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WW2 Pod: We Have Ways of Making You Talk
Japan's Road To War: Empire Of The Rising Sun (Part 1)
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- [00:02]
Al Murray
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- [02:04]
James Holland
People these days I find it so lamentable that such an arrogant nation as ours goes terrorizing our neighbors. Oh Americans, why don't you stand up now and make this brutal nation repent? And that is an entry from the diary of Nagai Kafu, who was a Japanese novelist fighting in June 1941. And perhaps not what one might expect a Japanese person to be writing in his diary in the summer of 1941.
- [02:32]
Al Murray
Well, we're going to see, aren't we, Jim? So welcome everyone to we have ways of making you talk with me, Al Murray and James Holland. Welcome. Well, what we're going to do for you in these four episodes is look at Japan's road to war, the immediate dissent in relations between Japan and what ends up being the western alliance from 1940 to 1941. And I think one of the things that is remarkable, actually, is there is a swirl of opinion in Japan, not just at this point, but throughout the war. Actually, there isn't a monolithic response to events in Japan at all. And that what you do have, however, is an attempt by the Japanese to sort of walk a tightrope that fails entirely. It's very hard, isn't it, when looking at the events of these two years, really, to not. To not treat it as fated, that you know that it's inevitable that the Japanese are going to go to war with the Americans. But certainly when you look at the series of events and the decisions people make, it feels awfully like it. I think it's fair to say that here in Britain we peel the onion of the road to war with Germany and repeal the onion over and over and over and over and over again. It's a very well rehearsed patch of history. But the other end isn't. Given that, I think it's very often seen as the Japanese go to war with the Americans at Pearl Harbor. They don't. They go to war with all the western empires in December 1941. And I think Britain, the Dutch. Exactly. And they've already gone. They've sort of already gone to war with France in a roundabout way, by coming to accommodation with Vichy France. And I think what's interesting is this is important and cataclysmic as the slide in Europe in the late 30s, but this just doesn't get. Doesn't get examined or picked over very much at all here in Britain. And yet they go to war. They go to war with us just like they go to the war with the Americans. But the American relationship is central to this story. So what we're going to do is we're going to try and work our way through that.
- [04:43]
James Holland
Well, yes, we're going to. We're going to focus basically on 1941.
- [04:47]
Al Murray
Yeah.
- [04:47]
James Holland
And we're calling it Japan's Road to War. But actually it's more the descent to war really, isn't it? But obviously we'll provide a bit of context for this. We'll go a little bit further back in time.
- [04:57]
Al Murray
Yeah.
- [04:58]
James Holland
And show how dramatically Japan changes since Meiji Restoration or revolution, whatever you want to call it, of 1868, which is really the kind of starting point on this road. But how they kind of get themselves into this bind from which they then find there's no exit strategy or no sensible, decent, no sensible, proper, pragmatic exit strategy, I think is probably the way to do it. And as of all these things, it's to do with resources, but it is also the hand of individuals, and particular individuals who are remarkable characters, is very much firmly on the tiller of this as well, isn't it?
- [05:42]
Al Murray
Yeah. And also, though you can't deny there's Western agency in relations with Japan, certainly in the 1920s, that causes all sorts of problems, that really pushes Japan away. You know, there's a really careless contribution to this from the great powers.
- [06:03]
James Holland
What's racism out. It's racism. Let's. Let's not be about the Bush.
- [06:06]
Al Murray
Well, yeah, we'll get to that. But this is off, not rehearsed, I think, which I think is quite interesting about this. So. So when we come to the autumn of 1940, so sort of a year out, Japan's decision to expand its war, because that's the other thing to remember is this is. This is an expansion of the Japanese war, not a. Not, not the beginning of the Japanese war. It's an expansion of their war effort that they've got a difficult relationship with, with America, and they've got a new alliance, burgeoning alliance with Nazi Germany. Basically. It's the friction of their attempts to deal with these two difficult things that results in the, you know, the many slips twixt, cup and lip that take them to war.
- [06:49]
James Holland
Yeah. And I think we should just say right up front, Manchuria, 1931.
- [06:53]
Al Murray
Yeah.
- [06:53]
James Holland
You know, that's. That's the start of it.
- [06:55]
Al Murray
Yeah.
- [06:56]
James Holland
And then 1937 is the invasion of China, which is supposed to be a quick fix. It's supposed to be a quick victory. Overwhelm China.
- [07:05]
Al Murray
Yeah.
- [07:05]
James Holland
Get the benefit of their resources, move on, you know, get back to kind of peace again and start, you know, and then kind of take a pause and then see where they're at.
- [07:14]
Al Murray
Yeah.
- [07:15]
James Holland
But the invasion of China doesn't go as well as they. They think it's going to because they get the coastal towns, but they don't get the huge bulk of the interior. The Nationalist government under Chiang Klaichek doesn't fold, and it is indeed propped up by the United States as well.
- [07:31]
Al Murray
Yeah.
- [07:31]
James Holland
And so suddenly they've got all sorts of problems and it's, do you double down and do more expansion or do you rein it back? And that is the dilemma. But in the autumn of 1940, the first signs that they're going to double down, because what they do is invade Northern Indochina. And Indochina is modern day Vietnam, but back in the day was French Indochine, a French colonial outpost in Southeast Asia. And they do this between the 22nd, 26th September 1940 and it's a complete cakewalk. I mean they just, they just basically walk in. Yeah, they've kind of, almost kind of warned the French beforehand. The French are in a position to put up any opposition at all, of course, after, after the fall of France to Germany in June 1940. So it's, it's, it's an easy picking. And I think it's interesting to consider why they do this, isn't it?
- [08:24]
Al Murray
They think they're doing this sort of pragmatically and within their, within their frame of reference and their sphere of influence is how they, they're seeing it. You know, because the American foreign policy has been hostile to the Japanese invasion of China. There's embargoes, embargoes in place. So aircraft exports to Japan since mid 38 have been, have been shut down by the American government, by the Roosevelt government. They're imposing harsher controls on their export of industrial materials to Japan from January 1940. So there's a, there's a pre existing treaty of Commerce and Navigation. The Americans turn that off. So the U.S. pacific Fleet has moved to Pearl harbor in May 1940. And of course it's a long, that's a long way from Japan, long way from the US and what they're trying to do as well is shut down British and American aid to Chiang Kai Shek. Indochina is a Route 3 through that the British and Americans. The Americans are on the side of the Chinese. They're backing them. I mean when we laid it out a moment ago, it doesn't sound dissimilar to a Russian military adventure in Ukraine. Too big, too difficult to actually deliver. It's meant to be over quickly. The Americans are underwriting Chinese resistance and a Nationalist leader is saying no thanks. If we're going to insist on looking for parallels, there's maybe one there. And the Americans are sincere in backing China, aren't they? It's seen as a progressive move, isn't it? Anti imperialist and all this sort of stuff.
- [09:49]
James Holland
Yeah. And they're taking no truck with this invasion of Northern Indo. Indochin either. No, no Indochina, you know, at the end of September, this is, this is seen as a really bad niv. And so the Americans respond by further economic measures and they give a further $50 million to Chiang Kai Shek and his Nationalist government In chunking, they oppose an embargo on scrap metal shipments to Japan, which is really big bad news for Japan because they're dependent on this because they don't have any iron ore themselves.
- [10:23]
Al Murray
Yeah.
- [10:23]
James Holland
And so they are completely reliant on resources coming from overseas. And this is. This is the big problem. But it doesn't really work because instead of Japan thinking, oh, hang on a minute, maybe we need to just sort of rein it in and come to an agreement with the Americans. Yeah. They actually then signed the Tripartite Pack pact with Germany and Italy on the 27th of September. So the sort of day after they concluded their invasion of Northern Indochina.
- [10:54]
Al Murray
Yeah.
- [10:54]
James Holland
And Germany is especially keen to join up with Japan because after the Battle of Britain, Nazi plans are to invade. Britain obviously are undermined. And allying Japan, they're hoping this will deter the US from joining the war. That's the point behind it. So the Germans are mustard keen. And also in the back of his mind, he's thinking about the Soviet Union and Japan, and the Soviet Union and Russia are kind of old enemies. So that's also good. There's also a kind of feeling that entering the kind of fascist alliance will help the sort of global balance of power and very much to kind of Japan's advantage. That's how the Japanese are thinking. It's. And the Foreign Minister, Matsuoka, encourages a very, very quick signing of the pact, and he thinks this is going to help strengthen Japan's negotiation position with the United States. But of course, what's going on here is both the United States and Japan are looking at this increasingly fractious relationship through the prism of their own worldview rather than how their. Their potential enemy sees it. So Japan is looking at it through the kind of. Through the prism of Japan's experience and Japan's worldview. And the United States is thinking, well, money talks. Japan's a kind of, you know, a country that's on the. On the up in terms of population and urbanization, all the rest of it. They need us more than we need them. So let's flex some economic muscle on it. But it's. There's a bigger thing going on with Japan. It's a bit kind of like the US view of Iran. Today, Trump is seeing Iran as just sort of purely transactional. Will get tough, then they'll come, then they'll come to the peace table. But Iran isn't seeing it like that because they're different. And this is the same situation here. So neither side, neither the Japanese or the Americans, are reading the other very well.
- [12:50]
Al Murray
Japan is keenly aware that it's short of material resources. So the, The Americans leaning on that is only. Is Bound to antagonize rather than, rather than, you know, encourage a change of heart. From the Japanese perspective, it's a purely antagonistic move, isn't it? They're in the middle of a war, the Japanese cutting them off from steel. That's aggressive if you're Japanese, isn't it? Yeah, simply put, yeah, the Japanese very much lean into this alliance as a sort of a good thing. You know, they, they, they have postcards with three happy children from the country, three countries, the three are good friends. The fact they've got into bed with the Nazis, you know, we've talked about this an awful lot of the podcast. The Nazis are not good allies. They are never going to deliver on what they say they're going to do for you, and they're going to be saying all sorts of horrible things about you behind your back. Is. This is the simple truth. The Italians are, they're not a busted flush, but they're writing checks they simply cannot cash in terms of their political ambition. And so as alliances go in order to rebalance world power, it's probably not going to deliver. But this is the thing. The Japanese feel antagonized. They feel beset by hostile diplomacy for the Americans. So what else are they going to do? And I think you're absolutely right. There's this thing that no one can see anyone else's point of view at all. But even if the Americans could see it like that, they'd be like, yeah, but you're wrong. You're wrong to be in China. You're wrong to be expanding into China. Like, you've, you've still got that wrong, haven't you? And this is the, this is how you end up at complete loggerheads, diplomatically. They've already sidled up to the, the Germans in 1936 with the anti Comintern pact. But the point of that is that's about containing Soviet ambition, isn't it? So, and now that, yeah, 100%. Now that the Germans have changed their minds about Soviets. After all, there's an attempt by the Japanese to draw Poland and Britain into the anti Comintern pact, which kind of makes sense on paper, doesn't it? You know, we've been. The British are outstandingly hostile to the Soviets in the interwar years. You know, it's, it's a sort of, it's, it's part of our, again, part of our problem of deciding what to do about the Germans is that the Soviets are the sort of the, a considerable fear, aren't they?
- [15:10]
James Holland
They're completely thrown by the Molotov ribbentrop Pact of 23rd of August 1939, which is obviously the kind of, you know, the final diplomatic move that kind of precedes the start of the Second World War with the German invasion of Poland. And this completely froze them because, as you say, Japan is very anti Russia, very anti the Soviet Union. They have their old enemies, they've been at war with them in 1905. You know, it's not good. And so they've got this. They've got this sort of pact with Nazi Germany, who's now made a pact with their enemy. And they're thinking, what the heck.
- [15:45]
Al Murray
Yeah, yeah.
- [15:47]
James Holland
You know, the Japanese prime minister at the time is a chap called Hiran Numa. He resigns at the time over this. Yeah, just says, yeah, I can't come ahead and turn a bit. But he says the European state of affairs is too complicated and bizarre. I mean, he's got a point, hasn't he?
- [16:04]
Al Murray
Okay, well. Well, I mean, you know, the. The consternation that the Molotov ribbon shop pack causes across the world for all people of all political stripes. You know, if you're. If you're a dedicated communist anti fascist in Britain, it absolutely wrecks your breakfast, doesn't it? You know, that news.
- [16:24]
James Holland
Yeah, completely.
- [16:25]
Al Murray
And causes quite a lot of confusion on the. On the sort of. On the edges of the left, in. In Britain, certainly, and all. In fact, all over. All over the world. And anyway, the Japanese are fighting the Soviets in late 1939, you know that they're having a real problem with them in Manchuria, Mongolia, aren't they? There's proper fighting, proper military encount, hunters squaring those circles like, as you say, poor old Hironuma doing my head. And I'm out of here.
- [16:54]
James Holland
I'm done. I'm done.
- [16:55]
Al Murray
But this confusion in foreign policy is really a reflection of the confusion in inside Japan. Isn't it in itself that domestically they're all over the. They're all over the shop, aren't they?
- [17:05]
James Holland
Yes, well, they start the 1930s as a democracy, but. But the end, 1930s very much is not a democracy. You know, there's a new prime minister and that's Konoa and Konoha. He introduced a centralization program which is known as the new structure, which effectively ends party politics. And Joseph Grew, who is the US ambassador to Japan, writes to Roosevelt in December 1940 and he says, no doubt you have seen some of my telegrams which have tried to paint the picture as clearly as have been possible at this post where we have to fumble and grope for accurate information simply because among the Japanese themselves, the right hand often doesn't know what the left hand is doing. Their so called new structure is an awful mess. And the bickering and controversy that go on within the government itself, a past belief, every new totalitarian step is clothed in some righteous sounding slogan. This indeed is not the Japan that we have known and loved. And don't forget, everyone is reeling from the after effects of the Great Depression. You know, this is what's prompted this. As we've said before and as we will unquestionably say again when we get onto our next series, you know, economic strife causes political strife. And that is exactly what has been happening here in Japan as they flail around trying to find solutions to the economic pickle they find themselves in.
- [18:35]
Al Murray
Yeah.
- [18:36]
James Holland
And try and wiggle their way out of it.
- [18:39]
Al Murray
Well, and the gap between their ambitions and their, and their capabilities is the, is the, it's always the, you know, this is what it always comes down to, doesn't it? It's that, is that with a, with a standard of living, you know, falling standard, living standards sort of in. You've got that problem and then you're, you know, wars are expensive. They've engaged in a war in, in continental Asia in an attempt to correct that problem and it hasn't worked. Wars cost money and you've got full extended.
- [19:06]
James Holland
It's worse.
- [19:07]
Al Murray
Yeah, you made it, you made it worse. You've compounded the problem.
- [19:09]
James Holland
You've made it worse because, because, because it's costing you money, but it's also costing you in terms of your relationship with the United States. You were providing you with all number of supplies. Yeah. So actually you've just got yourself into a massive spiral.
- [19:21]
Al Murray
If you've got a major foreign partner or adversary or competitor, you might end up blaming them. A government that's made some wonky decisions might end up pointing the finger at outside parties. Right. And, and I think it's, it's, it's quite interesting, isn't it? Konoe doesn't want Japan to go to war. He knows, he knows they can't go to war with the US and in, and in that sense he's a dove. But he's not prepared to actually pull enough levers to prevent it from, prevent the slide from happening, is he? Is it? Because, because the, you know, the war with China, they're locked in this war with China. They can't extricate themselves from it, they
- [19:58]
James Holland
don't even call it a war with China. It's so reminiscent of Ukraine.
- [20:02]
Al Murray
Yeah.
- [20:02]
James Holland
Because they call it the China incident, which is sort of a bit like, you know, a military operation in, in the Donbas. I mean, it's, it's, it's smoke and mirrors and euphemism, isn't it?
- [20:12]
Al Murray
Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. And, and, and what kind of a limit of his ability really is. He can't manage the militarists who are sort of very much have been in the ascendance. And, you know, Japan, Japan goes through this awful sort of period where basically that the army and the navy crank down on government and you have a series of sort of coups and risings and shootings and all this sort of stuff where the military, if they don't get what they want, stamp their feet, have a tantrum and get what they demand. And, you know, I think it's worth going, as you said at the start, it's worth going back to the sort of, the sort of unsteady foundations that this, that the Japanese state has been built on post the Meiji Revolution of 1868. So because you've got, you know, you've got ultra nationalistic, expansionist militarism in charge, which. How do you end up there?
- [21:06]
James Holland
Well, yes, because it wasn't there a decade earlier. That's the point.
- [21:09]
Al Murray
Exactly, exactly.
- [21:10]
James Holland
You know, end of the 1920s, started the 1930s, before the wall Street Crash, before the Great Depression. There's none of this in Japan. And what is, you know, what you discover over and over again in the kind of history of autocracy is that autocrats and autocratic regimes always draw upon the past in a kind of form of warped nostalgia.
- [21:37]
Al Murray
Yeah.
- [21:38]
James Holland
I mean, look at Putin and the whole Great patriotic war thing, etc. Etc. I mean, the Nazis are doing exactly the same thing. They're harking back to the 19th century militarism and Prussian militarism and, you know, all of that. It's all, you know, they've still got an eagle. It's just the heads facing a different way, but it's the same eagle as the Imperial Eagle, etc. Etc. So they're kind of tapping into all of that. Yeah. And Japan is doing the same. Because actually, what's really interesting is the old ancient shogunate, which is where you have these sort of aristocratic elites kind of sort of running the show. You do have a figurehead, but it's just a figurehead rather than that are sort of single government yeah, the meiji Revolution of 1868 changes that. The shogunate are out. And in place of old notions of samurai honor and all the rest of it has come this single emperor. Rapid urbanization and a dramatic lurch to modernity, which I suppose in many ways sort of manifests itself first in the war against Russia in 1905, which the Japanese win, you know, against the odds, no one expecting this. And in the First World War, Japan has actually sided with the Allies and has aspired to become a kind of economic powerhouse in the Asia Pacific region. But they're sort of slightly humiliated by the Treaty of Versailles. That follows that they're not, you know, they're not part of the big four discussions, that they're sidelined in terms of what they want and their views, and it feels like a poor reward for their support. That's sort of okay until there's economic disaster, which is what happens at the end of the 1920s, of course, and humiliation, catastrophic global economic depression. That sort of twin factor, and a sort of growing sense that, look, hey, we're on the world stage now. We should be taken more seriously. And by the way, this is our sphere of influence. Why is. Why is it the white Westerners are dominating Southeast Asia? Why isn't it us? We're the top dogs around here now. And that sends them into a. Into. Into a kind of, you know, different route, which is more aggressive, more racist. Yeah, more militaristic.
- [23:55]
Al Murray
You know, their reaction to the racism they're on the receiving end of is to more racist position themselves. It just shows no good can come of it. No good can come of racism. We haven't gone suddenly woke on this podcast, by the way, just to let you all know that, but it just shows no good can come of it because their reaction to being treated as. Treated as Asian inferiors is to bury themselves in racist ideas and about. About their position over other Asians as much as their reaction to white people, you know, turbocharges their feeling that they're the. They're the superior people in. In Asia. Superior to Chinese people. Chinese people are basically theirs to do with what they choose. Because again, this reaction in all this isn't there. You know, it's a reactionary movement because they've tried to move on from samurai honor codes in the major revolution, and they return to them in a sort of new shiny version, I think, you know, sort of modernized version. So you have a Bushido code that is about casting shame on people. I think it's really interesting that that's the, that's the sort of the, the lever, isn't it? Is use shame as leverage.
- [25:03]
James Holland
Well, the interesting thing that the Bushido code is only written down in the 1890s after Bushido cage has been kicked into long grass. It's a kind of, I think it comes out in 1899 in a, in a book which is written for Western consumption. But, but the idea that this is something that is the Bushido code is something that's been kind of around for centuries and is absolutely kind of woven into the kind of samurai DNA is not really true. There are absolutely honor codes within the samurai.
- [25:33]
Al Murray
Yeah.
- [25:34]
James Holland
And the term Bushido code is something that is, you know, someone in the 17th century might know about, but they might also know about a completely different code of honor which is called something completely different. The Bushido code has been completely hijacked.
- [25:48]
Al Murray
Yeah.
- [25:48]
James Holland
And the version that comes to mean so much in the 1930s, in the late 1930s, is something which is being purpose built purely for this ultra nationalistic, ultra militaristic new form of, of, of Japanese government. And it's not something that, that was there before. It teaches racial superiority and the brutality and strict obedience are very much part and parcel of national strength. So brutalizing recruits in all the armed services turns, of course, turns Japanese troops into automatons. And they also become inured to extreme violence. And they're also taught that death is inevitable, the dying for your emperor is a singular honor. And so what they've got is the start of a deaf cult. And also this is where you suddenly see officers suddenly wearing traditional samurai swords and all the rest of it, and it becomes de riga, de rigueur. Physical and mental weakness are not to be tolerated. And what China has shown, you know, and I'm thinking particularly about the rape of Nanking, but frankly, you can think of any town, city, village in China where the Japanese have shown complete contempt for human life is. It's turning decent men into monsters who are very willing to embrace deep cruelty, violence and self sacrifices as a very warped badge of honor.
- [27:15]
Al Murray
Yeah.
- [27:16]
James Holland
And it was interesting because I was talking to my brother Tom about this and he was just going, yeah, but you're looking that through the Western Christian prison. And I would dispute that because there's nothing in Shintoism or Buddhism that says you've got to go around sort of decapitating people and stabbing people and being, being unspeakably cruel. That's not part of it at all.
- [27:34]
Al Murray
Quite the opposite, in fact. I mean, yeah, it is new. It's that thing of. There's a whole load of people who want to be, who want to be brutal and want to be violent and they, they find an ideology that they could put on as clothes and use to use to get their way, essentially add some racism and, and you're away. The China war or the, you know, whatever we're going to call it, because it's not a war. The China incident, I mean, that starts with the Marco Polo bridge incident. I think what's interesting about it, you know, the timing is very interesting from a European perspective. If you're a British government who is looking east actually, because you're considering spending money on Singapore and reinforcing the empire and keeping the sinews of empire alive and open. It's a big, it's a big suddenly on your desk if you're at the Foreign Office. Oh, crap. You know, things are kicking off in a theater that we, we, we're just getting ourselves, our heads together what to do about the Germans. And suddenly there's another problem. And I mean, I remember back in a tutorial a very long time ago when I was doing, you know, origins of the Second World War stuff, our tutor, when we were reading the Cabinet papers, going on, what happens the following day? You know, we were doing the 6th of July, 1937, cabinet meeting, whatever he says, what happens the following day? And we were like, oh, gosh, well, I'm. I don't know, right. And it's this. And I think what is amazing about this is, you know, no one really knows what happens. Is it a false flag incident? Is it just some horrendous cock up? But what it is is it's an opportunity that the Japanese grab with both hands and try to make the, make full capital out of. Almost like the Reichstag fire, you know, whichever way round it, whichever way round the event happened, it doesn't matter. What matters is the way they treat it as an opportunity. There's a soldier who's gone missing, but he's gone to the loo. I mean, it's just got full chaotic energy in it.
- [29:33]
James Holland
But what is really interesting about it is that there is an opportun. Very quickly it is recognized by the Japanese government and by Prime Minister Kanoa that actually this needs to be kind of pulled back from the brink on this very, very quickly. So truce plan is drawn up. But Konoha still thinks, well, yeah, but I better send some truce. I've got to show tough. I've got to show I'm tough to the military hardliners in the government in Tokyo. But in doing so he's effectively signaling the start of the war, which is exactly what happens. Yeah, and he then drums up public support. So yeah, lots of strong patriotic speeches to galvanize Japanese nationalism, etc. And you know, it's just sort of no, pull back, don't do it, don't let yourself go down this route. But they do and they're still convinced that this is going to be a short easy war that's going to bring them lots of riches and cost them very little and, and how wrong they are.
- [30:33]
Al Murray
Yeah, I mean he essentially can't control the military. That's the, that's his, he's, that's his problem, you know, for all, for all. He might want to avoid a war. They're going to have one. Thanks very much. And, and they run out, they run out of his control. He's trying to ride, ride a tiger, isn't he? His management of the wars, as it becomes more intense, he basically can't, you know, it can't manage. It can, it becomes more self destructive.
- [30:57]
James Holland
Can't contain the military, it can't, you can't handle them.
- [30:59]
Al Murray
And they're just going to do what they damn well want is the truth. And I think it's quite interesting. It's, it's, it's in contrast with Germany where Hitler basically gets, gets the army on side by, by giving them what they want in the form of rearmament and then neuters them, doesn't he? Where, where essentially he decapitates the army and brings it into his control. Conway has no chance of doing that. Cannot do that because of this, you know, overheated militarism, this racism, this, this sort of the elevation of violence as, as a, as an aim in itself almost, you know, as you touched on it earlier, the, the Nanjing Massacre, mass rape and murder of Chinese civilians and pdubs, which is still controversial to this day. Conaway knows he can't bring the military under control so he basically says it's the Chinese's fault, implies that the Japanese are forced into it by Chinese aggression. It's a response. The byproduct is people start to think less of the Japanese and also it resolves the Chinese to defending themselves and their allies to defending themselves like for instance, the Americans. It's this sort of imperfect circle, isn't it, for them?
- [32:10]
James Holland
Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, absolutely. And of course the problem is is that everyone, you know what happens in China is broadcast around the world. And while there is, you know, not as much interest in the west, in what's going on in China as there might be something going on in Europe. Nonetheless, it is still pretty shocking because of the scale of the violence and the horrors. And that's very, very, very bad PR for the Japanese. And Kano is sort of interesting because, you know, he is an authoritarian, he is an autocrat. You know, he grows up suspicious of liberal internationalism. He finds the west preachy about equality and common humanity. Yeah. So they've got. There's reasons why the Japanese would be feeling aggrieved. You know, they're now a modern nation, they're an urban nation, they're rapidly modernizing, and yet the rest of the Western world doesn't seem to be catching up with this and doesn't seem to be treating them with the kind of respect and equality that they feel is owed. And, you know, Kanoa is very mindful of the rejection and the Versailles Treaty in 1919 of the Racial equality proposal which they put forward. And, you know, it sticks in their gullet. And Canoa once writes a polemical article that these Western countries welcome white immigrants but persecute yellow ones, including, of course, U.S. japanese. This fact is nothing new and remains a persistent source of our anger and frustration. And you can feel it. It's obviously very, very raw. But I would suggest that his approach to this is, you know, if you want to win people over, win people over by sophistication, civilization, and by subtle diplomacy. Don't do it by butchering lots of Chinese and raping them in Nanking.
- [34:00]
Al Murray
Although he's an authoritarian, Konoe is a man of the world. He's a sophisticated fellow. And, you know, Eric Otter, who we had on the podcast a very long time ago, says it's truly ironic that Japan, under a man who'd always despised Anglo American racism, would ally himself with the most fanatically racist of all European regimes, Nazi Germany. But, you know, in these circumstances, ironies tend to abound. We're going to take a very quick break, and then we're going to come back and look at the Kunai's attempt to bring about a new East Asian order. We'll see you in a tick.
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Al Murray
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Al Murray
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Al Murray
and participate in McDonald's while supplies last. Welcome back to. We have ways to make you talk. In 1938, the. The Japanese premier, Conway, he decides that he's going to create a new East Asian order, very much in the sort of image of Hitler Mussolini's new European order. And he's trying, basically trying to come up with an ideological foundation to the war in China, sort of reverse engineer one. And obviously because things are tough at home, things are difficult expressing that is difficult abroad. But he's trying to, like, harmonize domestic and foreign policy. So there's a national mobilization law which takes effect in April of 1938. So he puts Japan into a state of national emergency and begins to switch Japan to a total war economy, which goes back to our original point that, you know, 1941, Japan's entry into the war against the Western powers. This is. They're. Well, they're long into their war. You know, they've been at war a long, long time. The Japanese, in effect, they take resources from the market to the state. They place state control across the board in professional economic and social endeavors. And it's tough for Japanese people ongoing. Kono's problem is he's got to try and get the military under control or at least try and influence them. But I think what's very interesting is at the conferences, joint conferences, between military and government figures, the civilians are outnumbered. This is the thing that persists then through the war. So, you know, you'd have a. At a joint conference that Conway initiates In November of 37, you've got the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister. Right. Two civilians. And then you have the Army Minister, the Navy Minister, the chiefs of army and the Navy General staffs. Immediately. He's off balance, isn't he? And if you're caught in a nationalist and militaristic mood and engaged in a war, they're gonna have the fact there's more of them, they're gonna have more clout, aren't they, the military people?
- [38:09]
James Holland
Yes.
- [38:09]
Al Murray
I mean, the thing is, this all seems obvious, but these are the problems they're grappling with or the set of circumstances under which they're making their decisions.
- [38:17]
James Holland
Yeah. And the military is now run by these ultra nationalists, ultra militaristic, who are kind of enjoying their own taste of power, don't want to let go and. But they're not men. They don't have the same scale of worldliness and they don't have that geopolitical understanding. They don't, you know, that they're military figures, they're not diplomats. And for them, there's one language, and that's the language of the sword and the bullet and the warship and the warplane. And this is very bad news because they're steering the politicians down a direction, down a route that they can't afford is the truth of it. And you can see this sort of. This spiral is starting to. Just starting to get a little bit out of hand.
- [39:08]
Al Murray
The point is, as we've been saying, Connor has not been able to control the military. They've been getting their way, and the first big thing for them is the invasion of Manchuria in September 1931. And this is a false flag operation. Absolute classic of. Classic of the genre. Small bomb goes off, staged by the Japanese. They blame the Chinese and in they go. It's their fault. We're simply responding to aggression from the Chinese rather than just trading with people. They want an empire and they're worried about Soviets on their northern flank, essentially. And the general who's leading this invasion, Ishiawara, he believes that there's inevitably an east and west clash coming that will deliver Japan to its heroic, powerful destiny.
- [39:54]
James Holland
I mean, it's just. It's just, just. It's just, what is it with these people and sort of powerful destiny and the will and the triumph of the will and all the rest of it? I mean, it's, it's so sort of resonant of. Of hilarion rhetoric, isn't it? It's just. Yeah, it's absolutely bonkers.
- [40:08]
Al Murray
The army and the navy, they're driving this. So the government at the time is led by Wakatsuki. He has to give in. And the military are running their own propaganda, they're running their own journalism. And, and they, they're controlling the fact that it's. It's well known within journalism that this is a. This is a false flag, but they're not. It's not escaping. The strongest tell of that is there's a picture of a Chinese soldier's dead body. The papers are told to say that it's. He's the guy who's responsible for the body, but actually he's been killed by the Japanese and placed near the bombing site deliberately. It's reminiscent of. Of the start of the second of the war in Poland, in fact, with the Klaiwitz radio station. This exact thing of faking. Faking aggression, faking enemy action. And so Wakatsuki caves. There's public pressure because of this journalism. And the invasion goes ahead, he resigns. And there's this new state created by the Japanese army called Manchuko, which.
- [41:11]
James Holland
The former. The last emperor is, is the. Is the ruler, isn't it? Last emperor of China.
- [41:15]
Al Murray
That's right, exactly. And, and the, the Americans then issue a doctrine and you know, the Americans are getting serious when they issue a doctrine. The Stimson Doctrine.
- [41:25]
James Holland
Yes. What's his offer? Henry Stimson, who's a great diplomat and
- [41:28]
Al Murray
politician, major power play in Washington. And, and the Stimson doctrine is the non recognition of states created through a war of aggression is a direct response. You know, it's the classic, one of those laws that you, you end up. Or doctrines, you end up writing after someone's done something naughty, isn't it? It's.
- [41:44]
James Holland
Yes.
- [41:45]
Al Murray
Why? Essentially, when you come to 1937, six years later, this has all been bubbling under, fomenting and fermenting and becoming an irresistible force in the Japanese body politic. You've got jingoistic nationalism, the imperative of Japan needing to take on a world order that's ascent, that's tilted against it as well as, as well as a racist ideology that believes in that sphere of influence.
- [42:14]
James Holland
It's also bound up in this complete clap trap about kind of sort of, you know, it is our destiny to be the, you know, the dominant nation here in Southeast Asia and Austria of influence. You know, it is you know, it is our right and our duty to go into Japan, into China and dominate it and all the rest of it. And yeah, you know, you can convince yourself anything, can't you? But the truth of the matter is, is this is about resources. This is about bubbling resentment of being slighted by the West. This is about wanting to be taken seriously. You know, hang on a minute. You look down your noses, us. But look at us now. We've got China. We're about to get an even bigger emperor empire in Southeast Asia. And, you know, French ande Chin, you know, look out because we're coming. That's one part of it. And the other part of it is the practical part of it, which is if we control that country, then we control their resources, which we can use ourselves for our own burgeoning urbanization or restaurant modernity, blah, blah, blah. So it's the two things going on. The military is not very well trained. It's run amok in China, which is incredibly counterproductive diplomatically and pragmatically. That doesn't work because all that does is produce international condemnation and prompt the Chinese to dig in even further. It just doesn't work. And, and so they got themselves into a terrible position by the back end of 1940, entirely of their own making. No matter how justified their resentments, their bubbling resentment might be.
- [43:44]
Al Murray
The political problem is how do you control men of violence like this?
- [43:48]
James Holland
If you're a.
- [43:48]
Al Murray
If you're a politician and you cross these people, the chances are you might end up meeting a sticky end. Right? So there's. There's essentially threat built into the Japanese political system, isn't there? As much as anything else, if you're a politician, you give the army. You think the way to think the way to get the army on side is to give them what they want. But the problem is, is they want more. Right. And that there is in the end, no limit to what the Japanese military want, is there? That's the, that's the core problem.
- [44:19]
James Holland
Yes. And actually the media revolution was, was a sort of rejection of societal military militarism anyway. And so this urbanization is all about industry. It's all about living peacefully. It's creating this prosperous world in which we can live and embrace modernity. But then suddenly there is this kind of threat emerging at the end of the 1920s that actually we still got Russia we got to deal with, and we need to actually mobilize a few more men. So there's this sort of incremental change in Japanese society, which Starts with the military Service Law of 1927. So army draftees serve two years of active duty and then are in the reserves for 15 years. I mean, to be fair, that's not very different from France. Navy draftees serves three years and then is in the reserves for nine years. But in the early 1930s, men are absolutely desperate to avoid service. There is no culture of militarism now in Japan at all. You know, and you have people drinking super sized bottles of soy sauce before a physical to induce temporary liver or heart failure, or using laxatives to try losing enough weight to be ineligible for service. And you know, there's an example of this Kichijiro Ushiotsu, who's drafted into the army as late as August 1937. He's age 31, he's a shop owner from Kyoto, has never even heard a gunshot prior to his enrollment. And he sees terrible things while he's on duty in China. Decomposing bodies of Chinese soldiers surrounded by thousands of flies. Twelve year old Chinese girl who tries to sell herself to him. I mean, he's absolutely poor by this. A Chinese woman stumbling out of her house to escape a shootout, having just given birth to a baby she shot and killed by a stray bullet whilst holding her newborn still attached to her by the umbilical cord. I mean, can you think of anything more horrific? And mountains of Chinese bodies piled up as he enters Nanjing and some are completely flattened by stampedes as those alive are fleeing the city in terror. All of this he witnesses firsthand. And at one point he bumps into his 36 year old brother who'd recently been drafted himself. And the fact that the military is enrolling men of that age is a sign that the war is going significantly worse than the government of course is letting on. And yet the government just doubles down on this. Its response to this is to make itself more militaristic, devote more of the economy to defence, to recruit ever more people and to train them with this scale of brutality which adopts this kind of very ultra nationalistic warped Bushido code nonsense which is turning them all into a pot of a death cult. And that's the tragedy of it all.
- [47:16]
Al Murray
What there isn't is the prospect of the war in China. There's no conclusion on offer, is there? That's the problem. It's too big. They polarized the Chinese into the, you know, actually into rival resistance factions because with the Communist Party of China as well, I mean, it's quite interesting that there's a sort of a push for Japanese cultural confidence facing the rest of the world.
- [47:38]
James Holland
But it's a mask, isn't it?
- [47:40]
Al Murray
Yeah, exactly. That's exactly what's right out of my mouth. Lurking in the background is the truth about Japan, which is the war in and the, its government's intentions, which is the war in China. And you know, you have things like a Japanese architect, Sakakura Junzo, who wins a top prize for his pavilion at the 1937 Paris Exposition. But this is sort of window dressing, isn't it? You know, Tokyo holds the World Federation of education association conference, 48 different countries represented. And then there's a, an aircraft called the Kamikaze. The idea is it's going to fly to George to celebrate George VI's coronation, visit various European capitals.
- [48:18]
James Holland
Well, don't forget what Kamikaze means. It means divine wind. It means divine wind. It doesn't mean suicide bomber, not yet. It's like calling your ship, I don't know, Titanic. Right. It's like a tween name for a yacht or something. Kamikaze. Divine Wind is a name for a, for an aircraft, you know, which is, which is a new two seater which takes off from Tokyo. And this is all part, you know, part of their effort to celebrate George VI's coronation and visit other various European capitals. It's a PR stunt.
- [48:49]
Al Murray
Yeah, it's a PR stunt that's embraced by the Japanese population. Interestingly, it's a plane built by Mitsubishi for military reconnaissance, but it's purely Japanese made because as we said earlier on, you know, they're under pressure from the Americans trade wise. And it gets to Croydon, doesn't it? Flies to Croydon, having flown across the
- [49:10]
James Holland
world from Tokyo to London in 51 hours. Amazing.
- [49:13]
Al Murray
And you know, the British crowds greet the, greet the plane with cries of Banzai. And again, here are words that have changed their meaning. You know, we. That means live forever. It doesn't mean I'm coming charging at you with the hundred of my pals and we're going to kill you with
- [49:29]
James Holland
a sword now I'm waiting to be shot. Yeah, yeah.
- [49:32]
Al Murray
It doesn't mean that yet. And the, you know, the big idea that is that the, you know, it's to foster an atmosphere of peace and cordiality in the midst of the storms and thunders which rage over international relations today and threaten the world peace of tomorrow. But given what they're doing in China, it's not particularly credible, is it? If you're, if you've got an eye on things. No Conaway throws in the towel doesn't he? In January of 1939. Because reconciling all of these different tensions is difficult. But then basically he's back in office six months later in July of 1940 and no one in the meantime has been able to fix these intractable problems for Japan. And the newspapers are also doing that thing that newspapers inevitably do in time, time of war in not just in autocracies but in, but in democracies as well, saying it's going a lot better than it is, that you know, that's what, that's what newspapers do, don't they? They have to say it's going well.
- [50:31]
James Holland
But while things aren't going very well for the Japanese in, in China there's a European war has broken out and that sort of changes everything because some of the nations who are colonial masters in Japan's sphere of influence, or what it believes it should be a sphere of influence are now in big trouble. Of course, you know the Netherlands. Yeah, yeah. You know the Dutch East Indies and all the rest of it. This is Sarawak etc. Like that and Java. So Dutch possessions but the Dutch have been swallowed whole by, by Nazi Germany.
- [51:04]
Al Murray
Yeah.
- [51:04]
James Holland
France, okay. Indochina, that's now under Nazi occupation. Britain has retreated from Dunkirk. His armies, you know, tail between the legs and all the rest of it. That potentially makes these colonial territories and east and Southeast Asia considerably more vulnerable or less a threat to Japan. I mean, you know, maybe that's their easy pickings is what Japan is thinking and maybe they can then exploit the resources in these areas. After all, Burma, which is part of now, Myanmar, which is part of the British Empire is rich in oil, very useful for, for the Japanese and rubber, extremely useful for the Japanese. Timber of course, and all sorts of things. So.
- [51:50]
Al Murray
And right. And rice as well. So basically everything you might possibly need if you want to be a self respecting empire.
- [51:57]
James Holland
Yes. And if you're Japan, you're looking on those events in Europe thinking, well, Hitler's got this one, you know, Nazi Germany is going to win.
- [52:04]
Al Murray
Yeah.
- [52:04]
James Holland
And if it does win, then Germany isn't going to be backing Chiang Kai Shek anymore because nor will the Western Allies because that ship has sailed. So then Chiang Kai Shek will have to surrender and negotiate for peace. So therefore suddenly a friendship with the guys that seem to be winning at the moment, that is Nazi Germany, seems like a very attractive proposition if Japan is going to play a role in China's future and secure its territory territorial gains as quickly and easily as possible.
- [52:36]
Al Murray
So that's the foreign outlook that's the foreign policy. And then domestic policy is. We're into boiled frog territory here, aren't we? Basically as the, as the, as the temperature goes up on the Japanese population. So there's the Imperial Rule Assistance association formed in October 1940, which is basically these sort of fascistic ideas for a new order. This is all ghastly stuff, isn't it? They have a. Eugenicist principles about reproduction. The ideal woman was sturdy, big boned with wide hips so she can have more strong children. You've got, you know, neighborhood associations so that you've got grassroots mobilization under, under control, grouping households together, giving them job, patriotic duties to do. And obviously they start, they get everyone spying on each other, so mutual surveillance. So you've special high police informants everywhere. I think it's this interesting thing that, you know, nowadays we think of right wing people as wanting small government, right? But what you have here is a very, very right wing government that's expanding the state and getting the state to encroach into people's lives in all sorts of ways that previously were not its territory at all. You've got compliance, obedience backed up with punishment for, for anything subversive, becoming the sort of the dynamic of the relationship between the citizen and the state here, which is just all, you know, desperate stuff, isn't it?
- [54:02]
James Holland
Yeah, yeah. And it's a classic thing of the descent into autocracy, isn't it, where, you know, little by little you're more by more you're chipping away at personal freedoms. Kind of course what that means is during this transitional phase, you still got people who are outspoken about it and are complaining about it. And although the signing of the Tripartite Pact is spearheaded by Konoa, you know, there are people who are very unhappy about this and you know, not least Viscount Ishii Kikujiro, who's still part of the Emperor's council and former ambassador to the usa. And Ishii reminds statesmen that Bismarck once said, alliances require a donkey and a rider and Germany should always strive to be a rider. He also warns that Italy is not to be trusted because the country begot Machiavelli. But Canoa's mind is made up and he declares it is necessary to act defiantly with the United States so that it would not underestimate Japan. But if the worst case scenario happens, my government are resolved to deal with it. In other words, talking tough, acting tough is the way you deal with the United States. You don't, you don't show any sign of Weakness, you don't kowtow, you know, Whereas the way the Americans are looking at this is what we need to do is exert some pressure so that they kowtow.
- [55:25]
Al Murray
Yeah.
- [55:26]
James Holland
And all that is doing is prompting the Japanese government to just dig in their heels.
- [55:31]
Al Murray
And you've pressure from the army and the Navy, who are mad for it basically, as well as both parts being enthusiastic for war and in different spheres as well, which we'll come to eventually. They're competing. They're competing for money, glory, prestige, power, action, as well as the foreign outlook. There's the domestic problem. There's the domestic problem, and then the domestic military problem. So there's a lot for any Japanese premier to contend with. The Foreign Ministry is also generating pressure. It's either pro German or pro Anglo American in its faction. So kind of pro peace if you want. Lots of those diplomats have been given the flick, have been fired for having that position. And you have a pro axis Italian ambassador who's now central to the Foreign Ministry work as an advisor. So basically the restraining voices are being phased out of the decision making and policy making processes.
- [56:31]
James Holland
And I think in sort of recognizing this, recognizing this, the Americans are, you know, they're coming up with something which they call the draft understanding, which is an olive branch, isn't it? Of kind. And this is proposed in mid April 1941. It includes commitments for the United States to recognize Manchuku, normalize trade relations again, and for Japan to withdraw troops from China, plus guarantee China's independence. So there's a bit of, there's a bit of push me pull you there. Isn't that because there's sort of. Yeah, okay, well, we'll concede this point, and we'll concede this point. We'll get you back on track on the trade front, but you have to knock it on the head with, with China. And this is drawn up between. Is an American initiative, but it's also drawn up by not your front line of Japanese in the, you know, government officials or diplomats, you know, it's people who are looking upon the United States in friendly terms, who have relationships with, you know, who understand the United States who've been there and all the rest of it. These are the people who are working with the Americans on this. And the initiative is launched by Bishop James Walsh and Father James Drau, both American Catholic priests from a foreign mission society in upstate New York. And they've traveled to Japan the previous November and they've stayed for a month and they've met various political, military and Business figures. And they are urging both sides, both in Japan and in the United States, for kind of better US Japanese relationships. But there is a feeling that this is a sort of slightly amateur effort and it's not really coming from the top on both sides, whether it be the United States or Japan. And when Tokyo receives a telegram informing them of this proposal, most of the leaders are really delighted that the US is extending out this olive branch like this, because it does seem like there is a potential to get back on track. There's a fly very much in the ointment, isn't there? And that is Yazuki Matsuoka, who is largely forgotten today, I think it's fair to say. But he's massive figure in Japan's road to war. In fact, he's possibly the most consequential Japanese politician of all, isn't he, in this dissent?
- [58:58]
Al Murray
He's one of these people who's completely consequential. Changes the course of history here, for want of a better way of putting it, because this is the course of history we're talking about. But I think what's amazing about him is he grew up, spent a lot of his childhood on the west coast of America. He understands the America. He understands America. He's a businessman, a politician, sort of mercurial figure, isn't he? And bound up with a gigantic ego. Right. One of those people who you think, oh, good God, you know, like, if only he weren't involved in this, that you're in with a chance of, you know, of say the draft understanding working. And he's been to see that. He's been and signed a neutrality pact with the Soviet Union. And there's a non aggression pact already in place after the Soviets defeat the Japanese in late 1939 at Khokhinka. The Japanese know they, whatever they do, they got to keep the Soviets off their back. He's a big drinker, he's a big character. He says of the deal he's done with the Soviets. To shake hands with Germany is a temporary excuse to shake hands with the Soviet Union. But that handshaking with the Soviet Union is also nothing more than an excuse to shake hands with the United States. Well, fine, great.
- [60:09]
James Holland
I mean, I've got my view and I'm sticking to it.
- [60:12]
Al Murray
Yeah, exactly, exactly.
- [60:15]
James Holland
Because that's a, that's a line that sounds clever and wise, but actually isn't. Because it's just nonsense.
- [60:20]
Al Murray
Exactly. It's just junk, isn't it? And it's sort of. Well, it works rhetorically, but it has no content.
- [60:26]
James Holland
Well, the bottom line is, because of this, this, this deal he's done with the. This non. This neutrality pact, this non aggression pact with the Soviet Union in April 1941, he now thinks, okay, I've got Russia off our hands. Now we can turn back and deal with the United States and we can start bossing it around a little bit more, basically.
- [60:45]
Al Murray
And he's made his name as a politician with the Manchurian invasion, where basically he. Again, he's catalytic. He doesn't push for it, but he welcomes it. And then in February 1933, he's the Japanese delegate at the League of Nations when they announced their withdrawing. So that's the beginning of the. Of the fraying of. Of the power of the League of Nations. Then, of course, it's majorly consequential in Europe. He does that because the Leagues voted emphatically that the Japanese should leave Manchuria. Yeah, exactly. They've got to quit, Manchoka. They're not going to. So he announces the country's withdrawal. Withdrawal. Despite supposedly personally disagreeing with the decision, he says this incredible things and he says, read your history. We recovered Manchur from Russia. We made it what it is today. Japan has been and will always be the mainstay of peace, order and progress in the Far East. That's it for the League of Nations, really. That's the beginning of the end. And, you know, everyone's booing him. There's a bit of booing, there's a bit of applause, but it makes him a star in Japan, in the. In the business of foreign affairs. And this draft understanding is on the table and they just need to run it past this entirely stable, rational, not egotistical player who isn't determined to make a name for himself and who doesn't care whether that pitches Japan into a worse situation than it's already in. And in our next episode, we will find out what happens when Matsuoko returns from his European journey and claps eyes on the draft understanding from the amateur diplomats in the us it's an opportunity for dialogue. Will he take it?
- [62:28]
James Holland
Spoiler alert. Doesn't go entirely as planned. No, no, but remember that name, people. Yazuka Matsuoka. I mean, crikey.
- [62:39]
Al Murray
Exactly. Fingerprints on everything. We will see you in our next episode. If you want to listen to this without adverts, the next episode, go to our Patreon. Become a subscriber. If we have ways of making you Talk Patreon, there's 10,000 subscribers, people there waiting for you to join them or go to our Apple Channel and become officer class at Apple. But you get more out the Patreon. I'll be honest with you. You get live casts, you get all sorts of other content, and we look forward to seeing you for our next episode. Thanks for listening. Cheerio.
- [63:15]
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Al Murray
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Podcast Sponsor/Ad Voice
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