← WW2 Pod: We Have Ways of Making You Talk
WW2 Pod: We Have Ways of Making You Talk
Operation Barbarossa: Planning The Impossible (Part 2)
01:00:27
Loading summary
Transcript128 lines
- [00:02]
A
Thank you for listening to we have ways of making you talk. Sign up to our Patreon to receive bonus content, live streams and our weekly newsletter with money off books and museum visits as well. Plus early access to all live show tickets. That's patreon.com wehaveways.
- [00:24]
B
This episode is brought to you by my favourite London Review of Books, William here from Empire briefly Crossing the Goal Hanger Network Network Borders in our journey to unpick the complexities of the past, it's clear that history is not a straight line. It's a vast, intricate and complex tapestry. To truly understand a political revolution or the fall of a dynasty, you have to build up the picture piece by piece. You need diary entries and poetry that capture the scale of emotions, the secret correspondence of a diplomat, and the sharp, discerning insights of the era's great thinkers. And it's this art of the deep dive that the London Review of Books champions. They bring together the world's leading thinkers and interrogate a rich range of topics through long form essays. Try three months of the LRB completely free when you sign up today, subscribe at LRB Me Trial that is LRB Me Trial to try three months of the London Review of Books for free. Just do it. It's the most wonderful journal in the country and you will never regret it.
- [01:28]
C
Let's talk about a condition many people haven't heard of and it turns out it's more common than you'd think. Peyronie's disease, or PD for short. PD can happen when scar tissue builds up under the skin of the penis. This can cause a curve with a bump during an erection and for some men lead to pain during intimacy and may impact mental health. It may also lead to anger and frustration, depression, lower self esteem, and even withdrawal from sexual activity and physical intimacy. Because of this, some men could feel embarrassed or reluctant to talk about pd. The actual cause of PD isn't always known. In some cases it may be linked to a minor injury or repeated injuries during sex or other physical activity. The good news is PD is treatable. If you notice a curve with a bump, a trusted urology specialist can help diagnose it and walk you through your options, including non surgical treatment. To learn more about Peyronie's disease, visit talkaboutpd.com let's talk about Peyronie's disease or PD. It's not widely talked about and some men may feel reluctant to bring it up, but it's more common than you'd think. PD can happen when scar tissue builds up under the skin of the penis causing a curve with a bump during an erection that for some men may lead to pain during intimacy and impact mental health. A trusted urology specialist can help diagnose PD who and walk you through your options, including non surgical treatment. Visit talkaboutpd.com.
- [03:05]
A
The general staff demonstrated a wanton lack of professionalism, ignoring unfavorable intelligence and failing to consider in depth such critical questions as logistics, climate and the imposing spaces which extended not only the depth of operations, but owing to the expanding funnel of the Soviet landmass, the breadth of the front line. And that of course was Professor David Stahl, who has done some absolutely extraordinary work on Barbarossa. And I think he's one of the people who's moved the needle quite considerably, hasn't he, Jim, in recent years?
- [03:36]
D
Yeah, he has. And what he's done is he's gone into all the German archives and he's looked at all the original sources. So he's looked at what they're all saying at the time. He's looked at all the minutes of all the various conferences, the planning notes, the operational notes, he's looked at statistics and the Germans are very good at keeping all that stuff. And I know this from personal experience, having been to those same archives, you know, it's all there. And we left, didn't we, with the last episode? Stalin's response to the plan. A proposal of a four power pact between Japan, Italy, Germany and the Soviet Union. And he gave five conditions, all of which were impossible for the others to accept and least of all Germany. I think it's fair to say that plans for the invasion of Soviet Union from, from a German point of view accelerate after Stalin's response. I mean, Hitler is not just vexed, he's incensed, he's furious, he's livid.
- [04:28]
A
Welcome to episode two of our Barbarossa series. Here on World War II Pod, we have ways of making you talk of the run up to Barbarossa. And this episode is called Planning the Impossible. Because let's be, let's be frank now, we all know how it turns out. So it doesn't look like it was that possible. But at the, but at the time, when we look at the German preparations and the German mindset, they are not really sweating the fact that this might be impossible, are they?
- [05:00]
D
They're just going into a self delusion mode. They, they know it in their heart of hearts, but they're convincing themselves that it's all going to be fine.
- [05:08]
A
Hitler's response to. Stalin's response to the act is to. Is to go crazy. He's very, very unhappy about this. After all, it's a long time in his life since he experienced pushback of any kind. And Molotov has outraged him with his attitude in Berlin. And Stalin's formal response is absolutely outrageous as far as Hitler's concerned. And this is doubly painful because actually, Germany is reliant on the Soviet Union. Really?
- [05:39]
D
Not just a little bit either.
- [05:41]
A
Yeah, yeah. For petrol, for grain, for cotton, for manganese, which they need for making steel and other raw materials. And Stalin now wants the Germans to step out of Finland, where there's nickel and timber too. And of course, if the Soviets are dominant in Bulgaria, this means that German interest in the oil it can get its hands on that doesn't come from the Soviet Union. In Plesty, that's effectively going to be surrounded, which means they're completely dependent. Pretty much 83% of German fuel consumption is dependent on the Soviet Union. I mean, what a situation you've got yourself into.
- [06:22]
D
What a situation you've got yourself in. And to make matters worse, Italy has then invaded Greece at the very end of October and is making a complete hash of it. And because of all this, Hitler can't just sit back and ignore what is going on is on his southern front.
- [06:37]
A
Yeah.
- [06:37]
D
He cannot afford for this to be a disaster where because of Italian ineptitude, the Greeks fight back. The British then have a stranglehold as well in the Aegean, which then threatens Pleisty in a different way, you know, so he's got another threat to Pleisty, so he's got to do something, which basically means he's then got to divert resources to help sort that out. So it's a total nightmare. And on top of that, the Italians are also making a hash of things in North Africa, where the British are now completely overrunning them from the middle of December onward. He's now getting himself into a position where I would argue he can't avoid invading the Soviet Union. Really, you know, what else do you do? Because Soviet Union is going to come after him. You know, he's now got a choice. He's got Britain on one hand with America rearming and Britain rearming as well, at increasing armaments production at a great rate. Got the Soviet Union having an armaments race. What do you do?
- [07:38]
A
Well, it's interesting, isn't it, because some of the drivers for the war, which is the idea that Germany needs to sort of. The German economy can't run the way it does forever.
- [07:47]
B
Can't run.
- [07:48]
D
It can't run now. It's running out now.
- [07:51]
A
But this is my point, right, is the action he's taken to remedy what he regards as Germany's problems, right, which is the fact that Germany can't manage on it on its own as it exists as a state, right, that it needs to expand, it needs more. More people, more stuff, more. More land, more resources for it to function as a proper. As he sees it, as a world power. The action he's taken has made those problems worse. So in his effort to solve the problem, he's. He's made the problem much, much worse.
- [08:21]
D
Yeah, this is the great irony.
- [08:23]
A
He's exacerbated everything.
- [08:26]
D
But this is my point. This is the irony of the whole situation. On the one hand, he's got Europe at his feet. You know, he's all conquering. The swastika is flying everywhere, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah. It looks like it's absolutely amazing. But Germany itself, you know, armaments production has stagnated. They haven't got enough food. You know, rationing is unbelievably stringent in Germany and throughout the Reich. They haven't got enough of anything. They haven't got enough fuel, they haven't got enough resources. They're blockaded in by the Royal Navy. They've got the Soviet Union breathing down their necks and trying to ever kind of needle away and expand more. His one source of oil is almost completely surrounded. What does he do? You know, you've got the situation where on the one hand he's all conquering. On the other hand, he's absolutely pegged in, and he's as pegged in as Germany ever was, but with bigger borders than he had, which actually cost you more to maintain than they did when you had smaller borders. And he can't just shore up his defences and go, okay, well, we'll go on to the defensive because he hasn't got enough resources. So his choice is to make peace with Britain, which isn't going to happen, or try and do a deal with the Soviet Union, which has been rejected, or invade the Soviet Union, all of which I would argue are impossible or really bad. So at this moment of victory, he's actually in a really, really weak situation. And yet the irony is, is what's going to happen is. Is, you know, they are going to go to Italy's rescue in North Africa, they are going to go to Italy's rescue in Greece and Yugoslavia in the Balkans, and they're going to steamroller again and it's going to look like they're as all conquering as they ever were. But their situation is just getting worse and worse and worse, even though they're still having these victories. It's just extraordinary.
- [10:11]
A
One of the reasons he thinks he can do this, doesn't he, Hitler, is because he believes that Germany's perfected this modern motorized form of warfare, the Blitzkrieg. And of course, we're not going to spend half an hour arguing about whether Blitzkrieg exists or not, or what it was, or whether it's the product of press hype that the Germans then adopt and all that motorization. Let's look at this as the characterized method of German warfare that is supposedly the hallmark of the way they're going to do things.
- [10:43]
D
Wherein lies yet another irony.
- [10:46]
A
Well, here we go. Right, yeah. Well, and actually, I mean, if you, you know, if you like, if this is a me feuille of ironies, this entire thing, if a dense, a dense thicket of ironies now presents itself. So before, before the Blitzkrieg in France in particular, most German generals were, were pretty skeptical about rapid mechanized maneuver, this maneuver warfare that they bring to bear in the campaign against France in Falgelb. But then, of course, when Falgelb is a success, failure's an orphan. Right. Success has many fathers. Everyone immediately after the fall of France is going, yeah, yeah, yeah, mechanised manoeuvre. That's the way to do it. And I was always into it and it's definitely the way to do things. And that's definitely what we're going to do now. I mean, I think one of the things that's striking about the fall of France is they don't really. The Germans do not investigate exactly how the French offered up opportunities them over and over and over again, do they? They don't, they don't see it as a failure of the French army. They say it as their own dazzling brilliance.
- [11:52]
D
Yes, they do. I mean, I mean, there is a, there is a blind devotion to this new form of, new form of, of, of operating that comes with a kind of staggering intellectual bankruptcy from the point of view of the German High Command. Yeah. Both, both commanders on the ground and those at a staff level. So they just don't question that Western Europe's advanced infrastructure and geography is, Is what helps them with their notions of Pavegans Creek, which is the kind of sort of rapid war of maneuver which is Blitzkrieg. Yeah. In a way that the Soviet Union absolutely does not. You know, Because. Because France is the most automotive nation in Europe by some margin, so has the infrastructure to support it, which can then support rapid Panzer advances and mobile advances in a way that Soviet Union just does not have. That this huge gulf between what the German High Command now believes is possible and is part of their USP and what is the actual reality really comes to the fore with the absolutely catastrophic shortage of motor vehicles within the Reich and within particularly Germany. So motorization unquestionably has been vital for the success in France. Those leading Panzer divisions are really an all arms, mechanised formation equipped with fantastic comms. This is a mass use of radios. But the actual lack of mechanization in Germany is a massive, massive problem. And I think it's worth us just honing in on one of the individuals within the Wehrmacht trying to sort all this out. This is a largely forgotten character today, Major General Adolf von Schell, who has the grand title of General Plenipotentiary of Motor Vehicles within the War Economics and Armaments Office of the okw, the Obelkommando de Wehrmacht, the Combined General Staff, the combination German armed forces, and it's his job to try and sort it out. But of course, Germany is experiencing vehicle shortages now at the end of 1940, beginning of 1941, because of the problems of the 1920s and 1930s, because of the economic decline and for very obvious reasons, motor vehicles are still quite new post First World War and the great period of expansion is the 1920s first and foremost, and then the 1930s when they're all quite, you know, Germany's strapped, of course, for cash in the first part of the 1920s and then playing catch up. And it's the catch up that's the problem. So also the tariff war that followed from 1930 onwards with the smooth Hawley Tariff act has ensured that very, very few US cars, which are being mass produced in great numbers, are actually coming into Europe. So they have to build their own cars because there aren't any Model T, Fords and Buicks and Chevrolets and all the rest of it. So they have to develop their own motor vehicle industry. And again for the same reason, that's quite difficult to just get up and running from a standing start, particularly when you're late to the party. So although Germany has Mercedes, BMW, Audi, Hawke, all the rest of it, they're very much elites only, you know. So this is, this is. There is no mass produced car for the prototarat like there is for the American worker with the Model T. Yeah,
- [15:25]
A
you have to forget what you think about the German car industry now or in its heyday?
- [15:30]
D
Correct.
- [15:31]
A
Just drop it completely drop it, Just forget about it. Yeah. And also people in Germany are broke, so there isn't the money to buy the cars either. This is the thing is because Germans are broke.
- [15:41]
D
That's the point. That's the point. And so there isn't even kind of mass production like there is in Britain with Morrises and so on, or in France with Citroen and Renault and Persia, which are manufacturers coming. You know, Citroen is the largest automobile producer in Europe into the 1930s. So in 1935 there is one motorized vehicle for every 65 people in Germany. But in 1939, four years later, that figure is one vehicle per 47 people. So it's increased, but not much. So don't be hoodwinked into thinking, because you've got autobahns, you've got lots of cars. And one of the things that really annoys me about period films of Germany is they always have far too many vehicles in the scenes they were there. Yeah. And comparatively with Britain, there is one vehicle for 23 people in 1935 and one vehicle for 14 people by 1939. And that figure by 1939 is eight people for every motorized vehicle in France and three in the USA, which basically means in USA literally every adult has got a car that they can drive.
- [16:51]
A
Access to a vehicle.
- [16:52]
D
Yeah. In Italy, which has Alfa Romeo and Fiat and all the rest of it, it's 106 people every motorized vehicle. The lack of German vehicles in 1939 has made massive, massive knock on effects, which goes beyond just a vehicle shortage on the front lines. Because of course, if you've got fewer vehicles, you've got fewer vehicle factories. If you've got fewer factories, you've got less mechanics with the necessary vehicle knowledge, you've got fewer repair shops and garages and you've got fewer filling stations and you've also crucially got fewer people who know how to drive and you've got fewer petrol pumps, you know, so it's just, it's just there's a general shortfall in mechanized motorized vehicle.
- [17:39]
A
If you're going to catch up, it's going to be very difficult. I mean, just to just training people and getting them up to speed.
- [17:45]
D
Well, you need 10 years, don't you? Five, 10 years.
- [17:48]
A
Yeah, exactly. And an army is thinking, either I can train someone to drive or I could stick a rifle in their hand and tell them to get on with it. That's the other thing which is cheaper. Which is cheaper from the Wehrmacht's point of view, which is easier and which is more possible. That's the other thing, is which is more possible. So this is the gap between the glamorous image of the Wehrmacht, modernity, mechanization that Nazi propaganda is projecting is that the Wehrmacht is not like that. And in the Polish campaign, only 15 of the 53 divisions that took part were mechanized in any way. The others are dependent on horses and infantry foot slogging.
- [18:32]
D
So much emphasis is now being put on the spearheads which are motorized to a kind of totally unhealthy degree. It's sort of covering over all sorts of horrible cracks. And of course the truth is, is that the Polish campaign is not a yardstick at all for testing the German
- [18:49]
A
war machine because it's not really peer to peer combat, which is the thing that they're thinking, think they're going to be doing against the Soviet Union. So von von Shell is trying to deal with this, this gap, this motor shortage gap, these problems. And he's a, he's, he's 46 in 1939. He's a career soldier. So he's, you know, when we did our German generals roundup, basically, this is, this is the career, isn't it? He fought the first World War. He's wounded a lot of times, west and Eastern fronts. Yeah. He's got an Iron Cross first class twice. Stays in the Reichswear after the war. Take it back to the series we did, Jim, of worst in the West.
- [19:25]
D
That's all very on the money.
- [19:26]
A
It's all very on the money. A classic career path. And by 1930 he's a staff officer. He's a captain at the Reichs Ministry for Economic Affairs.
- [19:35]
D
Weren't they all?
- [19:36]
A
Yeah. And then this is remarkable. He gets a posting to the infantry school at Fort Benning in the U.S. there's so much sort of cross pollination here. The U.S. army actually publishes a book based on his lectures that he gives their battle leadership. Extraordinary.
- [19:53]
D
It's all good stuff. I've read it. It's fantastic. It's all very. Again, I'm very on the nose.
- [19:58]
A
Right, okay. And he's sort of regarded as genial, he's inquisitive. And while he's in the U.S. he takes his time to study the American motor industry. He visits the Ford motor plants in Detroit and has a good look at mass production. And this, this obviously informs his vision as it's going to be for mechanizing the German industry. Because why wouldn't you take in the lessons of Ford and, you know, the invention of proper mass production rather than artisan workshop, workshop mass production, which is what's going on in Germany and in Britain as well, and in France. Essentially. No one's quite doing it the way the Americans are. He's under secretary of the Ministry for transport in 1938, and at this point, he's spotted by Hitler and Goering. Goering announces his plans for increased rearmament in November 1938. And Fonshell then gets this job of General Plenipotentiary of Motor Vehicles. He does sound like, you know, a spreadsheets person, doesn't he? Sounds like this is a bit of a spreadsheet job. There's lots of emails, lots of spreadsheets, lots of PowerPoint presentations.
- [21:01]
D
Bit of graph paper thrown in.
- [21:02]
A
Exactly, exactly. His job is to coordinate and oversee the mechanization of the Wehrmacht. Oh, okay. That's a big inbox, isn't it? Bloody hell.
- [21:10]
D
Am I supposed to be pleased, Herr General? The problems quickly mount up, you know, because he realizes that motorized armed forces require a motorized economy. But Germany doesn't have a motorized economy, really, has no capability to mass produce whatsoever. And the current motor industry is very, very privatized. So there's lots and lots of little makers and there's lots of little plants all over the place and coach makers and all the rest who do the bodies and other people make the engines and other people do the upholstery and blah, blah, blah, blah. And, you know, it's just. It's. It's about 10 years behind everybody else, which is sort of entirely inevitable. There was also a kind of, you know, a terrible lack of iron ore. So the quota had been recently lowered in 1938. So Von Shell warns Goering in March 1939 that only 50% of truck orders could possibly be delivered by the beginning of 1940. And then that lack of work would then force factories to lay people off. And he writes, once this has happened, then an increase in production is unimaginable for several years. This would damage the motorization of the Wehrmacht, the Reich, and commerce, from which it would hardly be able to recover. So he's got to come up with something. So he comes up with the Shell plan, which is underpinned by a belief that the greater efficiency requires more state control of the motor industry. And you'd have thought, well, that's easy to do. They're Nazis and do what they like. But it's not quite as straightforward as that. But in his plan, he wants to reduce the number of vehicle types from 131 different kinds of truck to just 23 types of truck. You know, this is Max Beaverbrook and is. We're only going to build five types of aircraft in 1940, rather than, you know, 25, but on a completely different scale. He also wants to increase the number of vehicles operating with gas generators of solid fuels instead of petroleum. So, you know, those curl burners on the back and all the rest of it. This isn't the image of a modern fighting machine, is it? He wants to encourage production of the militarized Volkswagen, both military and civilian versions, known as the Kubelwagen, as a sort of general utility car for everyone. He wants to improve maintenance, which leads to the creation of the home and motor pool organization with more repair shops and garages which would stay privately owned but under direct Wehrmacht control. So basically like a sort of McDonald's, you know, you'd sort of lease them out. You lease out the name kind of thing. And also compulsory requisitioning. So 50% of all civilian trucks will be taken for military use. And the aim is to realize his plans by 1942, but not by 1941 and not, certainly not by 1939. Autumn of which is one of the reasons why the Wehrma has such heebie jeebies when. When Hitler suddenly goes, right, we're going to invade Poland in September 1939. Because they're just not ready for this.
- [24:07]
A
They're not ready. Yeah. This is interesting, isn't it? The context as well of, say, Plan Z, whether the idea is that the Kriegsmarine are going to build all sorts of massive battleships and, and hoover up all the iron, you know, which requires iron ore, which requires resources. So, you know, if you sit those two alongside each other, there isn't the stuff to do the, the navy's program, the Kriegsmuinness program. There's the stuff to do the armies. So you really pick one, right? But that's not how things work in Nazi Germany. When they do invade Poland, the Wehrmacht is like, although it's. I mean, it's this problem, isn't it? When you win, you maybe don't look at what didn't work. It immediately exposes their motor issues and there's, you know, they discover that there's very few vehicles actually in, in this part of the world. They discover the total lack of maintenance facilities and civilian repair shops. Poland's not even on our list of mechanized countries, motorized countries from earlier.
- [25:05]
D
No, no. It's even it's even less so. Even less so, of course, as a proportion. So of course, the vast majority of roads in Poland are not tarmac. You know, tarmacing comes in, in America in the 1920s, in Britain by the end of the 1920s, into the 1930s, that's when you start to tarmac roads. Otherwise they're just dirt roads. And they're almost entirely dirt roads in Poland, which of course means you're putting lots of weights of traffic on it, which to a degree that that road has not been designed to take. They very quickly become rutted and broken up and all the rest of it. And that puts much greater strain on the suspension and wheels and tires and blah, blah, blah, which means you need more rubber, which means you need more steel, which means you need more X, Y and Z, which means we need to factor in more time to repair them because they're broken, blah, blah, blah. And also you've got a massive inexperienced drivers who are too rough with the vehicles, you know, grinding gears and all the rest of it. You know, this is in a pre synchromesh age where you're having to double declutch and stuff. And you know, until you master it, it's quite a palaver.
- [26:17]
A
It's tricky. Yeah.
- [26:18]
D
So Von Schell, this is just after the Polish campaign, you know, when that's over, by the end of September 1939, you know, he's like, phew, okay, right now I can really sort of try and start to get to grips of this, but, you know, can you give me a bit more warning in future? That hasn't happened. Then has come France and the Low Countries and Norway and all the rest of it. And now he's being told they're going to do the Soviet Union. So he's got a massive, massive headache and he knows it's only going to get worse. And his attempts to streamline things haven't been working terribly well because people just aren't playing ball because actually the Nazi state is completely chaotic.
- [26:55]
A
So at the end of September 1940, Halder's already saying there's not enough motorised transport to meet our current urgent needs,
- [27:02]
D
let alone what might come in the Soviet Union in May 1941.
- [27:06]
A
Yeah, in July of 1940. So these figures are so interesting. The OKW says that 380 tanks per month will be produced and they'll be the lovely shiny new threes Panzer threes and fours. But By September of 1940, actually only 121 tanks have been produced that month. So they're Falling short, you know, they're producing a third of what they ought to be producing. Roughly despite this gap, on the 14th of September, the OKW announced 2000 Mark 3s and 800 Mark 4s will be produced by April of 1941, which is 466 tanks per month to make that number.
- [27:45]
D
Which they haven't ever achieved yet.
- [27:47]
A
Yeah, they've never achieved it. The numbers, the numbers are bad. The projections are delusional. There's. There's just no way they're ever going to be, ever going to be able to do this. This is a triumph of the wheel situation where you know, if they, if they want it hard enough, it'll happen.
- [28:00]
D
If you will it, it will happen.
- [28:02]
A
And so by November 1940, the Army Quartermaster General Gunnar Mayor Edvard Wagner is warning Halder, working on the assumptions given by the overcominator here, the Okh that made. They want to maintain 2 million men, which requires 300,000 horses and half a million 500,000 motor vehicles. And Wagner reckons that Germany can manage this kind of force for an advance 700-800km with food and ammo for 20 days. It's just also crackers. Leningrad and Moscow will be well beyond that range in terms of distance in time. So they can't. So what he reckons they can probably do. And don't forget they're feeding bad figures into the, into the machine before they turn the hattle. The figures are nonsense. They feed. It's rubbish in, rubbish out, this isn't it. In go the nonsense figures. They turn the handle, out comes this ludicrous projection. But that also doesn't deliver what they want. Von Schell, Wagner and everyone else working on this Barbarossa projected idea, they know the challenge is enormous and they actually know that they can't do it with what they've got. So, you know, no wonder diplomacy might be the better option here. This is really giving, really reminding me of the Japanese diplomatic spiral. Anyway, we're going to take a break. When we return to look at.
- [29:28]
D
We'll look at the actual plans of what they're. What they're hoping to do.
- [29:31]
A
The cat's cradle that emerges. We'll see you shortly.
- [29:39]
E
Hi, this is Gary Lineker from Goal Hangers. The rest is football. This episode is brought to you by wise. It's only when you start moving money between currencies that you really think about the exchanges, exchange rate, the fee and what might be hidden away in the small print. Whether you're living abroad, paying someone overseas or just trying to manage your money across borders. You want a fair exchange rate, an easy transfer, and no surprises along the way. Wise keeps things simple. Wise is a smart way to move the currencies you need around the globe. It works in more than 160 countries and with over 40 currencies, most transfers arrive instantly. Wise uses the mid market exchange rate like the one you see on Google, with no markups or hidden fees. So when money needs to move, you can see the rate, know the fee, and get on with it. Join millions saving billions on hidden fees by downloading the Wise app today. Be Smart, Get Wise T's and C's
- [30:36]
F
Apply this episode is brought to you by the National Archives. It's Tom Holland here from Goal Hangers. The rest is history Now. American independence is often painted as a quest for freedom, a triumph of democratic ideals. But it was also a period of immense risk and violence which turned the colonial world upside down. So if you want to go beyond the familiar tales of the Boston Tea Party and red coated battalions, I have some marvelous news for you. The National Archives is holding a free exhibition, Revolution 250America's Independence Story, 1763-1783. It's not just a story of declarations and battles and revolutionary heroes. It uncovers the human cost of decisions made on both sides of the Atlantic. You'll also encounter voices too often pushed to the margins. Don't miss this once in a lifetime exhibition, Revolution 250America's Independence Stories, 1763-1783 June 24 to November 29 at the National Archives in Kew.
- [31:40]
C
Let's talk about Peyronie's disease. It's not widely talked about and some men may feel reluctant to bring it up, but it's more common than you'd think. PD can happen when scar tissue builds up under the skin of the penis, causing a curve with a bump during an erection that for some men may lead to pain during intimacy and impact mental health. A trusted urology specialist can help diagnose PD and walk you through your options, including non surgical treatment. Visit talkaboutpd.com.
- [32:14]
A
Welcome back to WEAR of Ways of Making you talk with me, Al Murray and James Holland. And well, in our build up to Barbarossa, we've looked at the fact that the numbers don't add up, but that's not going to stop them, is it Jim? No.
- [32:26]
D
And I mean, you know, anyone listening to this will go again. Well, hang on a minute. You're saying all these figures are, you know, so bad and they haven't got enough and I can't do this, then how come they won in France? Well, they won in France because they were able to do it really, really quickly, effectively won in five days. I mean, I know that it took six weeks, but the battle was all but won by the 15th of May, having started on the 10th of May 1940. And they were able to do this by destroying the French in penny packets. And the way they were able to do that was by using these spearheads, which were very well equipped with motor vehicles, with trucks and half tracks and armoured cars and panzers, of course, tanks and mobile artillery, et cetera, et cetera, and, and motorbikes with sidecars. They were able to do that because they were able to communicate with one another in a way that the French couldn't, and nor could the British or Belgians or Dutch. So that was how they won. You know, one has to accept that the victory in France was 50% German operational brilliance and training and all the rest of it and the spearheads and 50%, you know, ineptitude on the part of the French. Soviet. Attacking the Soviet Union is something out of a completely different order altogether because of the geographical scale of it. And that's the issue. And this is the lesson that the Germans themselves have not learned. They're just thinking, they think, well, because the infrastructure of Russia is so backward, it's going to be a cakewalk. Rather than going because the infrastructure is so bad, that's not going to support very limited resources in motorized vehicles. And that's going to be a problem. They're not looking at it that way. So that's why they're successful in 1940, and that's why that is masking that victory, is masking the unbelievable shortfall in mechanization that the Wehrmacht has at this time.
- [34:13]
A
And there's two plans drawn up. So there's one by General Erich Marcks is the Chief of staff of 18th army, and by. And the other by Oberst Leutnant Bernhard von Losberg, who's on the staff at okw. And it's not unusual to have a couple of, couple of different teams working on the same thing. That's, that, that, that, that isn't sclerotic German planning. That's, that's, you know, banging heads together and coming up with good stuff. Marx has been at it a little longer, hasn't he? So from. He's been working on contingency plans for war with the Soviet Union in case of a Soviet move. So pre. Or feelings that there might be Soviet Union. So sort of preemptive aspect to that. And on the 29th of July, Marx arrives at the OKW headquarters in Fontainebleau in France for briefing on what he's, what he's got so far and the scope and how it's expanding. And Marx is an old pal of Halders. Everyone thinks he's fantastic. He's thin faced and bespectacled. Looks like a Latin teacher. Although I'm thinking of some of my Latin teachers. I'm wondering if they remind me of Eric Marx. Anyway.
- [35:19]
D
Well, yeah, and actually my Latin teacher is a fat bastard with a beard.
- [35:22]
A
There we go.
- [35:23]
G
Right.
- [35:23]
D
He used to pick his nose and wipe it on his beard.
- [35:25]
A
Ah, yeah, yeah, yeah.
- [35:28]
D
And you know, you'd be going through the school and you'd go, boy, elevate your hoses, things like that really, we'll just pull up your socks, obviously. And he used to call fish fingers piscatorial digits, which I thought was quite funny.
- [35:39]
A
Right, that's, that's not bad. Okay, I'm going to let the bogeys go. Anyway, he lays out he's got his plan. His first plan is completed in the first week of August. So he's getting on with it. It's called Operations and verf ost. So it's operations outline east, it's two main thrusts, one north, one south of the Pripyat marches.
- [36:02]
D
Well, we should explain this. The Pripyat marches comes up a lot, doesn't it, in talks of the Eastern Front. So this is a vast area in belarussia basically of 104,000 square miles north of Kyiv in central Belarus, as it is now known as polygy. So in other words, it's a big block of not really traversable terrain. Yeah, which means you're going to have to split your forces. You're either going to have to concentrate north of it entirely or south of it. But if you want to kind of do a broad front strategy, you're going to have to split them in two to an extent that they're not going to be mutually supporting in any shape or form. So that just has to be factored in.
- [36:45]
A
Although the feeling is that might not really be a problem because they certainly don't think much of the Red army, do they? And the stronger of these two thrusts will be aimed at Moscow. And this is how the wants this. Halder's convinced that Moscow is the key to eliminating Russian state. A political decapitation, in other words, words. And that that northern route to Moscow would also use one of the actually Better roads in the Soviet Union, which is a country without very many roads. So they are thinking. They are thinking in terms of the highway there. And the route would go for the border to Minsk, Sleminsk, through the Orsha corridor, between which goes between, roughly, there's the rivers that flow north, south, the Dvina and the Dnieper. And then the other northern thrust, which is the north, will also peel off and strike at Leningrad. I mean, again, these plans, you're supposedly the experts on concentration of force, and already they're dividing. Dividing their forces here.
- [37:40]
D
Well, they're dividing it and dividing it because there's a southern thrust, and that's vital because you cut off the Red army advance into Romania, but you also get into Ukraine, which is the breadbasket of Europe, of course, and Germans are short of food, so they need the food that Ukraine can produce.
- [37:54]
A
Yeah.
- [37:55]
D
So you're not only in this first plan by Marx are you splitting your forces into two. One north of the Privet Marches, one south into Ukraine. You're also then splitting the northern force between a drive to Moscow and a drive to Leningrad. So you're asking your guys to do quite a lot.
- [38:12]
A
But, I mean, the big idea is it will destroy the bulk of the Red army in the western half of the Soviet Union. It's got four phases, but the key phase is phase one, which pushes the Soviets back 400 kilometers from the German start line. They rings. That'll take three weeks and then three more phases of advance getting up to the River Don. And he thinks this will take 9 to 17 weeks in total. Here's the bit where you go, come on, lads. They also believe it's going to be different to 1812.
- [38:45]
D
Different. Different time, different time.
- [38:46]
A
We've got a different way of doing things.
- [38:48]
E
Right.
- [38:48]
A
We're not like silly old Napoleon. There is a great big howling lesson from history here. And, you know, we, obviously, we must always say that when you come to trying to draw lessons from history, the differences are as important as the similarities.
- [39:01]
D
Well, yes, and in 1812, the point is that the Russian army can retreat into the depths of the country.
- [39:07]
A
Yeah.
- [39:07]
D
But Marx reckons that they can't do that anymore because a modern army would be unable to abandon its lines of supply. And also, much of the Soviet industry is in the west, so therefore they. They could be expected to stand before the Pripet Marches.
- [39:23]
A
Yeah.
- [39:24]
D
In which case they don't have to divide all their forces, they can smash them all as one.
- [39:28]
A
However, he does predict that this will result in an enemy coalition of Britain and the Soviet Union that you know, they'll be, they'll be forced together and that the Americans joining him with that and he warns this would be a powerful economic block, you know if that
- [39:43]
D
saying, just, just, just putting it on there in writing.
- [39:48]
A
But here comes the back of the fag packet. Part right, with this plan is that he makes no assessment, Marx's plan makes no assessment of the Wehrmacht's capability of pulling this off in a single campaign. It's just, well, you know, we've done it before, we can do it again.
- [40:04]
D
Yeah. There's a supposition of success. Yeah. Like hardwired into the whole thing. Yeah.
- [40:10]
A
I mean it's awful, isn't it? And also, I mean the other thing you've got to remember in here is that the Germans did very well against the Russians in the First World War, that you've got this. There's the great battle of Tannenberg from 1914 where the Germans really do turn the Russians over quite completely, don't they? And again we talked about Hitler's belief system that it's a cocktail of things but you've shaken the cocktail so you can't separate these things out. Part of the cocktail here's that the Russians are terrible at fighting, right. Because, because the last time we, the last time we fought them they were terrible. In fact they defeat, don't forget they defeat the Germans do defeat Russia in the First World War while fighting a two war front against the British and the French.
- [40:53]
C
Right.
- [40:54]
A
They do defeat them, right. So they think we've done it before, we can do it again.
- [40:58]
D
But also there's also this, this, this, this thing isn't there with the Germans that you know, we're Prussians and, and what we do is we do, we do brilliant, we do brilliant military stuff in, that's our DNA. We're call it military which is, which is why there's such an issue with defeat in 1918. How can this be possible? We're supposed to be the top of this and they've never got rid of that, that, that point. And part of the Nazi self building of German confidence is to go, we were stabbed in the back, we were betrayed. We are really good at military. That is what we, that's what we do. And as if to prove it, we've just won in Poland and Scandinavia and in the west we've overrun everyone so we can do it again. So there is this, by this stage there is this hardwired military superiority kind of thrown into it which is also mingled with really, really Strong racism against these inferior, backward, primitive Slavs who have low toilet facilities.
- [42:00]
A
Yeah, exactly. And General Herman Hoth, he says that Russia is a place of bestial cruelty. When he encounters the Russians in 1914, Guderian also calls the Bolsheviks, he says they cavort like beasts. You know, Halder, he's been on the Eastern Front in 1917 when the Russians collapse. So they all, you know, and shake that in a cocktail with, with hardwired Nazi stuff about Bolshevism and about Judeo Bolshevik, about Jews and about Slavs. Give that all a shake, you know, and then. And they're all. And this is the cocktail they're all taking refreshing drafts from at this point, isn't it? So this is, this is the, the core of it, that they will not take the Red army seriously. And, and the Red army, the Red army has helped with that by, by making, by fumbling its offensive in Finland so they can look at the experience of the Finns and go see, they are, they are terrible. They're plodding, they've been purged, the officer class has been purged and all this sort of stuff. So they, you know, there's a. There's a very much a sort of impenetrable group. Think on this, isn't there?
- [43:11]
D
But there are some discerning voices, and not least General Leutnant Ernst Kerstring, who is the foremost German military expert on the Soviet Union. He's fluent in Russian and been the military attache in Moscow since 1935. And he strongly believes that there's nothing to be gained from war that couldn't be better served by a political solution. And on this he is absolutely on the money, although you know what that political solution is by the end of 1940, I'm not quite sure. But anyway, he recognized that Germany could be invaded by the Red army. But so long as Germany remains militarily strong and undefeated, there's little to worry about. Well, there's little to worry about apart from the shortage of food and fuel and literally every resource you possibly need to be able to defend yourself properly. Kerstring admits to Holder in September 1940 that the Red army is still four years away from reaching its former command levels. Pre purges. And these are the purges of the Red army command of 1937-1938. But he also warns that the demands of the terrain and conditions for an offensive campaign would be absolutely enormous. And he draws attention to the absence of roads as well as extremes in weather and said these were Russia's greatest allies. Along with both time and of course, space. They've got themselves into such a bind, haven't they? Because they can't do what Kerstring's suggesting, which is just sit back and just, you know, maintain military strength because they haven't got enough resources.
- [44:40]
A
But there's another plan, so there's the Losberg plan. So is this any. Jim, take us through this. Is this any more realistic?
- [44:45]
D
Well, not really. So Erbajnam Bernhard von Rossberg, he's been planning under the instructions of Jodl, who's the chief of plans of operations rather at the okw. Alfred Jodl, he's a horrible toady. He's the guy who ends up finally signing the surrender at Reims in the early hours of 7 May 1945. But anyway, Lossberg begins work on Operation Studia Operations Ost shortly after the 29 July Conference and completes it on 15 September, which of course, you know, goes down in fame as the Battle of Britain. Not infamy, but fame as the Battle of Britain Day. Anyway, Lossberg benefits from the study of Marx's plan, but also from the arbitration of Vienna in which, you know, which we talked about in the last one, the award of the Vienna award, which is the. The changed circumstances of Romania in which. Which, you know, northern Transylvania ceded to Hungary and parts of Bulgaria. And that means that Romania can now be used as a base because Germany has guarantees its security with permissions to move troops there, so they can use that as part of their kind of, you know, launching point. And Lossberg's plan calls for three simultaneous thrusts, each with an army group. So two north of the Pripit Marshes and one south. This indeed is exactly what eventually happens. And it's assumed that the Red army would mount a strong defence of the western Soviet Union to protect the mass of the Red army air bases which had been furiously built throughout 1940 and because the regime wouldn't allow an 1812 scale retreat. So they assume that the Red army can be expected to try and hold the line which would allow Germany to defeat them before an orderly withdrawal is possible. This obviously worked in favour of the German lines of supply and the shortcomings of the German military, that is their lack of motorisation. So, you know, the only way, in fact they could possibly win in the Soviet Union is if they defeat the mass of the Red army within, let's say, 500 kilometres of their start point. Yeah, and if a Soviet Union doesn't play ball, they've got a problem. Lossberg definitely appreciates the immense scale of the Soviet Union, more so than Marx, and absolutely stresses the importance of capturing Soviet broad gauge trains. He states that a transport system built only on roads will be insufficient. And this is something that goes back and forth, back and forth, back and forth, right up to the wire about what can they do about railway transport or not and how much are they dependent on motor transportation anyway. Lossberg also highlights the internal dissent as a source of support. He says, you know, the Ukrainians, they've got no love for the Russians. You know, they've had the famine which has been entirely induced by Moscow in the 1930s, which has killed anything up from sort of 2 to 9 million people. And he writes about, you know, it would be good to establish an independent Ukrainian government, obviously subservient to Germany, but independent. And like Marx, Lostberg's plan never once questions the ability of the Wehrmacht to achieve victory and only really goes into studying the best method of achieving that goal. So there's no real consideration of Soviet countermeasures. There's an astounding underestimation of the size and robustness of the Soviet economy. Even considering the urals industrial area 500 km east of Moscow. It was impossible that Russia can remain capable of resistance after losing her western territories and contact with the seas. Why?
- [48:28]
A
Yeah, why not?
- [48:30]
D
Answered everyone goes, yeah, no, quite right. Absolutely impossible. Impossible, possible that they could do this.
- [48:34]
A
I suppose you could, you could filter that through. They didn't have to conquer the whole of France for France to fall. They defeated her armies essentially on her borders and then the capital fell.
- [48:44]
D
You're dealing with, with Soviet autocracy here.
- [48:47]
A
Slightly different beast, I know, but I'm, I'm just trying to, I'm just trying to, you know, how do we get into, into this headset? How do we get, how do we get to understand it?
- [48:56]
D
It's just collective. They, they've all bought into it. You can't countenance an alternative. You know, the Slav is inferior, they're primitive, they're hopeless, they're crap at war. They always have been. We've always defeated them. We defeated them absolutely trounsome in the First World War. They've, they haven't shown any difference. They've had the purges, they were rubbish in Finland. You know, this is going to be a cakewalk because no one can stop us because we're unstoppable. And if you doubt that, look at Scandinavia, look at Poland, look at, look at the war in the West.
- [49:26]
A
Essentially both plans are full of the same kind of stereotyping the products of the same culture and the same mindset. I mean, interesting, isn't it? There's clear evidence in both plans that their intelligence on the Soviet Union Union is produced to match major decisions rather than the other way around. So basically come back with me with some intel that helps me with my plan rather than tell me what's going on.
- [49:46]
D
This is this fundamental paradox as well, isn't there? So on the one hand there's deep rooted suspicion of Russia as an aggressive colossus intending on spreading Bolshevism westwards. But there's also this assumption that they're fundamentally inferior in military weak. So if they're fundamentally inferior weak, why are you worrying about the westward spread of Bolshevism?
- [50:05]
A
I know we, we're sort of going, we're looking at this and it's through the, to the Wehrmacht prison, but this is, this is how people think themselves into making terrible decisions, isn't it? This is the, this is, this is how it's done. If I, if I march on Moscow in 1812, Europe will follow me and thank me and this time it'll be different. Exactly. So this comes to war directive number 21 with these two plans doing the rounds. On 3rd December 1940, Hitler tells Feld Marshal Feder von Bock, who will eventually end up commanding Army Group center for Barbarossa. He says the Eastern question is becoming acute. If the Russians were eliminated, England would have no hope of defeating us on the continent. He's made up his mind now and obviously Sea lion in the meantime has been, has been cancelled. They've left the British pot to simmer rather than try and do anything about it. Terrible mistake.
- [51:01]
D
But, but, but don't you think I just go, one thing, I mean, it's really interesting that there is this change of tone in Hitler since the cancellation of Sea Lion. So it's no longer that Britain has no hope and it's finished. What he's now saying is it now has no hope of defeating Germany on land. That's not the same thing at all. That's quite, that's quite downgraded, isn't it?
- [51:21]
A
It could be that the part of him that wants to fight the Soviets is, it's now being, you know, has smelt the blood in the water and is going for it. So, you know, because, because he lives on his feelings and all that sort of stuff. So the, the Lossberg and Marx plans, they, they do become the basis for the final drafting of the plan. That's to be implemented. And this is prepared by General Leutnant Friedrich Paulus. Those of you with a. Even though I think the most passing acquaintance with the history of the Second World War probably know that name. And he, at this point he's the senior quartermaster, one of the general staff in the OkH. So if anyone should know what the army's capable of, it's the senior quartermaster, isn't it? Right. So if anyone knows what's in the cupboard and whether the cupboards bare when it comes to, say, lorries, you'd think it would be him. And he begins preparation on the basis of this idea of a rapid penetration encirclement of the Red army in the western parts of the Soviet Union. He gets cracking. In December of 1940, he's conducting detailed map exercises. So these are, you know, exercises without troops, aren't they? So this is a classic war game, essentially. In these exercises they estimate that Germany will field 154 divisions, including the point of the spear of 18 Panzer divisions, 18 motorized infantry divisions, and these are going to face 125 Red army divisions plus 50 tank brigades.
- [52:51]
D
And these figures are a little bit off.
- [52:53]
A
What a surprise. I mean, and anyway, even if those figures are right, they're still not the three to one preponderance you're meant to have, are you? Are they for a successful assault?
- [53:06]
D
Not at all powerless.
- [53:08]
A
He doesn't calculate for German reinforcements, but he does include Soviet build up of 30 to 40 divisions in the first three months and another hundred within six months of the campaign. It's interesting that he might do that. So his figures have already. They're super wonky right from the start. And he agrees with Marx and Lossberg that the opening weeks would dictate the outcome, but that, that of course he does, because that's their style, isn't it, that you've got to do it quickly. So of course the start, the quick bit, is the bit that they're all going to look at rather than worry too much about the long term. So he preps two scenarios, one after eight days and then another after 20 days. It's quite interesting this, isn't it, that the map exercises reveal that they've placed too much emphasis on the leading Panzer groups. It's no Sherlock to be applied here. These were effectively panzer armies and they're going to be. They, they are the way they've been winning in the way they won in France. He says blunt's a knife. And opportunity for rapid penetration of the enemy front is lost, eliminating some abilities of his army and leaving the marching infantry with a predicament not unlike that faced by Napoleon's slow moving grand army. I mean, there's a clue there lads,
- [54:19]
D
in, in a nutshell, Palace's war gaming exercises show major objectives are not being fulfilled. And it also demonstrates that the Red army is trading space for time and pulling back with increasingly stubborn resistance. It's also reckoned because what they do is they set up two sides. They have a blue side which is roughly German, and a red side which is supposed to be the Red army, obviously. And they also reckon that the Germans would need a pause for at least three weeks for rest and refit and to allow build up of forward supply bases. Well, you know, there's no room for three week pauses. No, in the south, in Ukraine Army Group south would struggle even more to bring enough concentration of force to bear to isolate Kyiv. And the lessons from these exercises and study is absolutely crystal clear. The Wehrmacht doesn't have a significant enough quantitative superiority and can't raise reinforcements on the scale of the ussr. So clearly the size of the Soviet Union and critical time factor are major challenges. And the general conclusion, the German forces were barely sufficient for the purpose. And the planned final line of the Volga River Volga all the way up to Archangel in the Arctic was dismissed by Paulus as far beyond anything that the German forces available could hope to achieve.
- [55:35]
A
Well, in which case it's off, right? They've looked at that, they've run it. They've got the, they've got the right people running this thing. It's off. I'd cancel that, wouldn't you? Nah, suck it off, lads.
- [55:46]
D
Well, at the very least you'd think of a major rethink, wouldn't you? They might need to go back to the drawing board.
- [55:53]
A
They don't, do they? This is what's absolutely amazing. So on the 5th. No, of course they don't. Of course they don't. 5th of December 1940, Hitler meets with von Brauch, but also the chiefs of the OKW to hear the army's plans. And you know, I imagine, I imagine that you're quite nervous to present that do that presentation to Hitler at this point. And they're right to be nervous because instead of listening, he goes off on one. He tells them the upcoming battle is the definitive decision concerning German hegemony in Europe. He tells everyone that the Red army is in fear in arms, personnel, especially leadership. And he predicts the swift collapse of the Soviet state. And the thing is, they're all kind of thinking this anyway, aren't they? That's the truth, he's saying out loud the thing that's coloring their thinking anyway, but. And he then says, but the campaign needs to end on the Volga, which
- [56:46]
D
Paulus has said is far beyond anything that the German forces could hope to achieve. I mean, just amazing. Anyway, eventually the Fuhrer stops and it's then Halder who is the chief of staff, reminding everyone of the army. General Franz Halder. He gives his briefing and he says it's absolutely vital to strike at Moscow, Leningrad and Ukraine. So only three prongs, they'd have 105 infantry divisions, 32 Panzer and motor divisions. And Hitler broadly agrees with the plan, but insists it's essential that the Red army is broken in the western areas and should not be allowed any kind of orderly retreat. And a big division is emerging between what Halder perceives as absolutely vital and what Hitler does. Halder thinks that decapitating Moscow is key to the whole thing, but Hitler thinks taking Leningrad, Ukraine and swiftly destroying the Red army and going up into the Baltic is key. So in other words, Moscow will follow as a result of these immense victories at the beginning of the campaign, rather than being the absolute focus of the entire thing.
- [57:57]
A
Yeah.
- [57:58]
D
And despite these divergent reviews on the overall aims, complacency still clearly rules because von Brauch, who is the commander in chief of the army, notes massive frontier battles to be expected duration up to four weeks. But in further development, only minor resistance is then still to be reckoned with. And Holder puts it even more succinctly after this conference, the Russian is inferior. There you have it.
- [58:27]
A
After this, the OkH, the Oberkommoder hears the army command, works up written plans with Moscow as its firm, ultimate main objective. And this is. Losberg writes this up under Halder's direction. But I mean, then, then, then the tinkering begins. So on the 17th of December, JODL takes the plans to Hitler, who immediately orders great changes because he's in, he's in great warlord mode now. The main way to the attack is to be north of the Pripet Marshes. The Baltic states of Leningrad are to be destroyed first and then only then do you go all out for Moscow and Army Group south is still to attack in Ukraine. I mean, it's interesting, isn't it, because all the alterations don't address the fundamental problems. All the alterations end up being, well, we can do this and this and this and this and this, rather than what's our sole single objective, what's the one thing we need to do? To make this work, is it destroy the Soviet armies in the west or is it get to Moscow and decapitate the Soviet Union? Which is it? And they just, they just can't. It's because they think it's going to be easy that they can't decide. They think, well, you know, sky's the limit here. Why, why, why restrict ourselves simply to, simply to taking Moscow, you know. So the final text, the Fuhrer, directive number 21, which is announced on 18 December, sticks with Hitler's amendments, although Halder has watered down some of the words about moving on Moscow, which had got past the okw. So instead of turning on Moscow once the Baltic and Leningrad had been settled, became by the time Baltic and Leningrad had been made safe. But what this amounts to is Moscow is still not the main objective. So there's going to be three thrusts which all need to be completed quickly. One, south into Ukraine, north of the Baltic, and then central to Minsk and Slaminsk, which is in Belarus, but then not all the way to Moscow. And the capital will be. That's a mopping up battle after they've got 500k inside the Soviet Union. I mean, I could see this not working, Jim, I don't know about you, certainly in the long term.
- [60:45]
D
Yep.
- [60:46]
A
And we've left the Luftwaffe out of this stuff so far. So what's the Luftwaffe got to do, Jim?
- [60:51]
D
Well, they've got a dual role. They've got to obtain complete control over the theater's airspace by eliminating the Red Army Air Force, as well as providing close air support for ground troops. So they've got a dual role, long range bombing. I'm not going to bother with that. That will come later, you know. So this is all about the forward battle. The Kriegsmarine, meanwhile, have got to keep the Royal Navy at bay in the North Sea, in the Baltic, and that's all they've got to do, otherwise they're not involved. So the final preparations are to be completed by 15 May 1941, which is still at this stage in December 18, 1940 is still envisioned as the opening day of the campaign. So from now on, it's all systems go. The die has been cast. And in our next episode, we'll be looking at just exactly how those plans are going on and what Stalin is doing as well, and how the Red army is faring.
- [61:46]
A
And if you want to hear that right now, become a. We have ways of making you talk Patreon. Go to the Patreon website, look up. We have ways of making you talk and there's the site membership at the click of a button and you can even gift memberships. So if there's someone in your life who you know needs to listen to this stuff and get exclusive ticket offers and merchandise offers and the we have Waves Festival which is coming up in September 11th 13th September. A black pit brewery right next door to Silverstone. A whole weekend of this kind of war waffle and aircraft and tanks and and a convivial atmosphere, let's put it that way. We will see you in our next episode as things begin to quicken towards Barbarossa. Thanks for listening. Cheerio.
- [62:28]
D
Cheerio.
- [62:31]
H
Foreign. This episode is brought to you by Google Chrome. You think you know a browser, but Gemini and Chrome? That's new. It can help you with practically anything on the web, like restoring a vintage motorcycle from a 50 page restoration block. Or finally break down that long article you've had open for weeks. Gemini and Chrome is here for it, ready to make anything online makes sense. There's no no place like Chrome. Check responses, set up required compatibility and availability various 18
- [63:03]
G
your next chapter in healthcare starts at Carrington College's School of Nursing in Portland. Join us for our open house on Tuesday, January 13th from 4 to 7pm you'll tour our campus, see live demos, meet instructors, and learn about our Associate Degree in Nursing program that prepares you to become a registered nurse. Take Take the first step toward your nursing career. Save your spot now@carrington.edu events. For information on program outcomes, visit carrington.edu
- [63:32]
I
sci the right window treatments change everything. Your sleep, your privacy, the way every room looks and feels. @blinds.com, we've spent 30 years making it surprisingly simple to get exactly what your home needs. We've covered over 25 million windows and have 50,000 five star reviews to prove. Whether you DIY it or want a pro to handle everything from measure to install, we have you covered. Real design professionals, free samples, zero pressure right now. Get up to 50% off with minimum purchase plus get a free professional measure@blinds.com rules and restrictions apply.