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Thank you for listening to we have ways of making you talk. Sign up to our Patreon to receive bonus content, live streams and our weekly newsletter with money off books and museum visits as well. Plus early access to all live show tickets. That's patreon.com wehaveways. This episode is sponsored by Ancestry Military history is usually told through armies, campaigns, fronts and units. But that history feels different when your family name appears in the records. It's not just a division on a map, it's a person, a regiment, a rank, a service number, a line of family history. More than 5 million men served in the British Armed Forces during the First World War. For many British families, it isn't remote, it's a few generations away and often there's a paper trail. Ancestry's military records can help uncover the details of that service, where relatives served, their regiment and rank, medals, injuries, pension claims and next of kin. July marks the 100 110th anniversary of the Battle of the Somme. It's a reminder that behind the maps, units and casualty figures are individual records, names and families. Visit ancestry.co.uk and search First World War military records to discover your family's role in the First World War.
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Let's talk about a condition many people haven't heard of, and it turns out it's more common than you'd think. Peyronie's disease, or PD for short. PD can happen when scar tissue builds up under the skin of the penis. This can cause a curve with a bump during an erection and for some men lead to pain during intimacy and may impact mental health. It may also lead to anger and frustration, depression, lower self esteem and even withdrawal from sexual activity and physical intimacy. Because of this, some men could feel embarrassed or reluctant to talk about pd. The actual cause of PD isn't always known. In some cases it may be linked to a minor injury or repeated injuries during sex or other physical activity. The good news is PD is treatable. If you notice a curve with a bump, a trusted urology specialist can help diagnose it and walk you through your options, including non surgical treatment. To learn more about Peyronie's disease, visit talkaboutpd.com let's talk about Peyronie's disease, or PD. It's not widely talked about and some men may feel reluctant to bring it up, but it's more common than you'd think. PD can happen when scar tissue builds up under the skin of the penis, causing a curve with a bump during an erection that for some men may lead to pain during intimacy and impact mental health. A trusted urology specialist can help diagnose PD and walk you through your options, including non surgical treatment. Visit talkaboutpd.com.
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1100 meeting of generals at Fuhrer office address lasting almost two and a half hours. This war will be very different from the war in the West. In the east, harshness today means lenience. In the future. Commanders must make the sacrifice of overcoming their personal scruples. And that, of course, was General Franz Halder writing in his diary on 30 March 1941. And if that doesn't send alarm bells ringing, I don't know what will.
A
Well, welcome to we have ways to make you talk with me, Al Murray and James Holland, your World War II podcast of choice and episode three now of Barbarossa. And we're in the middle of the build up to Barbarossa, aren't we, Jim? And that's what we've, we've decided to do with these three episodes, is have another look at the forces and streams of events that are pushing the Germans towards Operation Barbarossa. And the decision has been made. That's the thing. Early on and with some motivated reasoning at work, Hitler very much capable of finding the solution to the problem in front of him in something he's already said or something he wants in the first place. And so the problems that come with the conquest of Western Europe are problems of scarcity, problems of resources. And so the solution, it would seem, is to take out the Soviet Union and destroy Judeo Bolshevism and all that stuff as well.
C
Well, we were arguing in the last one that he doesn't really have any choice in the matter, really. He's got himself into such a mess because he's so short of resources despite all these incredible victories. You know, it looks like he's got the world at his feet, but actually hasn't. He's just got himself into an unbelievably difficult situation where only victory in the Soviet Union very rapidly and involving the complete annihilation of the Red army is going to suffice. Anything short of that and he's in big trouble.
A
I mean, I think one of the interesting points of comparison you could make here is, you know, the British Empire after the end of the First War is larger than it's ever been. It's one of the interesting sort of outcomes of the First World War is that Britain ends up with a bigger empire. The ruling class in Britain, they regard it as a colossal headache. They can't afford it, they can't afford to run it, they can't afford to police it. Yes, it creates this great big free trade zone for them, but the drawbacks are how expensive is to do all that. And if Hitler had any idea of what a pain in the ass it
C
is, what a burden empire is, it's
A
expensive and it's difficult and that he thinks expansion is the answer to his problems, but in fact it's just created a whole new portfolio of problems. But of course, the thing he's always had in his heart is the destruction of the Soviet Union and Lehman's room. So it's from Hitler's sort of reasoning point of view, it's a happy coincidence, isn't it? And also, I think we can't leave out the fact that he regards himself as a man of destiny, that fate drives him to his decisions and it's his fate to take on the Soviets, isn't it? And so these things, these things are operating in sort of perfect confluence, aren't they? I think we said in previous episodes, it's like a cocktail. It may have different ingredients in it, but it's been shaken up to the point where you'll never separate them out. You may get the hint of one thing and the flavour of the other, but they're combined. And that's the situation the Germans are in. Because that's how Hitler has come to his conclusions, isn't it? Made his decisions, yes, but also, you
C
know, he is aware of the historic shortcomings of what had been Prussia and the German states, you know, their geographical isolation in the middle of Germany, their lack of natural resources, their lack of access to the world's oceans, all these things. I mean, that goes all the way back to the kind of, you know, 30 years war in the 17th century. And frankly, beyond a constant sort of shifting of borders, friction, et cetera, et cetera. And his point is, this time we're going to sort it out once and for all. We're going to be one unified whole. And any threats that are coming to us, whether it's from the west, the capitalist imperialist west, or whether it's going to come from the Bolsheviks on the east, we're going to sort it out. And in the same time we're going to create living space, Lebensraum, where we will colonise and get the food and the resources and everything we need to sustain this. That's the grand plan. The fact that it's batshit crazy is kind of neither here nor there. I mean, but he's trying to solve a historic problem of the German states
A
and create the ethno nationalist empire with the destruction of European Jewry into the bargain as well.
C
But he thinks that that is what's going to create long term stability.
A
Yeah, exactly, exactly. But the thing is again, the motivated reasoning is that that's the thing he wants to do and destroying the Soviet Union offers him that opportunity as well.
C
And frankly, haven't they just been rubbing him up the wrong way? I mean, you know, time and time again, you know, Stalin's been poking two fingers at him.
A
And that's the other really interesting thing here, isn't there? Because there is a sort of, there is a school of thought that says, that tries to paint the Barbarossa sort of purely preemptive and that the Soviets were about to attack, isn't there? There has been a sort of school of people trying to make that case, but certainly they haven't been getting along brilliantly. And the Soviet Union, Stalin has been taking liberties, he's been taking the piss.
C
I mean, literally taking the piss with the pack.
A
Literally taking people's liberties as well by invading countries and stripping them out and re engineering them in the Soviet imperial style, which bears a very close resemblance to the Russian imperial style, which is come in, install your own people, make everyone talk Russian, kill the people who represent some sort of political threat which can be real or imagined, perceived ideological, whatever. Anyway, Hitler's had that going on on his eastern flank as well. And that's the sort of thing he wants to do. That's the other part of it, isn't it?
C
Well, I don't think there's any question that Stalin has been provoking Hitler and Nazi Germany. And I don't think there's any question that he's massively overplayed his hand. That is the cause of, you know, a lot of the early defeats in that the Red army suffered at the same time. It's put Hitler in a situation that there is only one solution to the conundrum in which he finds himself, which is to go to war quickly before the Soviet industrial machine makes it impossible to do so. And that has been set up since he wrote Mein Kampf. That has been set up from the moment that he comes to power in January 1933. It is completely inevitable. There is no avoiding it. This is Hitler's worldview, but it's coming much earlier than he had originally planned or any of his commanders have originally planned. And it's coming with the kind of ideological consequences and shaping of the operation which you know you're going to be reaping what you sow and there's no getting around that. And the first sort of sign of this comes to the forest on 9 January 1941, when Hitler gathers all his senior commanders, plus von Ribbentrop, who's the Foreign minister, to give them a kind of overview of the war to date and his latest strategic thing.
A
And that's, that's basically a heads of all department meeting, isn't it, where everyone's gathered in and they're given the, given the next year's plan. What, this is what we're going to
C
do before we start. Anyone want a coffee?
A
This is exactly that meeting, isn't it? And interestingly, he stresses that one of the justifications for Barbarossa, aside from all these things that we've, we've been outlining, is defeating Britain. To defeat Britain you're going to have to defeat the Soviet Union to bring that about. And Britain is holding up his plans and obviously what Britain wants is a continental bloc against Germany. And I mean, it's very, the thinking here, if you wanted to drive the Soviets into the Britain's arms, then you attack the Soviets. Right. I mean, I, by the way, I'm
C
just, I'm completely distracted by this, this notion of, of sort of von Bock and, and Broukic sitting around, you know, Hitler in full flow.
A
Yeah.
C
Desperately trying not to chink their kind of cup and saucer too much or crunch too hard on the finger of shortbread.
A
Yeah, it's like, I'm sure it's just like. No, it would have been just like that, you know. Oh no, I interrupted his flow. Oh no, I'm in trouble now. But, but it is, there is this peculiar idea that, you know, in order to knock Britain out of the war, you have to knock the Soviets out. But the idea that, that wouldn't force Britain and Soviets together is bananas. That. Well.
C
And then on the other hand, you know, if USA and USSR join the war against Germany, that's, that's quite problematic, isn't it?
A
Yeah. And he can see this, put it mildly, but he says this. So the thing to do is get it done now. And I think what's, what's interesting, you know, we were talking a moment ago about Stalin. Because of his Marxist world, he is necessarily a strategic person, whereas Hitler is a tactician, relentless tactician. Everything Hitler deals with is immediate and, and if we get this done quickly, then that will get the result we need and that will keep us Going whereas Stalin's thinking in 50 years time we will have chewed up the whole of Europe because of the inevitability of communism and our, and our system. And actually when you look at the outcome of the war, you could say someone with a strategy defeats someone with just tactics.
C
And the truth is the Soviet Union has mobilized its vast industry, it has mobilized its vast population. It is developing huge numbers of aircraft, tanks, artillery pieces, KV1s for which the Germans simply don't have any answer at all. And T34s and the Germans don't know this at the time. So they are doing all this. And Hitler has every reason to be worried about the military might of the Soviet Union because it is mighty, certainly in terms of numbers. You know, it is overwhelming. But what Hitler does know, and knows correctly is that it's military leaderless at the moment. After the huge purges, you know, where 22,500 senior commanders were purged, including four out of five marshals and something like sort of 13 out of 15 army commanders all executed or locked up. You know, he's right about that. And it is true that the Red army didn't do very well in Finland at one level. He's absolutely right. You know, if he's going to go into the Soviet Union, now is the time to do it, you know, with spring and the summer ahead, before winter comes and strike hard and strike while momentum is with the German forces of Wehrmacht and while the Red army is still a little bit rudderless. So from that point of view he's right, but you know, everyone's going, yeah, but what about the huge distances? And he pre emphasized, he says there's absolutely nothing that the Germans haven't already mastered. Well, you know, he's just completely wrong about that. They haven't mastered them at all. All because they've never done it before. No one's done it before. No one's or those who have tried it before haven't done it successfully. So the operational objectives, he says are
A
the annihilation of the Russian army, seizure of most important industrial regions and the destruction of the remaining industrial legions. But not Moscow. He doesn't want to decapitate the country politically, which is quite interesting.
C
He also has this ability because the German High Command are so craven because they were so reluctant to accept the kind of talk he had about, yes, we're going to sweep into the Low Countries, we're going to overwhelm France and everyone's going, yeah, right, and sort of thinking what are we going to do about this Lunatic. It's all going to end in disaster. And then it proves, right, they've gone the other way. So that now there's just like. They hang on every single word. So there's this sort of grotesque kind of overconfidence about.
A
Well, and.
C
And afterwards, Alfred Jodl, who is the kind of, you know, head of operations at the opw, the Oberkommander de Wehrmacht, the German General Staff, he goes, the washing colossus will prove to be a pig's bladder. Prick it and it will burst. You know, they're overconfident.
A
But the French army was regarded as the greatest army in the world and they defeated it in five days, fortnight, three weeks, depending on your point of view. Right. So why is this going to be different? They also.
C
How hard can it be?
A
They also defeat Russia in 1917 without having to go to Moscow. So there is a giant slab of precedent here in their thinking and, you know, put those two together. I can see how you might talk yourself into that, particularly if you've got a.
C
They are talking themselves into it.
A
So they've gone. It is this appalling group think and it goes on though. This is. This is what's really, really interesting is that every obstacle is sort of waved away and I'll be fine, don't worry about it. Don't you. What you worrying about that for?
C
Don't worry about it.
A
General Thomas Thomas, he's the head of
C
the economics division at the. Ok, the German general start.
A
He's the guy with the spreadsheet.
C
So he's in charge of military finance. Basically.
A
He's got it all in front of him. And on 28 January 1941, Halder holds a big planning conference.
C
And just a reminder, Halder is the chief of staff of the Kherer, the army.
A
So what you've got here is the bloke in charge of the army saying, right, how are we going to do this? And obviously the requirement is to do it quickly and big distances and everything. So you have Adolf von Schell, who's the Grand Plenipotentiary of vehicles, isn't he, Jim?
C
Yes, of motorization in the. In the.
A
Basically the truck. Truck master General, he says truck production still nowhere near where it needs to be, I'm afraid. And how older Gas. That's not really a priority, don't worry.
C
Yeah, whatever.
A
Got French trucks and we'll take some from Switzerland as well. What? Hang on a minute. Switzerland's neutral, right? We're gonna buy them anyway. That all sounds fine. But there is a really big problem here, isn't there? Because otherwise country's stuff requires spare parts and getting them.
C
Well, they don't have standardized distributor caps, they don't have standardized gaskets, they don't have standardized pipes coming into the carburettor or fuel pumps or whatever it might be. So you know, everything's got to be different. And when something goes wrong on a truck that you've half inched from Switzerland or from Renault from France or whatever, you've got to have the part. And obviously there's a certain amount of bodging going on. You can bodge only so far before you actually need the real parts rather than the kind of, you know, on the spot manufactured part.
A
Yeah, exactly. And all the British stuff they've got from Dunkirk for instance. Fine, but they don't have the spares,
C
the steering wheels on the other side.
A
Exactly. For a start. Yeah, exactly, exactly. But anyway, it doesn't matter, Jim, because the Red army are going to get smashed on initial contact to the western area of the Soviet Union. Doesn't matter. It doesn't matter. Georg Thomas though, you know, gets out his spreadsheet and he says to the conference, we need 13,000 tons of rubber a month. But German industry can only process half that or let just about half that, 7,300 tons. And current stocks of rubber, they'll be gone by the end of February 1941. And this is, remember this conference is the end of January 1941.
C
So in other words they're almost out. Right?
A
We can replenish, but we're dependent on is blockade runners getting here from South America as well as there's 12,000 tons on the water right now from Indochina. And of course this is the Royal Navy blockade that they're having to contend with. They've bought some more from France, 25,000 tons from France. But Japan isn't releasing the shipment because it's not from France, it's from French colonies or from French dealers in the French colonies. But Japan isn't going to release the shipment despite the being allies. I mean allies. Ha ha. Because obviously the Japanese need it themselves because they're up against it.
C
Because this, because they're also short.
A
They're short of everything. You know, it's this issue, the thing that's driving you into war. The shortages is further exacerbating the shortages make them worse. And they're running out of fuel and poor old George Thomas.
C
Al, it'll be fine, It'll be fine. Just to stop worrying about it.
A
I Mean, he's Cassandra, isn't he? He very much is going, look, cupboards bare. And he thinks there's probably two months of.
C
Yes, and Halder is one of those. You know, there is a moment in, at a conference in November 1939 where he has a pistol in his pocket and he's planning to shoot Hitler. And he gets to shakes and he's so terrified he just can't bring himself to do it. And he goes, right, that's it, I'm just not going to do it anymore. Then he has his kind of sort of, oh God, it's actually going to be okay. You know, Hitler's going to pull it off with the plan for going into France and the low countries in May 1940. And now he's absolutely full on convinced himself to the other side. And you know, he's not alone. You know, he's a really, really competent and experienced staff officer. And in his heart of heart he must know better than this.
A
Yeah, but in his diary, what does he write?
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Speed. No stopping, no waiting for the railroads. Everything must be achieved with the motor. Increase motorization. Since the valve will destruction, water caused, a different gauge cannot be counted on for maintaining the pace. The continuous operation of supply depends upon the motor. But have you not been listening to what we've been saying? We haven't got enough fuel, we haven't got enough rubber, we've got too many different types. You know, Von Schell is reporting there aren't enough trucks.
A
But in his diary eight days earlier though, he had said the railway is the key to the logistical problem here, that we need the railways fixed. But then, I mean, it's absolutely amazing in his diary on 28 January, he
C
then writes, we must destroy the Russian army without pause over the Dnieper Duna line, 500 kilometers into North Russia. And the other goals, 500 kilometers in total, 1,000 kilometers.
A
Those crackers.
C
It's crackers. It reveals such a fundamental shortcoming of the military elites in Germany. And I do think there is this sort of fear of relegation from the traditional position of privilege within German society which these military elites have had, you know, since the formation of Germany in 1871 and before that, that they are now completely blind to the very obvious costs and problems of Hitler's ideological strategy and his very obviously opportunistic methods. You know, there is a moment at this conference where Field Marshall von Bock questions what would happen if the Red army does fall back in stages without collapse. And his query is just, that's not gonna Happen, don't be darf. So then Bock then later poses this to Hitler and the Fuhrer said, in that case, the campaign will simply have to carry on. Somehow, some way, it'll be, you know, the will of the German people. So Bok records this in his diary, but doesn't make any kind of further comment. It's like, all right, fine, whatever.
A
Cripes. The thing is, though, as we all know, any military operation relies on a fair assessment of the enemy intelligence. So how's that going?
C
Not very well. Intelligence is thin and, you know, the planning is based on low assumptions of Red army numbers and totals of tanks and guns and so on. You know, it reminds me so much of Studio Blur studied Blue before the Battle of Britain, where they just get it all completely wrong and go in there with a massively overinflated opinion of their own strength and overestimate the weaknesses of the enemy. And that didn't go very well. I mean, that's why they're having to invade Soviet Union in the summer of 1941, because they didn't defeat Britain in the summer of 1940. So they're making exactly the same mistake. And the truth is, is that Von Schell, the Plenipotentiary General of Motor Vehicles at the okw, is having an absolute nightmare. You know, he just cannot achieve what's required. And in February, the situation is made much, much worse by the dispatch of Rommel and two panzer divisions and then a third motorized division for North Africa. Yeah, I mean, you need that like a hole in the head, don't you?
A
Yeah, yeah.
C
And then it's made even worse by the demands of the campaign and Balkans and the Greece in March and April 1941, which, of course is again over, you know, hard, dusty, stony roads, not great conditions, which have huge amount of attrition on suspension systems and so on
A
and so forth, and burning up this fuel that they've only got the fuel for a couple of operational months at best. I mean, what's interesting here, I think, is very often the Balkans campaign in the story of Barbarossa is presented as a reason there's a delay. And if they'd gone earlier, all this sort of stuff, right, isn't it, that very often gets thrown in had they gone when they planned to go in May. But because they're distracted by the Balkans campaign, the delay then brings them closer to winter later on in the year and all that. But when you look at it like this, that they don't have the stuff, they haven't got the Spare parts they haven't got the fuel, the rubber. The rubber the Japanese won't let them have. Right. There are much bigger issues at stake here than, oh, we've been delayed by having to go to the Balkans in any way. Going to the Balkans, anything that blunts the spear in any way whatsoever makes the success of Barbarossa less likely. Anything, given the state they're actually in. It's not that if only the German war machine, which is gleaming and fantastic, hadn't been distracted for a few weeks. It's the fact it's hollow.
C
Yeah. And the truth is it doesn't matter whether you're a horse and cart or whether you're a truck or a half track or a stug or a Panzer IV or whatever. The effect of dirt roads with sharp stones on rubber is really bad. It really, really wears it away incredibly quickly. So when they're saying, you know, we're short of rubber and we're dependent on blockade runners to get, to get through, to deliver what we need, that really is a problem because if the wheels come off, literally you can't operate at the pace that you're supposed to operate.
B
Yeah.
A
With literally the wheels, you can't do
C
what you need to do.
A
Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah.
C
And, and you know, it has to be remembered that, that the hard yards of all their victories have been achieved by the panzer divisions, these all arms motorized unit and the motorized divisions. But out of 200 divisions that now exist in the Wehrmacht and the Waffen SS, only 33 of them are mechanized and only 17 Panzer divisions are available for Barbarossa. So that's only seven more than we used for France in a country 37 times the size. And when you put it like that, the challenge is a big one.
A
Yeah, it's crazy, isn't it? And also given this sort of two thrusts with a third thrust spiraling off the first one of the northern, you know, that strategy, it's effectively four thrusts. Yeah, well, exactly.
C
You've got one of the northern Army Group north is going between the Baltics and Leningrad. Then you got Army Group center, then you got Army Group South.
A
But, but, but why not write a plan that fits what you're actually capable of? Well, because, because as we, we've seen, they're high on their own supply and you know, they, they did defeat France in a fortnight. And they're thinking, well, how hard could it be? And that the Russians are Slavic people of a sort of lower capability and all that sort of stuff because there's racism in it. Too. I mean, it's interesting though, because. Because von Schell, I mean, God bless him, he's peddling hard to try and solve these problems, isn't he? He's come up with a complicated system of dumps and motor pools to get fuel as far forward as he can for your panzer and motorized divisions. And he notes the Balkan campaign left a large hole in the stock of supplies because the vehicles of motorized troops that had taken part in it had suffered badly in the mountainous train and they had to be re equipped for action in the east. In four weeks, all you're bringing me is problems.
C
He's writing that while dreaming of popcorn and movie theaters in America, isn't he?
A
Of course he is, yeah. And the smooth hum of a Ford. A model T, Ford production line. Exactly, yeah.
C
It's all of that. I really want a Chevrolet.
A
Oh, wouldn't that be nice? I'll drive up the Tiergarten in my Cadillac and everyone will admire me
C
and. But then I look fancy. You get all the.
B
For life.
A
Oh, God. I mean, the thing is, Hitler.
C
But I also quite like jazz music. Yeah. Yeah.
B
Oh, dear.
A
Yeah, he needs to keep that under his. Under his pickle hoy bit, doesn't he? The thing is though, Helder is honor Hitler about the need to, you know, rely on motorization because he knows that the Soviet railway gauge is different and the spaces are much bigger. So the refueling opportunities, the re. The recharging of the steam water tanks and all that stuff is further spaced out because the trains are bigger with large capacity and it's mainly single track. They. They know this and they know. And Held is saying also we're gonna have to get the Baltic ports open because that's a crucial supply line. And the thing is, is Hitler's not having any of it, is he?
C
He's.
A
He's like, well, we can do it.
C
The la la la. Don't tell me that it's the will.
A
Yeah, the will will triumph. And he seems to think that, you know, if anyone comes to with problems, what they need is good talking to. And they'll go away convinced that everything's all right. Despite all that, though, Hitler is having his doubts. And after the break, we'll have a little look at Hitler's doubts around this grand escapade. Achtung. Achtung.
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A
Welcome back to we have ways of making you Talk, the third part of our Barbarossa series. And although Hitler's big thing is obviously shows of confidence and will and all that sort of stuff, he is having doubts about Barbarossa and. And, you know, as anyone might. Right.
C
Well, let's face it, it's a big deal. Yeah, yeah. And history tells you it's quite challenging.
A
Yeah. I mean, there is one big example from history, isn't there, of this having gone horribly wrong, this kind of adventure. So, you know, in February, he demands two studies. This is a sort of, kind of a Hitler technique, isn't it, where he. What he wants to do, throw up some doubt so that he can then go, I was right, you see, right to doubt that. And you were all wrong. He does like to cover his tracks. Hitler. It's one of the things he sort of does. So he asked for a study about the obstacle of the Pripet Marshes. And I think whenever you say the Pripet marshes, you should say it the way Winston Churchill loved saying the Pripet Marshes. It's just the thing. You hear the broadcast.
C
How did he say
A
the obstacle of the Pipette marshes? So we have to say. So he wants to study into the Pipette marshes. And the second one is economic considerations, which is. Which is quite interesting. So foreign armies east, which is a department at the okw, look into the marshes and conclude that the Russians might be able to get across them using railways and then get into the German rear after the marches have been bypassed. However, they left this out of the report sent to Hitler.
C
Well, you know, you don't want to upset him, but I mean, I mean, we, we did talk about the. The Pipette marshes in the last episode. But just to stress, this is this vast area of generally impossible land in the middle of sort of what is now Belarus. So this is, you know, in front of Minsk, and it's huge. And basically it's going to divide their advance because Army Group center and north is going to go north of the Pripet Marches, and Army Group south is going to go to the south of it, and it's this big block, and it means that you can't be mutually supporting because you've got this. And the theory is. Yeah, but it doesn't matter because, you know, the Russians can't use it either. Or can they? And that's, that's the worry is that you bypass this and then there's lots of Russians in the middle who are sort of worming their way through the Pripet Marshes and sort of attack you up the arse.
A
Yes, it leaves an opportunity for a flank, but they don't. But they leave that out of it, out of the report to Hitler and
C
they conclude that, yes, the Russians could get through the Pripet Marshes because there are some railways and they could get into the German river. But as you say, they don't tell this to Hitler. It's just.
A
Yeah, yeah, you know what? I think we're not going to tell him, right? No, no, no, no. It's a terrible idea.
C
Is there any point? Tony Fury, I mean, you know he's only going to get off is me.
B
Yeah.
C
We're so far down the line now. Yeah, I'm sure it'll be fine.
A
It'll be fine, be fine.
C
That's what's going on.
A
Soviet's gonna fold, everyone knows that. They're terrible soldiers. And then there's General Georg Thomas's economic study. And he reports to Keitel on 22 January with loads and loads of misgivings. And so he's told to come up with another memo.
C
What happens on the 22nd? He has this meeting with Holder and he goes, I just want to let you know that I've got all sorts of problems, but anyway, I'll go off and do this study. He then presents a study on the 8th of February which makes it absolutely clear that there's any number of problems, mainly to do with fuel and rubber and what have you.
A
So basically he's laid out the problems and Keitel says, no, no, no, no, no, go away and look at the figures again. Come up with something, please.
C
He goes, okay, okay. All right, boss.
A
Five days later. So this is obviously pulling the all night SA crisis response, isn't he? Yeah, pulling a load of all nighters. He's had his staff on it. It's called the War Economy Consequences of an Operation in the East.
C
He's just been drinking coffee and ginger nuts for 24 hours, smoking fags for the next five days.
A
Exactly. And on 13 February
C
I have to make this verse.
A
And on 13 February he produces this document and then it's given to Hitler seven days later. And the new draft is entirely favorable to Hitler's wishes. It's just crazy, you know what I mean? I know we're finding a lot of this funny, but the sheer cataclysm that this is going to unleash, if, you know, lessons in groupthink are right here, he doesn't dare submit that report again, saying, no, the numbers don't add up. He goes away and he does the creative accounting. And what he leans into is the economic benefits of occupying the Soviet Union. You know, once we've done the hard bit, it's going to all be rosy sunlit uplands, literally. And he overlooks the problems of military feasibility. You know, there'll be grain coming from Ukraine that'll solve our food shortage. And anyway, 75% of the Soviet army will fall, with the remainder offering little threat. So he basically writes the thing Hitler wants to hear. So whatever doubts Hitler may have had, yeah, other people have gone away and assuaged them, haven't they?
C
But what is happening on the other side of the hill, that's.
A
Here we go.
C
So Stalin's mobilizing for war. Absolutely he is. He's front loading everything. So. So, you know, everyone spends a huge amount of time sort of talking about the very, very obvious buildup of German troops on the eastern border. But Stalin is doing all that. You know, he's got this huge construction program of airfield which are literally right on the border. You know, that's every bit as aggressive to the Germans is what the Germans are doing is to the Soviet Union. So Hitler might be fed up with the Molotov ribbentrop Pact of August 1939, but so is Stalin, who can now only see diminishing returns and has quite enjoyed his little push into Romania and Baltic states and all the rest of it. And you know, his aim had been to get Germany and the Western powers into an imperialistic war in which they effectively destroyed each other, which would then allow the USR to sweep in and overrun the ruins. That hasn't happened because of Germany's sweeping and very rapid victories. And German troops are now in Finland and in southeast Europe, which was far too close to comfort for Stalin. And Britain is still in the fight, but obviously not showing any sign of a future land campaign. And Hitler had been increasingly firm over Romania and Bulgaria. So that puts pay to Stalin's peaceful communist expansion plans, which, you know, as you know, is not peaceful at all. And in fact, the Soviet economy has been on war footing since 1928 with the succession of five year plans. So they're now in the third five year plan, which has begun in 1938 and it's incredibly ambitious, you know, aims to build 50,000 warplanes by the end of 1942. Well, that's kind of sort of Roosevelt language. 70,000 tons of aerial bombs, 125,000 aero engines, 60,755 tanks, 119,000 and 60 artillery pieces, 450,000 machine guns, 5.2 million rifles, 489 million artillery shells, etc. Etc. Etc. And also, by the way, 298,000 tons of chemical weapons. So this is not small beer. And it's true that not all the targets are being met by any stretch of the imagination, but there is immense progress. I mean really, really. And it's nothing like as fanciful as the German figures, for example.
A
Well, and the other thing that the Soviets have also done in a way that Hitler hasn't done is they've had their revolution. They've reorganized their society around this form of production. You know, they've had American mass production experts over to teach them how to do, show how to do it. One of the things the Soviets are really good at is picking people's brains, getting experts in ransacking their expertise and then very often then putting them on trial for espionage. Like the guys who build the tube in Moscow, the Vickers engineers. Right. You know, the cynicism of it at the core of it. But it means that what the Russians have, the Soviets have actually done is revolutionized their society around mass production and mass industry in a way the Germans haven't. Hitler's revolution is going to happen after the war is the Soviets are doing it as part of their revolution.
C
Well, yeah, and actually you're absolutely right about picking other people's brains. I mean, J. Walter Christie, his suspension system is the one that is used on the T34 which is now in development, which is going to be, you know, one of, one of the great sort of war changing tanks.
A
Yeah, yeah, yeah. And of course this is a totalitarian state, so those numbers are in the newspapers and maybe that's not what's happening. And maybe, you know, there are all those old stories about the Soviet Union where they'd have shoe factories that only produced one size of shoe, but they produced millions of them. You know, there's obviously a bit of that going on and there's also if
C
you don't meet the figures, you'll get shot.
A
Well, there's that too, but that means also you cook the figures that, you know, all these problems with the totalitarian industrialized state like this. But it does mean that by the end of 1940, the Red army on paper has 23,307 operational tanks. What? I mean, that's a lot of tanks, right? I mean, you can't sniff at that. 15,045 millimeter anti tank guns and 22,171 aircraft if it's just an inventory.
C
If numbers count.
A
If numbers count, yeah. And the Germans, by contrast, have 3,387
C
panzers, so that's almost 20,000 fewer. Yes.
A
So in terms of raw numbers on the spreadsheet, the Red army is the strongest army in the world. Full stop. By miles, by miles and miles and miles and miles. All this idea that it's a paper tiger. It's quite interesting that the Red army is not hollowed out.
C
No. And the vvs, the Red Army Air Force in the war with Finland, for example, has more than the Luftwaffe and RAF combined during the Battle of Britain.
A
Jeepers.
C
And by 1941, the Soviet Union has 267 submarines. And again, by comparison, Kriegsmarine had deployed eight U boats in total in the entire Atlantic.
A
Blimey, you need a lot of people to man 23,307 tanks. If each of those tanks. I mean, it's just the numbers of people have got to be enormous, aren't they? And the purges. The purges are really of the officer class, aren't they? Because that's what Stalin does, deals with the people he regards.
C
Yeah.
A
Completely with power and a possible threat. So even though you've had the purges in 3738, the Red Army's still growing. It's 1.2 million people in 1936, 1.9 three years later in 1939. In 1940, it's 3.75 million people. And by the spring of 1941, there are 5 million people in the Red Army. Now, of course, this kind of massive expansion comes with its own problems, you
C
know, a lot of bullets to kill 5 million.
A
Yeah. One way or another. You do, don't you?
C
And that's not the end of it either, because there's a mobilization plan in place for 1941 sees it grow again to 8,682,000.
A
How many?
C
8,682,000.
B
It's.
A
It, it's incredible, isn't it?
C
And, and by the way, nor do these fingers include the nkvd, the forerunner of the kgb, which includes huge construction battalions who are kind of near the frontier with Germany now, you know, in Poland and so on. And Romania, where they're building bridges, roads, railways, tank parks, petrol stations, airfields and so on. So add into that free labor of prisoners and what's called inverted commas, a strategic labor reserve of teenagers, 800,000 to a million annually, who are each conscripted for four years. You want a childhood, God, you'll need to come and construct some airfields for 40 years.
A
I mean, that's a lot of pairs of hands, isn't it? It's, that's a lot of pairs of hands, isn't it? It's extraordinary. And I mean the other thing is tank production has, has been modernized and is ahead of the game. And they're basically, they're doing better than anyone in the world at this point. You know, the British like to pat themselves on the back for having invented the tank. The Germans like to get the high fives for radicalizing tank warfare. And you know, the Soviets are doing the thinking here in terms of what you need from the vehicle. So you've got the great big 45 ton KV model, it's much bigger than anything anyone else has produced. And then the 234, which is a medium 29 ton tank, not a Sherman. They have that ready by 1941 for combat. You know, it's a prototype in 1939. By 1941 there's 3027 of them. How many German tanks did we say there were?
C
No, there's going to be built in 1941. There's going to be 3027. So there's that, that's, that's. Yeah, but that's about the total number of German tanks. Full size.
A
Yeah, yeah, exactly.
C
And by the way, only I think only 8% of German tanks of Panzer IVs.
A
That's like when you buy processed meat from the supermarket. You look at how much actual meat is in it. The rest is reconstituted tissue.
C
But my point is, my earlier point is that Hitler's Hitler, Hitler is right that he needs to strike quickly if he's going to have any chance of victory at all. Because Soviet industry is just dwarfing anything else they're going to come up against. It is true that in the first half of 1941, Soviet tanks are still absolutely tiny. You know, it's the T40 which is 5.5 tons, which is titchy, obviously, but then so too are Panzer I s and Panzer IIs and T35s and T38s, you know, so the KV1, the production's also ramped up for 1941. So in other words, if you don't strike them hard in the summer of 1941, by 1942, it's going to be too late, is the kind of implication. And on this point, point, Hitler is unquestionably right. It's just, has he got enough to do what he needs to do? You know, that's the, that's the question. The structure of the Red army is changing as well. The Red army have been looking at the Blitzkrieg and looking at those victories that the Germans have and they've realized, you know, you'd have much greater emphasis on mobility, motorized divisions. They're also, it should say that the Red army is training up in 1940 and 1941 for offensive operations, for attacking. It's not designed for defensive operations, which is obviously going to be a problem. They've also developed new airborne brigades of two, you know, nearly 3,000 men. And they've equipped them with more machine guns and more mortars and artillery than either German or UK airborne troops, which are kind of, you know, in the offing by this stage.
A
Yeah, exactly. So there's a lot of forward thinking. So the German mindset, you know, dopey Slavic Russians is not evidenced in any of this. They're also dope, are churning out tons of fighters and bombers that are coming. There's the long range Petlyakov Peh strategic heavy four engine bomber. So they are, they're building a heavy. They've got the Sukhoi SU2 bomber and the IL2 Sturmovik, which is based on an American aircraft, the Vultee, which is basically a really heavily armed ground attack aircraft and makes the Stuka look sort of dainty and ridiculous really, doesn't it? And it's sort of a Soviet Typhoon before. The Typhoon is a glimmer in anyone's eye.
C
Yeah, and much loved by flight simulator video games.
A
Yeah, that's right, yeah, yeah, yeah, exactly. They've also got the MiG3, which can do 315 miles an hour, which is, which is basically kind of like a hurricane. So they're up to speed with what everyone else is able to produce. And because they've had their revolution and created mass production, once they get the jigs set the factories going and it's not a hard hat site, a Soviet factory, let's be honest now, or a high vis area or any of those things, they churn them out at will, can't they? We detailed, didn't we, the talks between the Soviets and the Germans, Molotov's visit to Berlin and The attempts by the Germans to get the Soviets to sort of calm down on their eastern border and the Soviet point blank refusal to do so. And so Stalin, as a result of the collapse of those talks, orders a plan for southwestern front deployment along with these gigantic air bases.
C
It's a very, very ambitious plan. And it's the kind of ambitious plan that you can do when you have complete control over your industry and you have complete control over, over your labor sources. So, you know, by May 1941, 80% of these huge air bases have been built and Most of them, 199 of them were in the western districts, all within 30 minutes flying time of the Reich. Yeah. So that is at its very least very suggestive of aggressive intent, I would argue, which of course the Germans are watching and making a note of because they're doing their own incursions to kind of do photo reconnaissance of all this.
A
Yeah.
C
And you can argue, and I think he will be arguing, that Stalin is slightly hoisting himself by his own petard by this. But be that as it may, the old Stalin line, which had been along the original border before the pre Poland invasion border, is now redundant to a large extent. So they're having to build new pillboxes further west, but they're kind of a bit thin on the ground. This is known as a Molotov line. Huge railway construction too, to facilitate rapid deployment. Again with this wider Soviet railway gauge, which just for those who don't know, is 1,524 millimeters wide, which is 5 foot rather than the European standard of 1,435 millimeters, which is 4 foot 8 and a half inches wide. So it is, it's not a huge amount, but it's still three and a half inches wider. So he is definitely preparing and you can see why. This would make Hitler twitchy and think I've got to strike while Jan is hot. But not only is he doing that, Stalin is also doing diplomatic stuff to secure his own eastern border with Japan. And that is what we're going to be looking at in our next episode in this series on the build up towards Barbaross.
A
Because there are so many moving parts in all this, you can't simply say it's the Germans want to knock the Soviets out. Yes, they do. But why, what's going on and why is the timing so critical? And I think we're getting some way to explaining that. But as you say, Jim, what's going on the other end of the world is just as much on Stalin's mind and as much part of his strategic approach to everything. Because Stalin has this world long view, doesn't he, where he's trying to deliver something in the long term to create world global revolution rather than Hitler who's thinking, oh God, I got a problem right now. How do I solve it? So in our next episode. Yes, well, we'd be plunging back into the world of diplomacy with the Japanese. I imagine it might have us tearing our hair out. Who knows? We'll see you in our next episode. If you want to get to that right away, the best way to do that is to go to our Patreon Become a We have ways of making you talk Patreon Sign up. There's live casts, audio books, ticket offers, events, and the chance to chat with like minded people who don't glaze over when you start talking about a Christie suspension on a T34 tank. The best kind of people, basically. We will see you in our next episode. Thanks for listening and cheerio.
C
Cheerio.
A
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Operation Barbarossa: To The Brink (Part 3) – Podcast Summary
We Have Ways of Making You Talk / WW2 Pod – June 29, 2026
Hosts: Al Murray (A), James Holland (C)
In this third installment on "Operation Barbarossa," Al Murray and James Holland dissect the prelude to Nazi Germany’s 1941 invasion of the Soviet Union. They explore the ideological, economic, and logistical factors that compelled Hitler and his generals toward this fateful decision, highlighting alarming overconfidence and resource miscalculations in the German High Command. The duo contrasts this flawed preparation with the reality of Soviet capabilities and Stalin’s own ambitions and strategies—emphasizing that both sides were gearing up for a titanic clash, not just as a matter of necessity, but of deeply held (and deluded) worldviews.
Hitler’s Motivated Reasoning:
Historic German Insecurities:
Anglo-Soviet Tensions & Provocations:
Operational Groupthink:
Logistical Nightmares Ignored:
German Military Overconfidence & Blindness:
Misjudgments about the Enemy:
Stalin's Mobilization & Strategic Planning:
Soviet Military-Industrial Revolution:
Notable Insight:
German Deficit:
Resource Scarcity and Over-Extension:
Strategy vs. Tactics:
Totalitarian Mass Mobilization:
"This time, we're going to sort it out once and for all... create living space, Lebensraum... That's the grand plan. The fact that it's batshit crazy is kind of neither here nor there."
– James [06:21]
“The shortages driving you into war are further exacerbating the shortages—make them worse!”
– Al [18:17]
"He's Cassandra, isn't he? He very much is going, look, cupboards bare."
– Al on Georg Thomas [18:32]
“We need 13,000 tons of rubber a month. But German industry can only process half that...stocks gone by the end of February 1941.”
– Al quoting Thomas [17:05]
“On this point, Hitler is unquestionably right. It’s just, has he got enough to do what he needs to do?”
– James [44:09]
Joking about the German generals’ groupthink and fearful deference to Hitler:
| Segment | Time | |------------------------------------------------|---------------| | Opening: Barbarossa motivations & Hitler's reasoning | 03:33 – 07:22 | | Groupthink among Nazi High Command | 13:59 – 15:12 | | German logistical shortcomings | 15:25 – 18:29 | | Rubber and fuel crisis, Allied obstructions | 17:05 – 18:29 | | Overextension: Balkans & North Africa campaigns | 22:23 – 23:44 | | Soviet war production and mobilization | 36:00 – 47:16 | | German vs. Soviet numbers (tanks, troops) | 39:56 – 45:03 | | Contrast: Hitler’s doubts & economic justification | 31:04 – 36:00 |
For listeners wanting more:
Summary prepared to capture the essential themes, lively analysis, and memorable moments as presented by Al Murray and James Holland in their trademark style.