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WW2 Pod: We Have Ways of Making You Talk
Japan's Road To War: Power Behind The Throne (Part 2)
01:00:23
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- [00:02]
Al Murray
Thank you for listening to we have ways of making you talk. Sign up to our Patreon to receive bonus content, live streams and our weekly newsletter with money off books and museum visits as well. Plus early access to all live show tickets. That's patreon.com wehaveways. So good, so good, so good.
- [00:27]
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- [00:39]
Al Murray
Cause there's always something new.
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- [00:55]
Al Murray
Hunters, Haja Boys Breakfast Meal and Hunt Trix Meal have just dropped at McDonald's.
- [00:59]
James Holland
They're calling this a battle for the fans.
- [01:01]
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What do you say to that Rumi? It's not a battle. So glad the Saja Boys could take breakfast and give our meal the rest of the day.
- [01:08]
Al Murray
It is an honor to share. No, it's our honor. It is our larger honor. No, really stop.
- [01:15]
James Holland
You can really feel the respect in this battle. Pick a meal to pick a side
- [01:22]
Al Murray
and participate in McDonald's while supplies last.
- [01:24]
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- [02:01]
Al Murray
The American would not thank you if you bowed to him and politely gave way. He would actually look down on you thinking that you were a total pushover. If you gave him a punch in the face, that's when he will start respecting you, seeing you as his equal. Japanese diplomats should take note of this from now on. And that was the one and only Yosuke Matsuoka, the Japanese foreign minister in 1940, laying out his approach to dealing with his American opposite numbers.
- [02:28]
James Holland
He's turning into quite the character, isn't he?
- [02:29]
Al Murray
He's quite the character. Welcome to we have ways of making you talk and Episode two of our series Japan's Road to Matsuoka. I know, you know, we're supposed to be more nuanced than heroes and villains, Jim, that in the end, you know, we need to try and figure out what motivates People, what motivates people and, you know, get to grips with the underlying causes and all that sort of stuff. But Matsuoka is an absolute piece of work, isn't he?
- [02:54]
James Holland
Isn't he? And how. Yeah, he really is. He's quite the character. There's this man who likes drinking and dancing and being rude and is a phenomenal narcissist and just says what the first thing that comes into his mouth. I mean, you know, the other thing, he's just absolute, absolutely bristling with rage, isn't he? And he's bristling with resentment. And it's all the Americans fault. And you know, why are they sneering at us? And you know, they're not trying to be on our wavelength. We're having to kowtow to them and all this kind of stuff. And you can see this, this is not the language of diplomacy. This is the language of extreme aggression.
- [03:29]
Al Murray
And the remarkable thing, of course is people are listening to him, aren't they? Because Matsoka's been to America. He lived. He lived there for a while. So he can say, trust me, I know how they. I know what the Yanks are like. And they go, really? Oh, okay, this is the problem. Rather than that exposing him to America and him maybe having some insight, what it does is it gives him credit when he's holding forth on the subject when perhaps the stuff he's saying is all over the place. And one of the things I think we looked at in the first episode, or that we were coming to sort of outline in the first episode, was that the Americans and the Japanese are talking to each other at complete cross purposes. That the Japanese government has got the things it wants to do and doesn't see why it shouldn't do them. And the American government is coming at it from its own angle and cannot see why the Japanese would be doing any of the things they're doing. And you've also got that thing that the Americans can't quite believe, that actually what the Japanese want is conflict. Whereas the Japanese do want conflict. There's enough people in the Japanese body politics who are committed to conflict and who are completely comfortable with it. And as we'll see as we go through this episode, that manifests itself in all sorts of different ways, but at the core is they're laying train tracks to war in a way that the Americans aren't. You know, the Americans are trying to mitigate the situation and cool it down and make sure it doesn't come to pass, whereas the Japanese are like, well, if it happens, you know, whatever which is really quite.
- [04:58]
James Holland
It is our destiny and we will be. You know, this is our course in life. This is our divine wind and all the rest of it. But you remember at the end of the last episode, towards the end of the last episode, we were talking about the draft understanding in inverted commas which was put together by two priests, do you remember Bishop James Walsh and Father James Drought? And they. They'd set up a foreign mission society in upstate New York. And they go to Japan in the November 1940 and they meet various political bosses and military bosses and business figures and they are pressing for this improvement in Japanese American relations. And they then return to the us Meet with Roosevelt, report the findings and put together this, this draft understanding. And this is what Matsuoka is having none of. Doesn't want to hear about this. And he learns about this plan's true origins, feels he's been upstaged, feels people, you know, I'm the foreign minister here. What are you doing having conversations with these upstart American priests who were then reporting back to Roosevelt? No, no, no, no, no, no. We're doing this on our terms, not on their terms. And kicks it into the long grass, really. He really mucks it up, actually. And he absolutely loathes that. The plan proposes a meeting between President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Konoa, who's the prime minister. But a meeting that doesn't involve Matsuoka.
- [06:20]
Al Murray
But I mean, it's completely fair enough Roosevelt is the head of the American government and that the head of the Japanese government that they would meet as peers. Right. Why have you noticed put out a joint by that, at least you're getting to meet the top guy. They're not being fobbed off. Or the plan is not to fob them off, but he sees it as being fobbed off. And it's quite interesting though, because the State Department aren't involved in this. The US Secretary of State, Cordohal, he has been talking to Nomura because Nomura
- [06:46]
James Holland
is the ambassador and he's in Washington and it's easier.
- [06:49]
Al Murray
Well, exactly. And it's his job. It's the idea that Matsuoka's put off by the fact that people are doing things by the book rather than through him. You know, why am I not involved? And Harlan Nomura approach a kind of. They're approaching the idea that they're going to. They're going to tweak the draft understanding, but they'll get there, you know, with some modification, expansion. But Nomura telegrams back to Japan, but doesn't say this. And there is, I mean, it's very interesting, isn't it, that Communication, communication. When we looked at the end of the war in Japan, in our previous series about the end of the war, we looked at how communication in Japan was really chaotic and no one really saying what they meant. People shadowboxing through the language. Nomura doesn't say that he's spoken to Hull. He doesn't say that they're going to tweak it, that there's going to be modification, modification, expansion or entire elimination of elements of it. So he paints a rosy picture. And Matsuoka, he knows this, but continues to throw his toys out the pram. I mean, it's.
- [07:45]
James Holland
God. Yeah, yeah, yeah. You know, so he does a counter proposal, you know, so he does this counter proposal back to Hull and the Americans in May. On the face of it, it's just a sort of tweak of the original draft understanding plan, but it is, it's actually a massive change. And he writes, you know, the governments of the United States and Japan make it their common aim to bring about world peace. They shall therefore jointly endeavor not only to prevent further extension of the war, but also speedily to restore peace in Europe. But what that means is get involved in peace negotiations with Nazi Germany. That's not what this is about.
- [08:19]
Al Murray
No, no, no, no.
- [08:20]
James Holland
This is about America and Japan and obviously the Americans aren't going to negotiate with Nazi Germany.
- [08:26]
Al Murray
Well, first of all, they're not at war with them. I mean, it's, it's very odd. Matsuoko is seeing this as a world stage issue, isn't he, where he can basically say, look, I solved, I solved that war. How brilliant am I? Rather than dealing with the problem in front of him and may that the problem in front of him is essentially intractable and that, you know, that there are elements of Japan that are a runaway train. There's only so much you could do. But basically the Americans, obviously, they want peace talks regarding China. He rejects that. Yeah.
- [08:55]
James Holland
No, no, no, no, no, no, no. We're not giving up China. That's the whole point of the negotiation is to give up China. That's like absolutely writ large of everything. You know, we'll give you some latitude and we'll restore all the trade deals and give you oil and we'll give you steel and all that, but you've got to pull out of China. And he just goes, no, we can't do that and nor will we give up military options in Southeast Asia.
- [09:17]
Al Murray
Yeah. Which is the other angle, isn't it? And he's not going to do that either. That, for the Roosevelt administration is basically. Well, hang on a minute.
- [09:25]
James Holland
Yeah. It's a bright line, isn't it? A red line, rather. Yeah.
- [09:28]
Al Murray
What are we doing here? What's even the point? The other thing Matsuoku is doing is he's saying, I'm part of the Tripartite Pact, so that's my amendment. His amendments imply that. So which is, you know, this allegiance, this loose allegiance he's got with. So he's basically saying, yeah, yeah, yeah, we'll do a deal, but we're going to leave everything exactly the way I want it, which is not a negotiation at all. It's essentially a sort of form of telling the Americans to piss off, isn't it?
- [09:54]
James Holland
Yeah, basically. And also the other thing is it stems from this. This complete belief which he's got into his head, that the only way to deal with the Americans is to show that you're tough. America will never respect Japan if it rolls up, if it rolls over. It's got to stand up for itself. It's got to kind of fight back and it's got to be bullish and it's got to kind of, you know, any bullying tactics from America have got to be met with equal bullying tactics. Only when you punch Americans in the face will they respect you. It's this kind of thing and it's just. It causes absolute nonsense. The draft understanding have been drawn up as a kind of starting point for negotiations and Matsuka just kicks the whole thing into the long grass. And at the same time, he's also falling out with Kanoa, largely because he's taken the hump that he hasn't been involved in the draft understanding discussions early on. So, unfortunately, what then happens in this spring of an early summer of 1941 is that Matsuoka's hawkishness overpowers Kanoa's indecisiveness and passivity. And Kanoa ends up letting Matsuoka lead the government's diplomacy, which is a terrible thing to do because he's the least diplomatic person on the planet.
- [11:07]
Al Murray
But I mean, one of the things that we sort of outlined in the. In the previous episode is that Konoe, he can only really control so much in Japan anyway. And since 1931, since the invasion of Manchukuo, that the army or the militarists within the government have become more and more powerful and more and more uncontrollable. You know, they run a False flag in Manchuria. They essentially trigger a war in China. They're desperate to fight, and he's not actually able to control them. So you do get this sense that Konoe has been overpowered by circumstances. You know, he comes back into government in the spring, doesn't he? Having left government, comes back in and he still can't actually influence events the way he wants. And everyone's running rings around him. So Matsuoka does, the army does and the Navy does.
- [11:56]
James Holland
And it's about to get worse for Kanoa because General Hideki Tojo's coming into the scene. He's about as hawkish as you can get. So he's an army general now. Politician becomes army minister in July 1940. And he's racist, he's militaristic, he's an ultra national. He's cut from the same cloth as Matsuoka, but he's actually an army general and he's full of fire and brimstone and aggressiveness and for not pulling back. And he's also a massive advocate for the Tripartite Pact.
- [12:30]
Al Murray
If that sounds like a handful to have to deal with, the fact that it's. The army and the Navy are engaged in open rivalry, an open struggle for government supremacy and attention and resources. Yeah, well, exactly. In the blue corner with the Navy, Isoroku Yamamoto, who people may know is the guy who later, later devises the Pearl harbor attack. He's essentially opposed to war from the point of view, thinks Japan's biting off more than it can chew. But he's a naval hero, a hero of the Battle of Tsushima in May 1905, you know, when they defeated the Japanese, defeated Russia, and sort of entered the modern imperial world picture with that victory. And he's doing what he can to resist. But the Navy, of course, have been in this. Have been in this invidious position where after the First World War, they're sidelined by the great powers. They're told to control what ships they're allowed to build. They're very much treated as the sort of runt of the naval litter by the big players, by Britain, by the British Empire, you know, and even when they're given more ships and granted more ships, so at the London naval Conference in 1930, where that's loosened, they are not happy. They're still. They're still aggrieved by the fact that they aren't being taken seriously. And in the end, basically just build what the hell they want, don't they? And exceed all the treaty limits. And all that sort of stuff, and build enormous ships that far exceed anything anyone else is doing by the time they get round to it. What's happening, though, is that these factions are powerful enough in themselves without a foreign minister sort of running off, running off the rails, and without a weak prime minister who can't deal with them all, and then without an emperor at the top who, for quiet life, is basically nudging everything along, right, there's no one in this picture who can stop any of this, and they're all racing essentially in the same direction. It's almost like who can get to war first is the sort of feeling, isn't it?
- [14:26]
James Holland
Well, yes. The classic example of this is Admiral Yamamoto himself, who is seen as this sort of wise old sage. You know, he's been around the block. He's. He's a dove, not a hawk. He's also spent considerable amounts of time in the United States. He understands Americans, he speaks English, all this kind of stuff. But when the US Pacific Fleet is sent to Pearl harbor in Hawaii in May 1940, first of all, there's no mention of aircraft carriers. And how is he going to do this operation? What, he's going to be using aircraft carriers. So why hasn't he, in that opening centers, identified the US aircraft carriers as their number one prime target? Because in a battle in the Pacific, which is all about atolls and little sort of old volcanic mounds in the middle of the Pacific, strips of sand and all the rest of it where you can put a landing strip, aircraft carriers are what it's all going to be about, rather than battleships. And also, there is a kind of, I don't want to. I don't want to go to war. I want it to be peaceful. I can't see this working out, but if we have to do it, then this is what it's going to look like. So I would argue that Yamamoto is not quite as dovish as traditionally has been made out. He might think that a war is a bad thing, but I think he's been swept along in the tide of inevitability as early as February 1941. You know, this is a long way out from Pearl harbor, by the way, which is not for another 10 months.
- [15:44]
Al Murray
Well, maybe. I mean. And there is an echo of Matsuoka saying, punch the American in the face to get him to respect you in this letter.
- [15:52]
James Holland
Yes, there is an echo of that,
- [15:53]
Al Murray
but he's also doing what command, what commanders have done since the, you know, dawn of time. He's preparing for an eventuality that he sees possible, because if he doesn't, he'll get sacked. Right. You know, soldiers, soldiers, airmen, admirals tend to say, yes, we can do that, don't they? They tend to say, yes, of course we can do that. Yeah, we could do that. Because the last thing he wants to be doing is saying, well, if you're doing up in a war, what the hell are we going to do?
- [16:19]
James Holland
I'm not sure. I'm not sure I'm going to give
- [16:21]
Al Murray
him the benefit of the doubt, Jim. He's just a professional. He's a professional naval man. You know, if this is a British admiral going, well, you know, it looks like there's a possibility war with the Germans around the corner. We're going to have to sink the Italian fleet at Taranto. You've got all those chaps in the Med in 1938 planning to sink Italian fleet in Taranto. So I don't know, maybe. Maybe it's just a professional naval man doing his job, James.
- [16:44]
James Holland
Well, maybe. But I also think he's being. I think the talk is so aggressive. I think he's bowing to the kind of inevitability of the, of the swell of support for punching the Americans in the face, which is what this effectively is, possibly.
- [16:59]
Al Murray
But the Japanese navy have very much modeled themselves on the Royal Navy, haven't they? So there's a bit of. There's a bit of Nelsonian vinegar in this, perhaps. But the thing that changes absolutely everything, and the thing is we've been talking about a complex diplomatic situation as we've been going, with all sorts of different actors and different agents with all. All kinds of different influence over events. Well, the thing that really flips this all over is Operation Barbarossa. 22nd of June 1941. Matsuoko's plan and, and world view falls apart, doesn't it?
- [17:32]
James Holland
And just to remind people, this is the German invasion of the Soviet Union. For those who are new to this podcast, Barbarossa is the German invasion of the Soviet Union, which we will be going to in some detail later on this year.
- [17:46]
Al Murray
The thing that's shattering about this is that Germany is allied to the Soviet Union. So this flips the table, essentially.
- [17:54]
James Holland
So therefore is Japan, effectively.
- [17:56]
Al Murray
Well, yeah, exactly. So where does that leave them? And you know, the Japanese have last fought the Soviets two years previously and lost at Kolkin Gull. They've been kicked around the park by the Soviets, actually. And he's told, Matsuka's told about this by his secretary. He's at a commemorative performance in Tokyo. And it's a bit like that. You know, you can. You can picture the picture of George W Bush when he's told about 9, 11, where the guy whispers in his ear when he's at that nursery reading. It's a bit like that. Sort of Mr. Matsuoka of some bad news. And. And no one knows. No one knows what to do because they haven't seen this coming. Because. Because after all, the respect with which the Germans treat their allies is that the Japanese don't know about this. They'd know. No idea about it. I mean, the way the Germans treat their allies is they attack them. It's what Barbarossa is. So. So, you know, you know, as a measure of how you. The extent to which you should trust Hitler. So Conway says, right, we've got to abandon the Tripartite Pact. So that's a full U turn from him. Tojo thinks, no, we're in. We're in with the Germans, we're in with the Italians. The New York Times sums this up when it says, the outbreak of war between Germany and Russia froze official Japan into icy silence. The only official comment was that there would be no comment.
- [19:11]
James Holland
Diplomacy at work.
- [19:12]
Al Murray
Yeah, exactly. I mean, but, you know, if you've got nothing to say, nothing nice to say, say nothing at all. It's clearly the principle. But Matsuoka, meanwhile, is peddling hard looking for options, isn't he? And he's now looking to deter the us. His idea is that we'll go for Singapore, we'll invade Singapore. That'll put the Americans off. I mean, it's bonkers, isn't it?
- [19:33]
James Holland
It's absolutely bonkers.
- [19:34]
Al Murray
Although, you know, there's got to be a grain of assessment in that the. Britain is really looking the other way. There's nothing they can do about that. And he's, you know, maybe he's going to turn out to be right, but he's. He's now completely. They're all contradicting themselves. He's now contradicting that, his philosophy of peace, you know, that you use assertive diplomacy and, you know, you're strong and that will put the others off. And Konoe has to go to the Emperor, to Hirohito, and say, that's not actually our government stance, that's just him.
- [20:04]
James Holland
Well, Hirohito and Kanoa are quite, quite close because they're cousins. He's Prince Konoha, so he has the ear of the Emperor. And the Emperor's not massively impressed with Masoka, and he's sort of crashing around. And yet he still maintains his position of power. And the reason he presents his position of power is because he's a hawk and because the people that are now running the show are militaristic ultranationals. And Matsuoka is actually weirdly kind of untouchable because he is fulfilling everything that the hawks want him to fulfill.
- [20:37]
Al Murray
Which again shows that no matter who's in charge, they can't. They're riding wild horses, aren't they? That's the problem them, they can't control them. Even at this point, Washington still hadn't responded to Matsuoka's new version of the draft understanding that was sent in May.
- [20:51]
James Holland
What's to say?
- [20:53]
Al Murray
Well, yeah, exactly. Oh, thanks. Well no, no thanks. And he now wants an American Japanese neutrality pact. But the Americans don't respond to this because they know that Barbarossa is coming. And so they've been preparing their diplomatic position for the possibility, you know, the, the impact on American Japanese relations as of the invasion of the Soviet Union. The American assessment is this is basically because it's going to deliver a body blow to the status quo. Japan will be more amenable to concessions because there's the Japanese Soviet neutrality pact which is a non aggression pact. The northern strategy that the Japanese have. And we'll come to these strategies in a moment of expanding into the USSR from the east is impossible anyway because the Chinese war has not been concluded. Is, is breaking the bank for Japan. Japan's got as far as it can possibly go. And of course the last time they fought the Soviets was Khalkhin Gol and they lost. And there's also, they're wondering, you know, is America going to join forces with the Soviets against Germany? Because that might be the way the tides turned. And anyway, can the Japanese trust Germany? Because Germany has attacked an ally because no one can. Because no one can and no one's been able to since 1933. This is hardly news that you can't trust the Hitler government. And we're going to get to these in a minute. The northern, the southern strategies. It looks like the Japanese are going to be forced into their, what they call their southern strategy, which is to expand into the Pacific. And the Americans have the levers to be able to stop that because they could use economic warfare to bring the, to bring Japan on, you know, to line. So they finally respond to the draft understanding rewrite around the same time as Barbarossa gets going. And they basically say thanks but no thanks. And interestingly they Punch the Japanese in the face to make them respect them. They say, no, get knotted. This isn't going to work. We're not going to recognize Manchuku, which is the puppet province of Manchuria, and we're not going to permit you to use force in Southeast Asia. And Cordell Hull and this is, you know, this is going to go down well, isn't he? He calls in a statement. He calls implicitly, says, are you going to have to get Matsuoka out of the picture? He's not.
- [23:11]
James Holland
We can't deal with him. He's a nightmare.
- [23:13]
Al Murray
We can't deal with him. Let's get rid.
- [23:15]
James Holland
So Masuoka then advocates the northern strategy of invading the USSR in alliance with Nazi Germany. And this is just amazing. He then bypasses the government entirely and goes straight to the Emperor himself to pitch his idea. And Hirohito is really shocked by this suggestion. But Matsuoka stands firm. He says, heroes change their minds decisively. I have early advanced Sasamor southward move, but I am now switching to the north. In other words, what she's saying is I have changed my mind, but that just shows how strong I am.
- [23:44]
Al Murray
The thing is, though, the Tripartite Pact isn't particularly. It's very loose, isn't it? It's a sort of we're all friends, rather. No one's obliged to do anything for anybody in the Tripartite pack. So the Japanese don't have to help the Germans and the Germans don't have to help the Japanese. And Matsoka thinks that basically that his alliance alignment with Germany cancels out the Soviet Japanese neutrality pact.
- [24:08]
James Holland
But he just feels it. There's no. There's nothing in writing. There's no discussion. It's just this is what he's feeling at this particular time. He's such a piece of work.
- [24:15]
Al Murray
Yeah, it's such a piece. Colorway has to go to the Empire Emperor again and reassure me, look, this isn't. We aren't going to invade the USSR goes to heritage. We aren't going to attack the Soviets. So, you know, Matsoko's a liability. He's becoming more and more difficult to manage. He's going behind the nominal government's back. But no one can cope with the way that Barbarossa has changed everything. It's a complete game changer.
- [24:36]
James Holland
This is the history of unintended consequences, isn't it? I mean, you know, Hitler hasn't thought about this. No one's thought about this. So he just throws these global alliances completely off balance and then prompts a very swift regrouping because suddenly from being very anti communist, Britain and the western democracies suddenly think oh actually good old Uncle Joe rather than dictator Stalin. And it changes everything. This is what Churchill considers the fourth intense turning point of war. Yet another strategic earthquake, you know, to follow the fall of France and the
- [25:13]
Al Murray
Battle of Britain and Lend Lease and you know, I shall make a recommendation to the devil himself. It's like what are we going to do? We're now in bed with the Soviets. I mean probably the world's most prominent anti Bolshevik in the west is now 100% pro Bolshevik. As Matsuoka says, heroes change their minds decisively. Winston Churchill changes minds heroically.
- [25:34]
James Holland
It's all right when one side does it.
- [25:36]
Al Murray
Yeah, exactly. Slightly different from the Americans though, isn't it?
- [25:40]
James Holland
Well you know, Roosevelt's nervous, worried about the potential backlash from isolationists and anti communists and so on. And there is quite a strong anti communist strand in America even at this stage. But he does release $40 million of Soviet funds in the US that have been frozen during the Soviet attack on Finland in 1939. So these are frozen assets that have been handed back over. He establishes a special team to manage Soviet armament orders. Although obviously the logistical challenges prevent large scale amounts of orders reaching the USSR in the summer of 1941. That's more dependent on the British of their tanks and stuff. But boy do American supplies start to pour into the Soviet Union him within six months or so anyway. On the day the invasion begins, Cordell Hull asks Nimura Hull being the Secretary of State Hull and Nimura being the Japanese Ambassador to Washington. He asked him whether Germany's declaration of war against the Soviet Union might not affect the situation in such a way as to render it more easy for the Japanese government to find some sort of way. What he means by that is of dropping out of its alliances with Germany and Italy. Which is precisely what CNO was suggesting, but exactly what Matsuoko and the hawks are absolutely going no way. No of course we can't. This is, this is time to double down. And quite legally, from a legal point of view, from the Tripartite Pact, Japan is completely free to chuck it into the long grass because agreements are non biding under international law when circumstances change drastically, which they have done.
- [27:12]
Al Murray
I mean the Japanese are being offered the chance to get off the hook here, aren't they? Essentially by the Americans. But they, they, they can't take it. They double down, they double down with Tojo, with Matsuoko, with all the factions Jostling and the fact that Conor is himself weak and unable to, unable to sort of withstand this agitation against his position. He sort of thinks, you know, if they pull out of the pact there's be some reputational damage given that, you know, for him, given that he was so behind getting involved in the thing in the first place. So, so an unenviable set of circumstances. I think what we should do now, Jim, is take a break. We'll come back and look at what the Japanese see their options as at this point in 1941.
- [27:56]
James Holland
Yeah, good idea.
- [27:57]
Al Murray
We'll see you in a tick.
- [27:59]
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James Holland
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- [29:18]
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- [29:53]
Al Murray
Welcome back to Weird ways of making. You talk with me, Al Murray and James Holland here of course and we're on our road to war with Japan and before the break we said that what we're going to look at is the Options that the Japanese feel that they have even with the collapse of, of diplomatic certainties they thought existed. And these are the two strategies we brought them up earlier, which is the northern and Southern strategies, which are the Japanese options.
- [30:17]
James Holland
So what does that mean then, Al? What does that mean?
- [30:20]
Al Murray
Well, north is basically go for the USSR out of China, Spring out of China and go north, a land war in that direction. And the Southern Strategy is French into China.
- [30:30]
James Holland
So the southern half of it.
- [30:31]
Al Murray
Yeah, basically Cambodia, Vietnam, Thailand, seizing that
- [30:36]
James Holland
because they've already got the northern part of Vietnam. Do you remember they did that on the 22nd to the 26th of September. They go into Northern Indochina, Vietnam, just before they signed the Tripartite Pact the previous September. And now they're going to finish it off and it's going to take all those resources that they've got there, rice, tin, rubber. And it also makes them closer to British Malaya and Dutch East Indies, which also, and by the way, British Malaya also includes Singapore, which, which means they've now got a, you know, they've got a launch pad for that. And that is their kind of, you know, their next step in the stepping stones of creating this Japanese dominated sphere of influence in Southeast Asia. So that's the Southern Strategy and funnily
- [31:19]
Al Murray
enough the, that involves naval power more than anything else, doesn't it?
- [31:22]
James Holland
Yeah, it does a little bit, yeah.
- [31:24]
Al Murray
So the Navy are firm advocates of the Southern Strategy and the army previously had been the Northern Strategy because, you know, it's just inter service rivalry and, and they now switch. The army now turns its attention to the Southern Strategy. And what's really interesting about the Japanese setup is you've got the people at the top advocating stuff and arguing for and against things. But actually there's a set, there's institutional structures that are really the thing that's driving the argument and driving the possibilities. Because what you've got is people lower down the food chain, bureau and section levels of ministries who are formulating proposals and possibilities and plans and angles. And if a division comes up with a proposal, it needs to be approved, modified and endorsed from all the other division chiefs. So then it gets discussed at a joint meeting with the Army General Staff. Then the Navy has to be convinced, then it has to be approved by the Foreign Ministry, then the Cabinet, then it has to be put on the agenda of a liaison conference. And this means the tone of what they're all thinking and doing is it's all like being driven by people who want it to happen, isn't it?
- [32:36]
James Holland
Yeah, it's also very cumbersome system. I mean it really is. But you do have this uniquely in the Japanese system you have this grouping of Japanese officers and they're middle ranking military officers called the Bakuryo and they have tons of influence in this process. And the Bakuryo literally translates as. As officers behind the curtains. So this is the kind of middle management, isn't it? Yeah, effectively. And the three most important are in the summer of 1941 Tanaka who we saw later in. Do we see him in Burma later on in the war? Yes we do.
- [33:13]
Al Murray
Yeah.
- [33:13]
James Holland
He's Chief of General Staff's Operations Division. He's a massive hawk, especially with regard to China and also thinks a total victory is the only option here. So he's very, very anti American. And then there is Muto who is Chief of Army Ministries Military Affairs Bure and then Oka who is a chief of the Navy Ministry's Naval Affairs Bureau. And Ochre is also a strong advocate for the Axis alliance. And Oka in turn then appoints Ishikawa, who's a Navy section chief to be leader of the Naval Affairs Bureau's arms division. So these will go on and have a kind of really jingoistic influence on the Navy's position. Repearl Armor and he'd later boast. This is. Ishikawa would boast I am the one who brought Japan to the war course. I mean it's amazing, isn't it?
- [34:01]
Al Murray
Slow hand clap honestly.
- [34:03]
James Holland
As if that's something to boast about. Yeah, yeah, yeah, exactly. Chocolate tomatoes.
- [34:08]
Al Murray
Absolutely. This is the issue though isn't it, that they're not being there. Isn't someone above saying this is our policy, write plans accordingly. They're writing plans according to what they want to plan. So when there's a range of options discussion. They're all brim full of aggressive plotting and forward motion, aren't they? And after Barbarossa they're straight into. Into war preparation. They're preparing for war like mad. Despite. They're not. Despite there's an absence of a coherent national policy and there's. We've seen the leadership is sort of is fractured, running against itself weak big personalities flailing about trying to. Trying to have influence over events. And so you end up with these basically junior officers who have incredible influence over policy decisions that their superiors don't challenge. Because after all if you're Tojo, this is great, isn't it? Because when you decide to be aggressive you just have to phone up a plan from your. From the officers behind the curtains and they'll offer you it.
- [35:10]
James Holland
Yeah. And it's also a case of aggression by degrees, isn't there? Because both the army and the Navy Agree on 24 June 1941 that Japan should occupy the southern half of Inter China, not just the northern part. And then leave option open for the army to attack USSR are if an opportunity presents itself. And what would that be? That would be the mass transfer of Red army troops from east to the European frontline. In the West. Kanoa approves the plan because he's still a bit wet, but it still has to be approved in the Liaison Conference to become official policy. And there is a feeling they're all trying to sort of second guess what the American response would be. And there's a feeling that an attack on the Soviet Union could provoke a U.S. intervention now that the Soviet Union is busy defending itself against Germany. But no one thinks that expanding south into the southern half of Vietnam Indochina would do the same thing. Doesn't think that that operation would particularly necessarily aggravate the United States further. At the same time, there's clearly a sense that Japanese loyalty to Germany is dipping. But there's no sense here at all, is it that, gosh, we must go to our tripartite ally.
- [36:18]
Al Murray
I mean, we've said that earlier on the Germans are lousy allies. The Japanese are lousy allies too, here, aren't they? Because they're the Tripartite Pact for what they want. They're simply not interested in what the Germans want. You might easily get on the phone to von Ribbentrop and say, what can we do to help? Right, Is there anything we can do? You know, and the Germans might say, you know what, if you could keep the Soviets tied up on their eastern border, that'd be amazing. But that never happens. So basically this just means that the invasion of occupation of southern Indochina is essentially nodded through. There's no one to stand between that idea and no one, no one there to reject it. So it's, you know, the, the Emperor proves it, but that's basically a formality. Although if the Emperor proves of something, then people regard it as divine decision. His power is entirely passive, isn't it? But you. But used as leverage by. By others. I mean, it's a. God, such a mess, isn't it? This is such a mess, Jim. Yeah, yeah, yeah. What you need is a jolly good constitutional monarchy with a proper parliament. James. And an upper House of Lords and independent judiciary.
- [37:25]
James Holland
Just.
- [37:26]
Al Murray
Just rather underlines what a show this is.
- [37:30]
James Holland
Well, it is a show But I think it's also symptomatic of the fact that they have had this incredible kind of. You know, it's only since 1868 when the. The Meeji Restoration took place. So this massive period of expansion and of urbanization, all the rest of it has only just happened. And what's happened even more recently is this canceling of any form of democr. Total autocracy and the sort of infiltration of the government by ultra hawks and ultranationalists, military ultranationalists. And that's what's changing things. It's completely different suddenly. And the normal traditional pre military aggressive chains of command were cleaner and slicker. And so you've got the situation where you've got Tojo in a cabinet position who is a general. So there is not a kind of. There's no longer much of a disconnect between the military and the political classes. They're all one and the same. Same. So it makes the whole decision making process more. More kind of woolly.
- [38:23]
Al Murray
There's no membrane.
- [38:24]
James Holland
There's no membrane. Exactly that. Exactly that.
- [38:27]
Al Murray
Once the. The Southern Strategy policy is basically waved through, you have this extraordinary thing in the policy outline that basically puts the willies up Hara, who's the President of the Privy Council, where a single line, which is the Empire shall not flinch from war with Britain and the United States. And this has come from Tanaka and Ishikawa, although they haven't spoken to anybody else. I mean, it's just all these people running their own policy within the government at the same time. And you have the Vice Navy Minister Sawamoto who says I was surprised at their shall not flinch passage and asked Navy Minister Oikawa about it. He said he was against war, but considering the army's general preoccupation with the north, we had to say. We had to say that much to stop the policy from slipping out. This is the south incline policy of the Navy's control. So in other words, we go along with what they want. If we want to get what we want, they're going to go along with we want to get what they want. And so everyone's going to get what they want. It will run completely out of control. And Hara, at the Imperial Conference on 2 July, he says we need to be careful with the use of force.
- [39:34]
James Holland
And he's the President of the Privy Council, isn't he? He's a politician. He's not an army guy.
- [39:38]
Al Murray
Well, no, this is. Every now and again a civilian in this setup will go, hang on a minute. You lot. And he says we need to be careful with the use of force. It's one thing to make French into China listen to our demands by hinting at our power. It's quite another to exercise it. We don't want our action to be seen as an invasion. You say that you won't refrain from fighting Britain in the United States. How do you square that resolve with the reality of not being prepared really to fight them? That's what he's suggesting. What is the likelihood of this new policy prompting them to join forces against Japan? I would like a clear answer. So there is someone ringing the bell, sounding the alarm, but basically, too bad. You know, you've got Tojo, who's hawkish. Matsuoka, who now. Who's basically burned too many bridges. So he now needs support. He now needs to find someone to ally with. So he goes, all right, I'm all for the Southern strategy, because he's trying to play the cards he's dealt himself. And then they incredibly. And given the arm, given the track record of the Japanese military in China, China, and the brutality of their meted out in that war, they say to Hara, don't worry. It's going to be a peaceful occupation. We're not going to put entire towns to the bayonet. And it won't provoke the U.S. it's all right. It's just. God, these people are. Well, I don't know. It's also suggested that, you know, the America won't dare go to war with Japan because Germany's doing so well. In Europe, they're so dominant, the Americans can't tend to two emergencies, so they won't. And also. And, you know, here's a core assumption that a lot of people have at this point in the war. The Soviet Union's about to fall in on itself. The Germans are about to win. Maybe things have been destabilized by that invasion, but they're going to right themselves shortly with Germany in the ascendancy. I mean, it's such a mess. Such a mess.
- [41:27]
James Holland
It really, really is. Anyway, a few days after the Imperial Conference, this fatal conference, the top fleet commanders are summoned to Tokyo by the Navy Minister and the Naval Chief of Staff. And they're all really, really shocked when they hear about the plan, especially the shall not flinch from war part. And Yamamoto perks up and he goes, are we really ready for an aerial war? And Koga, who is the commander of the Second Fleet, says, how could you have endorsed such a critical policy without consulting us? What if a war really broke out. You can't just tell us then, okay, you go ahead and fight. We won't win. I mean. I mean, he's got a point, hasn't he? What about consulting us before you do all this kind of crazy rhetoric? And the Navy Chief of staff, who's played a massive hand in advocating the Southern Strategy, just shrugs his shoulders and says, what can I say? The government decided on it. It's tough shit.
- [42:21]
Al Murray
Despite me having lobbied it like mad,
- [42:23]
James Holland
it's having to get on with it.
- [42:24]
Al Murray
Yeah. And the Japanese public informed by Coney's chief cabinet secretary in a press conference that an important policy decision has been made recently owing to the present situation, but with no detail else. They're not told what's gone on. It's sent out internally. A draft of this policy is sent out internally, and it's sent to the Japanese Embassy in Washington. So the Americans, of course, they've managed to get into the Japanese cipher, and they know exactly what the Japanese government's decided on straight away. Oh, God.
- [42:53]
James Holland
I mean, it's just amazing, isn't it?
- [42:55]
Al Murray
It is. And you know what, Jim? Given how sort of familiar lots of people must be with the road to war in Europe, to see another runaway train like this, just as enormous a calam is incredibly dispiriting, isn't it? It's happened. Happens twice within the space of, you know, five years, globally.
- [43:13]
James Holland
It's clear that there are these. These hawks within the Japanese government who are not for. They're not for budging. You know, they've got their stance, which is they want the war. They want the decisive war. They want their opportunity to go and make good on what hasn't worked out in China. They want their opportunity to get their resources. They want their opportunity to be supreme in Southeast Asia. And there's a kind of. There's a kind of come on, let's, you know, let's give it to the Americas, come on, if you're hard enough kind of thing. It is a galloping train that's run completely out of control, and they're not thinking rationally or carefully. That's the problem. The emotional drive to war is overtaking sound judgment in a very, very rapid way.
- [44:01]
Al Murray
The American government is relieved of that. The Chinese Northern Strategy, Northern attack has been ruled out, but they know that the Japanese are completely willing to risk war with America and Britain. Roosevelt remarks to his Secretary of the Interior, Harold Ikes, on the 1st of July that it's terribly important for the control of the Atlantic for us to help to keep the peace of the Pacific. I simply have not got enough navy to go round. And every little episode of the Pacific means fewer ships in the Atlantic.
- [44:26]
James Holland
Well, he's absolutely right.
- [44:27]
Al Murray
Yeah, well, they're not in the war. They're not in the war against Germany. But he knows perfectly well, well that this is going to be really difficult.
- [44:33]
James Holland
What's around the corner, Hal? You know, from the first of July, it's the Atlantic charter, isn't it? What's one of the things that is agreed in that meeting between Churchill and Roosevelt in August 1941 is the formation of the US Navy's Atlantic Fleet. And the American warships will escort Allied shipping across the, you know, part of the way across the Atlantic. They are getting directly involved in the Battle of Atlantic. That's a month away from this. And so when he says that there's not enough to go around, he's absolutely right. And frankly, once it does kick off, that's the end of the Atlantic Fleet, by the way. Spoiler alert.
- [45:08]
Al Murray
Exactly. Entirely evident. But I mean, Matsuoko, he's still upset, isn't he, about the fact he's. That Cordoha asked for him to call for him to be removed. He's still in a huff, even though he's out of favor and is trying to create political space for himself. And he says, well, we should just stop talking to the Americans altogether.
- [45:27]
James Holland
And the home minister, who's called Hiranuma, he pleads, he says the empire has to avoid going to war with the United States at all costs. That is the most important thing. And he points out that if a war breaks out, it might continue for 50 or 100 years. I mean, the foreign minister himself has repeatedly referred to the great Japanese spirit represented in our common aim of harmonizing the eight corners of the world under one roof according to that spirit. Spirit, we had better avoid war. There are still doves, but the hawks are just going la la la. We're not listening, aren't they?
- [46:03]
Al Murray
Well, and Tojo, he says, well, we should pursue peace until the very end. And you kind of think you don't mean that.
- [46:12]
James Holland
You don't mean that. Yeah, yeah, yeah, you're doing.
- [46:16]
Al Murray
He's doing some ass covering. Obviously, there's lots, lots of contradictions. It's sort of sluicing about, you know, that one minute they want war, the next minute, then, oh God, we can't do that. That there's no clear thinking at all. And because there's no clear thinking at all, that when they do decide to occupy southern Indochina, they have in doing that and in the Americans knowing about that, they have already destroyed their relationship with America anyway. They've set themselves up for disaster there. One of their ambitions, aspirations is to break the economic stalemate with the us and they think the way to do that is to have a broader sphere of influence which makes them richer, which means that America have to treat them as a more serious player. And that exact ambition and that plan, that strategy and the way they're going to go about that is exactly what the Americans don't want them to do.
- [47:06]
James Holland
Exactly. So the Americans are looking at it from their perspective, which is, let's have talks, let's have face to face. This is our starting position, which is you have to withdraw with China. But if you do that, we will help you economically. We'll reopen those supply lines of metals and aero engines and oil and all the things you need and we'll help you get Bakla's trouble. You've got to abandon this aggressive militarism. And the Japanese are going. The way to deal with the Americans is to punch them in the face because that's what they respect. It's just the two stances are so kind of diametrically opposite. It's not true.
- [47:47]
Al Murray
The government decides to delay the response to Cordojal's counter proposal until the occupation is complete. So the thing that's going to destroy the counter proposal they're going to do first. Then they'll say, oh, you know, well, we've considered your offer.
- [48:01]
James Holland
It's so bonkers, isn't it?
- [48:03]
Al Murray
Yeah. Yes, madness. At the same time, they don't know that the Americans know what they're up to. Matsuoko sends off his response on 15 July, saying Japan's going to stay in the Tripartite Pact and that the Americans ought to urge Chiang Kai Shek to make peace with Japan, but without, I mean, without American interference. So that's complete, a complete rejection of the draft. Understand?
- [48:25]
James Holland
How well do you think that's going to go down with the Americans? Matsuoka? And he'll just go, yeah, yeah, but
- [48:29]
Al Murray
what you've got to do is you've
- [48:30]
James Holland
got to punch Americans in the face. It's so mad.
- [48:32]
Al Murray
It's mad. And the next day, Conway's entire cabinet resigns en masse. They've been planning this because they want to get rid of Matsuoko. And this is Conway's plan to get rid of Matsuo because he knows he can't make him resign voluntary, he can't fire him. So what they are. So he gets everyone to resign so he can immediately form another cabinet. Cabinet. And he forms another cabinet with everyone in the same job except a new foreign minister.
- [48:57]
James Holland
It's just, why can't he sack Matsuoka? That's what I don't understand.
- [49:00]
Al Murray
It's very odd, isn't it? It just feels like he can't because
- [49:03]
James Holland
he's a too elevated position and he's got the ear of the Emperor or something, I don't know.
- [49:07]
Al Murray
And he's famous. Also, everyone saying we can't work with him is unfactional, isn't it? Whereas if it's just the Prime Minister firing him, that could be seen as a factional action. Whereas if it's everyone saying we can't work with this guy anymore, then it's above board. It's, isn't it? And Eri Hota, whose history of this period is absolutely brilliant, says in just 12 months in office, Matsuoka had managed to entrench Japan in the very crisis with the United States he claimed to know how to avoid. With his brinkmanship, he'd done more damage to Japan's international position than anyone with much less knowledge of the world could ever have.
- [49:41]
James Holland
It's absolutely spot on, isn't it? Anyway, there is an American response to all this, of course, because abroad Tajiro Toyoda becomes the new foreign minister. Toyoda plays quite a big part later on in the war and he's confident with a strong military background, but he has no diplomatic experience at all. So this again is a kind of slightly odd appointment. And the US question whether his appointment will make any impact on Japan's policy direction. Is he going to take a softer tone now that Matsuoka is out? Are we going to get. Is that the end of this kind of nonsense talk that Matsuoka. But it clearly doesn't. And the Japanese leader seem to think that replacing Matsuoka will suddenly restore their credibility with America. But that's not going to happen without an awful lot of soothing and frankly without the Japanese saying, okay, well, we could consider leaving China. How's that going to look and what's in it for us if we do that? Which is what you would have thought would be perhaps the right way to go. But instead Toyota threatens the Vichy government, the French Vichy government, which still ostensibly runs the southern part of French Indochina, Vietnam, that if they don't hand over the southern part immediately, then they'll just go in there anyway. And because the French don't really have much of a leg to Stand on. And because their power is so denuded, they accept this on the 22nd of July. And that brings Japan access to eight air bases and two naval ports. So if you're the United States, this is not good news. There's no talk of pulling out of China now that Matsuoka's gone. There's no talk of reining in whatsoever. The only thing they're doing is they're threatening Vichy France and actually getting their own way and taking over the whole of Indochina with its new bases and airfields. So from an American point of view, that couldn't be more aggressive. Aggressive and beating the punch in the face is starting to seem like what it is. Punching America in the face is not the way to behave diplomatically is the truth of it.
- [51:51]
Al Murray
And so the Americans respond immediately. Cordo, hell's ill. So the acting Secretary of State, Sam Noel says, right, talks are off on 23 July, says that Roosevelt then freezes Japanese assets in America on 25 July. The Dutch East Indies, Britain, Canada, New Zealand and the Philippines, they all do the same same. And America puts American forces, US army forces, and you know, the colonial forces it has in the Philippines under Douglas MacArthur to protect the Philippines. So stages up basically for war Douglas
- [52:22]
James Holland
MacArthur, who had retired in 1937 to the Philippines and had then been by Quezon. President Quezon had been appointed a field marshal. A Philippine Field marshal had been retired. Ruso brings him out of retirement on the 26th of July 1941. So, you know, this is the moment. And there are also rumors that. Rumors that the Americans are going to impose an oil embargo too. And this is. This really would be very, very bad news for Japan because there could be dependent on the Americans for oil. And this massively concerns Toyoda and Tojo, who is the war minister, remember. But minutes of a meeting show that the leaders are ultimately, and I quote, convinced there will be no embargo as. As we don't go further than the military occupation of French Indochina. They're just reading all the wrong messages, aren't they?
- [53:12]
Al Murray
Well, they're making it up. They're making up as they go along though, aren't they? It's reconomics, isn't it? I reckon they won't be in an embargo as long as we don't go further. Yeah, I reckon you're right. Yeah, that should work. The Navy Ministry's Chief of 1st Division of Military affairs, who's Toshitane Takada? He's like a big advocate for the Southern Strategy this push south. He says years later, we had no inkling that the United States would be so angry over our going into southern French Indochina. We, myself included, thought that advancing as far as southern French Indochina would and should be all right. It was a groundless conviction. No, I did not solicit anyone else's opinions like the foreign ministries. Somehow we seem to believe it. That is inexcusable. That was inexcusable.
- [53:52]
James Holland
Yes, it was.
- [53:53]
Al Murray
By the way, talk about being wise after the event.
- [53:55]
James Holland
Well, it's your point. They're just winging it, aren't they? And they're starting to believe their own hype. They're believing what they want to believe rather than thinking this through, carefully planning it. Talking to Americas. If they just talk to Americans earlier on in the year, they would have got a settlement.
- [54:11]
Al Murray
The Japanese ambassador is in. In Washington visit. Nomura goes to see Roosevelt at the White House. On the day that Japanese assets in the US are frozen. Wells is standing in. His secretary state takes notes of the meeting. Roosevelt accuses Hitler of being behind Japan's move south, which Nomura has to deny. But Roosevelt isn't convinced, you know, because after all, they're in a tripartite pack. Maybe they are in cahoots. And also that's a. That's a way of making clear to the Japanese what the Americans think of what they're up to.
- [54:38]
James Holland
But that wouldn't make any sense because what, what hit is for Japan to attack the Soviet Union from the East. I don't think Roosevelt believes that.
- [54:45]
Al Murray
No, but none of it makes any sense. This is the point. None of it. And Roosevelt says, if you decide to take oil in the Dutch East Indies by force, and this is, you know, here's an absolute red line, we threat further sanctions or even war. But then he says the President could assure the Japanese government that he could do everything within his power to obtain from the governments of China, Great Britain, the Netherlands, and of course the United States a binding and solemn declaration. Declaration, provided Japan would undertake the same commission to regard Indochina as a neutralized country in the same way in which Switzerland had up to now been regarded by the powers as a neutralized country. So he's still saying, if you get out of Indochin, if you don't occupy Indochina, we'll let it go. We'll let this pass. The Japanese have been punching the Americans in the face. Even now the Americans are offering to turn the other cheek, essentially because the Americans also want access to the tin and rubber and raw materials that are in Indochin, China. And because the American economy is very much tilted now to helping the UK and the USSR through Lend Lease, they don't want another war because they don't want disruption to that. Roosevelt also uncouples Japan and Indochina. Japan's moving into China from the Chinese war to try and get the Japanese on board. And of course Nomura can't give an answer. He says to Roosevelt, well, I'll speak to my government. But when the American ambassador in Tokyo, Joseph Grew, meets with the Foreign Minister Toyoda Three days later, on 26 July, basically GRU discovers that Toyota doesn't know about Roosevelt's proposal.
- [56:17]
James Holland
So Nomura hasn't told it.
- [56:19]
Al Murray
Well, it's a mystery. We don't know why, do we? Is it Nomura, is it people in the, in the Foreign Ministry obstructing it, making sure that the message doesn't get through? We don't know, do we? But it's absolutely astonishing that Toyota doesn't know. And then anyway, Toyota says, ah, too late, too late. That proposal's come too late. Even though they've delayed it, the Japanese have delayed. We're not going to be able to turn ourselves around on this. And there's bad public opinion about America here in Japan anyway because of the asset freeze. We're concerned about what they call the ABCD encirclement, which is American, British, Chinese and Dutch are like predating our Imperial, our sphere of influence. You know, look who's on our border. The Americans, the British, we're surrounded. It's that sense, isn't it? These cruel colonial powers that Japan is at the mercy of, of. It's quite amazing, this meeting, because Toyoda is supposedly the new broom, isn't he? He's been come in. The whole idea is it's going to unfreeze relations because Mitsuoka is out of the picture. But actually it's more hardline than ever.
- [57:18]
James Holland
It's just nuts, isn't it? It's so nuts. You can just see this escalating and escalating so unnecessarily. But anyway, the bottom line is it's still in Kano's hands. He's the Prime Minister and he just, just doesn't react with any kind of urgency at all, you know, it is such a missed opportunity, don't you think?
- [57:37]
Al Murray
Oh yeah, absolutely. But then what can he actually do? Because these people have run away with it. If he was ever dribbling the football gym, he long lost control of it. Right?
- [57:45]
James Holland
Yeah. Back at center back, he hadn't gone forward at all, had he. And the truth is, Indochina has been completely taken over by the 28th of July, and that is the day after Toyota and GRU, the US ambassador meets. So it's too late. So it's not looking good, is it?
- [58:02]
Al Murray
No, it's not looking good.
- [58:03]
James Holland
Aren't you just finding this just absolutely stupefying, the pickle they get themselves into, the kind of, the pointless, unnecessary descent into war. Because I don't think that the Americans are being especially heavy handed in this. You know, that has been one of the historical complaints that they, you know, they're not giving enough flexibility to the Japanese that, you know, Roosevelt's refusing to meet Kanoa and all the rest of it. Not a big bit of is the Japanese every step of the way, who are putting the spanners in the works, I'm sorry to say. And this is, it's just incredible, isn't it? The total kind of mash up. The whole thing is.
- [58:39]
Al Murray
I mean, you could argue, couldn't you, that Roosevelt's neutralization of Indochina proposal is appeasement, couldn't you? You could say that's appeasement. It's diplomatic concessions to stop an aggressor that, you know, over a country that's nothing to do with you. All right, fine, it stays neutral as long as you stay out. And you could carry on doing what you want in China. That's appeasement. If you want to characterize it the way people talk about the 1930s in Europe, it doesn't look that different from, all right, you can have the Sudetenland, but leave the rest of Czechoslovakia out of it. Doesn't seem so different. And you're right, the Americans are often portrayed as heavy handed and blinkered and oblivious to what the Japanese really want. But what the Japanese really want, half of them here is a war, another war.
- [59:26]
James Holland
One, because don't forget, they're already in one with China and they want to take on, you know, the industrially strongest nation in the world. Are they mad?
- [59:34]
Al Murray
You know, we all make mistakes. And in our next episode, we will. I mean, this is the thing. We're only in July 1941. If you think relations have collapsed into chaos, just you wait. So join us in our next part.
- [59:47]
James Holland
There's a little bit further to go.
- [59:49]
Al Murray
Part three, our next episode. Join us subscribe to our Patreon Become a patron. And you can hear this ad free as it gets more and more depressing and swirls down to Pearl Harbour, which even the newest listener will have heard of, I imagine. And on the Patreon. We have live casts where James and I get together and chat about this stuff. Ticket offers for our festival in the Autumn, we have Wazefest Mark 6, a weekend of war, waffle of aircraft, of pints of excellent people, and always subscribe to our Apple Channel. Officer class, thanks very much for listening. We hope you've enjoyed this, but hope also that what you're learning here is don't listen to your admirals, your generals and your lunatic foreign minister. We will see you soon. Cheerio.
- [60:28]
James Holland
Period.