← WW2 Pod: We Have Ways of Making You Talk
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- [00:02]
Al Murray
Thank you for listening to we have ways of making you talk. Sign up to our Patreon to receive bonus content, live streams and our weekly newsletter with money off books and museum visits as well. Plus early access to all live show tickets. That's patreon.com we haveways when did making plans get this complicated? It's time to streamline with WhatsApp, the secure messaging app that brings the whole group together. Use polls to settle dinner plans, send event invites and pin messages so no one forgets mom 60th and never miss a meme or milestone. All protected with end to end encryption. It's time for WhatsApp message privately with everyone. Learn more at WhatsApp.com Limu Emu and.
- [00:56]
James Holland
Doug Here we have the Limu Emu in its natural habitat, helping people customize.
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Al Murray
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- [01:08]
James Holland
It's accompanied by his natural ally, Doug. Uh, Limu is that guy with the binoculars watching us. Cut the camera.
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Al Murray
They see us. Only pay for what you need@libertymutual.com Liberty Liberty Liberty Liberty Savings vary underwritten by Liberty Mutual Insurance Company and affiliates excludes Massachusetts. You're a sausage McMuffin egg didn't change your receipt.
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James Holland
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- [01:31]
Al Murray
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James Holland
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- [01:37]
Al Murray
Prices and participation may vary. During the first week of September I was a very wide man. I was a very wide man because I was short of pilots. That was the thing that worried me, frankly. I was never worried about the supply of aircraft. Pilot shortage was my main problem. The reason that I spent every afternoon from after I thought the main attacks were over at 4 or 5 o'. Clock. I went out to the Northolt aerodrome every day in the week and climbed into my old Hurricane and flew around some of the aerodromes every day, seven days a week in order to talk to the pilots, flight commanders, squadron commanders, to see how they were standing the strain because I was caning them. I was working them to the limit of their physical and mental capacity. That, of course, was Air Vice Marshal Keith park reflecting on the dark days of September during the Battle of Britain. Welcome to we have ways of making you talk with me, Al Murray and James Holland and our Battle of Britain series continues. Episode 5 Black Saturday Clues in the Name I mean, the thing is, James, let's be honest now. We've I think in recent episodes kind of said that the Battle of Britain, one way or another, is a foregone Conclusion that the Dowding system is in place. Fighter commanders prepared pretty much for this battle. The Luftwaffe is a, a tactical air force trying to achieve a strategic aim for which it is never planned. So what's the fuss, right?
- [02:58]
James Holland
But it's all very well saying that from our comfy seats 85 years hence, but it certainly didn't seem like that at the time. And also the great thing about history is that you can see, you can tell the story from both sides. But obviously in 1940, park and his immediate boss, commander in chief of Fighter Command, Air Chief Marshal Sir Hugh Dowding, can't. So they can only see what's in front of them. And you, you know, of course there's going to be crises because German planes are flying over southern England. They're attacking regularly. You know, airfields are starting to look a bit of a shambles. Pilots are being shot down and they've got a pretty good idea of what the Germans have got. But it's not a complete picture by any stretch of the imagination. And this is a life and death situation. You know, the stake of not just of Britain, but the whole free world lies in their hands. And I'd be a little bit worried if he wasn't feeling a little bit worried. If he sort of thinks it's all a breeze, you, you'd think, oh, well.
- [03:54]
Al Murray
And it shows the extent to which park really cares about his men that quote that he's, he's out there every day taking their temperature. That's what a good commander would do. And he would turn up in his white flying suit, wouldn't he? And everyone would know who he was. Basically, it's visible command, isn't it? It's very, really very, very important. We left episode four with a very heavy days fighting on the 25th of August. And we talked about expert and, and the difference between German aces and the idea of the RAFA and how it wanted to encourage a team effort. But the thing is, the Luftwaffe, for all of its culture and all its way, that the core part of it is it keeps changing tactics. That's the really the key thing to understanding what the Luftwaffe is doing during the Battle of Britain. It's groping around looking for answers, isn't it?
- [04:37]
James Holland
Yeah, because just to reiterate, they're not designed for this. They are designed primarily as a tactical air force one to support ground troops. And suddenly they're being given a completely different role. Their intelligence on their enemy is terrible. They don't really know what they're doing. This is completely new ground because air power is new ground, they're making up as they go along. And their commander in chief is someone who is spectacularly ill suited to the tasks that he's been given. And this is of course, Reichsmarshall Hermann Goering. And yes, he might have been a jolly good fighter commander of a Squadron back in 1918, but that doesn't really qualify you for the top job.
- [05:14]
Al Murray
No.
- [05:15]
James Holland
And he's getting frustrated because hubris and arrogance and bad intelligence and overconfidence had suggested that the RAF could be destroyed in three days. But let's give it four just for luck. And they've got nowhere near. And it's absolutely clear that here they are, you know, end of August, beginning of September, they're losing lots of planes, they're losing lots of pilots. They don't have home advantage. Things aren't going according to plan. Pressure is mounting for Sea lion and a decisive action that will see the end of the British effort in the Second World War. Goering is kind of starting to scratch his head a little bit, isn't he, and think, oh, what can I do? Because his subordinate commanders don't seem to have the answers either.
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Al Murray
The fact is the people below him have come up with some solutions, haven't they? So General Loetzer in Flieger Corps two, he thinks that the way to. The way to sort of crack the nut is to confuse the British RDF system, the early warning system. So they've at least got a measure of the fact they are being intercepted and met, haven't they? And so Lerza's view is what you're going to have to do is send up loads of people, loads of feint attacks, and the British won't know what's what. This is really the issue for Park.
- [06:21]
James Holland
That's not something else, by the way.
- [06:23]
Al Murray
Yeah, yeah. Lerza's got this dead right, hasn't he?
- [06:25]
James Holland
The big problem is, though, I mean, that is unquestionably the right tactics. But they don't have enough aircraft to do that. That's the problem they have. They can do lots of little raids and confuse the radar system, but they haven't got enough to then decisively attack the raf, because by splitting up their own numbers, they're then attacking in penny packets, which and vulnerable to counterattack by the squadrons. Suddenly, squadrons aren't attacking, you know, 12 planes aren't attacking, you know, formations of 200, they're attacking formations of 12 or 15 or whatever. And that's not the kind of overwhelming outnumbering that the Germans Require whatever tactics you come up with. It doesn't get away from the problem that you're not producing enough aircraft at this point. You haven't got enough pilots being processed and you haven't got enough aircraft en masse to be able to do what you need to do. But the thing is about doing these sort of multiple raids and attacking lots of different targets at once. That does in a nightmare for park and his ground controllers, because they don't know which ones to go for. And this is why you have this preponderance of what's known as X raids in people's logbooks. X rays are where you're directed towards something which then turns out to be nothing or, you know, and it probably was a single junkers 88 or something, but it disappeared in Clown and then bugged off home. And so it's come to nothing. And what part doesn't want is when his pilots are flying. He wants it to count. He doesn't want them sort of wasting time and effort and fuel chasing red herrings, basically.
- [07:43]
Al Murray
So he updates his orders. I mean, this is one of the interesting things about park is he's evolving the system as it comes, and as the Germans evolve, so does he. So he orders fighter leaders, whenever they see anything, to make a visual report of size, height and direction of any enemy formation they spot, which then goes back down to the ground and then is relayed to any other fighters already airborne. Because one of the things, of course, is that the radio they've got, you can't talk to one another between squadrons. Everything's got to go back to the ground control and then back up. So the ground needs all the information it can possibly get. So what he. What Parc's doing is he's adding another slice of info for his controllers on the ground to sort of siphon and filter.
- [08:19]
James Holland
The other thing that I think is really, really important to stress, and nearly every book that's ever been written about the Battle of Britain doesn't stress this, is that these ground controllers are getting better at it. The people manning the radar stations are getting better at it. The plotters on the ground overlooking the map table are getting better at it. This intensity is only improving the standard of the RAF's ability to analyse the information that's coming in. And actually alth. Although it causes a huge amount of concern, this incredibly panicked kind of sort of. Well, panic's not the right word, but this massive information coming into them when the Luftwaffe are doing this sort of scattergun raid approach is incredibly Good practice. There's nothing better to sharpen their skills than this. And that's the truth of it. And again, you're right. You know, park is a very tactically flexible commander. So, you know, he updates instructions again on the 27th of August. So it'd been agreed that should there be a heavy raid heading for 11 group airfields within easy reach of 10 and 12 group squadrons, then these neighbouring units could be called upon to help. Park is really happy that ten Group has been cooperating magnificently under Quentin Brand. He is less happy with 12 group and more of that in our bonus episode. But he says, up to date, 12.
- [09:32]
Al Murray
Group, on the other hand, have not shown the same desire to cooperate by dispatching their squadrons to the places requested. This is his airfield. So the idea is he doesn't want his airfields left unprotected. So when 11 group fighters scramble, the idea is that 12 group guys come down to patrol over those airfields to protect them from enemy attack. Because after all, the thing to emphasize about the, about the early warning system is once aircraft are over the coast, they're tracked by the Observer Corps, not by radar, not by rdf. And if, you know, if there's cloud or whatever, they may not spot everything. So your airfields in land, in 11 group need protecting by 12 group. And the issue is 12 group pilots, and as you say, there is a bonus episode to come about this, are pretty bored twiddling their thumbs, waiting, waiting to go into action. Because the action's been happening in 11 group, 10 group mainly, and they're so frustrated to get into action that what, what you end up with is a situation where they are, they are not going where they're directed. Which is kind of unbelievable when you come to it. But we, we will, we will save all that up for, for another episode. Because that story is extraordinary and interestingly, not so consequential for the Battle of Britain, but hugely consequential for the RAF and the campaign it fights the following year. Which is the. One of the things about it.
- [10:45]
James Holland
But the point is, by the last few days of August and the beginning of September, Those airfields in 11 group are really taking a hammering. And I've always been quite sort of smug about this and said, yeah, well, you know, they had scalpings, they just filled in the potholes and, you know, the craters and kind of cracked on and, you know, it's incredibly difficult to hit 100 acre grass airfield. All of which is unquestionably true. And they had put in quite a lot of contingency. So there are backup control rooms and all the rest of it. But make no mistake, these places are getting absolutely hammered and it's not good for anybody on the ground, whether you be a pilot or whether you be ground crew or whether you be part of the operations team, to have bombers coming over and strafing your airfield and dropping bombs willy nilly and all the rest of it. And one example is Biggin Hill, which is possibly one of the most famous Fighter Command Airfields. So on 28 August, 32 Squadron, which includes Pete Brothers, who we've mentioned a few times, he's rotated out, so they bid farewell to Biggin Hill having been stationed there eight years. Isn't that amazing?
- [11:43]
Al Murray
Yeah, yeah.
- [11:43]
James Holland
I mean, they go down to forward airfields during the Dunkirk evacuation, but basically they're stationed there. But the interesting thing is that 32 Squadron actually escapes the worst of the raids on Piggin Hill. But the Luftwaffe is still hitting coastal command stations. But more and more 11 group airfields are getting plastered and Biggin is smashed twice on 30 August when massive damage is done to buildings and to equipment, workshops, transport yards, stores, barrack stores, armory, met office and station office are all rendered completely useless. Gas and water supplies, as are a number of telephone lines. 39 people killed and a further 26 injured. I mean, that is no small number on a fighter base. You know, staff irks, all the rest of it. Ground crew are known as irks, by the way.
- [12:24]
Al Murray
Yeah, well, particularly in an organisation like the RAF where the single pilot has a vast number of people who get him into the sky. And so if you're taking that kind of ground crew loss on a frontline station, that could really. That can really affect things.
- [12:36]
James Holland
Yeah, absolutely. Anyway, 31st of August, the Germans are back, causing further and extensive damage to hangars and buildings, including the operations block, officer's mess, officers, married quarters. Same day, Croydon and Hornchurch, which are comparatively nearby, are also heavily attacked. In fact, 31st of August is Fighter Command's worst day. Yeah, it's not a well known day and I mean for that reason in the kind of sort of historiography of the Battle of Britain, but 41 aircraft are destroyed, nine pilots killed in action. Now, you know, when you're talking about the kind of sort of huge numbers of the Eastern Front or even later battles in northwest Europe, I mean, you know, what's nine pilots? But you have to remember that, you know, if you're repeating that every single day, that soon, that attrition rate soon starts to be felt. It's the one day in the whole battle where more British planes are downed.
- [13:23]
Al Murray
Than German and the numbers in those cases speak for themselves, isn't it? Because the RAF lose 41 planes, the Luftwaffe lose 39, the RAF lose nine crew, the Luftwaffe 21 crew. They might be winning in terms of airframes that day, the Luftwaffe, but they still learn losing in terms of personnel. And it's obviously because it's bombers and.
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James Holland
But, but I think all of this. But my point is that this is the background.
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Al Murray
Yeah.
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James Holland
To the crisis that Dowding, Lovell, his deputy and park start to feel around this time, you know, as augurs gives way to September, there is a real kind of yikes moment. Yeah. At the high command of Fighter Command, you know, where people are kind of thinking, you know, where Dowding and co are thinking, can we hang on this rate, this intensity of air fighting, you know, how long can we kind of keep going, you know? And in the last week of August, fighter command loses 64 pilots killed in action and 81 wounded in action. I mean, that's a lot. That's a lot out of Fighter Command. Yeah. And so it's understandable if park occasionally comes across as being a bit tetchy. I think the relentless attacks on airfield are definitely taking their toll. That's the point.
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Al Murray
Yeah. And because pilots are the issue, it's at this stage that we see the release of the Poles into the battle, basically, isn't it, because.
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James Holland
And the Czechs too.
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Al Murray
It's interesting, isn't it? Because the Poles have sort of become very much the sort of centrally remembered part of this effort, haven't they? I mean, obviously there's more of them than anyone else. There's lots of remembering of the Poles and I think that's a fantastic thing.
- [14:55]
James Holland
It's very funny how everyone always sort of goes, well, you know, no one ever remembers the polls, like. No one ever forgets, suppose. Yeah.
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Al Murray
I mean, they're in the movie, you know.
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James Holland
Quite right. Quite right too.
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Al Murray
But yeah, yeah. I mean, if they weren't in the Battle of Britain.
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James Holland
Justified.
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Al Murray
That's my point. They're in the Battle of Britain film. They're in the thing that everyone has seen about the Battle of Britain, the Battle of Britain film. I mean, come on.
- [15:15]
James Holland
Anyway, that Polish clap trap. Yes, that's right. Repeat, please.
- [15:18]
Al Murray
In Poland.
- [15:19]
James Holland
But the real focus is. Is. Is Also on. On 303 Kasuska squadron. And the reason it's. Is because they end up being the top scoring squadron in the Battle of Britain, but also because they're in 11 Group, whereas the Czechs and the other Polish squadron, 302, that's in Fighter Command. There are other bomber command, Polish squadrons, by the way, is in 12 group, you know, which, as we've already mentioned, aren't quite so in the action. Actually, 302 Squadron at Duxford are into the fray before 303 Squadron. But as we kind of mentioned before, there is a very good reason that you don't put the Poles in beforehand, because the cockpits are different layout to the Polish ones and because they don't speak English for the most part. And if you don't speak English, you can't go into a coordinated system like the Dowding system until you do. So that's why they're kept out. But what they have been doing since, I think around the 20th of August, is they have been allowed to do patrol work over airfields. And then on the 30th of August, a startling opportunity arrives, because they're patrolling at 10,000ft at around 4:15pm When Flying Officer Ludwig Paskovich suddenly spots a large formation of bombers and fighters above them. But although he warned his flight commander, Boozy Kellett, because they had English flight commanders and squadron leader, he didn't bother respond. So Paskovic decides to break formation anyway and chases after a Zastura an me110 closed to almost collision point, and then opens fire and the ME110 bursts into flames and spins to the ground, where it explodes in a ball of flames. And returning to Northhalt, he performs a victory roll over the airfield and lands. And he's immediately called in to see Group Captain Vincent, who is the station commander at Norfolk, who wraps him on the knuckles and emphatically reprimands him, but then at the same time is congratulated for scoring the squadron's first kill. And later that day, Kellett rings up Fighter Command and recommends that the squadron be made operational. And both Dowdy and Parck at this point agree, not least because they desperately.
- [17:12]
Al Murray
Need more pilots, of course, and motivated ones as well. And the Poles don't lack motivation. The backdrop is this mounting pressure, which is why they really could use their neighboring groups to help out. And I think it's. It's interesting. Ten Group, we haven't really talked about them much as an issue. We've talked about combat in the 10 group area, but it's just. It just happens.
- [17:31]
James Holland
Yes, because We've talked about BB Mont and 87 Squadron, haven't we? We've talked about 609 Squadron and David.
- [17:36]
Al Murray
Crook well, and attacks on Portsmouth and so on and, and Middle Wallop and all that sort of thing, but basically 11 group run of this intense pressure. But running these sorties is also great pressure on the germans themselves. On 28 August, for instance, Siegfried Betke in JG2, they move to the Belgian border, close to Dunkirk, their first and second group and are basing themselves at Marduk, while three JG2 go to Octaville. Becker fires three operational sorties on 30 August. You think about the personal strain of getting into that airplane every time and the tension and, you know, and they know by now, by this stage of the Battle Britain, that they are going to be met, that there will be a reception party for them. So he's, he's under a great deal of strain and he says the British fighter pilots might not have been the finest shots, but those brothers are good, nice tactics. He likes their flying tactics.
- [18:25]
James Holland
Whoa, brother.
- [18:27]
Al Murray
Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah.
- [18:28]
James Holland
I mean, but also, what did that say about the German's attitude? I mean, you know, knights of the sky and all the rest of it. I mean, it's absolutely part of their DNA, isn't it?
- [18:35]
Al Murray
Yeah, well, at least that's in his diary from the time rather than 1946, where.
- [18:40]
James Holland
Yeah, yeah, it is.
- [18:41]
Al Murray
Yeah. Well, but, you know what I mean, rather after the war, he's going, yeah, we were, we were just chivalrous knights of the sky. Nothing to do with us, all the unpleasantness and so on. And the next day he flies another three sorties on the 31st. Two on September 1st, another two on for September 2nd. That's got to wear a man out. You know, we were just saying that 32 Squadron are rotated out of Biggin Hill. He's been rotated out of the frying pan into the fire, basically, hasn't he? From going from Normandy to the Pas de cala.
- [19:09]
James Holland
Completely. Yeah. Oh, it's. It's completely relentless. But. But also, just by the way, I mean, all these guys like Beck, they've been flying throughout the French campaign.
- [19:16]
Al Murray
Yeah.
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James Holland
So they have been on the go since the 10th of May. You know, with no leave. They might have a day off, but. But there's no. There's no leave. It is. It has been utterly relentless.
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Al Murray
By the end of August, Flight fighter command has 1100 pilots. The Luftwaffe is down to 735 operational fighter pilots. So that the scales are tipping against the attackers.
- [19:36]
James Holland
What's it? Three to one? Three to one, yeah. Really, you. They, you know, to, to achieve. To achieve. They need all their bombers and they need 3,300 fighter pilots. You know, it's not just. You can't just look at this and go, well, you know, they're operating an average of sort of two and a half to one aircraft superiority. It doesn't work like that. You need three to one advantage in fighter planes escorting the bombers.
- [20:01]
Al Murray
Becker, in between his two sorties on the OR as well as his two sorties on the September 2, he's awarded the Iron Cross First Class. Although what he really wants is a Knight's Cross, isn't he? What he says in his diary is really revelatory, isn't it, Jim?
- [20:13]
James Holland
I will never get that far, at least not against the English fighters. We can almost never surprise them. They are always inferior in numbers because we never fly in a force less than a groupe. However, a groupe should be 50 planes. I only have five planes here. The other Staffeln only have six to seven machines at the moment. You know, this is. This is, I think, a really massive of revelation. You know, this is not how we picture the Battle of Britain. This sort of yellow nose bastards coming over and all the rest of it, you know, to kind of underline the point. These Staffel. These Staffel squadrons should have 12, you know, as an establishment. And here they are with. With six and five and all the rest of it. And, you know, they're. They're operating it as a group. So, you know, Instead of having 36 planes in your group, you've got 15 or 16, you know, or 18 or whatever, and you're having to close escort. Don't you remember what Goring said? He said, I want one grouper kind of, you know, doing the top cover, another one close, escorting the bombers, another one kind of sort of medium bombers protecting the one one Zeros or whatever. It's just not enough because the Luftwaffe.
- [21:16]
Al Murray
Has tilted to the expert. As new airframes come in, they're given to the experienced pilots, which means the new guys don't get any experience, which means you. You're. You're simultaneously amplifying the experience guys put it, and putting them at greater risk because they're always flying. Of course, you're amplifying them, and they're.
- [21:33]
James Holland
Mentally and physically getting exhausted.
- [21:34]
Al Murray
Yeah, and diminishing the people with no experience as well, and making their lives more difficult, more dangerous. There are two bad ends of that particular banana for the Germans, aren't there? The way this works, you're going to wear out the aces. As Fighter Command is capable of shooting down ex pattern, you know, perfectly kept because they don't know they're just me 109s when they, when they run into them, you know. But, but the least experienced pilots are getting less experience. That is only going to, only going to multiply the, amplify their problems, isn't it?
- [22:01]
James Holland
Well, yes, and they've only got seven pilots left. And you know, that very low rate of planes that Siegfried Bettka's talking about is replicated everywhere. So on the 1st of September, Hans Ekar, Bob's Neistaffel, for example, has only got five aircraft and six 109s on 2nd of September. So they are getting replacements or they're getting repaired or whatever, but it's never up to, you know, six is only half what they should be. Yeah, 50% of what it should be.
- [22:26]
Al Murray
Adolf Galland, he's worried about the new pilots and the lack of training they're getting. But what he's really worried about is he wants more experienced pilots. That's what he wants because, because Galland is an Instant Solutions fellow. Milk comes to see him on the 22nd of August, August and he asks for 30 more experienced pilots. I mean, how. There's a magic wand involved in that particular conversation, isn't there? And on the 31st, Galland only manages to get enough aircraft into the air for two missions and one free hunt, as they call it, over England. And then later the day he's rung up by Yafu too, asking for another sortie, an unscheduled sortie. That means all three gripen have to go for a fourth mission in one day. I mean, this is just imagine the, the nervous state you'd be in just getting, getting that plane the fourth time thinking, oh Christ, am I going to live?
- [23:11]
James Holland
Do you remember when we were talking to Clive Denny, who's a contemporary pilot, great mate of the show, mate of ours, he said to us, he said, honestly, mate, flying a Hurricane for an hour really, really takes it out of you.
- [23:22]
Al Murray
Yeah.
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James Holland
He said, you wouldn't want to be doing more than that.
- [23:24]
Al Murray
Yeah, it's hard work. Yeah.
- [23:25]
James Holland
Now admittedly, you know, he's, he's a bit older than these young youngsters, but he's also incredibly experienced. I mean, you know, there is nothing he doesn't know about flying a Hurricane.
- [23:34]
Al Murray
Yeah. So no one's ever tried to shoot him down either. That's the other part that's missing from Clive's equation.
- [23:40]
James Holland
And he hasn't had to sort of continually fly over the Channel, has he?
- [23:42]
Al Murray
Yeah.
- [23:43]
James Holland
So the Interesting thing is, is that by this stage, you know, the RAF fighter command, you know, pilots are now automatically given 48 hours every two weeks. You know, this is leave, 48 hours off, and we're rotated out the front line, usually after three weeks. And there is just no reciprocal respite for the Luftwaffe fighter pilots at all, you know, and obviously it's completely different flying over your own country rather than from a newly occupied territor.
- [24:06]
Al Murray
Yeah, of course.
- [24:06]
James Holland
And the stress and strain of keeping up that level of intense air fighting is absolutely immense, you know, and as well as flying over. Over southern England three or four times a day, they're also expected to regularly write up and discuss stuff and all the rest of it. And of course, they're being bombed themselves by marauding Blenheims, which is often forgotten about this. So on the second morning, Sifri Becker in JG2 and his fellows are shaken when a Blenheim comes over early and drops a number of bombs over, as Hans Eckard. Bob says, there's another meeling to Canal Crank, which is not just a sickness to try and get a Knight's Cross. It also means your nerves are shot and you simply cannot fly anymore. It's amazing, isn't it?
- [24:46]
Al Murray
They're getting fed up with each other as well. It's the thing. Ulri Steinhelper, who's at Kokel, he notes that the debates are getting more heated and tempers are fraying. One evening, Hynek Valor, one of the pilots, becomes so upset he storms out of the tent, threatening to shoot himself. The strain of unrelenting frontline flying was beginning to show There is a question of the suicide rate amongst pilots ticking up during this time, interestingly. But we need to return for part two, as we will enter what is supposed to be the last phase of the Battle of Britain. But as ever, we moved the start date, Jim, so we can decide when the last phase is at our leisure.
- [25:25]
James Holland
Yeah, it's got a few days. It's got a little way to go yet.
- [25:28]
Al Murray
Excellent. We'll see you after the break. This episode is brought to you by Progressive Insurance. Do you ever find yourself playing the budgeting game? Well, with the name your price tool from Progressive, you can find options that fit your budget and potentially lower your bills. Try it@progressive.com Progressive Casualty Insurance Company and affiliates, price and coverage match limited by state law. Not available in all states. Welcome back to Way of Ways of Making youg Talk, Part 5 of our battle of Britain series. Now, as we. As we've said the RAF's been placed under increasing pressure towards the end of August at the turn of the month of September. We're recording this on the. On the 1st of September. There's that feeling this time of year, isn't it? That year. The year has turned a corner and that you're now in the sort of. Yes, the days are getting noticeably shorter, but what Dowding in his dispatch called the last phase of the. Of the Battle of Britain.
- [26:26]
James Holland
But yes, it ends on the Saturday the 7th of September.
- [26:29]
Al Murray
Yeah, but there's, there's plenty going on before. Before this. The big politics is that the destroyers for bases deal between the US and the UK is ratified on the 2nd of September. Which is sort of basically Churchill getting Roosevelt to paddle beyond his ankles in the possibility of joining a war in the west, isn't he? Basically, he's getting him. He's saying, come on in, you know, you can do it. And these destroyers actually, when it comes to it, are really. They're very. They're symbolic more than anything else. They're out of date. They need a lot of work done to them. But the portion of American political establishment that doesn't like Britain gets some bases, so could rub its hands with glee at the. At the dismantlement of the British Empire and all that sort of thing. It is actually the sort of an important diplomatic moment. And also one of the things, and I think this is really interesting given how much we've talked about it. One of the things that's in. That's part of the information exchange, is details about rdf. It's the British.
- [27:20]
James Holland
Yeah.
- [27:20]
Al Murray
And this is a. This is actually sort of a hallmark of how the British conduct the war. The tech, whatever you want to know, we'll share it with you. That goes on into other things, like tube alloys, which becomes the atomic bomb. You know, this idea that. What do you want to know? Because you're going to need to know it yourself. It's the, I think the British attitude there. But Sea lion is still being simmered on a pot, isn't it, at this point? Which is one of the interesting things because. Because again, sea lion is so often dismissed in hindsight, isn't it? Well, I never worked. They weren't really very serious. But at the time, there's a whole load of people involved in the planning who are deadly serious about this. So they're getting there, trying to solve the problems that Sea lion offers.
- [27:56]
James Holland
Well, the bottom line is this. You don't remove thousands of Rhine river barges, upset the industrial economy. In Germany, if you're not serious about it, you don't go to all that effort. Yeah, if you're not serious about making a play for this doesn't mean that Hitler's going to go through with it. But he's serious about it, there's no question about it.
- [28:13]
Al Murray
And you have all these, these, all these arguments going on about where the Kriegsmarine should land, whether you cross light forces from Lavre to Brighton and mainlanding Eastbourne and Folkestone Falchion Jaeger being, being brought in, dropped on the South Downs, all this, all this sort of stuff. And of course Fausti Jager fall on a Luftwaffe so they form, fall under Gurring. So he's being consequently non committal because no one wants to make up their mind at this stage. But it's all series of compromises. But people are arguing about this and are trying to sort of figure out how on earth to do it. But what they're really interested in is its political effect. OkH and OkW they're agreed that the invasion, it's got to be a coup de grace, which is what Hitler wants, which is a thing that topples the British government rather than a like a full blown campaign.
- [28:58]
James Holland
The problem is, is the plans that they are, they're still working towards a plan as though they're going to have to carry it out. And if you remember the army want a broad front, the navy want a very small front. What they've done is a sort of medium sized front which kind of ends up pleasing nobody. But you know, be that as it may, it is all happening. You know there is also now talk of launch of launching large scale terror raids on London, bombing raids on London on the eve of the invasion with the intention of causing mass panic and you know, hope like France that streams of people would flee London, blocking roads and hampering British moves to meet the invasion. But making assumptions on a kind of sort of reactive response from, from the British I think is also kind of problematic. But Hitler is back in Berlin. He tells Jodl on 30 August that he would decide on Sea lion on or around the 10th of September, which is absolutely classic Hitler prevarication. But because, you know, since it's accepted that at least 10 days notice would be needed, a timetable was now drawn up and issued on the 3rd of September. But this made the earliest sailing date then around the 20th of September, which is very close to the autumn equinox of the 21st of September. Well they would be landing on the 21st of September. And that's the point where you get sighted dodgy tides and, you know, the weather's whipping up a little bit or can be, and time is running out. You know, there's, there's absolutely no question, and it's certainly true that Goering has very little faith in sea lion. But Hitler curacy is, as at this moment, at the beginning of September, becoming more optimistic, ironically, because at last the Luftwaffe seems to be emphatically winning the air battle currently raging, according to Luftwaffe intelligence, which is universally believed. And this goes back to our old friend Beppo Schmidt, his chief intelligence officer, who's junior in rank to the the actual head of intelligence for the Luftwaffe, General Martini. But at a conference held by the Reichsmarschal at The Hague on 29 August, Schmidt confirms that British fighter strength had dropped to almost around 100, although with the lull up to the 23rd, they probably had an actual strength around 350. Keep the options open. Castlering reports that according to General Meyer, Teo Osterkamp, the commander of Yafu 2 Germany already had unconditional fighter superiority now. And what's really interesting is it's only Hugo Spurla, who is the Luftflotte 3 commander, is prepared to add a note of skepticism here. By the first week of September, the situation looks even more favorable. Is the general feeling amongst the Luftwaffe hierarchy. English fighter defence hit hard. It's reported at the okw, which is, you know, after all, the German general Staff directly reporting to Hitler. Ratio of kills has changed much to our favor.
- [31:33]
Al Murray
Or has it just that figure, that figure from schmidt, it's maybe 100 or.
- [31:39]
James Holland
Maybe 350 or 350, or it might be, it might be 800 or it might be 263.
- [31:45]
Al Murray
What's your margin of error there? Or maybe they got minus 250 planes. I mean, the sheer variance in that. It's also, it's interesting because they don't then act, do they, on Sea Lion? You think, well, they're down to 100. We might as well go for it. But no one goes, well, they're down to the 100. Well, we'll have to carry on then. It's as if they don't believe the numbers, even though they believe the numbers.
- [32:06]
James Holland
But no one's admitting to the other that they don't believe the numbers.
- [32:09]
Al Murray
Yeah, exactly.
- [32:10]
James Holland
So they're putting on this kind of sort of, of course we're winning because anything else is just unconscionable. So whatever Dark thoughts you might be having, let's just keep that in the back of the mind and let's hope it'll all work out. But what is absolutely clear is while they're getting a little bit overconfident, their view is not reflected in the reality of their own staffeln, their own fighter squadrons with their depleted numbers. It is pilot shortage which is the, the big concern for Downing park and all at Fighter Command. And a report to the Joint Intelligence Committee by Air Intelligence is conducted by Group Captain Tommy Elmhurst, who we've mentioned before, who later becomes Mary Cunningham's right hand man in the Desert Air Force and then the first Tactical Air Force in Tunisia later on in the war. But his figures for downed germ German aircraft, you know, they're inaccurate, but they do have a pretty clear understanding of the, the German production level. So that's a good thing. And it's predicted that if current German fighter losses continue, the Luftwaffe will probably have to give up around the third week of September. But at the beginning of September, after the worst week for Fighter command since start of the summer, this doesn't really feel that much of comfort. And Elmer writes, the great query was however, whether our fighters could continue their present volume of effort and sustain their present rate of losses for another three weeks. So there is massive concern at this that they're running out of pilots. Dowding and his deputy Air Vice Marshal Douglas Evill are really, really worried at this point. They hope they can hang on for another three weeks, but they're not going to bet on it.
- [33:43]
Al Murray
To go back to the point we made at the start of the episode where someone who listened to the first four of these episodes about the Battle of Britain might think, well you know, it's all over bar the shouting. This is where the shouting is deafening and where it really does feel like things are going badly. And particularly if you're an 11 where you're being deployed the entire time and your airfields are being attacked, it's profoundly unsettling. The airfields are in turmoil. They can't keep their squadrons at strength. Even though Fighter Command are trying to make sure their pilots are arrested, they're still flying 50 to 60 hours a day.
- [34:14]
James Holland
Collectively.
- [34:14]
Al Murray
Yeah, collectively. It's hard going. Had the Luftwaffe had greater strength, this would be their moment to topple the raf. But as we keep saying, they don't.
- [34:24]
James Holland
And the truth is, and this is not known to park and Dowding at the time or even, you know, even as late as the 1960s when park is recorded talking about all this and his concerns about it, which is where that quote at the front of the episode comes from. The reality is that Fighter Command squadrons are often in much, much better shape than most of the Luftwaffe units and their pilots are getting way more chances to rest, you know, but again, it's all relative because the point is this is Luftwaffe's strength seems so formidable because it can choose when it attacks and is able to concentrate its for. So it always seems like there's lots of them, but in terms of total numbers of aircraft, so that includes Coastal Command, Bomber Command and Fighter Command is closing with comparison to the Luftwaffe rather than widening as the Luftwaffe High Command think. So in other words, at this crucial, crucial moment, Fighter Command are underestimating their own strength comparative to the Luftwaffe and the Luftwaffe are overestimating their strength compared to the raf. And in one case, the former case, that's no bad thing at this stage of a battle. In the case of Luftwaffe, that's a terrible mistake to be making. And you know, Obviously, hypothetically, the RAF could also have mounted a 1000 aircraft raid if they wanted to, on the Pas de Calais. You know, they could have amassed, you know, 450 bombers, 500 bombers and 700 fighter planes to go over in a huge, great display of strength. Logistically, this would have been impossible. But, you know, it is interesting to think what the Germans might have made of that had they, had they done it. But obviously they're not going to because they're fighting a defensive battle. There's no need to do it. And of course, all of this is just not the point. If you're doubting Everlor park, to them, it feels very clear that they've reached a crisis point. There's no obvious let up in enemy raids on the plotting tables at Bentley Prior in Uxbridge, photographs by Coastal Command and reports by Bomber Command's Blenheims warns of, you know, a warning of huge concentrations of barges and ships suddenly filling the harbours all the way from the ports of Holland to Le Havre. And further photos of continental ports and photo reconnaissance from northern France show that the buildup of Luftwaffe and army units suggests that the big hammer blow is coming. You know, they've been plotting the fact that most of the fighter planes and Stukas have been moved into the kind of Flanders and Pas de Calais and all the rest of it. What that all suggests is one giant massive hammer blow. And Dowding is worried that they're not going to be able to meet that blow. That's his concern.
- [36:45]
Al Murray
And then we come to the part in the notes where the words in capitals greet us. Goering takes control.
- [36:50]
James Holland
Hooray.
- [36:51]
Al Murray
We're probably. Well, exactly. You probably realize that we don't really rate Goering's ability to take control of things, but on the 6th of September, strolls into town in his private train, Asia. Hitler's train's called America, weirdly, with news that he was personally taking control of the battle. So here we go, ladies and gentlemen. And this is with the backdrop of Bomber Command having gone back to Berlin on the night of the 3rd, 4th September and bombed Berlin again.
- [37:15]
James Holland
At that point, Hitler's run out of patience. He's had it. That's right, he's had it right up to here with the British bombing.
- [37:20]
Al Murray
And the Brits have gone too far.
- [37:21]
James Holland
Initially, he's shown decent restraint, but now they've just pushed him too far, far. So he makes a speech at the Sports palace on 4 September, and he vows revenge and goes into the full Hitler rant mode. I mean, this is spittle flying, clutching the air.
- [37:37]
Al Murray
Don't mind if I do. And if the British air force drops 2, 3 or 4,000 kilos of bombs, then we will drop 1500-005800-00230,000, 300,000 off 400,000 kilos or more in one night. If they declare that they will attack our cities on a large scale, we will raise theirs. We will put a stop to the game of these night pirates, as good as our fitness. So I overcome when one or other of us will crumble, and that will not be National Socialist Germany. I mean, that was terrifying. 400,000 kilos of bombs.
- [38:16]
James Holland
Yeah, right, yeah, yeah, right, yeah, of course, whatever. Goering's not keen at all. I mean, you know, 10 days earlier he's champing at the bit to attack British cities, but now he's. He's got really bad case of cold feet and he. And he just, you know, he's still praying, as he was back in August 1939, that Britain could yet be brought to the peace table, you know, and he knows perfectly well that the moment is Luftwaffe start attacking London. That ain't gonna happen. He reaches the front. This is a famous moment. He reaches the front and he visits his commanders and summers a number of his new fighter commodores, including Vernon Mulders and Adolf Galland. Goering is not in a mood, I think it's fair to say. You know, he too, like Hitler, like, is like, like the Fuhrer, is racked with indecision about the mass attacks on British cities that Hitler's now at long last authorized and aware that of course, he knows the air battle is slipping despite what Beppo Schmidt's best efforts to upbeat picture. Protecting bombers, he tells them, is far more important than securing record bags of enemy fighters. And then he softens a little and he asks him what he could do to improve the matters for.
- [39:18]
Al Murray
For them.
- [39:18]
James Holland
Gallard says, I should like an outfit.
- [39:20]
Al Murray
Of Spitfires for my squadron.
- [39:22]
James Holland
To which Gary replies, we have the best fighter in the world. And of course, you know. Galen then explains what he means. He goes, yes, yes, you know, of course I prefer the ME109 as a fighter. It's much better because it could accelerate, climb and dive quickly and all the rest of it. But because of its lower wing loading, Spitfire is more suited to slower maneuvers, which is what you need when you're protecting bombers. Goering has no answer at all to this, so he scowls and turns away and goes, where's my fix of morphine?
- [39:52]
Al Murray
But I mean, the thing is, is the Luftwaffe crew, they're not mad keen on mass daylight raids anyway. Getting an aircraft like that organized is difficult. They also know that the RAF intercept them wherever they go. So a big fat juicy target to be intercepted isn't necessarily something you want to sign up for. You know, the sort of tip and run thing the Germans have been doing up to this point. At the end of August, there's been less of a strain. But I think the prospect of these big formations is difficult, although, so Galland himself thinks it's actually the way to go and it's the best way to flush the RAF out. Von Richthofen, who's commander of 8 Fleeker Corps, thinks similarly. This afternoon the decision comes to aid London. Let's hope the Reichsmarshall stands firm. I've got my doubts on that score. It's very interesting because as we've been talking about bombing through throughout this series, the sort of function of it changes, doesn't it? It's terror bombing one minute as part of Sea lion, it's to get the fighters out for another reason. In this instance, this is the problem. When you have a tactical air force, you don't know what to do with it. When you're not fighting an army, you've got to come up with something.
- [40:52]
James Holland
You don't know what to do and you haven't got enough.
- [40:54]
Al Murray
And also the whole of the 1920s and 1930s, there's been discussion about what bombing's for and what its political effect will be. And the Idea that Hitler doesn't think that a good bit of bombing isn't going to cause some sort of political knock on. You know, he thinks purely in political terms when it comes to war. And that's what he's used bombing for before. So. So there's got to be an element that while as we get into it, the idea is they're attacking industrial targets, but it's also about. It's about trying to deliver a moral effect, isn't it?
- [41:20]
James Holland
Completely. But the bottom line is if your job is to destroy the Royal Air Force, the best way to do that is to hammer airfields and continue hammering airfields. I mean, how are you going to destroy the air force? By attacking London, I suppose by drawing them into the battle. But it suggests tactics that are running out of steam, that you're kind of running out of ideas of the previous one, which was going to kind of destroy the RAF absolutely without question, you know, in four days has run out of steam and you're having to kind of scratch your head and start again.
- [41:47]
Al Murray
He thinks this bombing campaign will probably do the trick in four days as well, doesn't he?
- [41:51]
James Holland
So he's hoping, but he's skeptical about it, you know. But Richtofen is worried Goering's gonna kind of lose his nerve and pull out of the policy. But actually, he doesn't have to have worried about that because the following afternoon, Goering is standing on Cap Green A with his assembled commanders and entourage, watching the largest Luftwaffe formation ever assembled pass over his head. There's some nine aircraft, 300 bombers, 600 fighters stepped up between 14,000, 23,000ft. You know, this is. This is the mass formation of Luftwaffe, the sky dark with black crosses, all the rest of it, you know. And this is the afternoon of Saturday, 7th September. But before we get on to what happens with that raid, we need to turn back to Fighter Command and the pilot crisis. Because suddenly, suddenly a simple but genius solution has been put forward that very same morning of Saturday 7th September 1940. It's a brilliant misty morning, so classic Indian summer morning, with sort of low mist and then the sun burning it off. 249 Squadron are now at North Weald. They've moved from Boscombe down in part of the sort of rotation. Pilot Officer Tom Neal is on the slate all day. Flies once at 9am for 15 minutes. Second a bit later, patrolling the Thames F. Nothing doing. But even so, he senses something's up. There's a kind of air of expectancy, you know, Tom is aware of, of, of invasion talk and you know, is this it? But meanwhile, Dowding calls a meeting with Park Evil, his deputy Shoto Douglas Sholto Douglas, the Deputy Chief of the Air Staff. And he explains that they need to think about what they should do should Fighter Command start to inverted commas go downhill Hill. And his assumption is that they're soon going to be unable to keep squadrons fully equipped with pilots. If things continue, his policy of rotating squadrons is going to have to become, you know, it's going to become impossible. So he's already worried that the Germans might discover how hard hit they are. He has no idea that they already believe Fighter Command to be a spent force. So he suggests keeping 11 group at full strength come what may, but is unable to increase the numbers of squadrons in the Southeast because of the damage to airfields and the limited number of existing airfields that are functional and other logistical issues. What he does think he might have to do is withdraw pilots because he wants to keep his balance. He wants to keep Fighter Command through the whole of Southwest England, central England, Northern England and Scotland and all the rest of it. So that's his dilemma. And so he suggests keeping 11 group at full strength come what may, but maybe not the rest of Fighter Command.
- [44:23]
Al Murray
That's interesting, isn't it? Sholto Douglas. And we will encounter Sholto Douglas in our bonus episode episode regarding big wings and so on. He's an opponent of Dowding and has been pre war. They're in different camps within the RAF and he thinks that Dowding's being too pessimistic. He's got pilot figures from Training Command that suggest they've got lots of men coming through. But Dowding says it's no, it's about being a combat ready fighter pilot, not being a trained pilot. There are these grains of sand of tension within the RAF that turn into pearls of disaster later on for some of these protagonists. But there is this key feeling they're going downhill and they're losing 120 pilots a week and the losses are outstripping what the OTUs can produce. So they've already cut the course, which is interesting. Also kind of the source of the idea that people were sent into the Battle of Britain with no experience at all. But you've got less time on type as you transfer from your training aircraft to the monoplanes to the fighter planes. And it means some guys are getting onto squadron with 10 hours on Spitfires.
- [45:21]
James Holland
And Hurricanes just to make a point here. You know, it's the combat ready fighter pilot that's the Key this idea that squadron leaders are sending up green pilots with only 10 hours on a Hurricane into battle, that is not happening because they're next to useless. They actually cause more harm than good. So what that means is you're then putting more strain on the experienced pilots. It's the same thing that's happening to the Luftwaffe fighter pilots. So that's the problem. What you really need to do is you need pilots who are so completely au fait with their Hurricane, they're no longer thinking about where they put their hand, what they do, how they kind of turn all the rest of it. They are just honed as a killing machine. And that's what you want. That's. That's the problem. This is exactly the same thing that Galland is saying. I, I don't want more pilots, I want experienced pilots. Yeah, that's, that is the issue. So it's, it's not that guys out of OTU are being sent off to become sacrificial lambs. That is not happening. You know, it happens to one or two, but I mean, they are very much the exception rather than the rule. Rule it is that they no longer have enough experienced pilots.
- [46:21]
Al Murray
Sholto Douglas doesn't really get it. Dowding says to him, you must realize that we are going downhill. And this is where park finds the solution. It's just amazing, which is really, really clever. So new pilots will get sent to the north, the squadrons in the north, for extra training, while only fully trained pilots from the north will be sent to squadrons in the south. So you've got extra time on training sorties in the north. And Downing points out, it needs fresh operational squadrons to exchange with 11 groups, battle exhausted squadrons, because, as we pointed out, 11 they're flying all the time. And so Parkes says, well, why not run the two schemes together? So what we do is bring in pilots, not squadrons. So there's an internal rotation within the, within the squadrons rather than whole squadrons, so that you're not swapping out a completely exhausted formation for a brand new one. So you're avoiding that cliff edge of bringing in green people. And he suggests this should take effect only when a squadron's quota has fallen below 15, which is below its 75% strength.
- [47:20]
James Holland
This is the absolute nub of it. And again, this is something that almost every book written about the Battle of Britain doesn't explain. So, yes, you have 12 pilots in the air, but that doesn't mean you've got 12 pilots on the ground. This is why Tommy Elmhurst's report is so gloomy. He thinks in the Air Intelligence that a Luftwaffe stafel is the same as a squadron, I.e 20 to 22 pilots to keep 12 aircraft in the air at any one time. But this isn't the case because establish strength for the luftwaffe Verstappel is 12 and they rarely have that strong, even when they are inverted commas full strength, you know, it's usually sort of 10 or nine or something. And I think it's quite interesting because there is, there is some debate. I mean I caught up with Seb Cox last week, he used to be the head of the Air Historical Branch and he was saying, well, the problem is no one actually knows what the figures of what a true established strength was because it wasn't written down. So the only way you can find out what true pilot strength is is by looking at the operational record records books, which is the squadron diaries. And what's really interesting is that 609 Squadron on 31 August has 19 pilots. So it has MacArthur, Gaunt, Agazarian, Crook, Kirchen, Howell, Miller, Tobin, Bisdy, Feary, Mammedoff, Dali, Dundas, Keogh, Staples, Ogilvy, Navirsky, Appleby and Ostosevsky and 92 Squadron who by the 14th, 15th of September are up at Biggin Hill and are being absolutely pasted every single day. They've got 17 pilots so that is getting closer to, to that 75% strength. So they've got Patterson, Foley, Wade, Kingcombe, Isles, Holland, Wright, William Sydney, Hill, Mottram, Wellam, Saunders, Bryson, Mann, McGowan and Havercroft. That's what you've got even at this time. You know, this is. So in other words, Dowding at Evelyn park are absolutely right to be worried about things, but they don't need to be as worried as they are because actually they've got much more contingency than they think you have. But anyway, be that as it may, all of them, including Sholto Douglas, are unanimously agreed to. Park's proposal goes on and from now on squadrons are given categorization Class A and these are squadrons in 11 group and some in 10 and 12 group, like 609 and 87 squadrons for example, which are fully operational and have their quota of 16 or more combat ready pilots. Class B are squadrons who would contain up to six non operational pilots in a quota of 16. So you, in other words, you'd have 10 fully experienced ones and Class C are squadrons that will retain at least, at least three fully operational experienced pilots. And most Class C squadrons would be in 13 group up in the north, although there would also be some in 10 and 12 groups too. What that means is your Class C can then build up hours with the help of the experienced pilots and when they're ready as a whole squadron, they can then be moved. And the great thing about this, because of the flexibility of the Dowding system, this can be put to place immediate that very date, Saturday 7th September.
- [50:03]
Al Murray
I think it's fair to say we are now into the last phase of the Battle of Britain. As Dowding Hugh Dowding puts it, they've solved their pilot crisis or they've addressed it. At least the Luftwaffe isn't doing such a thing and is girding its loins for yet another one last heave to overpower the Royal Air Force. And in our next episode, we will get you to Battle of Britain Day, Sunday 15th September, and what is regarded as the climactic moment of the Battle of Britain. Britain. Thanks very much for listening. If you want to listen to all of these in one go with no adverts, then become a Patreon. And you'll also receive bonus episodes. You'll receive live casts, news of the we have Ways festival for next year or go to our Apple Channel, become Officer class. Thanks very much for joining us. Battle of Britain Day in our next episode. Thanks for listening. Cheerio.
- [50:48]
James Holland
Cheerio. Hey, it's Anthony Scaramucci and I want to tell you about my podcast, Open Book, which just joined the Goal Hanger network, which we're all very proud of. In my latest episode, I interviewed Goal Hanger's very own James Holland. We spoke about World War II and what World War II teaches us about today. A clip Prime Minister Winston Churchill. Well, I think he was a great man. I think he was a man of vision. He was a man of enormous geopolitical understanding and he was a man who offered possibilities. When you're in a life and death struggle, you need people that can persuade you, you need people that can bind you. You need men of vision, of charisma. That's the problem at the moment, is we haven't got those guys. I mean, you know, he's flawed, of course, all the great men are, but thank goodness for the developed world and the world. But he was political leader of Great Britain in 1940 and throughout the whole of World War II. He literally, in so many different ways, man of the century, I think, because Roosevelt was a charmer. Roosevelt was a great strategist. He pulled the Americans through the Depression and helped him manage the war. But without Churchill holding ground in May and June of 1940, it would have been a much darker, much worse world. It would have been not a lot that the Americans could have done without Churchill's steadfastness and his inspiration to his fellow citizens distance. If you want to hear the full episode, just search open book wherever you get your podcast. You are not luminous, Watson, but you.
- [52:40]
Al Murray
Are a conductor of light.
- [52:45]
James Holland
Here they are.
- [52:46]
Al Murray
Dr. Mortimer, I presume? Yes.
- [52:48]
James Holland
Hi, John.
- [52:49]
Al Murray
Dr. John Watson. Who is your client? He was my client, Sir Charles Baskerville.
- [53:02]
James Holland
Keep reading.
- [53:04]
Al Murray
A local shepherd. Noted. I saw first that of the maid. Hugo Baskerville passed me thence on his black mare, and there behind him, running mute upon his track, such a hound.
- [53:16]
James Holland
Of hell that God forbid, cheers should ever be at my heels.
- [53:24]
Al Murray
I wish I felt better in my mind about it. It's an ugly business, boss.
- [53:27]
James Holland
An ugly, dangerous business. And the more I see of it, the less I like it.
- [53:33]
Al Murray
I shall be very glad to have.
- [53:36]
James Holland
You back safe and sound in Baker street once more.
- [53:41]
Al Murray
Hello. Goal Hanger presents.
- [53:45]
James Holland
You're not Sherlock Holmes. I'm Henry Baskerville from one of the.
- [53:49]
Al Murray
Biggest audio dramas of all time. Is it bothering? Like in a creepy kind of way? Like in there's an evil giant hound.
- [53:56]
James Holland
That likes the taste of Baskerville's kind.
- [53:58]
Al Murray
Of way, the seminal gothic novel by Arthur Conan Doyle.
- [54:02]
James Holland
They're watching.
- [54:03]
Al Murray
Who are watching? It's not safe. I could just make out its pitch black form. Welcome to deepest everything, a hellish void. Darkest. Who are you? This piercing yellow glow of eyes. Dartmoor.
- [54:21]
James Holland
What do you want of giant fangs?
- [54:25]
Al Murray
No. Sherlock and co.
- [54:28]
James Holland
The hound of the Baskervilles.
- [54:32]
Al Murray
Listen now. Five stars, says the eye Patient.
- [54:37]
James Holland
Hugely popular, says the Guardian.
- [54:39]
Al Murray
A successful reinvention of Holmes for a.
- [54:42]
James Holland
Younger generation, says the Times. Search Sherlock & Co. Wherever you get your podcasts.