've had these American ships attacked by U boats in October, you know, Roosevelt's still treading slowly, slowly towards, you know, going to war with the Germans. He's still trying to avoid it because he wants. He wants to get that. He wants to time that right, doesn't he? If. If it's going to happen. There are more French, more Japanese troops arriving in French Indochina by the day.
- [33:52]
B
I mean, what's all that about?
- [33:54]
A
Well, who knows? I don't know, Jim. You tell me. You tell me. If you want to be seen as peaceful, why are you doing that? And the. The. For the British in the U.S. rampart, defenses in Malaya and the Philippines in response. And Soldier Yu, who's been one of our sort of poor sods having to deal with this on a personal level, he's relocated from northern China to somewhere in the Pacific. He doesn't know where or why he thought he was going home.
- [34:20]
B
He's absolutely devastated, isn't he? Yeah, he's gutted.
- [34:23]
A
And on the 18th of November. Yeah, yeah. Nomura and Kurisu meet Hull again. And Kodohal tells him that as long as Japan remains a fascist ally, he doesn't think anything can be done in the matter of reaching a satisfactory agreement with Japan. Fair enough. So what he's saying is, do something about that, lads. Do something about that, lads, and then
- [34:41]
B
come back and we'll have a chat.
- [34:42]
A
Yeah? Yeah.
- [34:43]
B
But then a massive moment arrives because Nimura suggests completely off the cuff about any preparation whatsoever, that Japan will. Would withdraw its troops from southern Indochina. So two countries would go back to the status which existed before the asset freeze in the. In the back in the summer. And Nomura wasn't supposed to know about this offer outlined in Plan B before. So the only conclusion one can have is that Caruso has told him about the Plan B and he's trying to show the White House that Japan, he is taking Roosevelt's desire for a modus vivendi seriously. Essentially, he's suggesting a detente. Hull initially seems unmoved by the suggestion, but as the meeting ends, he tells the diplomats he'll consider it. And Nimura and Kuruso are massively encouraged when they hear this. But of course, this is Japan we're talking about here. And of course, hope doesn't last very long. Togo catches Togo. The Foreign Minister catches wind that Nomura has not only introduced Plan B without his authorization, but actually made its most conciliatory Aspect a standalone proposal. And he blows his top, doesn't he? I mean, you know, he's absolutely furious. Demands that Nimura reverses this. Offers an updated final proposal. An updated Plan B, which outlies no military advance beyond Indochina. Cooperation to secure the Dutch East Indies resources. Reversal of commercial relations to pre July status. No U.S. intervention in the Sino Japanese peace and withdrawal of Japanese troops from southern Indochina. No mention of the Tripartite attack. You know, when are you people going to get this? So we're still waiting for an answer from Hull. Then Caruso submits a private draft letter to him the next day stating Japan would act independently of its fascist allies if the US went to war with Europe.
- [36:39]
A
Well, and I think it's quite interesting what Hull does at this meeting on the 21st of November is he obviously, I think he knows it's done. So he gets his farewells out of the way. He's unusually friendly. They chat about golf. Hull reminisces about what fantastic positive experiences he had with Japanese diplomats back in the 30s, which is a way of saying, you two are. And then earnestly shakes hands with everyone. Goodbye. Hal says to Chris, I'll look, I'll speak to someone else about the proposal. So he's basically, so long, fellas. It's been fun. Nice to know you wouldn't want to, you know, see I wouldn't want to be here. Yeah. And then he writes a memo later about the meeting which says, I looked at the paper and then asked Mr. Kurisu whether he had anything more on the subject of peace to offer. He replied that he did not. I said that I did not think this would be of any particular help and so dismissed it. This was virtually all that was said of importance. Following day, Hull goes back to being his usual professional self rather than doing dits about playing golf. There is no update on his thoughts on Plan B, but Plan B's in.
- [37:41]
B
That's all guff, isn't it?
- [37:42]
A
So golf. Exactly. You can't. You can't engage with guff.
- [37:45]
B
25 November 1941. Cordell Hull prepares a reply that proposes a truce and asks for immediate withdrawal from southern Indochina and a reduction of troops in northern Indochina too. In return, the US would unfreeze Japanese assets and assume relatively normal economic relations. That's pretty conservatory. The next day he scraps the plan, mainly because the White House receives intelligence of Japanese troop mobilization in the Pacific, especially south of Taiwan. Although they already knew this had been happening, they'd been mobilizing around there like themselves, and it looks like the Japanese are ready to strike at any moment and the US is done giving the Japanese any more chances. So fdr, President Roosevelt, he does anticipate a Japanese attack, but also underestimates Japan's ability to make the attack Trudy. Crippling. So, you know, he's going, well, you know, show us your worst, but we're going to be able to deal with it, basically, is what he's thinking, isn't he?
- [38:44]
A
Yeah, yeah.
- [38:45]
B
So the following day, 26th of November, Nomura and Caruso receive a note from Hull, don't they?
- [38:52]
A
The Hull note, indeed, as it becomes known.
- [38:56]
B
It's got a ring to it, hasn't it?
- [38:57]
A
Yeah, yeah, it covers it, doesn't it? This is a multilateral agreement between the U.S. japan, Britain, China and the Netherlands, and it involves withdrawal of all Japanese forces from China and Indochina. Imagine guarantee of no support for Japan or the. Or the Americans for any government in China that wasn't Chiang Kai Shek's and both governments would abandon extraterritorial rights in China. Interestingly, Hull knows, He says later, we had no serious thought that Japan would accept our proposal. He just thinks, we've got to do this. We've got to say something. And this shows the Americans are expecting there to be a war because they've asked for something impossible here, really, which is a multilateral agreement. How do you organize that? And what is a multilateral agreement proposal like this other than an attempt to stall? You know, you've got to get everyone else involved. That's going to slow everything down. Kurus then responds, well, we can't change our diplomatic way of doing things so quickly, particularly as we've never. No one's even mentioned a multinational agreement before. It's only ever bilateral. So, you know, are the Americans still interested in imovasvendi? Possibly, he asks. And Hul says, no. Done my best here, but, you know,
- [40:07]
B
you guys are giving me nothing. What can I do?
- [40:09]
A
And this goes down very badly in Tokyo. I mean, unsurprisingly, but nothing goes down well in Tokyo.
- [40:15]
B
They're outraged, obviously.
- [40:17]
A
What's wonderful about it from a Tokyo perspective is it gives all the different factions a chance to park their infighting and blame the White House. So you no longer have to say, well, the army are backsliding, the Navy are all wet and weak. It's the Americans, it's the White House. Look, see, ABDC encirclement is real and the A is leading it. Even the idea of a multilateral proposal is like. Is an encirclement in itself, isn't it?
- [40:46]
B
And it's worth, isn't it just thinking about, you know, the Japanese have clearly got sort of selective memory, haven't they? Because it's worth just recapping all the things that Japan has done to contribute to this very moment. So they've occupied southern Indochina whilst ignoring Roosevelt neutralization plan. They stuck with the Tripartite pact despite the US's clear mistrust of any association with Nazi Germany. Tojo's belligerent nationalistic speeches to Japanese public, all the while telling his diplomats to prioritize peace and the arbitrary self imposed deadline Japan has set for a diplomatic resolution. Resolution none of which have remotely helped the chances of peace in any shape or form. I mean it's completely hopeless. So they have a final PeaceTime meeting. On 27 November 1941. Nomura and Caruso meet with Roosevelt, the President and Cordell Hull, the Secretary of State in the Oval Office in the White house in Washington D.C. and Roosevelt creates an oddly warm and convivial atmosphere despite the obvious tensions. And the President offers a visitor cigarettes and even lights Nomura's for him. And after the chit chat, Roosevelt expresses his disappointment that Japanese leaders have continued to express opposition to the fundamental principles of peace and order. If Japan should decide to follow Hitlerism and courses of aggression, they'd come out the ultimate loser.
- [42:14]
A
Not so convivial that, is it?
- [42:17]
B
No. I mean, yes. Suddenly the, the warm energy is sucked out of the room in an, in an instant.
- [42:23]
A
Yeah, yeah. And, and Nomura tries to pour out. I do, I really do feel for Nomura. He appeals to Roosevelt's nostalgia for strong Japanese American relations, you know, which are because after all, Japan comes into the modern world as it were, because of American outreach, as it were. Hal dismisses it, dismisses this and says, you know, there's going to be no changes to the whole night, I'm afraid, unless the opposition to the peace element in control of the government should make up its mind and move in a peaceful direction. No conversations could or would get anywhere as has been so clearly demonstrated.
- [42:53]
B
And so he's got a point.
- [42:54]
A
Yep. Japanese diplomats leave. We've arrived here diplomatically. What is going to happen next? There's this sort of pregnant moment now, isn't there?
- [43:04]
B
30th of November 1941.
- [43:06]
A
Yeah.
- [43:06]
B
Emperor Hirohito summons Nagano and the Navy Minister Shimada to ask them about the
- [43:11]
A
naval preparations for war he's worried about losing. I mean who wouldn't be, right?
- [43:18]
B
Well again he's got a point.
- [43:20]
A
Yeah, but he doesn't worry about it that much to use his veto because there's no precedent. They'll all go, but they'll all say that's unprecedented. And, you know, we do, we do have. We have had, you know, a couple of decades of when people don't get what they want out of the political establishment in Japan, they'll rise up against it. You know, there's been officer coups and people being murdered and all this sort of thing. And even though he's the Emperor at the end of the war, they rise up against him because they don't want the war to end the war party. So maybe he's scared to use his to create a precedent. Anyway, he's also worried that Germany will abandon Japan. What have they been getting from Germany? Zip. Absolutely nothing. And this is the sort of. That they think that in the end the west will betray Asia through for racist reasons and that having a foot in the Western camp with the Germans is worth more than the fact that the Germans give them nothing.
- [44:17]
B
It's just absolutely unbelievable, isn't it?
- [44:19]
A
Yeah. And then Shimada, the Navy Minister, says, well, don't worry, don't worry. Your. Your Imperial wonderfulness war plan doesn't depend on Germany anyway. And anyway, whatever happens between the Germans, defeat, reconciliation, that's not been part of the plan either. You know, we. We're marching the beat of our own drum and we're not, we're not concerned with the rest of the global picture.
- [44:39]
B
1st of December 1941.
- [44:41]
A
Yeah.
- [44:42]
B
The deadline for diplomatic resolution has passed, and the decision for war is with the us, Britain and the Netherlands is approved at the Imperial Conference. And Hirohito is silent throughout the entire proceedings, but then finally gives his approval at the end. And he says, our negotiations with the United States, based on the resolution of the revised November 5th essentials for carrying out the Empire's policies, did not come to a successful collusion. The Empire will go to war with the United States, Britain and the Netherlands. So this is a man who remains Emperor, as should be reminded, until 1989.
- [45:21]
A
Yes, yes, he does. And who, when the moment for peace comes, throws everyone under the bus.
- [45:29]
B
Yes, the unconditional surrender with conditions.
- [45:31]
A
He's the condition. So on the 2nd of December, Admiral Yamamoto sends a radio message from the Nagato, anchored in the Inland Sea near Hiroshima. Message is addressed to Vice Admiral Nagumo's first Air Fleet, which is en route to Pearl Harbor. So they're already on their way there. The message reads, Climb Mount Nijtaka 1208. And that is the go phrase, the code word, the green light for the Japanese attack on Pearl harbor. And we will leave it there.
- [46:08]
B
We're gonna have to do Pearl harbor at some point, aren't we?
- [46:10]
A
Yeah, we are, we are, we are. But this has been fascinating, hasn't it?
- [46:13]
B
Yes. Oh my goodness.
- [46:15]
A
If completely maddening. Dear God. And I think we did, we did, we did address this right at the start of this series. So, you know, the coals of 1930s British foreign policy and you know, Anglo French foreign policy towards Germany in the run up to September 1939 be raked over so much. And the, and the politics of it. What is appeasement? Why does appeasement exist? Does it even exist? Who's responsible for it? Is it the government responding, the public? The public responding, the government? Who are the peace parties? Who are the war parties? Where does the Labour Party sit on this? Where's the Conservative Party? You know, all of it, the whole lot. What's the Foreign Office trying to do? What's the Cabinet trying to do? Where does Winston Churchill sit in the picture? What's Britain's actual state of preparation for war? But none of it, none of it is as maddening as this stuff, is it?
- [47:05]
B
It's just unbelievable, isn't it? It's absolutely unbelievable. It's extraordinary. I mean, I mean, you know, there are so many concessions that could have been made to Japan. You know, if they're just pulled out of China, if they just pulled out of the tripartite attacks, they pulled out, they'd have got their supplies from America that have got their oil, that have got their aluminium, that have got their scrap metal, that have got everything. They could have turned themselves into a highly productive manufacturing state with greater influence in Southeast Asia Pacific region without anyone having to go to war at all. Because America is policy and this is the frustrating thing and we'll get onto this when we look at the visionaries. But in a series to come. But America is shifting. America is not interested in imperial conquest, it's not interested in imperial possessions. It is not interested in anything other than people having the right to self determination at this stage. So all the opportunities for Japan are there. If they pursue peaceful means.
- [48:11]
A
Yeah, yeah, they're going to climb Mount Nijtucka 1208. So there we go.
- [48:14]
B
That's been fascinating, hasn't it?
- [48:15]
A
It's been really interesting. Thanks. Thanks everybody for listening. We hope you've been able to follow the twists and turns here of this diplomatic wrangle that results in the ultimate tragedy of the war in the Pacific and in Burma and in the Philippines and in, you know, that entire part of the world. Thanks very much for listening. We'll see you again very soon. Cheerio.
- [48:38]
B
Cheerio.