← WW2 Pod: We Have Ways of Making You Talk
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- [00:02]
Al Murray
Thank you for listening to we have ways of making you talk. Sign up to our Patreon to receive bonus content, live streams and our weekly newsletter with money off books and museum visits as well. Plus early access to all live show tickets. That's patreon.com we haveways.
- [00:26]
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- [02:30]
James Holland
Onagano was the master of speaking out of both sides of his mouth. All of Japan's leaders did it to a certain extent, switching effortlessly between public and private Personas without feeling dishonest. Moreover, such a habit of double talking encapsulated by the phrase true voice and facade had a tendency to be regarded as a virtue used to stave off embarrassing social situations. The liaison conferences were becoming a tragic farce of keeping up appearances for appearances sake. In the face of such misplaced priorities, the fate of the Japanese nation was secondary. And that, of course, was Eri Hotter, that brilliant historian writing in Japan, 1941 Countdown to Infamy, which is a superb book, it has to be said.
- [03:19]
Al Murray
Yes, and one which we've, I think, plundered richly for this series. Welcome to We Have Ways of Making youg Talk with Me, Al Murray and James Holland and our Road to Japan's War. We've been looking at the. The diplomatic twists and turns of the Japanese government's almost inexorable drift into its war with America and with the Western Allies. Because after all, don't forget, they are many, many years into a war in China, on the continent. Their continental ambitions are not playing out the way they want to. The Americans have made it clear they don't like the way Japan's carrying on. Japan has made it quite clear that they don't care for what America thinks. And in our last episode, we reached the point where that Roosevelt government actually, and we characterized it in the last episode as appeasement, attempts to appease the Japanese government by saying, you can have what you do what you like on the continent, in China, but going into Indochina is going too far and we're not keen on you doing that. And the Japanese government boldly ignoring that and rejecting it, not taking the American position seriously and not taking the American concessions seriously either, which I think is the sort of how far they've got themselves into this, talking out of both sides of their mouths, as Erry Hotter describes it. So we find ourselves in the late, in the midwell, the high summer of 1941, at the end of July, with a situation that, from a Japanese perspective, they don't think it's unraveling. They think they're getting what they want. But from an American perspective, things are now beginning to unravel and take the Americans, you know, closer to a situation which could well lead to war, though. You know, the Japanese say they want war and then they say they don't want war. And the Americans definitely don't want war.
- [05:08]
James Holland
And they're definitely talking out of both sides of their mouth, aren't they?
- [05:10]
Al Murray
Well, we talked about how the Japanese are driven by the fact that their military staff are all. Are very invested in cooking up schemes for invading, you know, either going north, the north strategy or the south strategy? And, and the, the problem is the higher ups in the military command are taking advice from people who are extremely motivated towards war. And so their options when they come to cabinet discussions are all for war and options for war rather than actually what do we do diplomatically in this situation. So the Japanese are driving themselves into a position which is really going to end up in one place.
- [05:49]
James Holland
Yeah. And, you know, the, that offer from the Americans was, in the circumstances, pretty conciliatory, and yet they completely ignore it and go into Indochina anyway, you know, which is all completed on the, you know, 27th of July, 1941. And this honor to Tatemay, this true voice or facade is really getting them into a terrible pickle because while it might be used traditionally as a virtue to kind of stave off embarrassing social situations, in, in this scenario, it's terrible because they're saying one thing, oh God, can't get to war. You know, this is a disaster. We're going to lose. But in another, openly, when they're all together, they're somehow kind of feeling more gung ho and saying exactly the opposite. So if no one's actually saying what they mean, the danger is that they're going to go down a path that they actually, in their heart of hearts, will know that they can't deal with. And yet that tide seems to be increasingly unstoppable. And the Navy Chief of Staff, who is Admiral Asami Nagano, he goes to visit the Emperor Hirohito at the palace on 31st July, 1941. And Nagano expresses strong opposition to the Tripartite Pact, which had been signed after all the previous autumn, and the imperative, and stresses the imperative of avoiding war with the us but instead of demanding Japan withdrawal from the pact, he warns this. If our petroleum supplies were cut off, we would lose our stock in two years. If a war broke out, we would use it all up in 18 months. So therefore, he says, to survive beyond this window, he argues that Japan has no chance but to strike further south than Indochina. To which Hirohito says, could we expect
- [07:42]
Al Murray
a big victory such as our victory in the Russo Japanese War, so harking back to former glory.
- [07:49]
James Holland
To which Nagano replies confidently, I am uncertain as to any victory, let alone the kind of huge victory won over Russia. To which Hirohito replies, what a reckless
- [08:01]
Al Murray
war that would be. These people.
- [08:03]
James Holland
Yes. So although Japan has already committed to a southern, not northern, strategy, there's still some doubt amongst the observers whether Japan's intentions are with the USSR or whether they're heading south into more into the Asia Pacific. And there's a clause in the policy that mainly is there to give the army a sense of relevance that is fairly vacuous, which reads, should a favorable development arise for the Empire due to the changing conditions of the German Soviet war, we shall resolve the northern problem by military force. Yeah, nothing like a bit of flim. Flaming well.
- [08:42]
Al Murray
Yeah, exactly. And also this points at the problem inside Japanese government is these factions all need, all need paying off. They all need being given their, their pound of flesh, don't they? So the army, the army want. The army is wedded to the northern problem. And the navy, because, because it involves having to sail places, is focused on the Southern strategy. It's all quite, it's all quite simple, but the fact is, is the politicians cannot control any of these people. In a way, what's interesting is that is sort of the opposite of the German problem, where Hitler is driving everything and people below are running to catch up. What you've almost got is the reverse where the people at the top are running to catch up with their subordinates who are driving policy. So the military leaders, their staff, they're running to catch up with their staff are all keen on war. And at the top, Hirohito is going, how do I control these factions? And can't do it. And Konoe can't either. So they start mass mobilization of troops and equipment to northern China on the 7th of. They've already, they've already started this before, before this conversation with Nagano. Not for a campaign, but if you looked from the outside, you'd assume there was a. You'd assume there was a campaign. I mean, mobilizing troops is hard to interpret, isn't it? Let's be honest now, if you're watching that happen, it's difficult to interpret other than they're preparing for war. It's really difficult to read.
- [10:02]
James Holland
Yes. I mean, there's only so many times people are going to believe there's mass mobilization on the border for just a training exercise.
- [10:08]
Al Murray
Well, yeah, exactly. And, well, but, but, but, you know, you look at the invasion of Ukraine four years ago and no one could quite bring themselves to believe that that's what, what people were preparing for. Stalin's worried about his eastern, his eastern border. The Germans. The Germans are obviously keen for Japan to get involved, to, to take pressure off them, because every little helps if you're the Germans. At this point, we talked about soldier Yu who was in the, the, the war in China, like being disgusted and appalled by what he saw in northern China. He's now reconscripted because there's a manpower shortage. So he's reconscripted and he's sent to northern China again. And he's having been home since his first campaign for three years, and he's told, don't worry, it's a provisional conscription. But, you know, you're still handing your life over to the government, aren't you? To the army. Closes his shop, goes away, no big military send off. Much to his frustration and dismay, he passes his physical. And we talked in the previous episode about people drinking gallons of soy sauce to give themselves palpitations so that they would.
- [11:11]
James Holland
They would fail.
- [11:12]
Al Murray
And off he goes to Manchuku. He's sent to Manchuria for unexplained duties. So the people actually having to do the fighting are being kept to the dark and fed bullshit with no enthusiasm.
- [11:24]
James Holland
Are they joining up either? Which I think is really interesting.
- [11:26]
Al Murray
Yes, it is interesting. But then, obviously, because Japan has rejected the American concessions, the Americans are now going to have to take action, because the Japanese have crossed the red line over into China and they've got to take action. And so the Americans impose an oil embargo. Japan is so vulnerable over oil. I think this is what's really striking about this. The Americans say, all right, we're embargoing on oil. On the 1st of August, 1941, Japan loses 90% of its oil supply.
- [11:57]
James Holland
Make no mistake. This is a massive moment. This is the big moment of the summer of 1941 that is really starting to tip the scales. This is a massive, massive deal. And what's amazing is you've got two sides who are squaring up against each other with just totally different worldviews and perspectives. So they're looking at it from, you know, the Americans are looking at it from their logical, pragmatic side. For Japan, it's something much more existential than that. And that's the truth of it, you know, so It's a catastrophe. 90% of it is oil. I mean, it's such a huge margin.
- [12:46]
Al Murray
Conaway writes to Hachiro Arito, who's a veteran diplomat, two days later writes to him to say it was a mistake to think that occupying French Indo China would not inflict serious damage.
- [12:56]
James Holland
Yeah, no shit, Sherlock.
- [12:57]
Al Murray
No shit, right? But when the new cabinet was formed, the navy ships bound for Indochina had already reached the island of Hainan. It was as if an arrow had already been shot. Nothing could have been done to stop it. All he could do was pray for a miracle in divine intervention. What he's saying is he didn't want to have to go and yell at. He didn't want to go get yelled at by the admirals. He didn't want to have to go and tell Nagano to knock it off, did he? He's too scared of the, you know, the navy who are running the show here that he can't. Oh, well, what can you do? No crying over invaded Indochina. It's absolutely crazy. You know, obviously, very often when governments decide where they're weighing up whether they can withdraw from a war, you know, you've spent the money. Sunk cost. Well, we've. We've spent the money, so we're going to have to see it through. All servicemen have been killed. Well, you know, so we. So we've got to see it through. But that hasn't happened yet because there aren't any Japanese casualties because there's been no local resistance. So the Japanese could say, well, you know, they could present it. There's been no blood spill on their part. They could knock it on the head again.
- [14:02]
James Holland
We're going back to this. We're going back to this sort of public and private view. You know, there are enough people at the very top of the Japanese government who know this is. Instinctively know this is a terrible idea, that they're going down the rapids from which they need to kind of, you know, paddle their way back up in very, very quick order. And yet, whatever their fears are privately, they're not saying it publicly. So you get these two completely different views, and one is incredibly gung ho and it is our destiny and, you know, all this kind of nonsense. And then the private view is, oh, my God, we're going to get absolutely shafted if we're not careful.
- [14:41]
Al Murray
Yeah. And what they could have done was with. With order a retreat and say, look, we successfully decolonized Vichy. France is no longer in power in Indochina. You know, actually deliver on some of their rhetoric, which is part of their. Part of their rhetoric is the end of. The end of European empires in, in their sphere of influence. But they decide not to do that. Conway decides not to do that. So. So they. They've muffed it politically, internally and on the international stage, and consequentially because of the oil embargo. So Japan has painted itself into this corner that is entirely consequential. This isn't losing face at a conference. This is an actual massive economic blow to them.
- [15:26]
James Holland
It's a catastrophe.
- [15:27]
Al Murray
It's a Complete catastrophe. And the newspapers handle it saying, well, the Americans are just hell bent on isolating Japan. Who, us. This is happening out of nowhere to us. And there's also a racial element to some of the analysis that's offered in the newspapers. I think this is really interesting because, you know, I think we've talked before on the podcast a long time ago about how the minute you inject the politics of race into stuff, you get bad outcomes without fail. Like it's bad fuel, you put it in the engine and everything starts going wrong. And what, you know, a big part of the Japanese racial aspect to this is in reaction to western racist politics against Japan. So you put, you put bad fuel in the engine and everything comes out, everything comes out rotten and it destroys the engine in the process. This is idea of the ABCD encirclement,
- [16:17]
James Holland
which is America, Britain, Commonwealth and Dutch.
- [16:21]
Al Murray
And the Dutch. Right. So in the newspaper Yomiuri it says the encirclement of Japan by the so called ABCD camp is becoming increasingly blatant of late. All the western military bases forming a horseshoe shape starting from Burma to Singapore, the Dutch East Indies, the Philippine Islands, Australia, Samoa, Hawaii, Guam fall within the sphere of East Asian nations. But they have all been trampled upon by white people. We must now pay attention to the five centuries of white invasion and face up to the realities. And the thing is, there is a decolonial argument here that you could make, right? But the people making the argument want to colonize it as their corrective. They don't want it decolonized by white people. They want to colonize it themselves, don't they?
- [17:02]
James Holland
Quite so. The whole thing is sort of rooted in rank hypocrisy. But, but, but, but kind of whatever. The point is, if they go to war, they are going to absolutely kill themselves. They're going to cause untold deaths, they're going to cause untold economic misery. It isn't going to work. It is going to fail. Now everyone knows that because the bottom line is you need these resources to fight a war and they don't have them anymore because 90% of their fuel taps been cut off. And they haven't thought through what happens. Just say you sweep into Burma and you take the oil fields of Burma. How are you actually going to get the oil from Burma to Japan? I mean, how's that going to happen? In the same way, it's the same question to be posed to the Germans when they're going into the Caucasus in summer of 1942. Don't enter a war, if you haven't planned it beforehand and haven't fought through the consequences, that's the bottom line. It's a really, really bad error.
- [18:00]
Al Murray
But James, all wars qualify under this, don't they? No one ever knows what the consequences of a war. People only embark on wars, they think that because they think they're going to win them, don't they?
- [18:09]
James Holland
Well, except the Japanese.
- [18:10]
Al Murray
Well, no, but, but when they, when they come to it, they said, don't worry, we'll win. No one has ever embarked on a war thinking they're going to lose.
- [18:17]
James Holland
No one has ever done that apart from the Japanese. And they're private. And they're private. They're private and public. I mean, privately they're all thinking we're going to lose. Publicly they're going, it's all going to be great. But okay, it's not a question about thinking you're going to lose. It's a thinking about, it's making sure you have planned for the consequences. You know, okay, so what do we get? So we've got this war, we need it because our resources have been cut off. So we now need to go and find these resources that have been cut off from us and take them for ourselves. How are we going to do that? What is the practical way in which we're going to do this?
- [18:50]
Al Murray
The Americans need punching on the nose, Jim. Remember? They need punching on the nose.
- [18:55]
James Holland
Yeah.
- [18:55]
Al Murray
So you punch them on the nose at Pearl harbor and they reel from the blow. And because they're weak willed, lily livered white people, they are chicken out of a war. Right? That's the, that's where you end up.
- [19:05]
James Holland
All right, but still, how are you going to, how are you going to get your oil from Burma to Japan?
- [19:11]
Al Murray
Could you stop, stop with this. The Emperor will will it and it'll happen. Jim, could you just knock it off?
- [19:16]
James Holland
Okay, fine. Yes. Now we're getting to the truth of the issue, aren't we?
- [19:22]
Al Murray
Yes. I mean, what's interesting about this though is as we're talking about these issues, this is a day by day progress. So we, we started on the 30, 31st of July with Admiral Nagano, and then on the 1st of August, the Americans impose their, their embargo. So the 6th of August, the Japanese finally respond to the American neutralization plan as it's called. They say, well, all right, we'll only withdraw troops from Indochina once the Chinese war has been resolved. Japan wants America to help negotiating peace with China. Huh? And Japan won't occupy any further south than Indochina. So basically they're telling the Americans to stick their neutralization plan where, where, where the rising sun doesn't shine. Right.
- [20:07]
James Holland
And, and there's, and there's absolutely no honor to tactomi in that. That's just completely public and private.
- [20:16]
Al Murray
Yeah, exactly. As well as this, Conaway wants to organize a meeting with Roosevelt to, to. To see if there's a possible route to de. Escalation reversal. So like you know, contradictory olive branch in one hand, fist, iron fist in the other sort of thing. And Cordell Howell tells Nomura because of their response, because of the Japanese response, they can't have a summit. The, the Roosevelt administration essentially views Indochina, the occupation of Indochina as a blatant demonstration of Japan's expansionist intent. I mean they, you know, they're judging them by their actions. What else they got to go on? Right. The Japanese have done this while the Americans are still waiting for a response to their diplomatic entreaty. You know, I mean, which they see as a generous offer and you know, they're essentially appeasing offer. So the Americans have offered to appease them and the Japanese have simply not even bothered going oh thank you very much. They've just rejected it. So you then have this situation where Toyoda asks Nomura to tell the Americans that the Indochina occupation is actually not rigid and that Conroy would like a heart to heart with the President from the broad advantage of maintaining world peace at this point that Nomura can't. Who's the ambassador in Washington? He can't tell the US administration this immediately because Roosevelt's in Canada meeting Churchill with other fish to fry. Which brings us to.
- [21:36]
James Holland
We should remind everyone that Cordell Hull, of course is the Secretary of State. He's the number one sort of diplomat really and the Secretary of State for the US at this time. And he's very much sort of right hand man to, to Roosevelt. And of course, you know, we've touched on the Atlantic charter before and we'll do so again, I'm sure, but this takes place between the 9th and 12th August on both the US cruiser Augustus Augusta and the British battleship Prince of Wales. Always makes me feel a little bit uneasy every time we mention its name.
- [22:07]
Al Murray
Be still my beating heart.
- [22:09]
James Holland
Yeah, you know, I know we've got to deal with it. I know we've got to come to it. I've come round to it, but I'm still not easy about it.
- [22:16]
Al Murray
Okay, sure.
- [22:18]
James Holland
The backdrop to this is of course Lend Lease has been signed off at the beginning of March 1941, America's very much gearing up. Congress is debating amendments to the Selective Training and Service act, which is basically, you know, conscription, first time ever in PeaceTime in the US and America's capacity to mobilize for war is really increasing enormously. And those of you who listened to earlier episodes, you remember we were talking about the strategic earthquake of the fall of France in the summer of 1940, both for Britain and for the United States. Because this is the moment where America and Roosevelt realizes, of course, that this is, you know, that the Atlantic is no longer the barrier that it once was and that they need to get ready for war. And so begins this massive rearmament process, which is starting to kick in by 1941. You know, what's initiated in the summer of 1940 takes time for anything meaningful to come off the conveyor belts, but it is starting to do now. So America is going militarily stronger and stronger with every passing day, let alone week and month. And this is the first time that Roosevelt and Churchill have met as political leaders of their respective countries. They get on very well. And they signed the Atlantic Charter, which is full of sort of heady utopian stuff, but also they decide to make a commitment to support Stalin and the USSR to do everything they can to prevent a collapse in the Soviet Union with the German invasion that has taken place in the third week of June. Ruser also agrees to send the U.S. navy, the Atlantic Fleet, into the Atlantic to help support and escort Allied convoys across the Atlantic. So it really feels at this point that America's direct involvement in the war. Well, it is already direct involved in the war, but actually becoming a combatant nation is really only a matter of time away. On the last day of the conference, Roosevelt Selective Trading and Service act is passed in the House. So this also accelerates, is going to accelerate the United States readiness for war. But is there the prospect of a summit between the two nations, between Japan and the United States, or has Japan completely blown it already?
- [24:38]
Al Murray
Well, what's interesting, isn't it Roosevelt accepts the overtures from Konoe to do exactly this. But Cordell Hull, that isn't keen. And we go back to the thing the Americans want, which is they want proper answers from the Japanese about China, about what's going on in China, because the Americans have. The American public opinion backs China very strongly. It's. It's seen as, you know, it's seen as a worthwhile cause in American politics. And so they want. They want clear answers about that and they want clearances about the alliance with the Axis, about the Tripartite alliance.
- [25:13]
James Holland
Not unreasonable, by the way.
- [25:15]
Al Murray
As if the Americans are going to change what they're concerned about, that it's the thing that's been bugging them all along. As if the Americans are going to shift. Right. We've got to come back to. This is what the American. And I do feel a little sorry for Nomura because he's sort of in the middle, isn't he? He's got to go in and say, oh, my government said something that I now have to, you know, I have to sweat my way through. I rather feel for him. And he says, well, you know, the China thing's going to be the hardest to solve before we have this summit. And Hull says, but you've just asked, you've explicitly asked for our help in negotiating a Chinese Japanese peace deal. You literally want it both ways.
- [25:53]
James Holland
What is it? Help me to help you.
- [25:56]
Al Murray
What is it you people want? Come on. It's got that element, isn't it? And, yeah, and, and you know, people tried drafting, diplomats tried drafting, you know, pre conference proposals and the two key points. And we come back to it, you know, the jab. They want Japan to, to withdraw from China as a general principle. The Japanese say, okay, fine. And then another commit, which is if war breaks out between America and Germany, Japan would exercise its own judgment. In other words, they wouldn't necessarily automatically join forces with Germany if America was to carry on in its direction of travel, fight and end up fighting the Germans.
- [26:34]
James Holland
And so that's all good.
- [26:36]
Al Murray
That's all good. And we're kind of back where the Americans want things. I mean it's just this awful huge sigh of relief.
- [26:43]
James Holland
Okay, we're actually making progress.
- [26:45]
Al Murray
However, however on the 27th of August and you know the government, the Prime Minister is happy with this draft. On 27 August, a group of researchers from the aptly named Total War Research Institute
- [27:04]
James Holland
do what it says on the tin.
- [27:06]
Al Murray
I wonder what they're going to say. Jim, hi, it's the Total War Research Institute here.
- [27:12]
James Holland
We've decided we haven't got a job. Well, you haven't got a roll. Because peace is the only way forward.
- [27:17]
Al Murray
Yeah, all that.
- [27:18]
James Holland
I mean it's just this journey all
- [27:20]
Al Murray
the guys at the Total War Research Institute, Jim, want to do. They just want to close the place down. They look forward to the day where they can all collect their P45s and quit. But they basically, they come to a conclusion that they present to the Prime Minister that says if Japan goes to war with the US and the Allies, it would categorically lose.
- [27:39]
James Holland
Right.
- [27:39]
Al Murray
They might, they might prevail in a few battles, but their resources would ultimately run out. They also say if we go south into the Dutch East Indies, there will definitely be a war. We could theoretically secure some oil fields. Ah, okay, here's your silver lining. But the American fleets in the Philippines would attack Japanese oil shipments of the Pacific so the oil wouldn't get back to Japan. So a war is both.
- [28:02]
James Holland
Tell me something I don't know. I mean, of course this is their conclusion. Because this is the only conclusion. Yeah, I mean, you know, you know, wars throughout history rely on resources and access to resources and logistics and supply. And if you can't maintain that supply, you haven't got a war. Simple as that.
- [28:22]
Al Murray
Yeah. They say it's inevitable and unwinnable if Japan carries on its current course of action.
- [28:27]
James Holland
So, so the silence in the room when this is presented. I mean, I mean, just imagine that cabinet meeting. So the Total War Research Institute has concluded that war is completely unwinnable. We can't possibly win this. The silence for a moment and then Tojo goes, well, clearly the answer here is to go to war, basically what he says, isn't it?
- [28:50]
Al Murray
Yeah.
- [28:50]
James Holland
I mean, despite some fairly stark statistics which show that the War Economy Research Office, another August institution in Tokyo, has concluded that Japan's industrial power is 1/20 of the US. I mean, you know, that's on a good day.
- [29:06]
Al Murray
Yeah.
- [29:06]
James Holland
And still Tojo, who is the kind of ultra aggressive Foreign Secretary in general, amidst much anxiety, it has to be said. But don't forget, we've also got our honey to tatami. So we've got our public and private projects delusion. He goes, this is, after all a desktop exercise. Actual wars do not go as you fellows imagine. We did not go to war with Russia thinking that we win. But you know what? We did win. So it's your point really, isn't it, that everyone goes to war thinking they're going to win doesn't mean that the decision is any more sensible. And just basically he says to the researchers to keep their conclusions to themselves, you know, exercise a bit of honour to tatami.
- [29:50]
Al Murray
That is like German war planners for Barbarossa being told to go away and run the war game again so that they win. This is the same.
- [29:58]
James Holland
It's worse. It's worse than that. But yes, it is a bit like that.
- [30:04]
Al Murray
Basically, where does he think the oil's going to come from to win this war? Because if the American oil supply is 90%. What are they going to do?
- [30:11]
James Holland
I rest my case. I refer you to my earlier point about Burma.
- [30:15]
Al Murray
So what we're going to do, we're going to take a quick break. While I'm sure all of you listening, digest this incredible thinking at the heart of the Japanese political establishment. And when we come back, we'll hear what Roosevelt has to say at this juncture as we progress into August and then on into September 1941. We'll see you in a moment.
- [30:44]
Commercial Announcer 2
K Pop Demon Hunters, Haja Boy's Breakfast Meal and Hunt Trick's Meal have just dropped at McDonald's.
- [30:49]
James Holland
They're calling this a.
- [30:51]
Commercial Announcer 2
A battle for the fans. What do you say to that, Rumi? It's not a battle. So glad the Saja Boys could take breakfast and give our meal the rest of the day.
- [30:59]
Al Murray
It is an honor to share.
- [31:00]
Commercial Announcer 2
No, it's our honor.
- [31:02]
Al Murray
It is our larger honor. No, really, stop.
- [31:06]
James Holland
You can really feel the respect in this battle. Pick a meal to pick a side.
- [31:11]
Al Murray
Ba da ba ba ba.
- [31:12]
Commercial Announcer 3
And participate in McDonald's while supplies last.
- [31:15]
Commercial Announcer 2
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- [32:01]
Al Murray
Welcome back to. We have ways to make you talk with me, Al Murray and James Holland. And we're on our third episode of Japan's Road to War. It's not so much a road to war, is it? As a sort of. It's like they've got on a ride at Alton Towers that they've absolutely. They're absolutely determined to. To get there one way or another.
- [32:17]
James Holland
They're about to go down the black hole, aren't they?
- [32:19]
Al Murray
The thing is, is this cabinet meeting aside, the last thing the Americans know is that the Japanese want to summit and that poor old Nomura has been able to. They've drafted up the pre summit conditions. Americans want pre conference conditions. And they carry on making preparations for this conference as well as the Japanese as well as preparing for war. And the Japanese don't think that these things are like contradictory. On 3rd September, the cabinet settles on a plan that recommends continuing the policy of negotiations with the US and that commits to war if the talks aren't fruitful before early October. And the Navy Chiefs of Staff says the Empire is getting skinnier in every category of material resources. So basically the view is we need, if we're going to fight, then we need to fight right away because we won't be able to fight because we don't have the material capacity to fight. So let's fight now to get the material capacity in order to be able to fight. You could just not fight. Right.
- [33:21]
James Holland
Of course there is an alternative view, but that's quite radical, isn't it? Let's face it. And also the moment you start imposing deadlines on things, it doesn't, it's not really terribly helpful, I don't think in negotiating it tends to put the hackles up of other people.
- [33:34]
Al Murray
There is then another pre conference proposal which is drawn up by the Foreign Ministry.
- [33:39]
James Holland
Yes, Another TED deadline.
- [33:41]
Al Murray
Yet another deadline. This is Conway, Conway's people. He knows this is being done and he's, but he's passive. This is the thing. I mean, he, he long ago lost control of, of, of the people around him and, and, and that's the way they like it.
- [33:55]
James Holland
He's not a great character, is he? I mean, you know, it's hard to feel much sympathy for Conaway. I mean. Yeah, yeah, you know, he, he is fundamentally dovish.
- [34:04]
Al Murray
Yeah.
- [34:05]
James Holland
But, but is completely consumed by honor to tatami and it's totally lost the ability to impose himself, hasn't he?
- [34:12]
Al Murray
Yeah, yeah. He's weak. And he thinks that the Foreign Ministry's draft contains enough concessions for Roosevelt. So why create a problem by advocating his proposal? I mean, oh God, it'd be so difficult negotiating with people like this though, from the American perspective, because he just, it's like, it's like, like negotiating with porridge, isn't it? And the biggest difference between his proposal and the Foreign Ministries is that the latter outright lines withdrawal from China only once agreements have been arrived at. And Conway proposed this unqualified as a general principle. And this is of course what the American. The opposite what the Americans want. So Roosevelt gets this on the 6th of September. This is the September 6th proposal. It's full title, snappy. The Essentials for Carrying out the Empire's Policies. And Hirohito is then given this. He's like, what, what's this? What this is a war mobilization plan, isn't it?
- [35:09]
James Holland
I mean, he literally takes off his glasses, polishes them, puts them back on, and takes a deep breath.
- [35:16]
Al Murray
And he wants to know why he's been kept in the dark.
- [35:19]
James Holland
Damn right he wants to know. I mean, he summons his chiefs of staff of the Navy and army, Nagano and Sugiyama, to explain themselves. And Konaway stands besides him and just listens. And Hirohito emphasizes that diplomacy must be prioritized over war. Quite right. Very sensible. And then he asks how long this proposed war would last.
- [35:42]
Al Murray
Sir, we intend to complete the mission in the South Seas in three months.
- [35:46]
James Holland
Hirohito, when the China incident broke out, you were our army minister. I remember you telling me then that the conflict would be over in about a month. But after four long years, it still hasn't ended.
- [35:58]
Al Murray
China has a huge hinterland. That was why we couldn't carry out our plans as we had originally envisioned.
- [36:05]
James Holland
And Hirohito says, well, if you say that China has a huge hinterland, the Pacific Ocean is even bigger, on what basis are you now telling me three months? I mean, he's got a point, hasn't he? And what. What does Sugiyama do?
- [36:17]
Al Murray
He blushes.
- [36:18]
James Holland
He blushes.
- [36:18]
Al Murray
He hangs his. And hangs his head in shame. Jim. He's humiliated by. By the divine emperor. He's let his family down, his emperor down. He's let his schoolhouse down. Hirohito, though, he asks for reassurance that they are going to prioritize diplomacy. And they go, oh, yeah, yeah, yeah. Don't worry about that. At the same time, he agrees. He acquiesces to the. The need for war plans. And. And again, he's like, you know, they're all doing it, aren't they? Hirohito can't put his foot down traditionally or within the. Although there is nothing judicial about it, you know, because this constitution is only so old. It's only like three generations old, isn't it? He. He thinks he's not really supposed to express a political judgment. And we see that at the end of the war, where with the. With the big six, where he has the casting vote over the cabinet, when the moment to surrender comes and it's him, they. They go, well, actually, you're gonna have to decide now. Boss is like, oh, God. Right, Fine. He thinks his role symbolic, but. But I think this. This means that he's actually nodding everything through. And he is meek, he is cautious, and there is no historical precedent for an imperial veto, so yet he's yet another person, you know, taking refuge in. Well, it's just the way we do things around here. I'm afraid I can't. If these, these fellows advise me, there's going to have to be a war. There's going to be a war, aren't there?
- [37:39]
James Holland
Yeah, but, but if, but if. If you're the emperor and. And you can see disaster looming, and you've just pointed out that the claim that it's all going to be over in three months is clearly absolute horseshit. Why don't you say something?
- [37:50]
Al Murray
Why don't you say something? And he doesn't say something because he doesn't, in the end want to, you
- [37:59]
James Holland
know, because he's meek and cautious and, you know, he's not an imposing character, a bit like Kanoe and, you know, they're both as bad as each other, aren't they?
- [38:12]
Al Murray
He doesn't want to be yelled at by admirals and generals and all that, does he? He doesn't or, or glowed at and all that sort of thing. And they're the civilians as well, in this picture. That's the other thing, you know, that you'd think that civilians would be less hawkish or less susceptible to being outmaneuvered and now outflanked by the hawkish faction in the Japanese government. So they carry on planning for war. Tojo is. Tojo is very much driving this. He thinks the Americans. The Americans only want peace between Japan and China so that they can dominate Asia themselves.
- [38:45]
James Holland
Well, you see, I think this is really interesting. Does he. Does he really think that or does he want to think that or. And is he saying that because he wants war? I mean, it's interesting. It's hard to know with Tojo.
- [38:57]
Al Murray
Yeah, it's impossible to know, really.
- [38:58]
James Holland
Do you see what I'm saying? I mean, I mean, what's, you know, which comes first, the chicken or the egg in this scenario?
- [39:03]
Al Murray
Well, it's just. It's hard to know what any of them think because they keep shifting their positions depending on who they're talking to. So although, although, you know, Tojo saying to his staff, carry on. Carry on writing me those plans and schemes, you know, he is. Carry on mobilizing, you know, he's saying that it's interesting there are opponents to war. So you have no Higash Kuni, who's a prince, and he meets Tojo on the. After the September 6th proposal is put together, and he says there is a possibility. He agrees that there's a possibility Americans are trying to provoke a war with Japan as part of a sort of Asian power scramble. But he does, however, that's regardless, he says we are not capable of winning this war. We're materially weak. We, we shouldn't even try. But Tojo thinks no, we have to resist.
- [39:52]
James Holland
He's la la la, I'm not hearing that.
- [39:53]
Al Murray
Yeah, isn't he?
- [39:54]
James Holland
I mean, yeah, yeah, don't want to know.
- [39:56]
Al Murray
Meanwhile, the American involvement in the European war and the other, the other war starts to crank up. So on the 4th of September there's the American destroyer, the Greer is approaching Iceland and is alerted by British bomber that German sub is lurking close. Bomber tries to hit the sub, misses it and retreats because she's never run out of fuel, you know, for their sortie. Greer is authorized, not authorized to attack but pursues the submarine instead of reporting back to base. Three hours after the subs first detective detected the boat. U boat gets within 330ft of destroyer, faster torpedo and misses and there's then a 10 hour scrap while both the submarine and the destroyer fail to hit one another. But engage, engage with one another. Yeah, they're trying, they're trying to, they're trying to. And, and what would happen, what would have happened had the career gone to the bottom at this point or the other way around?
- [40:55]
James Holland
Yeah, it's really interesting because this precedes the sinking of the USS Reuben James which is the first ship that gets sunk by U boat and that's eight weeks later. That's on the 31st of October 1941. So pre Cetis. But again it's another big moment, you know.
- [41:16]
Al Murray
Yeah, yeah, yeah.
- [41:18]
James Holland
And Roosevelt uses it. You know, he's like Roosevelt's thinking great, you know, this is exactly what I need here.
- [41:24]
Al Murray
What does he say? German. You do Roosevelt on this show.
- [41:27]
James Holland
It was not the first nor the last act of piracy which the Nazi government has committed against the American flag in this war for attack has followed attack. And he also announces that normal practices of diplomacy are no longer viable with Germany and therefore the US is going to have to strike Nazi submarines and raiders in the Atlantic to protect the US supply lines to the Allies. And this is quite a notable shift in public rhetoric. It's increasingly belligerent in its tone and there is a sense that he's trying to manufacture consent for the imminent possibility of war. I mean he's known a year, almost a year earlier during the election campaign in November 1940 that you know, they're heading down this route. So anyway, after this speech of his and you Know, the interesting thing about these speeches is they are heard by 65, 70% of the entire population. So that includes, you know, the elderly, children, all the rest of it. So almost every adult is, you know, working adult is listening to this. And it shows that 62% of Americans support this shoot on sight policy, you know, despite knowing what this implies. Yeah. Nonetheless, I mean, the vast majority of Americans still want to stay out of the European war, of course. But you know, American planners are now starting to draft a war plan which is completed by 25 September, albeit primarily against Germany at this point and not Japan, because that is what they have agreed with the British, you know, in earlier talks, the ABC1 talks that happened in the spring of 1941 of that same year is that should America enter the war, it will do so against Germany first and above any conflict with Japan. But of course, the situation is constantly changing and evolving. And what you say at the beginning of the year is not necessarily what you are going to do at the end of the year.
- [43:30]
Al Murray
You know, the war in Europe
- [43:33]
James Holland
is
- [43:33]
Al Murray
the sort of center of gravity in events at this point. The fact that Stalin now knows, via Richard Sorge, who's a German Communist working in Tokyo, that Japan isn't going to attack the USSR imminently. He's able to move troops from his eastern front facing the Japanese to the Soviet Western front. And he can use these to plug the gap and make it coagulate on his Western front. And this is a hugely consequential piece of intelligence. And it's very interesting this because Stalin's getting enough from the British by this point to let him know actually what's going on. But it's this hearing it from here from the, from the spy in Tokyo that relieves the pressure on the barber, his, you know, fighting the Barbarossa battle against the Germans. This also very much tells us what the Japanese think of the Tripartite Pact. They're not, they're, they're not honoring that either. They can't trust them on anything. Right across the board. And this isn't good for Japan because after all, Japan's relationship with the Germany, Italy, it's only useful for them if Germany's doing well. Right. And if German Germany struggles, it's not a useful alliance.
- [44:49]
James Holland
Right.
- [44:49]
Al Murray
But if it's got. But Germany's only going to do. But, but then, but then the catch 22 there is German. They have to help the Germans in order for the Germans to do well, but they're not going to help the Germans. So the so again, this is this trying to have it both ways thing that the Japanese have been doing throughout all of this sort of diplomatic flow is really not serving them at all well. And you think none of their. None of their position works, but they won't change their position. It's a remarkable sort of gumtree. They've got themselves up in relation to what's happening in Europe, isn't it?
- [45:24]
James Holland
I mean, the point is, if they do take the northern. If they take the Northern strategy and they do go into the Soviet Union, it'd be much easier for them to do that in the autumn of 1950, 1941. But where are the benefits? I mean, where are you going to get your oil and your rubber and everything and metal and everything you're short of by going into the eastern end of the Soviet Union? I mean, you're just not, are you?
- [45:45]
Al Murray
So, no,
- [45:48]
James Holland
it's a terrible plan to go into the Soviet Union, whichever way you look at it. I don't even know why they're even considering it, to be honest.
- [45:54]
Al Murray
Well, and the last time they fought them, they were soundly thrashed against a
- [45:58]
James Holland
Red army that wasn't very good.
- [45:59]
Al Murray
Well, yes, so they're. They're bound to be thinking, try and avoid that if we can. So, I mean, so what, what this means though, is that even despite all this, the Japanese don't try to extract themselves. The Tripartite Pact, even though they know it's not serving them diplomatically, they don't try and reverse that position either. So you've got this. You know, the things that have. The things across the summer that are making Japan's position with the US deteriorate are that they've occupied southern Indochina before. Responding to Roosevelt's rather ameliorative proposal, the neutralization proposal. They've insisted on staying in a fascist alliance with an antagonist. That the Americans are becoming more keen on fighting. And there's the more. Again, antagonism is where this is at. There's the more antagonistic proposal about what to do about China. The September 6 proposal is let through by Conway from the Foreign Ministry. So basically, on the three things that are bothering everybody, they've made their positions worse because. Because basically that the leadership can't control itself. Even Connor can't control himself, can he? Let alone the people around.
- [47:08]
James Holland
No. Well, Kano is in big trouble, isn't he? I mean. Yeah, yeah, that's. That's the truth of it. I mean, they. They send another reworked pre summit proposal to Washington that's even firmer. On China before, the Americans haven't accepted the earlier suggestions and this time they're insisting on merging of Chiang Kai Shek's government with Wang Ching Wei's Japanese puppet government in eastern China. Well, they're never ever on a million years going to accept that. Nomura protests as before, sending a telegram to Tokyo saying he does not believe this proposal will do, which clearly it isn't. Tokyo then completely ignores him, despite the fact that he is the ambassador, Japanese Ambassador to the United States of Washington, and despite being committed to de escalation at practically every turn. Nomura's influence of his own government is clearly at rock bottom at this point. And then on 25 September, in another liaison conference, the Chiefs of Staff of the army and the Navy, Sugiyama and Nagano, want to set a specific deadline for terminating diplomacy with the US and they say we need to choose between diplomacy and war by October 15th at the very latest.
- [48:22]
Al Murray
Why? Well, I don't know, Jim.
- [48:25]
James Holland
The problem with all these deadlines is all it does is it corners people and makes people kind of double down. That's the thing. I mean, it's just crazy. Anyway, Kanoa starts to panic, conspicuously so at this time, which is unusual because he's, he's usually very good at the honor to Tatemi and, and hiding what he's really thinking.
- [48:46]
Al Murray
But.
- [48:46]
James Holland
But this time it's starting to be a bit clear. And the next day he privately confides to Koichi Kido, who is the Emperor's closest personal advisor, and they've known each other since they were children.
- [48:57]
Al Murray
If the military insists on the October 15 deadline to begin war, I do not have any confidence. I have no other choice but to think of resigning.
- [49:05]
James Holland
And Kido says, you are the one who set the original early October deadline for diplomacy. You cannot leave that decision hanging and just disappear. That's irresponsible.
- [49:14]
Al Murray
Yeah.
- [49:14]
James Holland
It's not good, is it?
- [49:15]
Al Murray
It's not good. And so he doesn't resign, but he basically runs away and goes to his villa in Kamakura and doesn't reappear until the 2nd of October, where there's not even two weeks to go. And now Toyoda has to lobby for the summit, the Konoe Roosevelt summit. And he's speaking to GRU about this.
- [49:35]
James Holland
Who's the American in Japan, isn't he?
- [49:37]
Al Murray
Yeah, the American ambassador of Japan. And he's trying to convince Roosevelt that Conway has good intentions. But I mean, how. That, that's a. That's a sticky wicket after all these months. Of all this sort of prevarication and nonsense. So he writes to the, he writes to the President and says, I do not consider unlikely the possibility of Prince Kanoy being in a position to give President Roosevelt directly a more explicit and satisfactory engagement. Engagement than has already been vouchsafed in the course of the preliminary conversations. He's basically saying, yeah, it's, there's no point, there's no point. You're not going to get anywhere. By now, American policymakers, they think gru's being too soft. This is appeasement. Now, the Japanese, because the Trip pact are associated with Nazism, right? And, and the fact that the Conway can't see that this is to his detriment, they can't see the consequence with the Americans of their own actions, particularly as the temperature is going up between America and Germany. And then of course, the other major factions in this are the army and the Navy. And tensions are now rising between the army and the Navy because of course, they are. The Navy Minister, Koshiro Oikawa, he's openly opposed this deadline, the October 15th deadline, and Yamamoto's Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet. He also warns the Navy Chief of Staff Nagano, that the Japanese can win a few initial victories. Yeah, but it won't ensure long term victory.
- [51:06]
James Holland
He says a US Japanese war is bound to be protracted. The United States will not give up fighting as long as Japan has the upper hand. The war will last for several years. In the meantime, Japan's resources will be depleted. Battleships and weaponry will be damaged. Replenishing materials will be impossible. Japan will be impoverished. A war with so little chance of success should not be fought.
- [51:32]
Al Murray
Made himself clear there, and that's basically exactly what happens. Yamamoto knows this and Toyoda also, he doesn't like the diplomatic deadline. The obstacles to overcome are people like Tojo, who's the Army Minister, who's really keen on fighting. So come the 2nd of November, Cordell Hull, Secretary of State, gives Nomura a proposal asking Japan to accept his four principles. Respect for the sovereignty of all nations. So we're on Atlantic Charter territory here. Support for non interference in internal affairs of other countries, support for the principle of equality, non disturbance to the status quo in the Pacific unless it can be altered peacefully. Guess what? He wants the Japanese to make it clear that they are going to withdraw from China and French Indochina. And these are the essential points. Without these, there can be no summit. It's not the Americans who've changed their position, is it?
- [52:24]
James Holland
No, no, no.
- [52:25]
Al Murray
They've been incredibly consistent yeah, they're incredibly consistent. And Nomura tells Hull that, you know, this is too difficult for us. The way we see things are the treaties the America imposes on us are unequal. You know, it's in a. It's in bed with the imperialist powers. It's domestic policy towards Americans of color. So bringing in the. Bringing the race aspect to also. Also tell us that, you know, the Americans are a bad actor and all this. And then we run into this thing where Hull's demands that are then not passed on properly, they've not been translated, so they've not been discussed. People are trying. There are people trying to slow this process down again in Japan, Nagano says, well, you know, it's no longer time for discussion. We should set a time date for war right away. And this is ticking down. You know, this is October 4th now. Even though two days previously he says he's told Oikawa that he thinks there shouldn't. The war with the west should be avoided, possibly can.
- [53:18]
James Holland
Again, it's kind of saying one thing, one day, something, you know, or in public, another thing in private. It's just, you know, Jesus, I mean, just have a stance and stick to it. Whether it's private or public is what I'd say to these guys right now. But obviously that would fall on deaf ears. The oscillation, the kind of ambivalence and deception of policymaking at this time. It's just hopeless, isn't it? You know, benching the fate of a nation for the sake of keeping up appearances and pride and spurious notions of honor. I mean, it's just crazy. So Oikawa stays pretty silent during this meeting. And the war skeptics are becoming increasingly reluctant to voice dissenting opinions in case they're sort of seen as kind of, you know, wet losers or something. And no one wants to stamp their name on a decision that could ultimately be a mistake or unpopular. So again, they're. They're thinking of their asses rather than thinking of the wider needs of the Japanese empire. And on the 6th of October, Sugiyama and Tojo decide they have to categorically stop the Navy's possible attempt to back out of the war. You know, so no more of this defeatist nonsense. You know, we've got to gear up for this. So even though Oikawa and others aren't asserting strong opinions, the Navy leaders form a consensus that it would be folly to start a war with the United States. That is now their prescribed view. And they also agree to withdrawal of troops From China in principle. Which would of course enrage the army because it's mainly an army operation given that they bear the brunt of such a public humiliation and public hub humiliation. Nuh, that's not.
- [55:01]
Al Murray
Yeah, yeah. It's a non starter.
- [55:02]
James Holland
Not to be conceived. Because that would be. Because that would be humiliating. You can't be humiliated even if it does save the lives of millions.
- [55:08]
Al Murray
The army meeting log from 6th October summarizes their opinion, which says the army and Navy are still in disagreement. The army is saying there's no hope for diplomacy. The Navy still thinks there is hope. It was only the day before yesterday at the Liaison Conference that Nagano declared there was no longer time for discussion. But what now? The Navy's selfishly trying to nullify the sacrosanct decisions made at the Imperial Conference. Unspeakable. How responsible the Navy is, how untrustworthy the Navy is actually destroying our nation kinda.
- [55:33]
James Holland
Or saving it.
- [55:34]
Al Murray
The Navy's assessment is much more sanguine. The operations division's chief says as far as losses of ships are concerned, 1.4 million tons was sunk in the first year of the war. The results of the new war games conducted by the Combined Flint show there will be no ships left for fulfilling requirements in the third year of the war. I have no confidence in this war. Don't do it, boys. You know, but they're gonna do it, aren't they? I mean, what's interesting, Jim, is we're obviously with hindsight, we know what's coming, we know how it's going to pan out. But if you were to stop here now and look at what's going on, what, what conclusion would you draw? Surely you'd say, well, there's no way out of this for anybody.
- [56:12]
James Holland
But. Well, yeah, but you would also say you'd also be praying that the Navy would. Would win through and make everyone see sense. But. And the Hirohito would man up and Canoa would man up and you know, this, there is this terrible sense, isn't there, of inevitability, of sort of pointless inevitability about the whole thing. You know, it shouldn't be inevitable, it should be sortable. And yet the escalation is continuing because the people that wanted to escalate somehow have a greater hold on the Japanese government than those who want to de. Escalate.
- [56:54]
Al Murray
Exactly. Well, however, we have another episode. Find out what happens next. Will. Will the Japanese pull themselves back from the brink? We'll find out. Thanks very much for listening. Become a patreon Join our Patreon we have Ways. Patreon is a sunlit uplands of extra stuff of live casts of ticket offers and a discussion with other like minded afflicted people. Or you could simply become officer class on our Apple Podcast channel where there's no ads. But none of the none of the joys. The extra joys, the extra squeeze of lemon and lime in your We Have Ways beverage. Anyway, we hope you've enjoyed this. Come back for part four as the countdown for it to infamy kicks off. We'll see you soon. Cheerio.
- [57:39]
James Holland
Cheerio.
- [57:49]
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