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Essay Concerning Human Understanding Book IV - John Locke
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John Locke's "Essay Concerning Human Understanding Book IV" delves into the nature of knowledge and probability, exploring the limits of human understanding and the concepts of judgment and faith. Locke raises essential questions about the existence...
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Narrator (Librivox Reading - John Locke)
Refreshers contain caffeine section zero of an essay Concerning Human Understanding by John Locke Book four of Knowledge and Probability this is a Librivox recording. All Librivox recordings are in the public domain.
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For more information or to volunteer, please
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visit Librivox.org recording by Gillian Hendry of Knowledge and Probability Synopsis of the Fourth
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Book Locke's review of the different sorts
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of ideas or appearances of what exists
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that can be entertained in a human
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understanding and of their relations to words
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leads in the fourth book to an
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investigation of the extent and validity of the knowledge that our ideas bring within our reach and into the nature of faith in probability by which assent is extended beyond knowledge for the conduct of life. He finds Chapters one and two that knowledge is either an intuitive, a demonstrative,
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or a sensuous perception of absolute certainty
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in regard to one or other of
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four sorts of agreement or disagreement on
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the part of ideas, one of each idea within itself as identical and and
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different from every other two in their
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Narrator (Librivox Reading - John Locke)
abstract relations to one another, three in their necessary connections as qualities and powers coexisting in concrete substances, and 4 as revelations to us of the final realities of existence. The unconditional certainty that constitutes knowledge is perceptible by man only in regard to the first, second, and fourth of of these four sorts in all general propositions only in regard to the first and second, that is to say, in identical propositions and in those which express abstract relations of simple or mixed modes in
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which nominal and real essences coincide for
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example Propositions in pure mathematics and abstract morality. Chapters three and five to eight the fourth sort, which express certainty as to realities of existence, refer to any of three realities. For every man is able to perceive with absolute certainty that he himself exists, that God must exist, and that finite beings other than himself exist the first
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of these perceptions being awakened by all
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our ideas the second as the consequence of perception of the first and the last in the reception of our simple ideas of sense. Chapters 1 Section 72 Section 14 3. Section 214 and 9 to 11 agreement of the third sort of necessary coexistence of simple ideas as qualities and powers in particular substances with which all physical inquiry is concerned lies beyond human knowledge. For here the nominal and real essences are not coincident.
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General propositions of this sort are determined
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Narrator (Librivox Reading - John Locke)
by analogies of experience in judgments that are more or less probable intellectually necessary. Science of nature presupposes omniscience. Man's interpretations of nature have have to
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turn upon presumptions of probability.
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Chapters 3, sections 9 to 174 sections 11, 176 and 1416
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informing their stock of certainties and probabilities.
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Men employ the faculty of reason, faith in divine revelation and enthusiasm. Chapters 17:19 Much misled by the last, as well as by other causes of wrong assent.
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Chapter 20 when they are at work
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in the three great provinces of the intellectual world.
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Chapter 21 concerned respectively with 1. Things as knowable physica 2. Actions as they depend on us in order to happiness practica and 3.
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Methods for interpreting the signs of what
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is and of what ought to be
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that are presented in our ideas and words.
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Logica end of Section 0. Section 1 of an essay Concerning Human Understanding by John Locke, Book four of Knowledge and Probability. This is a Librivox recording. All Librivox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit Librivox.org recording by Pamela Nagami, M D Chapter I of knowledge in general 1. Our knowledge conversant about our ideas only since the mind in all its thoughts and reasonings hath no other immediate object but its own ideas, which it alone does or can contemplate, it is evident that our knowledge is only conversant about them. 2. Knowledge is the perception of the agreement or disagreement of two ideas. Knowledge, then, seems to me to be nothing but the perception of the connection of an agreement with, or disagreement and repugnancy of any of our ideas. In this alone it consists where this perception is, there is knowledge, and where it is not there, though we may fancy, guess, or believe, yet we always come short of knowledge. For when we know that white is not black, what do we else but perceive that these two ideas do not agree? When we possess ourselves with the utmost security of the demonstration that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right ones, what do we more but perceive that equality to two right ones does necessarily agree to, and is inseparable from the three angles of a triangle?
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3.
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This agreement or disagreement may be any of four sorts. But to understand a little more distinctly wherein this agreement or disagreement consists, I think we may reduce it all to these four sorts. 1. Identity or diversity. 2. Relation. 3. Coexistence or necessary connexion. 4. Real existence. 4. First of identity or diversity in ideas. First, as to the first sort of agreement or disagreement, namely identity or diversity. It is the first act of the mind, when it has any sentiments or ideas at all, to perceive its ideas, and so far as it perceives them, to know each what it is, and thereby also to perceive their difference, and that one is not another. This is so absolutely necessary, that without it there could be no knowledge, no reasoning, no imagination, no distinct thoughts at all. By this the mind clearly and infallibly perceives each idea to agree with itself, and to be what it is, and all distinct ideas to disagree, that is, the one not to be the other. And this it does without pains, labour, or deduction, but at first view, by its natural power of perception and distinction. And though men of art have reduced this into those general rules, what is, is, and it is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be for ready application in all cases, wherein there may be occasion to reflect on it. Yet it is certain that the first exercise of this faculty is about particular ideas. A man infallibly knows, as soon as ever he has them in his mind, that the ideas he calls white and round are the very ideas they are and that they are not other ideas which he calls red or square nor can any maxim or proposition in the world make him know it clearer or surer than he did before, and without any such general rule. This, then is the first agreement or disagreement which the mind perceives in its ideas, which it always perceives at first sight and if there ever happen any doubt about it, it will always be found to be about the names and not the ideas themselves, whose identity and diversity will always be perceived as soon and clearly as the ideas themselves are, nor can it possibly be otherwise. 5. Secondly, of abstract relations between ideas. Secondly, the next sort of agreement or disagreement the mind perceives in any of its ideas may, I think, be called relative and it is nothing but the perception of the relation between any two ideas of what kind soever, whether substances, modes, or any other. For since all distinct ideas must eternally be known not to be the same, and so be universally and constantly denied one of another, there could be no room for any positive knowledge at all, if we could not perceive any relation between our ideas and find out the agreement or disagreement that they have with another. In several ways the mind takes of comparing them. 6. Thirdly, of their necessary co existence in substances. Thirdly, the third sort of agreement or disagreement to be found in our ideas, which the perception of the mind is employed about, is co existence or non coexistence in the same subject, and this belongs particularly to substances. Thus, when we pronounce concerning gold that it is fixed, our knowledge of this truth amounts to no more than this. That fixedness, or a power to remain in the fire unconsumed, is an idea that always accompanies and is joined with that particular sort of yellowness, weight, fusibility, malleableness, and solubility in aqua regia, which which makes our complex idea signified by the word gold. 7. Fourthly, of real existence agreeing to any idea. Fourthly, the fourth and last sort is that of actual real existence agreeing to any idea within these four sorts of agreement or disagreement is, I suppose, contained all the knowledge we have or are capable of. For all the inquiries we can make concerning any of our ideas, all that we know or can affirm concerning any of them is that it is or is not the same with some other that it does or does not always coexist with some other idea in the same subject, that it has this or that relation with some other idea, or that it has a real existence without the mind. Thus blue is not yellow is of identity. Two triangles upon equal bases between two parallels are equal is of relation Iron is susceptible of magnetical impressions is of coexistence God is is of real existence. Though identity and coexistence are truly nothing but relations, yet they are such peculiar ways of agreement or disagreement of our ideas, that they deserve well to be considered as distinct heads and and not under relation in general, since they are so different grounds of affirmation and negation as will easily appear to any one who will but reflect on what is said in several places of this essay, I should now proceed to examine the several degrees of our knowledge, but that it is necessary first to consider the different acceptations of the word knowledge. 8. Knowledge is either actual or habitual. There are several ways wherein the mind is possessed of truth, each of which is called knowledge. 1. There is actual knowledge, which is the present view the mind has of the agreement or disagreement of any of its ideas, or of the relation they have to one another. 2. A man is said to know any proposition which, having been once laid before his thoughts, he evidently perceived the agreement or disagreement of the ideas whereof it consists, and so lodged it in his memory, that whenever that proposition comes again to be reflected on, he without doubt or hesitation embraces the right side, assents to, and is certain of the truth of it. This I think one may call habitual knowledge. And thus a man may be said to know all those truths which are lodged in his memory by a foregoing clear and full perception whereof the mind is assured past doubt as often as it has occasion to reflect on them for our finite understandings, being able to think clearly and distinctly, but on one thing at once. If men had no knowledge of any more than what they actually thought on, they would all be very ignorant, and he that knew most would know but one truth, that being all he was able to think on at one time. 9. Habitual knowledges. Of two degrees of habitual knowledge there are also, vulgarly speaking, two degrees. First, the one is of such truths laid up in the memory, as whenever they occur to the mind it actually perceives the relation is between those ideas, and this is in all those truths whereof we have an intuitive knowledge where the ideas themselves, by an immediate view, discover their agreement or disagreement one with another. Secondly, the other is of such truths, whereof the mind having been convinced, it retains the memory of the conviction without the proofs. Thus a man that remembers certainly that he once perceived the demonstration that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right ones, is certain that he knows it, because he cannot doubt the truth of it in his adherence to a truth where the demonstration by which it was at first known is forgot though a man may be thought rather to believe his memory than really to know. And this way of entertaining a truth seemed formerly to me like something between opinion and knowledge, a sort of assurance which exceeds bare belief, for that relies on the testimony of another. Yet upon a due examination, I find it comes not short of perfect certainty, and is in Effect true knowledge. That which is apt to mislead our first thoughts into a mistake in this matter is that the agreement or disagreement of the ideas in this case is not perceived as it was at first, by an actual view of all the intermediate ideas, whereby the agreement or disagreement of those in the proposition was at first perceived, but by other intermediate ideas that show the agreement or disagreement of the ideas contained in the proposition whose certainty. We remember, for example, in this proposition that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right ones. One who has seen and clearly perceived the demonstration of this truth, knows it to be true, when that demonstration is gone out of his mind, so that at present it is not actually in view, and possibly cannot be recollected, but he knows it in a different way from what he did before. The agreement of the two ideas joined in that proposition is perceived, but it is by the intervention of other ideas than those which at first produced this perception he remembers, that is, he knows. For remembrance is but the reviving of some past knowledge that he was once certain of the truth of this proposition that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right ones. The immutability of the same relations between the same immutable things is now the idea that shows him that if the three angles of a triangle were once equal to two right ones, they will always be equal to two right ones. And hence he comes to be certain that what was once true in the case is always true. What ideas once agreed will always agree. And consequently, what he once knew to be true, he will always know to be true, as long as he can remember that he once knew it. Upon this ground, it is that particular demonstrations in mathematics afford general knowledge. If, then, the perception that the same ideas will eternally have the same habitudes and relationship be not a sufficient ground of knowledge, there could be no knowledge of general propositions in mathematics, for no mathematical demonstration would be any more than particular. And when a man had demonstrated any proposition concerning one angle or circle, his knowledge would not reach beyond that particular diagram. If he would extend it further, he must renew his demonstration in another instance before he could know it to be true in another like triangle, and so on, by which means one could never come to the knowledge of any general propositions. Nobody, I think, can deny that Mr. Newton certainly knows any proposition that he now at any time reads in his book to be true, though he has not in actual view that admirable chain of intermediate ideas whereby he had first discovered it to be true. Such a memory as that able to retain such a train of particulars, and may be well thought beyond the reach of human faculties, when the very discovery, perception, and laying together that wonderful connexion of ideas is found to surpass most readers comprehension. But yet it is evident the author himself knows the proposition to be true, remembering he once saw the connection of those ideas as certainly as he knows such a man wounded another remembering that he saw him run him through but because the memory is not always so clear as actual perception, and does in all men more or less decay in length of time, this amongst other differences, is one which shows that demonstrative knowledge is much more imperfect than intuitive, as we shall see in the following chapter. End of section 1.
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Section 2 of an essay Concerning Human Understanding by John Locke, Book four of Knowledge and Probability. This is a Librivox recording. All Librivox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit Librivox.org Recording by Jennifer Henry Chapter 2 of the Degrees of Our Knowledge One of the Degrees or Differences in Clearness of Our Knowledge 1. Intuitive all our knowledge, consisting, as I have said, in the view the mind has of its own ideas, which is the utmost light and greatest certainty we with our faculties and in our way of knowledge are capable of. It may not be amiss to consider a little the degrees of its evidence. The different clearness of our knowledge seems to me to lie in the different way of perception the mind has of the agreement or disagreement of any of its ideas. For if we will reflect on our own ways of thinking, we will find that sometimes the mind perceives the agreement or disagreement of two ideas immediately by themselves.
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Berry Blast with berry flavors and cold foam.
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Call 1-800-GRAINGER, click grainger.com or just stop by Grainger for the ones who get it done without the intervention of any other and this I think we may call intuitive knowledge. For in this the mind is at no pains of proving or examining, but perceives the truth as the eye doth light only by being directed towards it. Thus the mind perceives that white is not black, that a circle is not a triangle, that three are more than two, and equal to one and two. Such kinds of truths the mind perceives at the first sight of the ideas together by bare intuition, without the intervention of any other idea and this kind of knowledge is the clearest and and most certain that human frailty is capable of this part of knowledge is irresistible, and like bright sunshine, forces itself immediately to be perceived as soon as ever the mind turns its view that way, and leaves no room for hesitation, doubt, or examination but the mind is presently filled with the clear light of it. It is on this intuition that depends all the certainty and evidence of of all our knowledge, which certainty every one finds to be so great that he cannot imagine, and therefore not require a greater for a man cannot conceive himself capable of a greater certainty than to know that any idea in his mind is such as he perceives it to be, and that two ideas wherein he perceives a difference are different, and not precisely the same. He that demands a greater certainty than this demands he knows not what, and shows only that he has a mind to be a sceptic without being able to be so. Certainty depends so wholly on this intuition that in the next degree of knowledge, which I call demonstrative, this intuition is necessary in all the connections of the intermediate ideas, without which we cannot attain knowledge and certainty. 2. 2. Demonstrative. The next degree of knowledge is where the mind perceives the agreement or disagreement of any ideas but not immediately though wherever the mind perceives the agreement or disagreement of any of its ideas, there be certain knowledge yet it does not always happen that the mind sees that agreement or disagreement which there is between them, even where it is discoverable, and in that case remains in ignorance, and at most gets no further than a probable Conjecture. The reason why the mind cannot always perceive presently the agreement or disagreement of two ideas is because those ideas concerning whose agreement or disagreement the inquiry is made, cannot by the mind be so put together as to show it. In this case, then, when the mind cannot so bring its ideas together, as by their immediate comparison, and, as it were juxtaposition or application, one to another, to perceive their agreement or disagreement, it is fain by the intervention of other ideas, one or more, as it happens, to discover the agreement or disagreement which it searches and this is that which we call reasoning. Thus the mind, being willing to know the agreement or disagreement in bigness between the three angles of a triangle and two right ones, cannot by an immediate view and comparing them, do it because the three angles of a triangle cannot be brought at once and be compared with any other one or two angles. And so of this the mind has no immediate no intuitive knowledge. In this case, the mind is fain to find out some other angles to which the three angles of a triangle have an equality, and finding those equal to two right ones comes to know their equality to two right ones. 3. Demonstration depends on clearly perceived proofs. Those intervening ideas which serve to show the agreement of any two others are called proofs and where the agreement and disagreement is by this means plainly and clearly perceived, it is called demonstration. It being shown to the understanding, and the mind made to see that it is so. A quickness in the mind to find out these intermediate ideas that shall discover the agreement or disagreement of any other, and to apply them right, is, I suppose, that which is called sagacity.
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4.
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As certain, but not so easy and ready as intuitive knowledge. This knowledge, by intervening proofs, though it be certain, yet the evidence of it is not altogether so clear and bright, nor the assent so ready as in intuitive knowledge. For though in demonstration the mind does at last perceive the agreement or disagreement of the ideas it considers, yet it is not without pains and attention. There must be more than one transient view to find it. A steady application and pursuit are required to this discovery and there must be a progression by steps and degrees, before the mind can in this way arrive at certainty and come to perceive the agreement or repugnancy between two ideas that need proofs, and the use of reason to show it.
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Narrator (Librivox Reading - John Locke)
5.
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The demonstrated conclusion not without doubt, precedent to the demonstration. Another difference between intuitive and demonstrative knowledge is, that though in the latter all doubt be removed when by the intervention of the intermediate ideas the agreement or disagreement is perceived. Yet before the demonstration there was a doubt which in intuitive Knowledge cannot happen to the mind that has its faculty of perception left to a degree capable of distinct ideas no more than it can be a doubt to the eye that can distinctly see white and black, whether this ink and this paper be all of a colour. If there be sight in the eyes, it will at first glimpse without hesitation perceive the words printed on this paper different from the colour of the paper. And so if the mind have the faculty of distinct perception, it will perceive the agreement or disagreement of those ideas that produce intuitive knowledge. If the eyes have lost the faculty of seeing, or the mind of perceiving, we in vain inquire after the quickness of sight in one, or clearness of perception in the other. 6. Not so clear as intuitive knowledge it is true, the perception produced by demonstration is also very clear yet it is often with a great abatement of that evident lustre and full assurance that always accompany that which I call intuitive. Like a face reflected by several mirrors, one to another, where as long as it retains the similitude and agreement with the object, it produces a knowledge but it is still in every successive reflection, with a lessening of that perfect clearness and distinctness which is in the first till at last, after many removes, it has a great mixture of dimness, and is not at first sight so knowable, especially to weak eyes. Thus it is with knowledge made out by a long train of proof. 7. Each step in demonstrated knowledge must have intuitive evidence. Now in every step reason makes in demonstrative knowledge there is an intuitive knowledge of that agreement or disagreement it seeks with the next intermediate idea, which it uses as a proof for if it were not so, that yet would need a proof since without the perception of such agreement or disagreement, there is no knowledge produced if it be perceived by itself, it is intuitive knowledge if it cannot be perceived by itself, there is need of some intervening idea as a common measure to show their agreement or disagreement by which it is plain that a every step in reasoning that produces knowledge has intuitive certainty, which when the mind perceives, there is no more required but to remember it to make the agreement or disagreement of the ideas concerning which we inquire visible and certain so that to make anything a demonstration, it is necessary to perceive the immediate agreement of the intervening ideas, whereby the agreement or disagreement of the two ideas under examination whereof the one is always the first, and the other the last in the account is found. This intuitive perception of the agreement or disagreement of the intermediate ideas in each step and progression of the demonstration, must also be carried exactly in the mind and man must be sure that no part is left out which because in long deductions and the use of many proofs, the memory does not always so readily and exactly retain. Therefore it comes to pass that this is more imperfect than intuitive knowledge, and men embrace often falsehood for demonstrations. 8. Hence the mistake ex precognitus et praeconces. The necessity of this intuitive knowledge in each step of scientifical or demonstrative reasoning gave occasion, I imagine, to that mistaken axiom that all reasoning was ex praecognitus et praeconces, which how far it is a mistake I shall have occasion to show more at large, when I come to consider propositions, and particularly those propositions which are called maxims, and to show that it is by a mistake that they are supposed to be the foundations of all our knowledge and reasonings. 9. Demonstration not limited to ideas of mathematical quantity it has been generally taken for granted that mathematics alone are capable of demonstrative certainty. But to have such an agreement or disagreement as may intuitively be perceived, being as I imagine not, the privilege of the ideas of number, extension, and figure alone, it may possibly be the want of due method and application in us, and not of sufficient evidence in things, that demonstration has been thought to have so little to do in other parts of knowledge, and been scarce so much as aimed at by any but mathematicians. For whatever ideas we have, wherein the mind can perceive the immediate agreement or disagreement that is between them, there the mind is capable of intuitive knowledge and where it can perceive the agreement or disagreement of any two ideas by an intuitive perception of the agreement or disagreement they have with any intermediate ideas, there the mind is capable of demonstration which is not limited to ideas of extension, figure, number, and their modes. 10. Why it has been thought to be so limited the reason why it has been generally sought for, and supposed to be only in those, I imagine, has been not only the general usefulness of those sciences, but because in comparing their equality or excess, the modes of numbers have every the least difference very clear and perceivable and though in extension every the least excess is not so perceptible, yet the mind has found out ways to examine and discover demonstratively the just equality of two angles, or extensions, or figures and both these, that is, numbers and figures, can be set down by visible and lasting marks, wherein the ideas under consideration are perfectly determined, which for the most part they are not, where they are marked only by names and words. 11. Modes of qualities not demonstrable, like modes of quantity, but in other simple ideas, whose modes and Differences are made and counted by degrees and not quantity. We have not so nice and accurate a distinction of their differences as as to perceive or find ways to measure their just equality, or the least differences. For those other simple ideas being appearances of sensations produced in us by the size, figure, number and motion of minute corpuscles, singly insensible, their different degrees also depend on the variation of some or all those causes which, since it cannot be observed by us in particles of matter whereof each is too subtile to be perceiv'd, it is impossible for us to have any exact measures of the different degrees of these simple ideas. For supposing the sensation or idea we name whiteness be produced in us by a certain number of globules which, having a verticity about their own centres, strike upon the retina of the eye with a certain degree of rotation as well as progressive swiftness, it will hence easily follow that the more the superficial parts of any body are so ordered as to reflect the greater number of globules of light, and to give them the proper rotation which is fit to produce this sensation of white in us, the more white will that body appear, that from an equal space sends to the retina the greater number of such corpuscles with that particular sort of motion. I do not say that the nature of light consists in very small round globules, nor of whiteness in such a texture of parts as gives a certain rotation to these globules when it reflects them. For I am not now treating physicality of light or colours, but this I think I may say that I cannot, and I would be glad any one would make intelligible that he did conceive how bodies without us can any ways affect our senses, but by the immediate contact of the sensible bodies themselves, as in tasting and feeling, or the impulse of some sensible particles coming from them, as in seeing, hearing and smelling, by the different impulse of which parts caused by their different size, figure and motion, the variety of sensations is produced in us 12 particles of light and simple ideas of color. When you're a maintenance engineer in a beverage manufacturing plant, you keep production lines moving and quality on track because there is no room for slowdowns. With Grainger's vast selection of high quality motors, sensors, belts and hard to find parts, you can get what you need fast and all in one place. So nothing gets in the way of getting the job done. Call 1-800-GRAINGER Click grainger.com or just stop by Grainger for the ones who get it done. Grainger knows. When you're a procurement manager for an office park, you're not managing one building, you're managing all of them. And to stay ahead, you need to see through walls and around corners. Lights about to fail. Filter filters ready to clog H Vac on its last leg. If you wait until something breaks, you're already behind. Count on Grainger for quality products, easy reordering and 24.
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- [40:34]
Narrator (Librivox Reading - John Locke)
done,
- [40:36]
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whether then they be globules or no, or whether they have a verticity about their own centers that produces the idea of whiteness in us, this is certain that the more particles of light are reflected from a body fitted to give them that peculiar motion which produces the sensation of whiteness in us, and possibly too, the quicker that peculiar motion is, the whiter does the body appear from which the greatest number are reflected, as is evident in the same piece of paper put in the sunbeams, in the shade, and in a dark hole in each of which it will produce in us the idea of whiteness in far different degrees. 13. The secondary qualities of things not discovered by demonstration, not knowing, therefore what number of particles, nor what motion of them, is fit to produce any precise degree of whiteness, we cannot deny demonstrate the certain equality of any two degrees of whiteness, because we have no certain standard to measure them by, nor means to distinguish every the least real difference, the only help we have being from our senses, which in this point fail us, but where the difference is so great as to produce in the mind clearly distinct ideas, whose differences can be perfectly retained there. These ideas, or colors, as we see in different kinds, as blue and red, are as capable of demonstration as ideas of number and extension. What I have here said of whiteness and colors, I think, holds true in all secondary qualities and their modes. 14 3. Sensitive knowledge of the particular existence of fun finite beings without us. These two, viz. Intuition and demonstration, are the degrees of our knowledge. Whatever comes short of one of These with what assurance soever embraced is but faith or opinion, but not knowledge, at least in all general truths. There is indeed another perception of the mind employed about the particular existence of finite beings without us, which, going beyond bare probability, and yet not reaching perfectly to either of the foregoing degrees of certainty, passes under the name of knowledge. There can be nothing more certain than that the idea we receive from an external object is in our minds. This is intuitive knowledge.
- [43:21]
Narrator (Librivox Reading - John Locke)
But.
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But whether there be anything more than barely that idea in our minds, whether we can thence certainly infer the existence of anything without us which corresponds to that idea, is that whereof some men think there may be a question made, because men may have such ideas in their minds when no such thing exists, no such object affects their senses. But yet here I think we are provided with an evidence that puts us past doubting. For I ask anyone whether he be not invincibly conscious to himself of a different perception when he looks on the sun by day and thinks on it by night, when he actually tastes wormwood, or smells a rose, or only thinks on that savor or odor. We as plainly find the difference there is between any idea revived in our minds by our own memory and actually coming into our minds by our senses, as we do, between any two distinct ideas. If anyone, say, a dream may do the same thing, and all these ideas may be produced in us without any external objects, he may be pleased to dream that I make him this answer. 1. That it is no great matter whether I remove his scruple or no where all is but dream, reasoning and arguments are of no use. Truth and knowledge nothing that I believe he will allow a very manifest difference between dreaming of being in the fire and being actually in it. But yet, if he be resolved to appear so sceptical as to maintain that what I call being actually in the fire is nothing but a dream, and that we cannot thereby certainly know that any such thing as fire actually exists. We, without us I answer that we certainly finding that pleasure or pain follows upon the application of certain objects to us whose existence we perceive or dream that we perceive by our senses. This certainty is as great as our happiness or misery, beyond which we have no concernment to know or to be, so that I think we may add to the two former sorts of knowledge. This also of the existence of particular external objects by that perception and consciousness we have of the actual entrance of ideas from them, and allow these three degrees of knowledge, viz. Intuitive, demonstrative, and sensitive, in each of which there are different degrees and ways of evidence and certainty. 15. Knowledge not always clear where the ideas that enter into it are clear. But since our knowledge is founded on and employed about our ideas only, will it not follow from thence that it is conformable to our ideas, and that where our ideas are clear and distinct, or obscure and confused, our knowledge will be so too? To which I answer no. For our knowledge consisting in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of any two ideas, its clearness or obscurity consists in the clearness or obscurity of that perception, and not in the clearness or obscurity of the ideas themselves. VG A man that has as clear ideas of the angles of a triangle and of equality to two right ones, as any mathematician in the world, may yet have but a very obscure perception of their agreement, and so have but a very obscure knowledge of it. But ideas which by reason of their obscurity or otherwise are confused, cannot produce any clear or distinct knowledge, because as far as any ideas are confused so far the mind cannot perceive clearly whether they agree or disagree, or to express the same thing in a way less apt to be misunderstood. He that hath not determined ideas to the words he uses, cannot make propositions of them, of whose truth he can be certain. End of Section 2 recording by Jennifer Henry.
- [47:58]
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Section 3 of an essay Concerning Human Understanding by John Locke Book four of Knowledge and Probability this is a Librivox recording. All Librivox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit Librivox.org recording by Matthew Bennett CHAPTER III OF the Extent of human knowledge 1. Extent of our Knowledge Knowledge, as has been said, lying in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of any of our ideas. It follows from hence, first, it extends no further than we have ideas. First, we can have knowledge no further than we have ideas. Secondly, it extends no further than we can perceive their agreement or disagreement. Secondly, that we can have no knowledge further than we can have perception of that agreement or disagreement which perception being one, either by intuition or the immediate, comparing any two ideas, or by reason examining the agreement or disagreement of two ideas by the intervention of some others, or three, by sensation perceiving the existence of particular things. Hence it also follows three thirdly, intuitive knowledge extends itself not to all the relation of all our ideas. Thirdly, that we cannot have an intuitive knowledge that shall extend itself to all our ideas and all that we would know about them, because we cannot examine and perceive all the relations they have, one to another, by juxtaposition or an immediate comparison one with another. Thus having the ideas of an obtuse and an acute angled triangle, both drawn from equal bases and between parallels, I can by intuitive knowledge perceive the one not to be the other, but cannot that way know whether they be equal or no, because their agreement or disagreement in equality can never be perceived by an immediate comparing them. The difference of figure makes their parts incapable of an exact immediate application, and therefore there is need of some intervening qualities to measure them by which is demonstration or rational knowledge. 4. Fourthly, nor does demonstrative knowledge. Fourthly, it follows also from what is above observed, that our rational knowledge cannot reach to the whole extent of our ideas, because between two different ideas we would examine, we cannot always find such mediums as we can connect to one another with an intuitive knowledge in all the parts of the deduction and wherever that fails, we come short of knowledge and demonstration.
- [50:52]
Narrator (Librivox Reading - John Locke)
5.
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Fifthly, sensitive knowledge narrower than either. Fifthly, sensitive knowledge reaching no further than the existence of things actually present to our senses, is yet much narrower than either of the former. Sixthly, our knowledge therefore narrower than our ideas. Sixthly, from all which it is evident that the extent of our knowledge comes not only short of the reality of things, but even of the extent of our own ideas, though our knowledge be limited to our ideas, and cannot exceed them either in extent or perfection, and though these be very narrow bounds in respect of the extent of all being, and far short of what we may justly imagine to be in some even created understandings, not tied down to the dull and narrow information that is to be received from some few and not very acute ways of perception, such as are our senses. Yet it would be well with us if our knowledge were but as large as our ideas, and there were not many doubts and inquiries concerning the ideas we have whereof we are not, nor, I believe, ever shall be in this world resolved. Nevertheless, I do not question but that human knowledge, under the present circumstances of our beings and constitutions, may be carried much further than it has hitherto been, if men would sincerely and with freedom of mind employ all that industry and labor of thought in improving the means of discovering truth which they do for the coloring or support of falsehood to maintain a system, interest, or party they are once engaged in. But yet, after all, I think I may, without injury to human perfection, be confident that our knowledge would never reach to all we might desire to know concerning those ideas we have, nor be able to surmount all the difficulties and resolve all the questions that might arise concerning any of them. We have the ideas of a square, a circle and equality, and yet perhaps shall never be able to find a circle equal to a square, and certainly know that it is so. We have the ideas of matter and thinking, but possibly shall never be able to know whether any mere material being thinks or no, it it being impossible for us, by the contemplation of our own ideas without revelation, to discover where omnipotency has not given to some systems of matter fitly dispos'd a power to perceive and think, or else join'd and fix'd to matter so dispos'd a thinking immaterial substance, it being in respect of our notions, not much more remote from our comprehension, to conceive that God can, if he pleases, superadd to matter a faculty of thinking, than he should superadd to it another substance with a faculty of thinking, since we know not wherein thinking consists, nor to what sort of substances the Almighty has been pleased to give that power which cannot be in any created being, but merely by the good pleasure and bounty of the Creator. For I see no contradiction in it, but that the first eternal thinking being, or omnipotent spirit, should, if he pleased, give to certain systems of created senseless matter, put together as he thinks, fit some degrees of sense perception and thought though, as I think I have proved, it is no less than a contradiction to suppose matter, which is evidently in its own nature void of sense and thought, should be that eternal first thinking being, what certainty of knowledge can anyone have, that some perceptions, such as v. G, Pleasure, and pain, should not be in some bodies themselves, after a certain manner modified and mov'd, as well as that they should be in an immaterial substance, upon the motion of the parts of the body Body, as far as we can conceive, being able only to strike and affect body and motion according to the utmost reach of our ideas, and being able to produce nothing but motion, so that when we allow it to produce pleasure or pain, or the idea of a colour or sound, we are fain to quit our reason, go beyond our ideas, and attribute it wholly to the good pleasure of our Maker for since we must allow, he has annexed effects to motion, which we can no way conceive motion able to produce, what reason have we to conclude that that he could not order them as well to be produced in a subject we cannot conceive capable of them, as well as in a subject we cannot conceive, the motion of matter can any way operate upon I say not this, that I would any way lessen the belief of the soul's immateriality. I am not here speaking of probability, but knowledge and I think not only that it becomes the modesty of philosophy not to pronounce magisterially, but where we want that evidence that can produce knowledge, but also that it is of use to us to discern how far our knowledge does reach. For the state we are at present in not being that of vision, we must in many things content ourselves with faith and probability. And in the present question about the immateriality of the soul, if our faculties cannot arrive at demonstrative certainty, we need not think it strange. All the great ends of morality and religion are well enough secured without philosophical proofs of the soul's immateriality, since it is evident that he who made us at the beginning to subsist here sensible, intelligent beings, and for several years continued us in such a state, can and will restore us to the like state of sensibility in another world, and make us capable there to receive the retribution he has designed to mention according to their doings in this life. And therefore it is not of such mighty necessity to determine one way or the other, as some overzealous for or against the immateriality of the soul have been forward to make the world believe who, either on one side, indulging too much their thoughts immersed altogether in matter, can allow no existence to what is not material, or who on the other side, finding not cogitation within the natural powers of matter, examined over and over again by the utmost intention of mind, have the confidence to conclude that omnipotency itself cannot give perception and thought to a substance which has the modification of solidity. He that considers how hardly sensation is in our thoughts reconcilable to extended matter or existence to anything that has no extension at all or will confess that he is very far from certainly knowing what his soul is. It is a point which seems to me to be put out of the reach of our knowledge. And he who will give himself leave to consider freely and look into the dark and intricate part of each hypothesis, will scarce find his reason able to determine him fixedly for or against the soul's materiality since on which side soever he views it either as an unextended substance or as a thinking extended matter, the difficulty to conceive either will, whilst either alone, is in his thoughts, still drive him to the contrary side an unfair way which some men take with themselves, who, because of the inconceivableness of something they find in one, throw themselves violently into the contrary hypothesis, though altogether as unintelligible to an unbiased understanding. This serves not only to show the weakness and the scantiness of our knowledge, but the insignificant triumph of such sort of arguments, which, drawn from our own views, may satisfy us that we can find no certainty on one side of the question, but do not at all thereby help us to truth by running into the opposite opinion, which on examination will be found clogged with equal difficulties. For what safety, what advantage to anyone is it for the avoiding the seeming absurdities, and to him unsurmountable rubs he meets with in one opinion, to take refuge in the contrary, which is built on something altogether as inexplicable and as far remote from his comprehension. It is past controversy that we have in us something that thinks our very doubts about what it is confirm the certainty of its being, though we must content ourselves in the ignorance of what kind of being it is and it is in vain to go out to be sceptical in this, as it is unreasonable in most other cases to be positive against the being of anything, because we cannot comprehend its nature. For I would fain know what substance exists that has not something in it, which manifestly baffles our understanding, understandings other spirits who see and know the nature and inward constitution of things, how much must they exceed us in knowledge to which, if we had larger comprehension, which enables them at one glance to see the connexion and agreement of very many ideas, and readily supplies to them the intermediate proofs which we, by single and slow steps and long pouring in the dark, hardly at last find, find out, and are often ready to forget one before we have hunted out another, we may guess at some part of the happiness of superior ranks of spirits, who have a quicker and more penetrating sight, as well as a larger field of knowledge. But to return to the argument in hand, our knowledge, I say, is not only limited to the paucity and imperfections of the ideas we have, and which we employ it about, but even comes short of that too. But how far it reaches, let us now inquire seven how far our knowledge reaches. The affirmations or negations we make concerning the ideas we have may, as I have before intimated in general, be reduced to these four sorts, viz. Identity, coexistence, relation, and real existence. I shall examine how far our knowledge extends in each of these. 8. Firstly, our knowledge of identity and diversity in ideas extends as far as our ideas themselves. First, as to identity and diversity in this way of agreement or disagreement of our ideas, our intuitive knowledge is as far extended as our ideas themselves and there can be no idea in the mind which it does not presently by an intuitive knowledge perceived to be what it is, and to be different from any other. 9 Secondly, of their coexistence extends only a very little way. Secondly, as to the second sort, which is the agreement or disagreement of our ideas in coexistence, in this our knowledge is very short, though in this consists the greatest and most material part of our knowledge concerning substances. For our ideas of the species of substances, being as I have shew'd nothing but certain collections of simple ideas united in one subject, and so co existing together, v. G Our idea of flame as a body hot, luminous, and moving upward, of gold, a body heavy to a certain degree yellow, malleable, and fusible, for these or some such complex ideas as these in men's minds, do these two names of the different substances, flame and gold, stand for? When we would know anything further concerning these or any other sort of substances, what do we inquire but what other qualities or powers these substances have, or have not, which is nothing else but to know what other simple ideas do or do not coexist with those that make up that complex idea? 10 because the connection between simple ideas and substances is for the most part unknown, this how weighty and considerable a part soever of human science is yet very narrow and scarce any at all. The reason whereof is, that the simple ideas whereof our complex ideas of substances are made up, are for the most part such as carry with them in their own nature no visible necessary connexion or inconsistency with any other simple ideas whose co existence with them we would inform ourselves about. 11 especially of the secondary qualities of bodies, the ideas that our complex ones of substances are made up of, and about which our knowledge concerning substances substances is most employ'd are those of their secondary qualities, which depending all as has been shown upon the primary qualities of their minute and insensible parts, or, if not upon them, upon something yet more remote from our comprehension, it is impossible we should know which have a necessary union or inconsistency one with another for not knowing the root they spring from, not knowing what size, figure, and texture of parts they are on which depend, and from which result those qualities which make our complex idea of gold. It is impossible we should know what other qualities result from, or are incompatible with the same constitution of the insensible parts of gold, and so consequently must always coexist with that complex idea we have of it, or else are inconsistent with it. 12 because necessary connexion between any secondary and the primary qualities is undiscoverable by us. Besides this ignorance of the primary qualities of the insensible parts of bodies on which depend all their secondary qualities, there is yet another and more incurable part of ignorance, which sets us more remote from a certain knowledge of the coexistence or incoexistence, if I may so say, of different ideas in the same subject and that is, that there is no discoverable connection between any secondary quality and those primary qualities which it depends on. 13. We have no perfect knowledge of their primary qualities. That the size, figure, and motion of one body should cause a change in the size, figure, and motion of another body is not beyond our conception. The separation of the parts of one body upon the intrusion of another, and the change from rest to motion upon impulse, these and the like seem to have some connexion, one with another. And if we knew these primary qualities of bodies, we might have reason to hope we might be able to know a great deal more of these operations of them one upon another. But our minds, not being able to discover any connexion betwixt these these primary qualities of bodies, and the sensations that are produced in us by them, we can never be able to establish certain and undoubted rules of the consequence or coexistence of any secondary qualities, though we could discover the size, figure, or motion of those invisible parts which immediately produce them. We are so far from knowing what figure, size, or motion of parts produce a yellow colour, a sweet taste, or a sharp sound, that we can by no means conceive how any size, figure, or motion of any particles can possibly produce in us the idea of any colour, taste, or sound whatsoever. There is no conceivable connexion between the one and the other, 14 and seek in vain for certain and universal knowledge of unperceived qualities in in substances. In vain, therefore, shall we endeavour to discover by our ideas the only true way of certain and universal knowledge, what other ideas are to be found constantly joined with that of our complex idea of any substance, since we neither know the real constitution of the minute parts on which their qualities do depend, nor did we know them could we discover any necessary connexion between them and any of the secondary qualities which is necessary to be done before we can certainly know their necessary coexistence. So that let our complex idea of any species of substances be what it will, we can hardly, from the simple ideas contained in it, certainly determine the necessary co existence of any other Quality whatsoever our knowledge in all these inquiries reaches very little further than our experience. Experience indeed. Some few of the primary qualities have a necessary dependence and visible connection one with another, as figure necessarily supposes extension, receiving or communicating motion by impulse supposes solidity. But through these, and perhaps some others of our ideas have yet there are so few of them that have a visible connexion, one with another, that we can by intuition or demonstration, discover the coexistence of very few of the qualities that are to be found united in substances and we are left only to the assistance of our senses to make known to us what qualities they contain. For all of the qualities that are co existent in any subject without this dependence and evident connexion of their ideas, one with another, we cannot know certainly any two to coexist any further than experience by our senses informs us. Thus, though we see the yellow colour, and upon trial find the weight, malleableness, fusibility, and fixedness, that are united in a piece of gold, yet because no one of these ideas has any evident dependence or necessary connexion with the other, we cannot certainly know that where any four of these are, the fifth will be there also, how highly probable soever it may be, because the highest probability amounts not to certain certainty, without which there can be no true knowledge. For this coexistence can be no further known than it is perceived and it cannot be perceived, but either in particular subjects, by the observation of our senses, or in general by the necessary connection of the ideas themselves.
- [69:42]
Narrator (Librivox Reading - John Locke)
15.
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Of repugnancy to coexist our knowledge is larger as to the incompatibility or repugnancy to coexistence. We may know that any subject may have of each sort of primary qualities but one particular at once. VG Each particular extension figure, number of parts, motion excludes all other of each kind. The like also is certain of all sensible ideas peculiar to each sense for whatever of each kind is present in any subject, excludes all other of that sort. VG no one subject can have two smells or two colours at the same time. To this perhaps will be said, has not an opal, or the infusion of lignum nephriticum two colours at the same time. To which I answer that these bodies two eyes differently plac'd, may at the same time afford different colours. But I take liberty also to say that to eyes differently placed, it is different parts of the object that reflect the particles of light, and therefore it is not the same part of the object, and so not the very same subject, which at the same time appears both yellow and azure for it is as impossible that the very same particle of any body should at the same time differently modify or reflect the rays of light, as that it should have two different figures and textures at the same time. 16 Our knowledge of the coexistence of power in bodies extends but a very little way. But as to the powers of substances to change the sensible qualities of other bodies, which make a great part of our inquiries about them, and is no inconsiderable branch of our knowledge, I doubt as to these whether our knowledge reaches much further further than our experience, or whether we can come to the discovery of most of these powers and be certain that they are in any subject by the connection with any of those ideas which to us makes its essence
- [71:48]
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- [73:18]
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Because the active and passive powers of bodies and their ways of operating consisting in a texture and motion of parts which we cannot by any means come to discover. It is but in very few cases we can be able to perceive their dependence on or repugnance to any of those ideas which make our complex one. Of that sort of things I have here instanced in the Corpuscularian hypothesis, as that which is thought to go furthest in an intelligible explication of those qualities, qualities of bodies, and I fear the weakness of human understanding is scarce able to substitute another which will afford us a fuller and clearer discovery of the necessary connexion and co existence of the powers which are to be observed united in several sorts of them, this at least is certain, that whichever hypothesis be clearest and truest, for of that it is not my business to determine our knowledge concerning corporeal substances, will be very little advanc'd by any of them, till we are made to see what qualities and powers of bodies have a necessary connexion or repugnancy, one with another, which in the present state of philosophy, I think we know but to a very small degree and I doubt whether with those faculties we have, we shall ever be able to carry our general knowledge. I say not particular experience in this part. Much further experience is that which in this part we must depend on, and it were to be wished that it were more improved. We find the advantages some men's generous pains have this way brought to the stock of natural knowledge. And if others, especially the philosophers by fire who pretend to it, had been so wary in their observations, and sincere in their reports, as those who call themselves philosophers, ought to have been, our acquaintance with the bodies here about us, and our insight into their powers and operations, and had been yet much greater 17 of the powers that coexist in spirits, yet narrower. If we are at a loss in respect of the powers and operations of bodies, I think it is easy to conclude we are much more in the dark in reference to spirits, whereof we naturally have no ideas but what we draw from that of our own by reflecting on the operations of our own souls within us, as far as they can come within our observation. But how inconsiderable a rank the spirits that inhabit our bodies hold amongst those various and possibly innumerable kinds of nobler beings, and how far short they come of the endowments and perfections of cherubim and seraphim and infinite sorts of spirits above us is what, by a transient hint in another place, I have offered to my readers consideration. 18. Thirdly, of relations between abstracted ideas, it is not easy to say how far our knowledge extends. Thirdly, as to the third sort of our knowledge, viz. The agreement or disagreement of any of our ideas in any other relation. This, as it is the largest field of our knowledge. So it is hard to determine how far it may extend, because the advances that are made in this part of knowledge, depending on our sagacity in finding intermediate ideas that may show the relations and habitudes of ideas whose coexistence is not considered. It is a hard matter to tell when we are at an end of such discoveries, and when reason has all the helps it is capable of for the finding of proofs, or examining the agreement or disagreement of remote ideas. They that are ignorant of algebra cannot imagine the wonders in this kind are to be done by it. And what further improvements and helps advantageous to other parts of knowledge, the sagacious mind of man may yet find out. It is not easy to determine this. At least I believe, that the ideas of quantity are not those alone that are capable of demonstration and knowledge, and that other, and perhaps more useful parts of contemplation would afford us certainty, if vices, passions, and domineering interest did not oppose or menace such endeavors. Morality capable of demonstration, the idea of a supreme being, infinite in power, goodness, and wisdom, whose workmanship we are, and on whom we depend, and the idea of ourselves as understanding rational creatures, being such as are clear in us, would, I suppose, if duly considered and pursued, afford such foundations of our duty and rules of action as might place morality amongst the sciences capable of demonstration, wherein I doubt not. But from self evident propositions by necessary consequences as incontestable as those in mathematics, the measures of right and wrong might be made out to any one that will apply himself with the same indifferency and attention to the one as he does to the other of these sciences. The relation of other modes may certainly be perceived, as well as those of number and extension, and I cannot see why they should not also be capable of demonstration, if due methods were thought on to examine or pursue their agreement or disagreement. Where there is no property, there is no injustice, is a proposition as certain as any demonstration in Euclid. For the idea of property being a right to anything, and the idea of which the name injustice is given, being the invasion or violation of that right, it is evident that these ideas being thus established, and these names annexed to them, I can as certainly know this proposition to be true, as that a triangle has three angles equal to two right ones. Again, no government allows absolute liberty, the idea of government being the establishment of society upon certain rules or laws which require conformity to them and the idea of absolute liberty being for any one to do whatever he pleases, I am as capable of being certain of the truth of this proposition as of any in the mathematics. 19. Two things have made moral ideas to be thought incapable of demonstration, their unfitness for sensible representation, and their complexedness. That which in this respect has given the advantage to the ideas of quantity, and made them thought more capable of certainty and demonstration is, first, that they can be set down and represented by sensible marks which have a greater and nearer correspondence with them than any words or sounds whatsoever. Diagrams drawn on paper are copies of the ideas in the mind, and not liable to the uncertainty that words carry in their signification. An angle, circle, or square drawn in lines, lies open to the view, and cannot be mistaken. It remains unchangeable, and may at leisure be considered and examined, and the demonstration be revised, and all the parts of it may be gone over more than once, without any danger of the least change in the ideas. This cannot be thus done in moral ideas we have no sensible marks that resemble them whereby we can set them down. We have nothing but words to express them, by which, though, when written, they remain the same, yet the ideas they stand for may change in the same man, and it is very seldom that they are not different in different persons. Secondly, another thing that makes the greater difficulty in ethics is that moral ideas are commonly more complex than those of the figures ordinarily considered in mathematics, from whence these two inconveniences follow. First, that their names are of more uncertain signification, the precise collection of simple ideas they stand for, not being so easily agreed on and so the sign that is used for them in communication always and in thinking often does not steadily carry with it the same idea upon which the same disorder, confusion, and error follow, as would if a man going to demonstrate something of an heptagon, should in the diagram he took to do it, leave out one of the angles, or by oversight, make the figure with one angle more than the name ordinarily imported, or he intended it should when at first he thought of his demonstration. This often happens, and is hardly avoidable in very complex moral ideas, where the same name being retained, one angle, that is, one simple idea is left out, or put in the complex one still called by the same name, more at one time than another. Secondly, from the complexness of these moral ideas there follows another inconvenience, viz. That the mind cannot easily retain those precise combinations so exactly and perfectly as is necessary in the examination of the habitudes and correspondences, agreements, or disagreements of several of them, one with another especially where it is to be judged of by long deductions, and the intervention of several other complex ideas to show the agreement or disagreement of two remote ones. The great help against this which mathematicians find in diagrams and figures, which remain unalterable in their draughts, is very apparent, and the memory would often have great difficulty otherwise to retain them so exactly whilst the mind went over the parts of them step by step to examine their several correspondences. And though in casting up a long sum, either in addition, multiplication, or division, every part be only a progression of the mind, taking a view of its own ideas, and considering their agreement or disagreement, and the resolution of the question be nothing but the result of the whole made up of such particulars, whereof the mind has a clear perception, yet without setting down the several parts by marks whose precise significations are known, and by marks that last and remain in view when the memory had let them go. It would be almost impossible to carry so many different ideas in the mind, without confounding or letting slip some parts of the reckoning, and thereby making all our reasonings about it useless. In which case the ciphers or marks help not the mind at all to perceive the agreement of any two or more numbers, their equalities or proportions. That the mind has only by intuition of its own ideas of the numbers themselves. But the numerical characters are helps to the memory to record and retain the several ideas about which the demonstration is made, whereby a man may know how far his intuitive knowledge, in surveying several of the particulars has proceeded, that so he may without confusion go on to what is yet unknown, and at last have in one view before him the result of all his perceptions and reasonings. 20. Remedies of our difficulties in dealing demonstratively with moral ideas. One part of these disadvantages and moral ideas which has made them be thought not capable of demonstration, may in a good measure be remedied by definitions, setting down that collection of simple ideas which every term shall stand for, and then using the terms steadily and constantly for that precise collection, and what methods algebra, or something of that kind, may hereafter suggest to remove the other difficulties. It is not easy to foretell, confident I am, that if men would in the same method, and with the same indifferency, search after moral as they do mathematical truths, they would find them have a stronger connexion one with another, and a more necessary consequence from our clear and distinct ideas, and to come nearer, perfect demonstration that is commonly imagined. But much of this is not to be expected. For whilst the desire of esteem, riches, or power makes men espouse the well endowed opinions in fashion, and then seek arguments either to make good their beauty or varnish over and cover their deformity. Nothing being so beautiful to the eye as truth is to the mind nothing so deformed and irreconcilable to the understanding as a lie. For though many a man can with satisfaction enough own a no very handsome wife in his mind bosom, yet who is bold enough openly to avow that he has espoused a falsehood, and received into his breast so ugly a thing as a lie, whilst the parties of men cram their tenets down all men's throats, whom they can get into their power, without permitting them to examine their truth or falsehood, and will not let truth have fair play in the world, nor men the liberty to search after it. What improvements can be expected of this kind? What greater light can be hoped for in the moral sciences? The subject part of mankind in most places might instead thereof with Egyptian bondage expect Egyptian darkness, were not the candle of the Lord set up by himself in men's minds, which it is impossible for the breath or power of man wholly to extinguish. 21 Fourthly, of the three real existences of which we have certain knowledge, fourthly, as to know the fourth sort of our knowledge, viz. Of the real actual existence of things, we have an intuitive knowledge of our own existence, and a demonstrative knowledge of the existence of a God, of the existence of anything else. We have no other, but a sensitive knowledge which extends not beyond the objects perfect present to our senses. End of section 3. Section 4 of an essay Concerning Human Understanding by John Locke Book four of Knowledge and Probability this is a Librivox recording. All Librivox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, we please visit Librivox.org recording by Matthew Bennett 22 Our Ignorance Great our knowledge being so narrow, as I have shown it, will perhaps give us some light into the present state of our minds, if we look a little into the dark side and take a view of our ignorance, which, being infinitely larger than our knowledge, may serve much to the quieting of disputes. An improvement of useful knowledge if, discovering how far we have clear and distinct ideas, we confine our thoughts within the contemplation of those things that are within the reach of our understandings, and launch not out into that abyss of darkness where we have not eyes to see nor faculties to perceive anything, out of a presumption that nothing is beyond our comprehension. But to be satisfied of the folly of such a conceit, we need not go far. He that knows anything knows this in the first place, that he need not seek long for instances of his ignorance. The meanest and most obvious things that come in our way have dark sides that the quickest sight cannot penetrate into the clearest and most enlarged understandings of thinking. Men find themselves puzzled and at a loss in every particle of matter. We shall the less wonder to find it so when we consider the causes of our ignorance, which, from what has been said, I suppose, will be found to be these first, want of ideas its causes. Secondly, want of a discoverable connection between the ideas we have. Thirdly, want of tracing and examining our ideas. 23 first, one cause of our ignorance want of ideas one want of simple ideas that other creatures in other parts of the universe may have. First, there are some things, and those not a few, that we are ignorant of for want of ideas when you're
- [89:42]
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- [90:34]
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- [91:12]
Narrator (Librivox Reading - John Locke)
first.
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All the simple ideas we have are confined, as I have shown, to those we receive from corporeal objects by sensation and from the operations of our own minds as the objects of reflection. But how much these few and narrow inlets are disproportionate to the vast whole extent of all beings. Will not be hard to persuade those who are not so foolish as to think their span that the measure of all things. What other simple ideas it is possible the creatures in other parts of the universe may have, by the assistance of senses and faculties, more or perfecter than we have, or different from ours. It is not for us to determine, but to say or think there are no such because we conceive nothing of them, is no better an argument than if a blind man should be positive in it, that there was no such thing as sight and colours, and because he had no manner of idea of any such thing, nor could by any means frame to himself any notions about seeing. The ignorance and darkness that is in us no more hinders nor confines the knowledge that is in others than the blindness of a mole is an argument against the quick sightedness of an eagle. He that will consider the infinite power, wisdom, and goodness of the creator of all things, will find reason to think it was not all laid out upon so inconsiderable, mean, and impotent a creature as he will find man to be, who in all probability is one of the lowest of all intellectual beings. What faculties, therefore, other species of creatures have to penetrate into the nature and inmost constitutions of things, what ideas they may receive of them far different from ours, we know not this we know, and certainly find, that we want several other views of them besides those we have to make discoveries of them more perfect and we may be convinced that the ideas we can attain to by our faculties are very disproportionate to things themselves, when a positive, clear, distinct one of substance itself, which is the foundation of all the rest, is concealed from us. But want of ideas of this kind, being a part as well as cause of our ignorance, cannot be described only this, I think I may confidently say of it, that the intellectual and sensible world are in this perfectly alike that that part which we see of either of them holds no proportion with what we see not and whatsoever we can reach with our eyes or our thoughts of either of them is but a point, almost nothing in comparison of the rest. 24. Want of simple ideas that men are capable of having, but having not one, because their remoteness or secondly, another great cause of ignorance is the want of ideas we are capable of, as the want of ideas which our faculties are not able to give us, shuts us wholly from those views of things which it is reasonable to think other beings perfecter than we have of which we know nothing. So the want of ideas I now speak of keeps us in ignorance of things we conceive capable of being known to us. Bulk, figure, and motion we have ideas of. But though we are not without ideas of these primary qualities of bodies in general, yet not knowing what is the particular bulk, figure, and motion of the greatest part of the bodies of the universe, we are ignorant of the several powers, efficacies, and ways of operation whereby the effects which we daily see are produced. These are hid from us in some things by being too remote, and in others by being too minute. When we consider the vast distance of the known and visible parts of the world, and the reasons we have to think that what lies within our ken is but a small part of the universe, we shall then discover a huge abyss of ignorance. What are the particular fabrics of the great masses of matter which make up the whole stupendous frame of corporeal beings? How far they are extended, what is their motion, and how continued or communicated, and what influence they have, one upon another, are contemplations that at first glimpse our thoughts lose themselves in. If we narrow our contemplations and confine our thoughts to this little canton, I mean this system of our sun and the grosser masses of matter that visibly move about it, what several sorts of vegetables, animals, and intellectual corporeal beings, infinitely different from those of our little spot of earth, may there probably be in the other planets, to the knowledge of which even of their outward figures and parts we can no way attain whilst we are confined to this earth. There being no natural means, either by sensation or reflection, to convey their certain ideas into our minds, they are out of the reach of those inlets of all our knowledge. And what sorts of furniture and inhabitants those mansions contain in them, we cannot so much as guess, much less have clear and distinct ideas of them. 25 2. Because of their minuteness, if a great, nay, far the greatest part of the several ranks of bodies in the universe escape our notice by their remoteness, there are others that are no less concealed from us by their minuteness. These insensible corpuscles, being the active parts of matter, and the great instruments of nature, on which depend not only all their secondary qualities, but also most of their natural operations, our want of precise, distinct ideas of their primary qualities keeps us in an incurable ignorance of what we desire to know about them. I doubt not but if we could discover the figure, size, texture, and motion of the minute constituent parts of any two bodies, we should know without trial several of their operations. One upon another, as we do now the properties of a square or a triangle. Did we know the mechanical affections of the particles of rhubarb, hemlock, opium, and and a man, as a watchmaker does, those of a watch whereby it performs its operations, and of a file which by rubbing on them, will alter the figure of any of the wheels. We should be able to tell beforehand that rhubarb will purge, hemlock, kill, and opium make a man sleep as well as a watchmaker can that a little piece of paper laid on the balance will keep the watch from going till it be removed or that some small part of it being rubbed by a file, the machine would quite lose its motion, and the watch go no more. The dissolving of silver in aqua fortis and gold in aqua regia, and not vice versa, would be then perhaps no more difficult to know than it is to a smith to understand why the turning of one key will open a lock and not the turning of another. But whilst we are destitute of senses, acute enough to discover the minute particles of bodies and and to give us ideas of their mechanical affections, we must be content to be ignorant of their properties and ways of operation. Nor can we be assured about them any further than some few trials we make are able to reach. Whether they will succeed again another time we cannot be certain. This hinders our certain knowledge of universal truths concerning natural bodies and our reason carries us herein very little beyond particular, particular matter of fact. 26. Hence no science of bodies within our reach. And therefore I am apt to doubt that how far soever human industry may advance useful and experimental philosophy in physical things scientifical will still be out of our reach. Because we want perfect and adequate ideas of those very bodies which are nearest to us and most under our command. Those which we have ranked into classes under names and we think ourselves best acquainted with. We have but very imperfect and incomplete ideas of distinct ideas of the several sorts of bodies that fall under the examination of our senses. Perhaps we may have but adequate ideas. I suspect we have not of any one amongst them. And though the former of these will serve us for common use and discourse, yet whilst we want the latter, we are not capable of scientifical knowledge, nor shall ever be able to discover general, instructive, unquestionable truths concerning them. Certainty and demonstration are things we must not in these matters pretend to. By the color, figure, taste and smell, and other sensible qualities. We have as clear and distinct ideas of sage and hemlock block as we have of a circle and triangle. But having no ideas of the particular primary qualities of the minute parts of either of these plants, nor of other bodies which we would apply them to, we cannot tell what effects they will produce nor when we see those effects, can we so much as guess, much less know their manner of production. Thus, having no ideas of the particular mechanical affections of the minute parts of bodies that are within our view and reach, we are ignorant of their constitutions, powers, and operations and of bodies more remote, we are yet more ignorant, not knowing so much as their very outward shapes, or the sensible and grosser parts of their constitutions. 27 Much less a science of unembodied spirits. This at first will show us how disproportionate our knowledge is to the whole extent even of material beings to to which, if we add the consideration of that infinite number of spirits that may be and probably are, which are yet more remote from our knowledge, whereof we have no cognisance nor can frame to ourselves any distinct ideas of their several ranks and sorts, we shall find this cause of ignorance conceal from us in an impenetrable obscurity almost the whole intellectual world, a greater certainty and more beautiful world than the material. For bating some very few, and those, if I may so call them, superficial ideas of spirit, which by reflection we get of our own, and from thence the best we can collect of the Father of all spirits, the eternal independent author of them and us and all things we have no certain information so much as of the existence of other spirits, but by revelation angels of all sorts are naturally beyond our discovery, and all those intelligences whereof it is likely there are more orders than of corporeal substances are things whereof our natural faculties give us no certain account at all that there are minds and thinking beings in other men as well as himself. Every man has a reason from their words and actions to be satisfied, and the knowledge of his own mind cannot suffer a man that considers to be ignorant that there is a God, but that there are degrees of spiritual beings between us and the great God who is there, that by his own search and ability can come to know much less have we distinct ideas of their different natures, conditions, states, powers, and several constitutions, wherein they agree or differ from one another and from us and therefore in what concerns their different species and properties, we are in absolute ignorance. 28. Secondly, another cause want of a discoverable connexion between ideas we have secondly, what a small part of the substantial beings that are in the universe the want of ideas leaves open to our knowledge we have seen in the next place another cause of ignorance of no less moment is, is a want of discoverable connexion between those ideas we have for wherever we want that we are utterly incapable of universal and certain knowledge, and are in the former case left only to observation and experiment, which, how narrow and confined it is, how far from general knowledge we need not be told, I shall give some few instances of this cause of our ignorance. And so leave is evident that the bulk, figure, and motion of several bodies about us produce in us several sensations as of colours, sounds, tastes, smells, pleasure and pain, etc. These mechanical affections of bodies, having no affinity at all with those ideas they produce in us, there being no conceivable connexion between any impulse of any sort of body, and any perception of a colour or smell, smell which we find in our minds, we can have no distinct knowledge of such operations beyond our experience, and can reason no otherwise about them than as effects produced by the appointment of an infinitely wise agent which perfectly surpass our comprehensions. As the ideas of sensible secondary qualities which we have in our minds can by us be no way deduced from bodily causes, nor any corresponding despondence or connexion be found between them and those primary qualities which experience shows us produce them in us. So, on the other side, the operation of our minds upon our bodies is as inconceivable how any thought should produce a motion in body, is as remote from the nature of our ideas as how any body should produce any thought in the mind. That it is so, if experience did not convince us, the consideration of the things themselves would never be able in in the least to discover to us these and the like, though they have a constant and regular connexion in the ordinary course of things. Yet that connexion being not discoverable in the ideas themselves, which, appearing to have no necessary dependence one on another, we can attribute their connexion to nothing else but the arbitrary determination of that all wise agent who has made them to be and to operate as they do in a way wholly above our weak understandings to conceive. 29 instances. In some of our ideas there are certain relations, habitudes and connexions so visibly included in the nature of the ideas themselves, that we cannot conceive them separable from them by any power whatsoever and in these only we are capable of certain and universal knowledge. Thus the idea of a right line triangle necessarily carries with it an equality of its angles to two right ones. Nor can we conceive this relation, this connexion of these two ideas to be possibly mutable, or to depend on any arbitrary power which of choice made it thus, or could make it otherwise. But the coherence and continuity of the parts of matter, the production of sensation in us of colours and sounds, etc. By impulse and motion, nay, the original rules and communication of motion being such, wherein we can discover no natural connexion with any ideas we have, we cannot but ascribe them to the arbitrary will and good pleasure of the wise architect. I need not, I think, here mention the resurrection of the dead, the future state of this globe of earth, and such other things which are by every one acknowledged to depend wholly on the determination, determination of a free agent. The things that, as far as our observation reaches, we constantly find to proceed regularly, we may conclude, do act by a law set them, but yet by a law that we know not, whereby, though causes work steadily, and effects constantly flow from them, yet their connexions and dependencies being not discoverable in our ideas, we can have but an experimental knowledge of them from all which it is easy to perceive what a darkness we are involved in, how little it is of being and the things that are that we are capable to know. And therefore we shall do no injury to our knowledge when we modestly think with ourselves that we are so far from being able to comprehend the whole nature of the universe and all the things contained in it, that we are not capable of a philosophical knowledge of the bodies that are about us and make a part of us concerning their secondary qualities, powers, and operations. We can have no universal certainty. Several effects come every day within the notice of our senses, of which we have so far sensitive knowledge, but the causes, manner, and certainty of their production. For the two foregoing reasons we must be content to be very ignorant of. In these we can go no further than particular experience informs us of matter of fact and, by analogy, to guess what effects the like bodies are upon other trials like to produce. But as to a perfect science of natural bodies, not to mention spiritual beings, we are, I think, so far from being capable of any such thing that I conclude it lost labor to seek after it. 33rdly, a third cause, want of tracing our ideas. Thirdly, where we have adequate ideas, and where there is a certain and discoverable connexion between them. Yet we are often ignorant for want of tracing those ideas which we have or may have, and for want of finding out those intermediate ideas which may show us what habitude of agreement or disagreement they have. One with another. And thus many are ignorant of mathematical truths, not out of any imperfection of their faculties or uncertainty in the things themselves, but for want of application, in acquiring, examining, and by due ways comparing those ideas that which has most contributed to hinder the due tracing of our ideas, in finding out their relations and agreements or disagreements, one with another, has been, I suppose, the ill use of words. It is impossible that men should ever truly seek or certainly discover the agreement or disagreement of ideas themselves themselves, whilst their thoughts flutter about, or stick only in sounds of doubtful and uncertain significations. Mathematicians, abstracting their thoughts from names and accustoming themselves to set before their minds the ideas themselves that they would consider, and not sounds instead of them, have avoided thereby a great part of that perplexity, puttering, and confusion which has so much hinder'd men's progress in other parts of knowledge. For whilst they stick in words of undetermined and uncertain signification, they are unable to distinguish true from false, certain from probable, consistent from inconsistent in their own opinions. This having been the fate or misfortune of a great part of men of letters, the increase brought into the stock of real knowledge has been very little in proportion to the schools, disputes, and writings the world has been filled with. While students, being lost in the great wood of words, knew not whereabouts they were, how far their discoveries were advanced, or what was wanting in their own, or the general stock of knowledge had men, in the discoveries of the material
- [110:50]
Narrator (Librivox Reading - John Locke)
done as they have in those of
- [110:52]
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the intellectual world, involved, all in the obscurity of uncertain and doubtful ways, of talking volumes, writ of navigation and voyages, theories and stories, of zones and tides multiplied and disputed, nay, ships built and fleets sent out would never have taught us the way beyond the line and the antipodes would still be as much unknown as when it was declared heresy to hold there were any. But having spoken sufficiently of words, and the ill or careless use that is commonly made of them, I shall not say anything more of it here.
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Narrator (Librivox Reading - John Locke)
31.
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Extent of human Knowledge in respect to its universality Hitherto we have examined the extent of our knowledge in respect of the several sorts of beings that are. There is another extent of it in respect of universality, which will also deserve to be considered. And in this regard our knowledge follows the nature of our ideas. If the ideas are abstract, whose agreement or disagreement we perceive our knowledge is universal.
- [111:58]
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- [112:26]
Narrator (Librivox Reading - John Locke)
it done
- [112:28]
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- [112:58]
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C A S T L I B
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R A R Y
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For what is known of such general ideas will be true of every particular thing in whom that essence, that is that abstract idea, is to be found and what is once known of such ideas will be perpetually and forever true, so that as to all general knowledge, we must search and find it only in our minds, and it is only the examining of our own ideas that first furnisheth us with that truths belonging to essences of things, that is to abstract ideas are eternal, and are to be found out by the contemplation only of those essences, as the existence of things is to be known only from experience. But having more to say of this in the chapters where I shall speak of general and real knowledge, this may here suffice as to the universality of our knowledge in general. End of section 4.
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Narrator (Librivox Reading - John Locke)
Section 5 of an essay Concerning Humane Understanding by John Locke, Book four of Knowledge and Probability. This is a Librivox recording. All Librivox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit Chapter four of the Reality of Knowledge. One Objection Knowledge placed in our ideas may be all unreal or chimerical. I doubt not, but my reader by this time may be apt to think that I have been all this while only building a castle in the Air and be ready to say to me to what purpose all this stir? Knowledge, say you, is only the perception of the agreement or disagreement of our own ideas. But who knows what those ideas may be? Is there anything so extravagant as the imaginations of men's brains? Where is the head that has no chimeras in it? Or if there be a sober and a wise man, what difference will there be by your rules between his knowledge and that of the most extravagant fancy in the world? They both have their ideas, and perceive their agreement and disagreement one with another. If there be any difference between them, the advantage will be on the warm headed man's side, as having the more ideas and the more lively and so by your rules he will be the more knowing. If it be true that all knowledge lies only in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of our own ideas, the visions of an enthusiast and the reasonings of a sober man will be equally certain. It is no matter how things are so a man observe, but the agreement of his own imaginations and talk conformably. It is all truth, all certainty. Such castles in the air will be as strongholds of truth as the demonstration of Euclid. That an harpy is not a centaur is by this way a certain knowledge, and as much a truth as that a square is not a circle. But of what use is all this fine knowledge of men's own imaginations? To a man that inquires after the reality of things, it matters not what men's fancies are it is the knowledge of things that is only to be prized. It is this alone gives a value to our reasonings and preference to one man's knowledge over another's, that it is of things as they really are, and not of dreams and fancies. 2. Answer not so where ideas agree with things. To which I answer that if our knowledge of ideas terminate in them, and reach no further where there is something further intended, our most serious thoughts will be of little more use than the reveries of a crazy brain and the truths built thereon of no more weight than the discourses of a man who sees things clearly in a dream, and with great assurance utters them. But I hope before I have done, to make it evident that this way of certainty by the knowledge of our own ideas goes a little further than bare imagination. And I believe it will appear that all the certainty of general truths a man has lies in nothing else. 3. But what shall be the criterion of this agreement? It is evident the mind knows not things immediately, but only by the intervention of the ideas it has of them. Our knowledge, therefore is real only so far as there is a conformity between our ideas and the reality of things. But what shall be here the criterion? How shall the mind, when it perceives nothing but its own ideas, know that they agree with things themselves? This, though it seems not to want difficulty. Yet I think there be two sorts of ideas that we may be assured agree with things for as first, all simple ideas are really conform'd to things first, the first are simple ideas which sense the mind, as has been showed, can by no means make to itself, must necessarily be the product of things operating on the mind in a natural way, and producing therein those perceptions which by the wisdom and will of our Maker they are ordained and adapted to from whence it follows that simple ideas are not fictions of our fancies, but the natural and regular productions of things without us really operating upon us, and so carry with them all the conformity which is intended, or which our state requires for they represent to us things under those appearances which they are fitted to produce in us, whereby we are enabled to distinguish the sorts of particular substances, to discern the states they are in, and so to take them for our necessities, and apply them to our uses. Thus the idea of whiteness or bitterness, as it is in the mind, exactly answering that power which is in any body to produce it there, has all the real conformity it can or ought to have with things without us and this conformity between our simple ideas and the existence of things is sufficient for real knowledge. 5. Secondly, all complex ideas, except ideas of substances, are their own archetypes. Secondly, all our complex ideas, except those of substances, being archetypes of the mind's own making, not intended to be the copies of anything, nor referred to the existence of anything as to their originals, cannot want any conformity necessary to real knowledge for that which is not designed to represent anything but itself can never be capable of a wrong representation, nor mislead us from the true apprehension of anything by its dislikeness to it and such, excepting those of substances, are all our complex ideas, which, as I have showed in another place, are combinations of ideas which the mind, by its free choice puts together without considering any connexion they have in nature. And hence it is that in all these sorts the ideas themselves are considered as the archetypes and things no otherwise regarded, but as they are conformable to them so that we cannot but be infallibly certain that all the knowledge we attain concerning these ideas is real, and and reaches things themselves because in all our thoughts, reasonings, and discourses of this kind, we intend things no further than as they are conformable to our ideas, so that in these we cannot miss of a certain and undoubted reality. 6 Hence the reality of mathematical knowledge I doubt not, but it will be easily granted that the knowledge we have of mathematical truths is not only certain, but but real knowledge, and not the bare empty vision of vain insignificant chimeras of the brain. And yet, if we will consider, we shall find that it is only of our own ideas. The mathematician considers the truth and properties belonging to a rectangle or circle only as they are in idea in his own mind for it is possible he never found either of them existing mathematically, for instance, precisely true in his life. But yet the knowledge he has of any truths or properties belonging to a circle or any mathematical figure are nevertheless true and certain, even of real things existing because real things are no further concerned, nor intended to be meant by any such propositions. Then, as things really agree to those archetypes in his true mind. Is it true of the idea of a triangle that its three angles are equal to two bright ones? It is true also of a triangle wherever it really exists, whatever other figure exists that it is not exactly answerable to that idea of a triangle in his mind is not at all concerned in that proposition and therefore he is certain all his knowledge concerning such ideas is real knowledge, because intending things no further than they agree with those his ideas, he is sure what he knows concerning those figures, when they are barely an ideal existence in his mind, will hold true of them also when they have a real existence in matter, his consideration being barely of those figures which which are the same wherever or however they exist. 7 and of moral and hence it follows that moral knowledge is as capable of real certainty as mathematics, for certainty being but the perception of the agreement or disagreement of our ideas and demonstration nothing but the perception of such agreement by the intervention of other ideas or mediums. Are moral ideas as well as mathematical being archetypes themselves and so adequate and complete ideas, all the agreement or disagreement which we shall find in them will produce real knowledge as well as in mathematical figures. 8. Existence not required to make abstract knowledge real. For the attaining of knowledge and certainty it is requisite that we have determined ideas, and to make our knowledge real, it is requisite that the ideas answer their archetypes. Nor let it be wondered that I place the certainty of our knowledge in the consideration of our ideas, with so little care and regard as it may seem to the real existence of things, since most of those discourses which take up the thoughts and engage the disputes of those who pretend to make it their business to inquire after truth and certainty will, I presume, upon examination, be found to be general propositions and notions in which existence is not at all concerned. All the discourses of the mathematicians about the squaring of a circle, conic sections, or any other part of mathematics, concern not the existence of any of those figures, but their demonstrations, which depend on their ideas, are the same, whether there be any square or circle existing in the world or no. In the same manner the truth and certainty of moral discourses abstracts from the lives of men and the existence of those virtues in the world whereof they treat. Nor are Tully's offices less true, because there is nobody in the world that exactly practises his rules and lives up to that pattern of a virtuous man which he has given us, and which existed nowhere when he writ but in idea. If it be true in speculation, for instance in idea, that murder deserves death, it will also be true in reality of any action that exists conformable to that idea of murder. As for other actions, the truth of that proposition concerns them not. And thus it is of all other species of things which have no other essences but those ideas which are in the minds of men. 9. Nor will it be less true or certain, because moral ideas are of our own making and naming. But it will here be said that if moral knowledge be placed in the contemplation of our own moral ideas and those as other modes be of our own making, what strange notions will there be of justice and temperance, what confusion of virtues and vices, if every one may make, what ideas of them he pleases. No confusion or disorder in the things themselves, nor the reasonings about them. No more than in mathematics. There would be a disturbance in the demonstration or a change in the properties of figures and their relations, one to another. If a man should make a triangle with four corners, or a trapezium with four right angles, that is, in plain English, change the names of the figures, and call that by one name, which mathematicians call ordinarily by another. For let a man make to himself the idea of a figure with three angles whereof one is a right one, and call it, if he please, equilaterum, or trapezium, or anything else, the properties of and demonstrations about that idea will be the same as if he called it a rectangular triangle. I confess, the change of the name by the impropriety of speech will at first disturb him. Who knows not what idea it stands for, but as soon as the figure is drawn, the consequences and demonstration are plain and clear. Just the same is it in moral knowledge let a man have the idea of taking from others without their consent, what their honest industry has possessed them of, and call this justice, if he please, he that takes the name here without the idea put to it, will be mistaken by joining another idea of his own to that name. But strip the idea of that name, or take it such as it is in the speaker's mind, and the same things will agree to it, as if you called it injustice. Indeed, wrong names in moral discourses breed usually more disorder, because they are not so easily rectified as in mathematics, where the figure once drawn and seen, makes the name useless and of no force. For what need of a sign, when the thing signified is present and in view? But in moral names that cannot be so easily and shortly done, because of the many decompositions that go to the making up the complex ideas of those modes. But yet for all this the miscalling of any of those ideas, contrary to the usual signification of the words of that language, hinders not but that we may have certain and demonstrative knowledge of their several agreements and disagreements, if we will carefully, as in mathematics, keep to the same precise ideas, and trace them in their several relations, one to another, without being led away by their names. If we but separate the idea under consideration from the sign that stands for it, our knowledge goes equally on in the discovery of real truth and certainty, whatever sounds we make use of. 10. Misnaming disturbs not the certainty of the knowledge. One thing more, we are to take notice of that where God, or any other lawmaker hath defined any moral names, there they have made the essence of that species to which that name belongs and there it is not safe to apply or use them otherwise. But in other cases it is bare impropriety of speech to apply them, contrary to the common usage of the country. But yet even this too disturbs not the certainty of that knowledge, which is still to be had by a due contemplation and comparing of those even nicknamed ideas. 11 thirdly, our complex ideas of substances have their archetypes without us and here knowledge comes short. Thirdly, there is another sort of complex ideas, which, being referred to archetypes without us, may differ from them, and so our knowledge about them may come short of being real. Such are our ideas of substance substances, which, consisting of a collection of simple ideas supposed taken from the works of nature, may yet vary from them by having more or different ideas united in them than are to be found united in the things themselves, from whence it comes to pass that they may and often do fail of being exactly conformable to things themselves. 12. So far as our complex ideas agree with those archetypes without us, so far our knowledge concerning substances is real. I say, then, that to have ideas of substances which by being conformable to things, may afford us real knowledge, it is not enough, as in modes, to put together such ideas as have no inconsistence, though they did never before so exist. For instance, the ideas of sacrilege or perjury, etc. Were as real and true ideas before as after the existence of any such fact. But our ideas of substances, being supposed copies and referred to archetypes without us, must still be taken from something that does or has existed they must not consist of ideas put together at the pleasure of our thoughts, without any real pattern they were taken from, though we can perceive no inconsistence in such a combination. The reason whereof is because we, knowing not what real constitution it is of substances whereon our simple ideas depend, and which really is the cause of the strict union of some of them one with another, and the exclusion of others, there are very few of them that we can be sure are or are not inconsistent in nature any further than experience and sensible observation reach. Herein, therefore is founded the reality of our knowledge concerning substances, that all our complex ideas of them must be such and such only as are made up of such simple ones as as have been discovered to co exist in nature and our ideas being thus true, though not perhaps very exact copies, are yet the subjects of real as far as we have any knowledge of them, which, as has been already shown, will not be found to reach very far, but so far as it does, it will still be real knowledge. Whatever ideas we have, the agreement we find they have with others will still be knowledge. If those ideas be abstract, it will be general knowledge. But to make it real concerning substances, the ideas must be taken from the real existence of things, whatever simple ideas have been found to co exist in any substance, these we may with confidence join together again, and so make abstract ideas of substances. For whatever have once had an union in nature, and may be united again 13. In our inquiries about substances, we must consider ideas, and not confine our thoughts to names or species suppos'd set out by names. This if we rightly consider and confine not our thoughts and abstract ideas to names, as if they were or could be no other sorts of things than what known names had already determined, and as it were set out, we should think of things with greater freedom and less confusion than perhaps we do. It would possibly be thought a bold paradox, if not a very dangerous falsehood. If I should say that some changelings, who have lived 40 years together without any appearance of reason, are something between a man and a beast, which prejudice is found upon nothing else but a false supposition that these two names, man and beast, stand for distinct species, so set out by real essences, that there can come no other species between them. Whereas if we will abstract from those names, and the supposition of such specific essences made by nature, wherein all things of the same denominations did exactly and equally partake. If we would not fancy that there were a certain number of these essences, wherein all things, as in moulds were cast and formed, we should find that the idea of the shape, motion, and life of a man without reason, in as much a distinct idea, and makes as much a distinct sort of things from man and beast, as the idea of the shape of an ass with reason, would be different from either that of man or beast, and be a species of an animal between or distinct from both. 14. Objection against a changeling being something between a man and beast answered Here everybody will be ready to ask if changelings may be supposed something between man and beast. Pray, what are they? I answer, changelings, which is as good a word to signify something different from the signification of man or beast, as the names man and beast are to have significations different one from the other. This well considered, would resolve this matter and show by meaning without any more ado. But I am not so unacquainted with the zeal of some men which enables them to spin consequences, and to see religion threatened whenever any one ventures to quit their forms of speech, speaking as not to foresee what names such a proposition as this is like to be charged with. And without doubt it will be asked, if changelings are something between man and beast, what will become of them in the other world? To which I answer, ay, it concerns me not to know or inquire to their own master. They stand or fall it will make their state neither better nor worse, whether we determine anything of it or no. They are in the hands of a faithful Creator and a bountiful father, who disposes not of his creatures according to our narrow thoughts or opinions, nor distinguishes them according to names and species of our contrivance. And we that know so little of this present world, we are in may, I think, content ourselves without being peremptory in defining the different states which strictly creatures shall come into when they go off the stage. It may suffice us that he hath made known to all those who are capable of instruction, discoursing, and reasoning, that they shall come to an account and receive according to what they have done in this body. 15. What will become of changelings in a future state? But secondly, I answer the force of these men's question, namely, will you deprive changelings of a future state? Is founded on one of these two suppositions, which are both false. The first is, that all things that have the outward shape and appearance of a man must necessarily be designed to an immortal future being after this life or secondly, that whatever is of human birth must be so. Take away these imaginations, and such questions will be groundless and ridiculous. I desire, then, those who think there is no more but an accidental difference between themselves and changelings, the essence in both being exactly the same, to consider whether they can imagine immortality annexed to any outward shape of the body. The very proposing it is, I suppose, enough to make them disown it. No one yet that ever I heard of how much soever immersed in matter, allowed that excellency to any figure of the gross sensible outward consequence of it or that any mass of matter should after its dissolution here be again restored hereafter to an everlasting state of sense perception and knowledge, only because it was moulded into this or that figure, and had such a particular frame of its visible parts such an opinion as this, placing immortality in a certain superficial figure, turns out of doors all consideration of soul or spirit, upon whose account alone some corporal beings have hitherto been concluded immortal and and others not. This is to attribute more to the outside than inside of things and to place the excellency of a man more in the external shape of his body than internal perfections of his soul, which is but little better than to annex the great and inestimable advantage of immortality and life everlasting, which he has above other material beings to an exit, I say, to the cut of his beard or the fashion of his coat. For this or that outward mark of our bodies no more carries with it the hope of an eternal duration than the fashion of a man's suit gives him reasonable grounds to imagine it will never wear out, or that it will make him immortal. It will perhaps be said that nobody thinks that the shape makes anything immortal, but it is the shape that is the sign of a rational soul. Within which is immortal. I wonder who made it the sign of any such thing, for barely saying it will not make it so. It would require some proofs to persuade one of it. No figure that I know speaks any such language. For it may as rationally be concluded that the dead body of a man, wherein there is to be found no more appearance or or action of life than there is in a statue, has yet nevertheless a living soul in it, because of its shape as that there is a rational soul in a changeling, because he has the outside of a rational creature, when his actions carry far less marks of reason with them in the whole course of his life than what are to be found in many a beast. 16 monsters. But it is the issue of rational parents, and must therefore be concluded to have a rational soul. I know not by what logic you must so conclude. I am sure this is a conclusion that men nowhere allow of, for if they did, they would not make bold, as everywhere they do, to destroy ill formed and misshaped productions. Ay, but these are monsters. Let them be so. What will your driveling, unintelligent, intractable changeling be? Shall a defect in the body make a monster? A defect in the mind? The far more noble and in the common phrase, the far more essential part not shall the want of a nose or a neck make a monster, and put such issue out of the rank of men. The want of reason and understanding not. This is to bring all back again to what was exploded just now. This is to place all in the shape and to take the measure of a man only by his outside to show that, according to the ordinary way of reasoning in this matter people do lay the whole stress on the figure and resolve the whole essence of the species of man as they make it into the outward shape, how unreasonable soever it be, and how much soever they disown it, we need but trace their thoughts and practice a little further, and then it will plainly appear the well shaped changeling is a man has a rational soul, though it appear not this is past doubt. Say you make the ears a little longer and more pointed, and the nose a little flatter than ordinary, and then you begin to boggle, make the face yet narrower, flatter, and longer, and then you are at a stand. Add still more and more of the likeness of a brute to it, and let the head be perfectly that of some other animal. Then presently it is a monster, and it is demonstration with you that it hath no rational soul and must be destroyed. Where now, I ask, shall be the just measure which the utmost bounds of that shape that carries with it a rational soul. For since there have been human foetuses produc'd, half beast and half man, and others three parts one and one part the other and so it is possible they may be, in all the variety of approaches to the one or the other shape, and may have several degrees of mixture of the likeness of a man or a brute, I would gladly know what are those precise lineaments which, according to this hypothesis, are or are not capable of a rational soul to be joined to them. What sort of outside is the certain sign that there is or is not such an inhabitant within? For till that be done, we talk at random of man, and shall always, I fear, to do so, as long as we give ourselves up to certain sounds and the imaginations of settled and fixed species in nature we know not what but after all, I desire it may be considered that those who think they have answered the difficulty by telling us that a misshaped fetus is a monster run into the same fault they are arguing against by constituting a species between man and beast. For what else, I pray, is there monster in the case? If the word monster signifies anything at all, but something neither man nor beast, but partaking somewhat of either, and just so, is the changeling before mentioned so necessary is it to quit the common notion of species and essences, if we will truly look into the nature of things, and examine them by what our faculties can discover in them as they exist, and not by groundless fancies that have been taken up about them. 17. Words and species. I have mentioned this here because I think we cannot be too cautious that words and species, in the ordinary notions which we have been used to of them, impose not on us. For I am apt to think therein lies one great obstacle to our clear and distinct knowledge, especially in reference to substances and from thence has rose a great part of the difficulties about truth and certainty. Would we accustom ourselves to separate our contemplations and reasonings from. From words? We might in a great measure remedy this inconvenience within our own thoughts but yet it would still disturb us in our discourse with others, as long as we retained the opinion that species and their essences were anything else but our abstract ideas, such as they are with names, and next to them to be the signs of them. 18. Recapitulation. Wherever we perceive the agreement or disagreement of any of our ideas, there is certain knowledge and wherever we are sure those ideas agree with the reality of things, there is certain real knowledge of which agreement of our ideas with the reality of things having here given the marks I think I have shown wherein it is that certainty, real certainty consists which whatever it was to others, was I confess to me heretofore one of those desiderata which I found great want of end of Section 5
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C A S T L I B
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R A R Y dot O R
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G.
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Narrator (Librivox Recording Introduction)
Section 6 of an essay Concerning Humane Understanding by John Locke Book four of Knowledge and Probability. This is a Librivox recording. All Librivox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit Librivox.org Chapter 5 of Truth in General 1. What truth is what is truth? Was an inquiry many ages since, and it, being that which all mankind either do or pretend to search after, it cannot but be worth our while carefully to examine wherein it consists, and so acquainting ourselves with the nature of it, as to observe how the mind distinguishes it from falsehood. 2. A right joining or separating of signs I either Ideas or words. Truth then seems to me, in the proper import of the word, to signify nothing but the joining or separating of signs, as the things signified by them do agree or disagree one with another. The joining or separating of signs here meant is what by another name we call proposition, so that truth properly belongs only to propositions, whereof there are two sorts, viz. Mental and verbal, as there are two sorts of signs commonly made use of, viz. Ideas and words, 3. Which make mental or verbal propositions. To form a clear notion of truth, it is very necessary to consider truth of thought and truth of words, distinctly one from another. But yet it is very difficult to treat of them asunder, because it is unavoidable in treating of mental propositions, to make use of words. And then the instances given of mental propositions cease immediately to be barely mental and become verbal. For a mental proposition being nothing but a bare consideration of the ideas as they are in our minds stripped of names, they lose the nature of purely mental propositions as soon as as they are put into words. 4. Mental propositions are very hard to be treated of, and that which makes it yet harder to treat of mental and verbal propositions separately is that most men, if not all, in their thinking and reasonings within themselves, make use of words instead of ideas, at least when the subject of their meditation contains in it complex ideas, which is a great evidence of the imperfection and uncertainty of our ideas of that kind, and may, if attentively made use of, serve for a mark to show us what are those things we have clear and perfect established ideas of, and what not. For if we will curiously observe the way our mind takes in thinking and reasoning, we shall find, I suppose, that when we make any propositions within our own thoughts, about white or black, sweet or bitter, a triangle or a circle, we can, and often do frame in our minds the ideas themselves without reflecting on the names. But when we would consider or make propositions about the more complex ideas, as of a man, vitriol, fortitude, glory, we usually put the name for the idea, because the ideas these names stand for being, for the most part imperfect, confused, and undetermined. We reflect on the names themselves because they are more clear, certain, and distinct, and readier accord to our thoughts than the pure ideas. And so we make use of these words instead of the ideas themselves, even when we would meditate and reason within ourselves and make tacit mental propositions in substances, as has been already noticed, this is occasioned by the imperfections of our ideas, we making the name stand for the real essence of which we have no idea at all. In modes it is occasioned by the great number of simple ideas that go to the making them up. For many of them, being compounded, the name occurs much easier than the complex idea itself, which requires time and attention to be recollected and exactly represented to the mind, even in those men who have formerly been at the pains to do it, and is utterly impossible to be done by those who, though they have ready in their memory the greatest part of the common words of that language, yet perhaps never troubled themselves in all their lives to consider what precise ideas the most of them stood for some confused or obscure notions have served their turns and many who talk very much of religion and conscience, of church and faith, of power and right, of obstructions and humors, melancholy and choler, would perhaps have little left in their thoughts and meditations, if one should desire them to think only of the things themselves and labour those words with which they so often confound others, and not seldom themselves also.
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5.
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Narrator (Librivox Recording Introduction)
Mental and verbal Propositions contrasted. But to return to the consideration of truth, we must, I say, observe two sorts of propositions that we are capable of making. First, mental, wherein the ideas in our understandings are without the use of words, put together or separated by the mind perceiving or judging of their agreement or disagreement. Secondly, verbal prepositions, which are words, the signs of our ideas put together or separated in affirmative or negative sentences, by which way of affirming or denying these signs made by sounds are as it were, put together or separated from another. So that proposition consists in joining or separating signs, and truth consists in the putting together or separating those signs according as the things which they stand for agree or disagree. 6. When mental propositions contain real truth, and when verbal, every one's experience will satisfy him. That the mind, either by perceiving or supposing the agreement or disagreement of any of its ideas, does tacitly within itself put them into a kind of proposition, affirmative or negative, which I have endeavoured to express by the terms putting together and separating. But this action of the mind, which is so familiar to every thinking and reasoning man, is easier to be conceived by reflecting on what passes in us when we affirm or deny, than to be explained by words. When a man has in his head the idea of two lines, viz. The side and diagonal of a square whereof the diagonal is an inch long, he may have the idea also of the division of that line into a certain number of equal parts, v. G into five, ten, a hundred, a thousand, or any other number and may have the idea of that inch, line being divisible or not divisible, into such equal parts as a certain number of them will be equal to the side line. Now, whenever he perceives, believes, or supposes such a kind of divisibility to agree or disagree to his idea of that line, he, as it were, joins or separates those two ideas, viz. The idea of that line, and the idea of that kind of divisibility, and so makes a mental proposition which is true or false, according as such a kind of divisibility, a divisibility into such eloquote parts does really agree to that line or or no, when ideas are so put together, or separated in the mind, as they or the things they stand for do agree or not, that is, as I may call it, mental truth. But truth of words is something more, and that is the affirming or denying of words one of another, as the ideas they stand for agree or disagree and and this again is twofold, either purely verbal and trifling, which I shall speak of, chapter eight or real and instructive, which is the object of that real knowledge which we have spoken of already. 7. Objection against verbal truth that thus it may all be chimerical, but here again will be apt to occur the same doubt about truth that did about knowledge and it will be objected that if truth be nothing but the joining and separating of words and propositions, as the ideas they stand for agree or disagree in men's minds the knowledge of truth is not so valuable a thing as it is taken to be, nor worth the pains and time men employ in the search of it, since by this account it amounts to no more than the conformity of words to the chimeras of men's brains, who knows not what odd notions many men's heads are filled with, and what strange ideas all men's brains are capable of. But if we rest here, we know the truth of nothing by this rule, but of the visionary wards in our own imaginations nor have other truth but what as much concerns harpies and centaurs as men and horses for those and the like may be ideas in our heads, and have their agreement or disagreement there, as well as the ideas of real beings, and so have as true propositions made about them and it will be altogether as true a proposition to say all centaurs are animals, as that all men are animals, and the certainty of one as great as the other. For in both the propositions the words are put together according to the agreement of the ideas in our minds and the agreement of the idea of animal with that of centaur is as clear and visible to the mind as the agreement of the idea of animal with that of man and so these two propositions are equally true, equally certain but of what use is all such truth to us? 8. Answered real truth is about ideas agreeing to things though what has been said in the foregoing chapter to distinguish real from imaginary knowledge, might suffice here in answer to this doubt, to distinguish real truth from chimerical, or, if you please, barely nominal, they depending both on the same foundation. Yet it may not be amiss here again to consider that though our words signify things, the truth they contain when put into propositions, will be only verbal when they stand for ideas in the mind that have not an agreement with the reality of things and therefore truth as well as knowledge, may well come under the distinction of verbal and real, that being only verbal truth, wherein terms are joined according to the agreement or disagreement of the ideas they stand for, without regarding whether our ideas are such as really have or are capable of having an existence in nature but then it is they contain real truths when these signs are joined as our ideas agree, and when our ideas are such as we know are capable of having an existence in nature, which in substances we cannot know, but by knowing that such have existed. 9. Truth and falsehood in general truth is the marking down in words the agreement or disagreement of ideas as it is falsehood is the marking down in words the agreement or disagreement of ideas otherwise than it is and so far as these ideas thus marked by sounds agree to their archetypes, so far only is the truth real. The knowledge of this truth consists in knowing what ideas the words stand for, and the perception of the agreement or disagreement of those ideas according as it is marked by those words. 10. General Propositions to be treated of more at large. But because words are looked on as the great conduits of truth and knowledge, and that in conveying and receiving of truth, and commonly in reasoning about it, we make use of words and propositions, I shall more at large inquire wherein the certainty of real truth contained in propositions consists, and where it is to be had, and endeavour to show in what sort of universal propositions we are capable to of being certain of their real truth or falsehood. I shall begin with general propositions, as those which most employ our thoughts and exercise our contemplation. General truths are most looked after by the mind, as those that most enlarge our knowledge, and by their comprehensiveness, satisfying us at once of many particulars, enlarge our view, and shorten our way to knowledge. 11. Moral and metaphysical truth. Besides truth, taken in the strict sense before mentioned, there are other sorts of truth, as one. Moral truth, which is speaking of things according to the persuasion of our own minds, though the proposition we speak agree not to the reality of things.
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Narrator (Librivox Reading - John Locke)
2.
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Narrator (Librivox Recording Introduction)
Metaphysical truth, which is nothing but the real existence of things, conformable to the ideas to which we have annexed their names. This, though it seems to consist in the very beings of things, yet when considered a little nearly will appear to include a tacit proposition whereby the mind joins that particular thing to the idea it had before settled with the name to it but these considerations of truth either having been before taken notice of, or not being much to our present purpose, it may suffice here only to have mentioned them. End of section 6.
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Section 7 of an essay Concerning Human Understanding by John Locke Book four of Knowledge and Probability this is a Librivox recording. All Librivox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit Librivox.org Recording by Jennifer Henry Chapter 6 of Universal Propositions Their Truth and Certainty 1. Treating of words necessary to knowledge though the examining and judging of ideas by themselves, their names being quite laid aside, be the best and surest way to clear and distinct knowledge. Yet through the prevailing custom of using sounds for ideas, I think it is very seldom practised. Every one may observe how common it is for names to be made use of, instead of the ideas themselves, even when men think and reason within their own breasts, especially if the ideas be very complex, and made up of a great collection of simple ones. This makes the consideration of words and propositions so necessary a part of the treatise of knowledge, that it is very hard to speak intelligibly of the one without explaining the other two. General truths hardly to be understood but in verbal propositions, all the knowledge we have being only of particular or general truths, it is evident that whatever may be done in the former of these, the latter, which is that which with reason is most sought after, can never be well made known, and is very seldom apprehended but as conceived and expressed in words. It is not, therefore out of our way in the examination of our knowledge, to inquire into the truth and certainty of universal propositions. 3. Certainty twofold of truth and of knowledge. But that we may not be misled in this case by that which is the danger everywhere, I mean by the doubtfulness of terms, it is fit to observe that certainty is certainty of truth and certainty of knowledge. Certainty of truth is when words are so put together in propositions, as exactly to express the agreement or disagreement of the ideas they stand for as really it is. Certainty of knowledge is to perceive the agreement or disagreement of ideas as expressed in any proposition. This we usually call knowing or being certain of the truth of any proposition.
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4.
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Narrator (Grainger Advertisement)
No proposition can be certainly known to be true, where the real essence of each species mentioned is not known. Now, because we cannot be certain of the truth of any general proposition, unless we know the precise bounds and extent of of the species its terms stand for, it is necessary we should know the essence of each species, which is that which constitutes and bounds it. This in all simple ideas and modes is not hard to do. For in these the real and nominal essence being the same, or which is all one, the abstract idea which the general term stands for, being the sole essence and boundary that is or can be supposed of the species, there can be no doubt how far the species extends, or what things are comprehended under each term which, it is evident, are all that have an exact conformity with the idea it stands for, and, and no other. But in substances wherein a real essence distinct from the nominal is supposed to constitute, determine, and bound the species, the extent of the general word is very uncertain, because, not knowing this real essence, we cannot know what is or what is not of that species, and consequently what may or may not with certainty be affirmed of it. And thus, speaking of a man, or gold, or any other species of natural substances, as supposed constituted by a precise and real essence which nature regularly imparts to every individual of that kind whereby it is made to be of that species, we cannot be certain of the truth of any affirmation or negation made of it. For man or gold, taken in this sense and used for species of things constituted by real essences different from the complex idea in the mind of the speaker stand for we know not what and the extent of these speakers species with such boundaries are so unknown and undetermined that it is impossible with any certainty to affirm that all men are rational, or that all gold is yellow. But where the nominal essence is kept to as the boundary of each species and men extend the application of any general term no further than to the particular things in which the complex idea it stands for is to be found there, they are in no danger to mistake the bounds of each species, nor can be in doubt on this account whether any proposition be true or not. I have chosen to explain this uncertainty of propositions in this scholastic way, and have made use of the terms of essences and species on purpose to show the absurdity and inconvenience there is to think of them as of any other sort of realities than barely abstract ideas with names to them. To suppose that the species of things are anything but the sorting of them under general names, according as they agree to several abstract ideas of which we make those names signs, is to confound truth and introduce uncertainty into all general propositions that can be made about them. Though therefore, these things might to people not possessed with scholastic learning be treated of in a better and clearer way, yet those wrong notions of essences or species, having got root in most people's minds, who have received any tincture from the learning which has prevailed in this part of the world, are to be discovered and removed to make way for that use of words which should convey certainty with it. 5. This more particularly concerns substances. The names of substances, then, whenever made to stand for species, which are supposed to be constituted by real essences which we know not, are not capable to convey certainty to the understanding of the truth. General propositions made up of such terms we cannot be sure the reason whereof is plain. For how can we be sure that this or that quality is in gold, when we know not what is or is not gold? Since in this way of speaking nothing is gold but what partakes of an essence which we not knowing cannot know where it is or is not, and so cannot be sure that any parcel of matter in the world is or is not in this sense gold, being incurably ignorant whether it has or has not that which makes anything to be called gold, that is, that real essence of gold, whereof we have no idea at all, this being as impossible for us to know as it is for a blind man to tell in what flower the colour of a pansy is or is not to be found, whilst he has no idea of the colour of a pansy at all or if we could, which is impossible, certainly know where a real essence which we know not is. V. G In what parcels of matter the real essence of gold is. Yet could we not be sure that this or that quality could with truth be affirmed of gold, since it is impossible for us to know that this or that quality or idea has a necessary connection with with a real essence, of which we have no idea at all, whatever species that supposed real essence may be imagined to constitute.
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Narrator (Librivox Reading - John Locke)
6.
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On the other side, the names of substances, when made use of as they should be for the ideas men have in their minds, though they carry a clear and and determinate signification with them, will not yet serve us to make many universal propositions of whose truth we can be certain not because in this use of them we are uncertain what things are signified by them, but because the complex ideas they stand for are such combinations of simple ones as carry not with them any discipline, discoverable connection or repugnancy, but with a very few other ideas. 7. The complex ideas that our names of the species of substances properly stand for, are collections of such qualities as have been observed to coexist in an unknown substance substratum which we call substance. But what other qualities necessarily coexist with such combinations we cannot certainly know, unless we can discover their natural dependence, which in their primary qualities we can go but a very little way in and in all their secondary qualities we can discover no connection at all, for the reasons mentioned. Chapter three. Because we know not the real constitutions of substances on which each secondary quality particularly depends, did we know that it would serve us only for experimental, not universal, knowledge, and reach with certainty no further than that bare instance? Because our understandings can discover no conceivable connexion between any secondary quality and any modification whatsoever of any of the primary ones and therefore there are very few general propositions to be made concerning substances which can carry with them undoubted certainty.
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Instance in gold all gold is fixed is a proposition whose truth we cannot be certain of how universally soever it be believed. For if, according to the useless imagination of the schools, anyone supposes the term gold to stand for a species of things set out by nature by a real essence belonging to it, it is evident he knows not what particular substances are of that species, and so cannot with certainty affirm anything universally of gold. But if he makes gold stand for a species determined by its nominal essence, let the nominal essence, for example, be the complex idea of a body of a certain yellow color, malleable, fusible, and heavier than any other known in this proper use of the word gold there is no difficulty to know what is or is not gold, but yet no other quality can withstand certainty, be universally affirmed or denied of gold but what hath a discoverable connection or inconsistency with that nominal essence. Fixedness, for example, having no necessary connection that we can discover with the color weight, or any other simple idea of our complex one, or with the whole combination together, it is impossible that we should certainly know the truth of this proposition that all gold is fixed. 9. No discoverable necessary connection between Nominal essence gold and other simple ideas as there is no discoverable connection between fixedness and the color weight, and other simple ideas of that nominal essence of gold. So if we make our complex idea of gold a body, yellow, fusible, ductile, weighty, and fixed, we shall be at the same uncertainty concerning solubility in aqua regia. And for the same reason, since we can never from consideration of the ideas themselves with certainty, affirm, or deny of a body whose complex idea is made up of yellow, very weighty, ductile, fusible, and fixed, that it is soluble in aqua regia, and so on of the rest of its qualities, I would gladly meet with one general affirmation concerning any will no doubt be presently objected. Is not this an universal proposition? All gold is malleable? To which I answer. It is a very complex idea the word gold stands for but then here is nothing affirmed of gold, but that that sound stands for an idea in which malleableness is contained and such a sort of truth and certainty as this is, it is to say, a centaur is four footed. But if malleableness make not a part of the specific essence the name of gold stands for, it is plain. All gold is malleable is not a certain proposition. Because let the complex idea of gold be made up of whichsoever of its other qualities you please. Malleableness will not appear to depend on that complex idea, nor follow from any simple one contained in it. The connection that malleableness has, if it has any, with those other qualities being only by the intervention of the real constitution of its insensible parts which, since we know not, it is impossible we should perceive that connexion, unless we could discover that which ties them together. 10. As far as any such coexistence can be known so far, universal propositions may be certain, but this will go but a little way. The more, indeed, of these coexisting qualities we unite into one complex idea under one name, the more precise and determinate we make the signification of that word, but never yet make it thereby more capable of universal certainty in respect of other qualities not contained in our complex idea, since we perceive not their connexion or dependence on one another, being ignorant both of that real constitution in which they are all founded, and also how they flow from it. For the chief part of our knowledge concerning substances is not, as in other things, barely of the relation of two ideas that may exist, some separately, but is of the necessary connection and coexistence of several distinct ideas in the same subject, or of their repugnancy. So to coexist, could we begin at the other end, and discover what it was wherein that color consisted, what made a body lighter or heavier, what texture of parts made it malleable, fusible, and fixed, and fit to be dissolved in this sort of liquor, and not another. If I say we had such an idea as this of bodies we could perceive, wherein all sensible qualities originally consist, and how they are produced, we might frame such abstract ideas of them as as would furnish us with matter of more general knowledge, and enable us to make universal propositions that should carry general truth and certainty with them. But whilst our complex ideas of the sorts of substances are so remote from that internal real constitution on which their sensible qualities depend, and are made up of nothing but but an imperfect collection of those apparent qualities our senses can discover. There can be few general propositions concerning substances of whose real truth we can be certainly assured, since there are but few simple ideas of whose connection and necessary coexistence we can have certain and undoubted knowledge. I imagine amongst all the secondary qualities of substances, and the powers relating to them, there cannot any two be named whose necessary coexistence or repugnance to coexist can certainly be known, unless in those of the same sense which necessarily exclude one another, as I have elsewhere shewed, no one, I think, by the colour that is in any body, can certainly know what smell, taste, sound, or tangible qualities it has, nor what alterations it is capable to make or receive on or from other bodies. The same may be said of the sound or taste, etc. Our specific names of substances standing for any collections of such ideas, it is not to be wondered that we can with them make very few general propositions of undoubted real certainty. But yet, so far as any complex idea of any sort of substances contains in it any simple idea whose necessary coexistence with any other may be discovered so far, universal propositions may with certainty be made concerning it. VG could anyone discover a necessary connection between malleableness and the color or weight of gold, or any other part of the complex idea signified by that name, he might make a certain universal proposition concerning gold in this respect and the real truth of this proposition, that all gold is malleable, would be as certain as of the three angles of all right lined triangles are all equal to two right ones.
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The qualities which make our complex ideas of substances depend on mostly on external, remote, and unperceived causes. Had we such ideas of substances as to know what real constitutions produce those sensible qualities we find in them, and how those qualities flowed from thence, we could, by the specific ideas of their real essences in our own minds, more certainly find out their proper properties, and discover what qualities they had or had not, than we can now by our senses. And to know the properties of gold it would be no more necessary that gold should exist, and that we should make experiments upon it, than it is necessary for the knowing the properties of a triangle. That a triangle should exist in any matter, the idea in our minds would serve for the one as well as the other. But we are so far from being admitted into the secrets of nature, that we scarce so much as ever approach the first entrance towards them. For we are wont to consider the substances we meet with each of them as an entire thing by itself, having all its qualities in itself, and independent of other things, overlooking for the most part the operations of those invisible fluids they are encompassed with, and upon whose motions and operations depend the greatest part of those qualities which are taken notice of in them, and are made by us the inherent marks of distinction whereby we know and denominate them. Put a piece of gold anywhere by itself, separate from the reach and influence of all other bodies, it will immediately lose all its colour and weight, and perhaps malleableness too, which, for aught I know, would be changed into a perfect friability water, in which, to us, for fluidity is an essential quality, left to itself, would cease to be fluid. But if inanimate bodies owe so much of their present state to other bodies without them, that they would not be what they appear to us, were those bodies that environ them removed, it is yet more so in vegetables which are nourished grow and produce leaves, flowers, and seeds in a constant succession. And if we look a little nearer into the state of animals, we shall find that their dependence as to life, motion, and the most considerable qualities to be observed in them is so wholly on extrinsical causes and qualities of other bodies that make no part of them, that they cannot subsist a moment without them, though yet those bodies on which they depend are little taken notice of, and make no part of the complex idea we frame of those animals. Take the air but for a minute from the greatest part of living creatures, and they presently lose sense, life and motion this the necessity of breathing has forced into our knowledge. But how many other extrinsical, and possibly very remote bodies do the springs of these admirable machines depend on, which are not vulgarly observed, or so much as thought on and how many are there which the severest inquiry can never discover? The inhabitants of this spot of the universe, though remov'd so many millions of miles from the sun, yet depend so much on the duly temper'd motion of particles coming from or agitated by it, that were this earth remov'd but a small part of the distance out of its present situation, and placed a little further or nearer that source of heat, it is more than probable that the greatest part part of the animals in it would immediately perish, since we find them so often destroyed by an excess or defect of the sun's warmth, which an accidental position in some parts of this our little globe exposes them to. The qualities observed in a loadstone must needs have their source far beyond the confines of that body. And the ravage made often on several sorts of animals by invisible causes, the certain death, as we are told of some of them, by barely passing the line, or, as it is certain of other, by being removed into a neighboring country, evidently show that the concurrence and operations of several bodies with which they are seldom thought to have anything to do is absolutely necessary to make them be what they appear to us and to preserve those qualities by which we know and distinguish them. We are then quite out of the way when we think that things contain within themselves the qualities that appear to us in them. And we in vain search for that constitution within the body of a fly or an elephant upon which depend those qualities and powers we observe in them, for which perhaps to understand them aright, we ought to look not only beyond this our earth and atmosphere, but even beyond the sun or remotest star our eyes have yet discovered. For how much the being and operation of particular substances in this our globe depends on causes utterly beyond our view is impossible for us to determine. We see and perceive some of the motions and grosser operations of things here about us. But whence the streams come that keep all these curious machines in motion and repair, how conveyed and modified, is beyond our notice and apprehension. And the great parts and wheels, as I may so say of this stupendous structure of the universe, may for aught we know, have such a connection and dependence in their influence and operations, one upon another, that perhaps things in this our mansion would put on quite another face and cease to be what they are. If some one of the stars or great bodies incomprehensibly remote from us should cease to be or move as it does. This is certain things, however absolute and entire they seem in themselves, are but retainers to other parts of nature for that which they are most taken notice of by us. Their observable qualities, actions, and powers are owing to something without them. And there is not so complete and perfect a part that we know of nature which does not owe the being it has and the excellence of it to its neighbors. And we must not confine our thoughts within the surface of any body, but look up a great deal further to comprehend perfectly those qualities that are in it. 12. Our nominal essences of substances furnish few universal propositions about them that are certain. If this be so, it is not to be wondered that we have very imperfect ideas of substances, and that the real essences on which depend their properties and operations are unknown to us. We cannot discover so much as that size, figure, and texture of their minute and active parts, which is really in much less the different motions and impulses made in and upon them by bodies from without, upon which depends, and by which is formed the greatest and most remarkable part of those qualities we observe in them, and of which our complex ideas of them are made up. This consideration alone is enough to put an end to all our hopes of ever having the ideas of their real essences, which, whilst we want the nominal essences we make use of instead of them, will be able to furnish us, but very sparingly, with any general knowledge or universal propositions capable of real certainty. 13. Judgment of probability concerning substances may reach further, but that is not knowledge. We are not, therefore, to wonder if certainty be to be found in very few general propositions made concerning substances. Our knowledge of their qualities and properties goes very seldom further than our senses reach and inform us. Possibly inquisitive and observing men may by strength of judgment penetrate further, and on probabilities taken from wary observation and hints well laid together, often guess right at what experience has not yet discovered to them. But this is but guessing still it amounts only to opinion, and has not that certainty which is requisite to knowledge. For all general knowledge lies only in our own thoughts, and consists barely in the contemplation of our own abstract ideas. Whenever we perceive any agreement or disagreement amongst them, there we have general knowledge, and by putting the names of those ideas together accordingly in propositions, can with certainty pronounce general truths. But because the abstract ideas of substances for which their specific names stand, whenever they have any distinct and determinate signification, have a discoverable connection or inconsistency with but a very few other ideas, the certainty of universal propositions concerning substances is very narrow and scanty in that part which is our principal inquiry concerning them. And there are scarce any of the names of substances. Let the idea it is applied to be what it will, of which we can generally and with certainty pronounce that it has or has not this or that other quality belonging to it, and constantly coexisting or or inconsistent with that idea, wherever it is to be found. 14. What is requisite for our knowledge of substances? Before we can have any tolerable knowledge of this kind, we must first know what changes the primary qualities of one body do regularly produce in the primary qualities of another, and how. Secondly, we must know what primary qualities of any body produce certain sensations or ideas in us this is in truth no less than to know all the effects of matter under its diverse modifications of bulk, figure, cohesion of parts, motion, and rest, which I think everybody will allow, is utterly impossible to be known by us without revelation. Nor if it were revealed to us what sort of figure, bulk, and motion of corpuscles would produce in us the sensation of a yellow colour and what sort of figure, bulk, and texture of parts, in the superficies of any body, were fit to give such corpuscles their due motion to produce that colour? Would that be enough to make universal propositions with certainty concerning the several sorts of them? Unless we had faculties acute enough to perceive the precise bulk, figure, texture, and motion of bodies in those minute parts by which they operate on our senses, so that we might by those frame our abstract ideas of them. I have mentioned here only corporeal substances whose operations seem to lie more level to our understandings. For as to the operations of spirits, both their thinking and moving of bodies, we at first sight find ourselves at a loss though perhaps when we have applied our thoughts a little nearer to the consideration of bodies and their operations, and examine how far our notions even in these reach with any clearness beyond sensible matter of fact, we shall be bound to confess that even in these two are discovered discoveries amount to very little beyond perfect ignorance and incapacity. 15. Whilst our complex ideas of substances contain no ideas of their real constitutions, we can make but few general propositions concerning them. This is evident the abstract complex ideas of substances for which their general names stand not comprehending their real constitutions, can afford us very little universal certainty, because our ideas of them are not made up of that on which those qualities we observe in them, and would inform ourselves about, do depend, or with which they have any sense certain connection. VG Let the ideas to which we give the name man be, as it commonly is, a body of the ordinary shape, with sense, voluntary motion, and reason joined to it. This being the abstract idea, and consequently the essence of our species, species man, we can make but very few general certain propositions concerning man standing for such an idea, because not knowing the real constitution on which sensation, power of motion, and reasoning with that particular shape depend, and whereby they are united together in the same subject, there are very few other qualities with which we can perceive them to have a necessary connexion. And therefore we cannot with certainty affirm that all men sleep by intervals, that no man can be nourished by wood or stones, that all men will be poisoned by hemlock, because these ideas have no connection nor repugnancy with this our nominal essence of man, with this abstract idea that name stands for, we must in these and the like appeal to trial in particular subjects which can reach but a little way we must content ourselves with probability in the rest, but can have no general certainty, whilst our specific idea of man contains not that real constitution which is the root wherein all his inseparable qualities are united, and from whence they flow Whilst our idea, the word man stands for, is only an imperfect collection of some sensible qualities and powers in him, there is no discernment, discernible, connection or repugnance between our specific idea and the operation of either the parts of hemlock or stones upon his constitution. There are animals that safely eat hemlock, and others that are nourished by wood and stones. But as long as we want ideas of those real constitutions of different sorts of animals, whereon these and the like qualities and powers depend, we must not hope to reach certainty in universal propositions concerning them. Those few ideas only which have a discernible connection with our nominal essence, or any part of it, can afford us such propositions but these are so few and of so little moment, that we may justly look on our certain general knowledge of substances, as almost none at all. 16. Wherein lies the general certainty of propositions? To conclude, general propositions of what kind soever, are then only capable of certainty, when the terms used in in them stand for such ideas, whose agreement or disagreement as there expressed, is capable to be discovered by us, and we are then certain of their truth or falsehood, when we perceive the ideas the terms stand for to agree or not agree, according as they are affirmed or denied one of another, whence we may take notice that general certainty is never to be found but in our ideas, whenever we go to seek it elsewhere in experiment or observations without us our knowledge goes not beyond particulars. It is the contemplation of our own abstract ideas that alone is able to afford us general knowledge. End of section 7. Section 8 of an essay Concerning Human Understanding by John Locke, Book four of Knowledge and Probability this is a Librivox recording. All Librivox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit Librivox.org recording by Jennifer Henry chapter 7 of Maxims 1 maxims or axioms are self evident propositions. There are a sort of propositions which, under the name of maxims and axioms, have passed for principles of science, and because they are self evident, have been supposed innate without that anybody that I know ever went about to show the reason and foundation of their clearness or cogency. It may, however, be worth while to inquire into the reason of their evidence, and see whether it be peculiar to them alone, and also to examine how far they influence and govern our other knowledge. 2. Wherein that self evidence consists. Knowledge, as has been shown, consists in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas. Now where that agreement or disagreement is perceived immediately by itself, without the intervention or help of any other, there our knowledge is self evident. This will appear to be so to any who will but consider any of those propositions which without any proof he assents to at first sight for in all of them he will find that the reason of his assent is from that agreement or disagreement which the mind, by an immediate comparing them, finds in those ideas answering the affirmation or negation in the proposition. 3. Self evidence not peculiar to received axioms. This being so, in the next place let us consider whether this self evidence be peculiar only to those propositions which commonly pass under the name of maxims, and have the dignity of axioms allowed them. And here it is plain that several other truths not allowed to be axioms, partake equally with them in this self evidence. This we shall see if we go over these several sorts of agreement or disagreement of ideas which I have above mentioned, viz. Identity, relation, coexistence, and real existence, which will discover to us that not only those few propositions which have had the credit of maxims of are self evident, but a great many, even almost an infinite number of other propositions are such. 4. As to identity and diversity, all propositions are equally self evident. 1. For first the immediate perception of the agreement or disagreement of identity being founded in the minds having distinct distinct ideas. This affords us as many self evident propositions as we have distinct ideas. Every one that has any knowledge at all has as the foundation of it various and distinct ideas. And it is the first act of the mind, without which it can never be capable of any knowledge to know every one of its ideas by itself, and distinguish it from others. Every one finds in himself that he knows the ideas he has that he knows also when any one is in his understanding and what it is, and that when more than one are there, he knows them distinctly and unconfusedly one from another, which always being so, it being impossible but that he should perceive what he perceives, he can never be in doubt when any idea is in his mind, that it is there, and is that idea it is and that two distinct ideas, when they are in his mind, are there, and are not one and the same idea so that all such affirmations and negations are made without any possibility of doubt, uncertainty, or hesitation, and must necessarily be be assented to as soon as understood that is, as soon as we have in our minds determined ideas which the terms in the proposition stand for. And therefore, whenever the mind with attention considers any proposition so as to perceive the two ideas signified by the terms, and affirmed or denied one of the other to be the same or different, it is practical, presently, and infallibly certain of the truth of such a proposition. And this equally, whether these propositions be in terms standing for more general ideas, or such as are less so. V. G. Whether the general idea of being be affirmed of itself, as in this proposition whatsoever is is, or a more particular idea be affirmed of itself as a man is a man, or whatsoever is white, is white or whether the idea of being in general be denied of not being, which is the only, if I may so call it, idea different from it, as in this other proposition, it is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be, or any idea of any particular particular being be denied of another different from it. As a man is not a horse, red is not blue. The difference of the ideas as soon as the terms are understood, makes the truth of the proposition presently visible and that with an equal certainty and easiness in the less as well as the more general propositions and all for the same reason these because the mind perceives in any ideas that it has the same idea to be the same with itself, and to different ideas to be different and not the same and this it is equally certain of, whether these ideas be more or less general, abstract, and comprehensive. It is not therefore alone to these two general propositions whatsoever is is and it is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be, that this sort of self evidence belongs by any peculiar right, the perception of being or not being, belongs no more to these vague ideas signified by the terms whatsoever and thing, than it does to any other ideas. These two general maxims, amounting to no more in short sort but this, that the same is the same, and the same is not different, are truths known in more particular instances, as well as in those general maxims, and known also in particular instances, before these general maxims are ever thought on, and draw all their force from the discernment of the mind employed about particular ideas, there is nothing more visible than that the mind, without the help of any proof or reflection on either of these general propositions perceives so clearly, and knows so certainly that the idea of white is the idea of white and not the idea of blue, and that the idea of white, when it is in the mind is there, and is not absent, that the consideration of these axioms can add nothing to the evidence or certainty of its knowledge. Just so it is as every one may experiment in himself, in all the ideas a man has in his mind, he knows each to be itself, and not to be another, and to be in his mind and not away when it is there with a certainty that cannot be greater. And therefore the truth of no general proposition can be known with a greater certainty, nor add anything to this, so that in respect of identity our intuitive knowledge reaches as far as our ideas, and we are capable of making as many self evident propositions as we have names for distinct ideas. And I appeal to everyone's own mind, whether this proposition a circle is a circle, be not as self evident a proposition as that consisting of more general terms whatsoever is is. And again, whether this proposition blue is not red, be not a proposition that the mind can no more doubt of as soon as it understands the words than it does of that axiom. Axiom it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be, and so of all the like. 5. In coexistence we have few self evident propositions. 2. Secondly, as to coexistence, or such a necessary connection between two ideas, that in the subject where one of them is supposed there the other must necessarily be also of such agreement or disagreement as this, the mind has an immediate perception, but in very few of them, and therefore in this sort we have but very little intuitive knowledge. Nor are there to be found very many propositions that are self evident, though some there are. VG the idea of filling a place equal to the contents of its superficies being annexed to our idea of body, I think it is a self evident proposition that two bodies cannot be in the same place. 6 3. In other relations we may have many. Thirdly, as to the relations of modes, mathematicians have framed many axioms concerning that one relation of equality as equals taken from equals, the remainder will be equal, which with the rest of that kind, however, they are received for maxims by the mathematicians and are unquestionable truths. Yet I think that any one who considers them will not find that they have a clearer self evidence than than these that 1 and 1 are equal to 2 that if you take from the five fingers of one hand 2, and from the five fingers of the other hand 2. The remaining numbers will be equal. These and a thousand other such propositions may be found in numbers, which at the very first hearing force the ascent, and carry with them an equal if, if not greater clearness than those mathematical axioms concerning real existence we have none. Fourthly, as to real existence, since that has no connexion with any other of our ideas but that of ourselves and of a first being, we have in that concerning the real existence of all other beings, not so much as demonstrative, much less a self evident knowledge and therefore concerning those there are no maxims.
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These axioms do not much influence our other knowledge. In the next place let us consider what influence these received maxims have upon the other parts of our knowledge. The rules established in the schools that all reasonings are ex praecognitis et praeconces, seem to lay the foundation of all other knowledge in these maxims, and to suppose them to be praecognita, whereby I think, are meant these two. First, that these axioms are those truths that are first known to the mind, and secondly, that upon them the other parts of our knowledge depend. 9. Because maxims or axioms are not the truths we first knew first, that they are not the truths first known to the mind is evident to experience, as we have shown in another place Book 1, Chapter 1 who perceives not that a child certainly knows that a stranger is not its mother, that its sucking bottle is not the rod, long before he knows that it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be and how many truths are there about numbers which it is obvious to observe that the mind is perfectly acquainted with and fully convinced of, before it ever thinks thought on these general maxims, to which mathematicians in their arguings do sometimes refer, whereof the reason is very plain for that which makes the mind assent to such propositions, being nothing else but the perception it has of the agreement or disagreement of its ideas, according as it finds them affirmed or denied one of another in words it understands. And every idea being known to be what it is, and every two distinct ideas being known not to be the same, it must necessarily follow that such self evident truths must be first known, which consist of ideas that are first in the mind and the ideas first in the mind, it is evident, are those of particular things, from whence by slow degrees the understanding proceeds to some few general ones, which, being taken from the ordinary and familiar objects of sense, are settled in the mind with general names to them. Thus particular ideas are first received and distinguished, and so knowledge got about them, and next to them the less general or specific, which are next to particular. For abstract ideas are not so obvious or easy to children, or the yet unexercised mind, as particular ones if they seem so to grown men, it is only because by constant and familiar use they are made so. For when we nicely reflect upon them, we shall find that general ideas are fictions and contrivances of the mind, that carry difficulty with them, and do not so easily offer themselves as we are apt to imagine? For example, does it not require some pains and skill to form the general idea of a triangle, which is yet none of the more abstract, abstract, comprehensive, and difficult? For it must be neither oblique nor rectangle, neither equilateral, equicrural, nor scalenon, but all and none of these at once. In effect it is something imperfect that cannot exist an idea wherein some part of several different and inconsistent ideas are put together. It is true the mind in this imperfect state has need of such ideas, and makes all the haste to them it can, for the conveniency of communication and enlargement of knowledge to both which it is naturally very much inclined. But yet one has reason to suspect such ideas are marks of our imperfection. At least this is enough to show that the most abstract and general ideas are not those that the mind is first and most easily acquainted with, nor such as its earliest knowledge is conversant about. 10. Because on perception of them the other parts of our knowledge do not depend. Secondly, from what has been said, it plainly follows that these magnified maxims are not the principles and foundations of all our other knowledge. For if there be a great many other truths which have as much self evidence as they, and a great many that we know before them, it is impossible they should be the principles from which we deduce all other truths. Is it impossible to know that 1 and 2 are equal to 3? But by virtue of this or some such axiom, viz. The whole is equal to all its parts, parts taken Together, many A1 knows that 1 and 2 are equal to 3, without having heard or thought on that or any other axiom by which it might be proved, and knows it as certainly as any other man knows that the whole is equal to all its parts, or any other maxim, and all from the same reason of self evidence, the equality of those ideas being as visible and certain to him without that or any other axiom, as with needing no proof to make it perceived nor after the knowledge that the whole is equal to all its parts, does he know that 1 and 2 are equal to 3, better or more certainly than he did before. For if there be any odds in those ideas, the whole and parts are more obscure, or at least more difficult to be settled in the mind, than those of 1, 2, and 3. And indeed I think I may ask these men who will needs have all knowledge besides those general principles themselves, to depend on general innate and self evident principles. What principle is requisite to prove that 1 and 1 are 2, that 2 and 2 are 4, that 3 times 2 are 6? Which, being known without any proof, do evince that either all knowledge does not depend on certain praecognita or general maxims called principles, or else that these are principles and if these are to be counted principles, a great part of numeration will be so to which, if we add all the self evident propositions which may be made about all our distinct ideas, principles will be almost infinite, at least innumerable, which men arrive to the knowledge of at different ages. And a great many of these innate principles they never come to know all their lives. But whether they come in view of the mind earlier or later, this is true of them. That they are all known by their native evidence, are wholly independent, receive no light, nor are capable of any proof one from another, much less the more particular from the more general, or the more simple from the more compounded, the more simple and less abstract, being the most familiar, and the easier and earlier apprehended. But whichever be the clearest ideas, the evidence and certainty of all such propositions is in this, that a man sees the same idea to be the same idea, and infallibly perceives two different ideas to be different ideas. For when a man has in his understanding the ideas of one and of two, the idea of yellow and the idea of blue, he cannot but certainly know that the idea of one is the idea of one and not the idea of two, and that the idea of yellow is the idea of yellow, and not the idea of blue. For a man cannot confound the ideas in his mind which he has distinct that would be to have them confused and distinct at the same time, which is a contradiction and to have none distinct is to have no use of our faculties, to have no knowledge at all. And therefore what idea soever is affirmed of itself, or whatsoever two entire distinct ideas are denied one of another, the mind cannot but assent to such a proposition as infallibly true, as soon as it understands the terms without hesitation or need of proof, or regarding those made in more general terms and called maxims. 11. What use these general maxims or axioms have what shall we then say? Are these general maxims of no use? By no means, though perhaps their use is not that which it is commonly taken to be. But since doubting in the least of what hath been by some men ascribed to these maxims, may be apt to be cried out against, as overturning the foundations of all the sciences, it may be worth while to consider them with respect to other parts of our knowledge, and examine more particularly to what purposes they serve, and to what not of no use to prove less general propositions, nor as foundations on consideration of which any science has been built. 1. It is evident from what has been already said, that they are of no use to prove or confirm less general self evident propositions. 2. It is as plain that they are not, nor have been the foundations whereon any science hath been built. There is, I know, a great deal of talk propagated from scholastic men of sciences, and the maxims on which they are built. But it has been my ill luck never to meet with any such sciences, much less any one built upon these two maxims. What is, is, and it is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be and I would be glad to be shown where any such science erected upon these or any other general axioms, is to be found, and should be obligated to any one who would lay before me the frame and system of any science so built on these, or any such like maxims, that could not be shown to stand as firm without any consideration of them. I ask whether these general maxims have not the same use in the study of divinity and in theological questions that they have in other sciences. They serve here too, to silence wranglers, and put an end to dispute. But I think that nobody will therefore say that the Christian religion is built upon these maxims, or that the knowledge we have of it is derived from these principles. It is from revelation we have received it and without revelation these maxims had never been able to help us to it. When we find out an idea by whose intervention we discover the connection of two others, this is a revelation from God to us by the voice of reason for we then come to know a truth that we did not know before. When God declares any truth to to us, this is a revelation to us by the voice of his Spirit, and we are advanced in our knowledge but in neither of these do we receive our light or knowledge from maxims but in the one the things themselves afford it, and we see the truth in them by perceiving their agreement or disagreement in the other, God himself affords it immediately to us, and we see the truth of of what he says in his unerring veracity. 3. Nor as helps in the discovery of yet unknown truths, they are not of use to help men forward in the advancement of sciences, or new discoveries of yet unknown truths. Mr. Newton, in his never enough to be admired book, has demonstrated several propositions which are so so many new truths before unknown to the world, and are further advances in mathematical knowledge. But for the discovery of these it was not the general maxims, what is, is, or the whole is bigger than a part, or the like, that helped him. These were not the clues that led him into the discovery of the truth and certainty of those propositions nor was it by them that he got the knowledge of those demonstrations but by finding out intermediate ideas that showed the agreement or disagreement of the ideas as expressed in the propositions he demonstrated. This is the greatest exercise and improvement of human understanding in the enlarging of knowledge and advancing the sciences, wherein they are far enough for from receiving any help from the contemplation of these or the like magnified maxims would those who have this traditional admiration of these propositions, that they think no step can be made in knowledge without the support of an axiom no stone laid in the building of the sciences without a general maxim. But distinguish between the method of acquiring knowledge and and of communicating it, between the method of raising any science and that of teaching it to others as far as it is advanced. They would see that those general maxims were not the foundations on which the first discoverers raised their admirable structures, nor the keys that unlocked and opened those secrets secrets of knowledge. Though afterwards, when schools were erected, and sciences had their professors to teach what others had found out, they often made use of maxims, that is, laid down certain propositions which were self evident, or to be received for true, which being settled in the minds of their scholars as unquestionable verities, they on occasion made use of to convince them of truths in particular instances that were not so familiar to their minds as those general axioms which had before been inculcated to them, and carefully settled in their minds though these particular instances, when well reflected on, are no less self evident to the understanding than the general maxims brought to confirm them. And it was in those particular instances that the first discoverer found the truth without the help of the general maxims. And so may anyone else do, who with attention considers them maxims of use in the exposition of what has been discovered and in silencing obstinate wranglers, to come therefore to the use that is made of maxims. 1. They are of use, as has been observed in the ordinary methods of teaching sciences, as far as they are advanced, but of little or none in advancing them further. 2. They are of use in disputes for the silencing of obstinate wranglers, and bringing those contests to some conclusion, whether a need of them to that end came not in the manner following, I crave leave to inquire. The schools, having made disputation the touchstone of men's abilities, and the criterion of knowledge, educated victory to him that kept the field and he that had the last word was concluded to have the better of the argument, if not of the cause but because by this means there was like to be no decision between skilful combatants Whilst one never fail'd of a medias terminus to prove any proposition, and the other could as constantly without, or with a distinction, deny the major or minor, to prevent as much as could be running out of disputes into an endless train of syllogisms, certain general propositions, most of them indeed self evident, were introduced into the schools, which, being such as all men allowed and agreed in, were looked on as general measures of truth, and served instead of principles, where the disputants had not lain down any other between them, beyond which there was no going, and which must not be receded from by either side. And thus these maxims, getting the name of principles, beyond which men in dispute could not retreat, were by mistake taken to be the originals and sources from whence all knowledge began, and the foundations whereon the sciences were built. Because when in their disputes they came to any of these, they stopped there, and went no further. The matter was determined. But how much this is a mistake hath already been shown, how maxims came to be so much in vogue. This method of the schools, which have been thought the fountains of knowledge, introduced, as, I suppose, the like use of these maxims, into a great part of conversation out of the schools, to stop the mouths of cavaliers, whom any one is excused from arguing any longer with, when they deny these general self evident principles received by all reasonable men who have once thought of them. But yet their use herein is but to put an end to wrangling. They in truth, when urged in such cases, teach nothing that is already done by the intermediate ideas made use of in the debate, whose connection may be seen without the the help of those maxims and so the truth known before the maxim is produced, and the argument brought to a first principle. Men would give off a wrong argument before it came to that, if in their disputes they proposed to themselves the finding and embracing of truth, and not a contest for victory. And thus maxims have their use to put a stop to their precious perverseness, whose ingenuity should have yielded sooner. But the method of the schools having allowed and encouraged men to oppose and resist evident truth till they are baffled, that is, till they are reduced to contradict themselves or some established principles, it is no wonder that they should not in civil conversation be ashamed of that which is in the schools is counted a virtue and a glory, viz. Obstinacy, to maintain that side of the question they have chosen, whether true or false, to the last extremity, even after conviction. A strange way to attain truth and knowledge. And that which I think the rational part of mankind, not corrupted by education, could scarce believe, should ever be admitted amongst the the lovers of truth and students of religion or nature, or introduced into the seminaries of those who are to propagate the truths of religion or philosophy amongst the ignorant and unconvinced how much such a way of learning is like to turn young men's minds from the sincere search and love of truth. Nay, and to make them doubt whether there is any such thing, or at least worth the adhering to, I shall not now inquire. This, I think, that baiting those places which brought the peripatetic philosophy into their schools, where it continued many ages, without teaching the world anything but the art of wrangling, these maxims were nowhere thought the foundations on which the sciences were built, nor the great helps to the advancement of knowledge of great use to stop wranglers in disputes, but of little use to the discovery of truths. As to these general maxims, therefore, they are, as I have said, of great use in disputes to stop the mouths of wranglers, but not of much use to the discovery of unknown truths, or to help the mind forwards in its search after knowledge. For who ever began to build his knowledge on this channel? General proposition. What is, is, or it is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be and from either of these as from a principle of science deduced a system of useful knowledge, wrong opinions, often involving contradictions, one of these maxims, as a touchstone, may serve well to show whither they lead. But yet, however fit to lay open the absurdity or mistake of a man's reasoning or opinion, they are of very little use for enlightening the understanding and it will not be found that the mind receives much help from them in its progress in knowledge, which would be neither less nor less certain were these two general propositions never thought on. It is true, as I have said, that they sometimes serve in argumentation to stop a wrangler's mouth by showing the absurdity of what he saith, and by exposing him to the shame of contradicting what all the world knows, and he himself cannot but own to be true. But it is one thing to show a man that he is in an error, and another to put him in possession of truth. And I would fain know what truths these two propositions are able to take, teach, and by their influence make us know which we did not know before, or could not know without them. Let us reason from them as well as we can. They are only about identical predications and influence, if any at all. None but such. Each particular proposition concerning identity or diversity is as clearly and certainly known in itself self, if attended to as either of these general ones. Only these general ones, as serving in all cases, are therefore more inculcated and insisted on. As to other less general maxims. Many of them are no more than bare verbal propositions, and teach us nothing but the respect and import of names, one to another. The whole is equal to all its parts. Parts. What real truth, I beseech you, does it teach us? What more is contained in that maxim than what the signification of the word totem or the whole does of itself import? And he that knows that the word whole stands for what is made up of all its parts, knows very little less than that. The whole is equal to all its parts, and upon the same ground. I think that this proposition, a hill is higher than a valley, and several the like may also pass for maxims. But yet masters of mathematicks, when they would, as teachers of what they know, initiate others in that science, do not without reason, place this and some other such maxims at the entrance of their systems, that their scholars, having in the beginning perfectly acquainted their thoughts with These propositions made in such general terms, may be used to make such reflections and have these more general propositions, as formed rules and sayings ready to apply to all particular cases. Not that if they be equally weighed, they are more clear and evident than the particular instances they are brought to confirm, but that being more familiar to the mind, the very naming them is enough to satisfy the understanding. But this, I say, is more from our custom of using them, and the establishment they have got in our minds by our often thinking of them than from the different evidence of the things. But before custom has settled methods of thinking and reasoning in our minds, I am apt to imagine it is quite otherwise and that the child, when a part of his apple is taken away, knows it better in that particular instance than by this general proposition. The whole is equal to all its parts and that if one of these have need to be confirmed to him by the other, the general has more need to be let into his mind by the particular than the particular by the general. For in particulars our knowledge begins, and so spreads itself by degrees to generals. Footnote this is the order in time of the conscious acquisition of knowledge that is human. The essay might be regarded as a commentary on this one sentence. Our intellectual progress is from particulars and involuntary recipiency through reactive doubt and criticism, into what is at last reasoned faith though afterwards the mind takes the quite contrary course, and having drawn its knowledge into as general propositions as it can, makes those familiar to to its thoughts, and accustoms itself to have recourse to them as to the standards of truth and falsehood. This is the philosophic attitude therein one consciously apprehends the intellectual necessities that were unconsciously presupposed its previous intellectual progress. In philosophy we draw our knowledge into as general practice propositions as it can be made to assume, and thus either learn to see it as an organic while in a speculative unity, or learn that it cannot be so seen in a finite intelligence, and that even at the last it must remain broken and mysterious in the human understanding by which familiar use of them as rules to measure the truth of of other propositions. It comes in time to be thought that more particular propositions have their truth and evidence from their conformity to these more general ones, which in discourse and argumentation are so frequently urged and constantly admitted. And this I think to be the reason why, amongst so many self evident propositions, the most general only have had the title of maxims. 12 maxims if care not be taken in the use of words may prove contradictions. One thing further, I think it may not be amiss to observe concerning these general maxims, that they are so far from improving or establishing our minds in true knowledge, that if our notions be wrong, loose, or unsteady, and we resign up our thoughts to the sound of words, rather than fix them on settled determined ideas of things. I say these general maxims will serve to confirm us in mistakes, and in such a way of use of words which is most common, will serve to prove contradictions. Vg. He that with Descartes shall frame in his mind an idea of what he calls body to be nothing but extension, may easily demonstrate that there is no vacuum, that is no space void of body. By this maxim what is is for the idea to which he annexes the name body, being bare exterior extension, his knowledge that space cannot be without body is certain, for he knows his own idea of extension clearly and distinctly, and knows that it is what it is, and not another idea, though it be called by these three names, extension, body, space, which three words standing for one and the same same idea, may no doubt, with the same evidence and certainty be affirmed one of another as each of itself. And it is as certain that whilst I use them all to stand for one and the same idea, this predication is as true and identical in its signification that space is body, as this prediction predication is true and identical, that body is body, both in signification and sound, 13 instance in vacuum. But if another should come and make to himself another idea different from Descartes, of the thing which yet with Descartes he calls by the same name body, and make his idea which he expresses by the word body, to be of a thing that hath both extension and solidity together, he will as easily demonstrate that there may be a vacuum or space without a body, as Descartes demonstrated the contrary. Because the idea to which he gives the name space, being barely the simple one of extension, and the idea to which he gives the name body, being the complex idea of extension and resistibility, or solidity together in the same subject, these two ideas are not exactly one and the same, but in the understanding as distinct as the ideas of one and two, white and black, or as of corporeity and humanity, if I may use those barbarous terms. And therefore the predication of them in our minds, or in words standing for them, is not identical, but the negation of them, one of another, viz. This proposition, extension, or space, is not body, is as true and evidently certain as this maxim. It is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be can make any proposition, but they prove not the existence of things without us. But yet, though both these propositions, as you see, may be equally demonstrated, viz. That there may be a vacuum, and that there cannot be a vacuum, by these two certain principles, viz. What is, is, and the same thing cannot be and not be, yet neither of these principles will serve to prove to us that any or what bodies do exist, for that we are left to our senses to discover to us as far as they can those universal and self evident principles, being only our constant, clear and distinct, distinct knowledge of our own ideas more general or comprehensive, can assure us of nothing that passes without the mind. Their certainty is founded only upon the knowledge we have of each idea by itself, and of its distinction from others, about which we cannot be mistaken whilst they are in our minds, though we may be and often are mistaken when we retain the names without out the ideas, or use them confusedly, sometimes for one, and sometimes for another idea, in which cases the force of these axioms, reaching only to the sound, and not the signification of the words, serves only to lead us into confusion, mistake, and error. It is to show men that these maxims, however cried up for the great guards of truth, will not secure them from error in a careless loose use of their words, that I have made this remark. In all that is here suggested concerning their little use for the improvement of knowledge, or dangerous use in undetermined ideas, I have been far enough from saying or intending they should be laid aside, as some have been too forward to charge me. I affirm them to be truths, self evident truths, and so cannot be laid aside as far as their influence will reach. It is in vain to endeavour, nor will I attempt to abridge it. But yet without any injury to truth or knowledge, I may have reason to think their use is not answerable to the great stress which seems to be laid on them and I may warn men not to make an ill use of them for the confirming themselves in errors. 15. They cannot add to our knowledge of substances, and their application to complex ideas is dangerous. But let them be of what use they will in verbal propositions they cannot discover or prove to us the least knowledge of the nature of substances as they are found, and exist without us any further than grounded on experience. And though the consequence of these two propositions called principles be very clear, and their use not dangerous or harmful, in the probation of such things, wherein there is no need at all of them for proof, but such as are clear by themselves without them, viz. Where our ideas are determined and known by the names that stand for them. Yet when these principles, viz. What is, is, and it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be, are made use of in the probation of propositions, wherein are words standing for complex ideas. VG man, horse, gold, virtue, there they are of infinite danger, and most commonly make men receive and retain falsehood for manifest truth and uncertainty for demonstration upon which follow error, obstinacy, and all the mischiefs that can happen to from wrong reasoning the reason whereof is not that these principles are less true, or of less force in proving propositions made of terms standing for complex ideas, than where the propositions are about simple ideas but because men mistake generally thinking that where the same terms are preserved, the propositions are about the same things, though the ideas they stand for are in truth different. Therefore these maxims are made use of to support those which in sound and appearance are contradictory propositions, and is clear in the demonstrations above mentioned about a vacuum so that whilst men take words for things as usually they do, these maxims may and do commonly serve to prove contradictory propositions, as shall yet be further made manifest.
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Narrator (Librivox Reading - John Locke)
16.
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Narrator (Grainger Advertisement)
Instance in demonstrations about man which can only be verbal, for instance, let man be that concerning which you would by these first principles demonstrate anything and we shall see that so far as demonstration is by these principles it is only verbal, and gives us no certain universal true proposition or knowledge of any being existing without us. First. A child having framed the idea of a man, it is probable that his idea is just like that picture which the painter makes of the visible appearances joined together and such a complication of ideas together in his understanding makes up the single complex idea which he calls man, whereof white or flesh color in England being one, the child can demonstrate to you that a Negro is not a man, because white color was one of the constant simple ideas of the complex idea he calls man and therefore he can demonstrate by the principle it is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be, that a Negro is not a man, the foundation of his certainty being not that universal proposition which perhaps he never heard nor thought of, but the clear distinct perception he hath of his own simple ideas of black and white, which he cannot be persuaded to take, nor can ever mistake one for another, whether he knows that maxim or no. And to this child, or anyone who hath such an idea which he calls man, can you never demonstrate that a man hath a soul, because his idea of man includes no such notion or idea in it? And therefore to him the principle of what is is proves not this matter, but it depends upon collection and observation by which he is to make his complex idea called man? 17. Another instance, secondly another, that hath gone further in framing and collecting the idea he calls man, and to the outward shape adds laughter and rational discourse may demonstrate that infants and changelings are no men by this maxim it is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be and I have discoursed with very rational men, who have actually denied that they are men. 18. A third instance, thirdly, perhaps another, makes up the complex idea which he calls man only out of the ideas of body in general, and the powers of language and reason, and leaves out the shape wholly this man is able to demonstrate that a man may have no hands, but be quadrupeds, neither of those being included in his idea of man, and in whatever body or shape he found speech and reason joined, that was a man because having a clear knowledge of such a complex idea, it is certain that what is is.
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Narrator (McDonald's Advertisement)
19.
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Narrator (Grainger Advertisement)
Little use of these maxims improves where we have clear and distinct ideas, so that if rightly considered, I think we may say that where our ideas are determined in our minds, and have annexed to them by us known and steady names, under those settled determinations, there is little need or no use at all of these maxims to prove the agreement or disagreement of any of them. He that cannot discern the truth or falsehood of such propositions without the help of these and the like maxims will not be helped by these maxims to do it, since he cannot be supposed to know the truth of these maxims themselves without proof, if he cannot know the truth of others without proof, which are as self evident as these. Upon this ground it is that intuitive knowledge neither requires nor admits any proof one part of it more than another. He that will suppose it does, takes away the foundation of all knowledge and certainty and he that needs any proof to make him certain, and give his assent to this proposition, that 2 are equal to 2, will also have need of a proof to make him admit that what is is he that needs a probation to convince him that two are not three, that white is not black, that a triangle is not a circle, etc. Or any other two determined distinct ideas are not one and the same will need also a demonstration to convince him that it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be. 20. Their use dangerous where our ideas are not determined and as these maxims are of little use where we have determined ideas, so they are, as I have showed, of dangerous use where our ideas are not determined, and where we use words that are not annexed to determined ideas, but such as are of a loose and wandering signification, sometimes standing for one, and sometimes for another idea, from which follow mistake and error, which these maxims brought as proofs to establish propositions, wherein the terms stand for undetermined ideas, do by their authority confirm and rivet. End of section 8. Recording by Jennifer Henry.
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Narrator (Librivox Reading - John Locke)
Section 9 of an essay Concerning Humane Understanding by John Locke, Book four of knowledge and Probability. This is a Librivox recording. All Librivox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit Librivox.org Chapter 8 of Trifling Propositions 1. Some propositions bring no increase to our knowledge. Whether the maxims treated of in the foregoing chapter be of that use to real knowledge, as is generally supposed, I leave to be considered. This, I think, may confidently be affirmed that there are universal propositions, which, though they be certainly true, yet they add no light to our understanding, bring no increase to our knowledge. Such are two as first identical propositions, first all purely identical propositions. These obviously, and at first blush, appear to contain no instructions in them for when we affirm the said term of itself, whether it be barely verbal, or whether it contains any clear and real idea, it shows us nothing but what we must certainly know before whether such a proposition be either made by, or proposed to us. Indeed, that most general one what is is may serve sometimes to show a man the absurdity he is guilty of, when, by circumlocution or equivocal terms, he would in particular instances deny the same thing of itself because nobody will so openly bid defiance to common sense as to affirm visible and direct contradictions in plain words. Or if he does, a man is excused if he breaks off any further discourse with him. But yet I think I may say, that neither that received maxim, nor any other identical proposition teaches us anything and though in such kind of propositions this great and magnified maxim, boasted to be the foundation of demonstration, may be, and often is made use of to confirm them, yet all it proves amounts to no more than this, that the same word may with great certainty be affirmed of itself self, without any doubt of the truth of any such proposition. And let me add also without any real knowledge. Three examples. For at this rate, any very ignorant person who can but make a proposition, and knows what he means when he says aye or no, may make a million of propositions of whose truth he may be infallibly certain, and yet not know one thing in the world thereby. For instance, what is a soul is a soul, or a soul is a soul, a spirit is a spirit, a fetish is a fetish, etc. These all being equivalent to this proposition, namely, what is is, for instance, what hath existence hath existence, or who hath a soul hath hath a soul. What is this more than trifling with words, it is but like a monkey shifting his oyster from one hand to the other, and had he but words might no doubt have said, oyster in right hand is subject, and oyster in left hand is predicate, and so might have made a self evident proposition of oyster, for instance, oyster is oyster, and yet with all this not have been one whit the wiser, or more knowing and that way of handling the matter would much at one have satisfied the monkey's hunger or a man's understanding, and they would have improved in knowledge and bulk together. For secondly, propositions in which a part of any complex idea is predicated of the whole two. Another sort of trifling propositions is when a part of the complex idea is predicated of the name of the whole, a part of the definition of the word defined. Such are all propositions wherein the genus is predicated of the species, or more comprehensive of less comprehensive terms. For what information, what knowledge carries this proposition in it? Namely, Lead is a metal. To a man who knows the complex idea, the name lead stands for all the simple ideas that go to the complex one signified by the term metal, being nothing but what he before comprehended, and signified by the name lead. Indeed, to a man that knows the signification of the word metal, and not of the word lead, it is a shorter way to explain the signification of the word lead, by saying it is a metal which at once expresses several of its simple ideas, than to enumerate them one by one, telling him it is a body very heavy, fusible, and malleable. 5. As part of the definition of the term defined alike trifling it is to predicate any other part of the definition of the term defined, or to affirm any one of the simple ideas of a complex one of the name of the whole complex idea, as all gold is fusible for fusibility being one of the simple ideas that goes to the making up the complex one the sound gold stands for. What can it be but playing with sounds to affirm that of the name gold which is comprehended in its received signification, it would be thought little better than ridiculous to affirm gravely as a truth of moment, that gold is yellow. And I see not how it is any jot more material to say it is fusible, unless that quality be left out of the complex idea of which the sound gold is the mark in ordinary speech. What instruction can it carry with it to tell one that which he hath been told already? Or is he supposed to know before? For I am supposed to know the signification of the word another uses to me, or else he is to tell me, and if I know that the name gold stands for this complex idea of body, yellow, heavy, fusible, malleable. It will not much instruct me to put it solemnly afterwards in a proposition, and gravely say, all gold is fusible. Such propositions can only serve to show the disingenuity of one who will go from the definition of his own terms by reminding him sometimes of it, but carry no knowledge with them but of the signification of words, however certain they may be. 6. Instance, man and Palfrey. Every man is an animal or living body is as certain a proposition as can be but no more conducing to the knowledge of things than to say, a palfrey is an ambling horse, or a neighing ambling animal, both being only about the signification of words, and make me know but this that body, sense, and motion, or power of sensation and moving, are three of those ideas that I always comprehend and signify by the word man and when they are not to be found together, the name man belongs not to that thing, and so of the other, that body, sense, and a certain way of going, with a certain kind of voice, are some of those ideas which I always comprehend and signify by the word palfrey and when they are not to be found together, the name palfrey belongs not to that thing. It is just the same, and to the same purpose, when any term standing for any one or more of the simple ideas that altogether make up that complex idea which is called man, is affirmed by the term man. For instance, suppose a Roman signified by the word homo, all these distinct ideas united in one subject, corporiatis sensibilitas potentia, si movendi rationalitis risibilitas. He might no doubt with great certainty universally affirm one more or all of these together of the word homo, but did no more than say that the word homo in his country comprehended in its signification all these ideas, much like a Romance knight, who by the word palfrey signified these ideas. Body of a certain figure, four legged, with sense, motion, ambling, neighing, wight, used to have a woman on his back, might with the same certainty universally affirm also any or all of these of the word palfrey, but did thereby teach no more but that the word palfrey in his or Romance language stood for all these, and was not to be applied to anything where any of these was wanting. But he that shall tell me that in whatever thing, sense, motion, reason, and laughter were united, that thing had actually a notion of God, or would be cast into a sleep by opium made indeed an instructive proposition because neither having the notion of God, nor being cast into sleep by opium, being contained in the idea signified by the word man, we are by such propositions taught something more than barely what the word man stands for, and therefore the knowledge contained in it is more than verbal. 7. For this teaches but the signification of words. Before a man makes any proposition, he is supposed to understand the terms he uses in it or else he talks like a parrot, only making a noise by imitation and framing certain sounds which he has learnt of others, but not as a rational creature, using them for signs of ideas which he has in his mind. The hearer also is supposed to understand the terms as the speaker uses them or else he talks jargon, and makes an unintelligible noise, and therefore he trifles with words. Who makes such a proposition, which, when it is made, contains no more than one of the terms does and which a man was supposed to know before for instance, a triangle hath three sides, or saffron is yellow, and this is no further tolerable than where a man goes to explain his terms to one who is supposed or declares himself not to understand him, and then it teaches only the signification of that word and and the use of that sign, 8 but adds no real knowledge. We can know then the truth of two sorts of propositions with perfect certainty. The one is of those trifling propositions which have a certainty in them, but it is only a verbal certainty, but not instructive and secondly, we can know the truth, and so may be certain in propositions which affirms something of another, which is a necessary consequence of its precise complex idea, but not contain'd in it, as that the external angle of all triangles is bigger than either of the opposite internal angles, which relation of the outward angle to either of the opposite internal angles, making no part of the complex idea signified by the name triangle triangle. This is a real truth, and conveys with it instructive real knowledge. 9. General propositions concerning substances are often trifling. We have little or no knowledge of what combinations there be of simple ideas existing together in substances but by our senses we cannot make any universal certain propositions concerning them any further than our nominal essences lead us, which being to a very few and inconsiderable truths in respect of those which depend on their real constitutions. The general propositions that are made about substances, if they are certain, are for the most part but trifling and if they are instructive, are uncertain and such as we can have no knowledge of their real truth, how much soever, constant observation and analogy may assist our judgment in guessing. Hence it comes to pass that one may often meet with very clear and coherent discourses that amount yet to nothing. For it is plain that names of substantial beings, as well as others, as far as they have relative significations affixed to them, may with great truth be joined negatively and affirmatively in propositions, as their relative definitions make them fit to be so joined. And propositions consisting of such terms may with the same clearness be deduced one from another as those that convey the most real truths. And all this without any knowledge of the nature or reality of things existing without us. By this method one may make demonstrations and undoubted prospects propositions in words, and yet thereby advance not one jot in the knowledge of the truth of things. For instance, he that, having learnt these following words, with their ordinary mutual relative acceptations annexed to them for instance, substance, man, animal, form, soul, vegetative, sensitive, rational, may make several undoubted propositions about the soul, without knowing at all what the soul really is. And of this sort a man may find an infinite number of propositions, reasonings, and conclusions in books of metaphysics, school, divinity, and some sort of natural philosophy and after all, know as little of God, spirits, or bodies as he did before he set out. 10. And why he that hath liberty to define, for instance, to determine the signification of his names of substances, as certainly every one does in effect, who makes them stand for his own ideas, and makes their significations at a venture, taking them from his own or other men's fancies, and not from an examination or inquiry into the nature of things, themselves may with little trouble demonstrate them one of another, according to those several respects and mutual relations he has given them one to another wherein, however things agree or disagree in their own nature, he needs mind nothing but his own notions with the names he hath bestowed upon them all. But thereby no more increases his own knowledge than he does his riches. Who, taking a bag of counters, calls one in a certain place a pound, another in another place a shilling, and a third in a third place a penny, and so proceeding, may undoubtedly reckon right and cast up a great sum according to his counter, so placed, and standing for more or less as he pleases, without being one jot the richer, or without even knowing how much a pound, shilling, or penny is, but only that one is contained in the other 20 times, and contains the other 12. Which a man may also do in the signification of words, by making them in respect of one another more or less or equally comprehensive. 11. Thirdly, using words variously is trifling with them though yet concerning most words used in discourses equally argumentative and controversial, there is this more to be complained of, which is the worst sort of trifling, and which sets us yet further from the certainty of knowledge we hope to attain by them, or find in them namely, that most writers are so far from instructing us in the nature and knowledge of things things, that they use their words loosely and uncertainly, and do not, by using them constantly and steadily in the same significations, make plain and clear deductions of words one from another, and make their discourses coherent and clear. How little soever they were instructive, which were not difficult to do, did they not find it convenient to shelter their ignorance or obstinacy under the obscurity and perplexedness of their terms, to which perhaps inadvertency and ill custom do in many men much contribute? 12. Marks of verbal propositions first predication in abstract to conclude, barely verbal propositions may be known by these following marks. First, all propositions wherein two abstract terms are affirmed one of another, are barely about the signification of sounds. For since no abstract idea can be the same with any other but itself, when its abstract name is affirmed of any other term, it can signify no more but this, that it may or ought to be called by that name or that these two names signify the same idea. Thus should any one say that parsimony is frugality, that gratitude is justice, that this or that action is or is not temperate, however specious these and the like propositions may at first sight seem, yet when we come to press them and examine nicely what they contain, we shall find that it all amounts to nothing but the signification of those terms terms. 13. Secondly, a part of the definition predicated of any term. Secondly, all propositions wherein a part of the complex idea which any term stands for is predicated of that term, are only verbal. For instance, to say that gold is a metal or heavy and thus all propositions wherein more comprehensive words, called genera, are affirmed, of subordinate or less comprehensive, called species or individuals, are barely verbal. When by these two rules we have examined the propositions that make up the discourses we ordinarily meet with, both in and out of books, we shall perhaps find that a greater part of them than is usually suspected are purely about the signification of words, and contain nothing in them but the use and application of these signs. This I think I may lay down for an infallible rule that wherever the distinct idea any word stands for, is not known and considered, and something not contained in the idea, is not affirmed or denied of it. There our thoughts stick home wholly in sounds, and are able to attain no real truth or falsehood. This, perhaps, if well heeded, might save us a great deal of useless amusement and dispute, and very much shorten our trouble in wandering in search of real and true knowledge. End of Section.
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Section 10 of an essay Concerning Human Understanding by John Locke, Book four of Knowledge and Probability.
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This is a Librivox recording.
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All Librivox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please
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visit Librivox.org Chapter 9 of our Threefold Knowledge of Existence 1. General Propositions that are certain concern not existence.
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Hitherto we have only considered the essences
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of things, which, being only abstract ideas, and thereby removed in our thoughts from particular existence that being the proper operation of the mind in abstraction to consider
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an idea under no other existence but
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what it has in the understandings, gives us no knowledge of real existence at all. Where, by the way, we may take notice that universal propositions, of whose truth or falsehood we can have certain knowledge, concern not existence and further, that all
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particular affirmations or negations that would not be certain if they were made general,
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are only concerning existence, they declaring only the accidental union or separation of ideas in things existing, which in their abstract natures have no known necessary union or repugnancy. 2. A threefold knowledge of existence. But leaving the nature of propositions, and different ways of predication to be considered more at large in another place, let us proceed now to inquire consider concerning our knowledge of the existence of things,
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and how we come by it.
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I say, then, that we have the
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knowledge of our own existence by intuition,
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of the existence of God, by demonstration,
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and of other things by sensation.
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3.
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Our knowledge of our own existence is intuitive. As for our own existence, we perceive it so plainly, and so certainly, that it neither needs nor is capable of any proof for nothing can be more evident to us than our own existence. I think I reason I feel pleasure and pain. Can any of these be more evident to me than my own existence? If I doubt all other things, that
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very doubt makes me perceive my own
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existence, and will not suffer me to doubt of that. For if I know I feel pain, it is evident that I have as certain perception of my own existence as the existence of the pain I feel
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or, if I know, I doubt I
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have as certain perception of the existence of the thing doubting as of that thought which I call doubt. Experience then convinces us that we have an intuitive knowledge of our own existence, and an internal infallible perception that we are in every act of sensation, reasoning, or thinking.
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We are conscious to ourselves of our
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own being, and in this matter come not short of the highest degree of certainty. End of section 10.
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Section 11 of an essay Concerning Human Understanding by By John Locke Book four of Knowledge and Probability this is a Librivox recording. All Librivox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit Librivox.org Recording by Matthew Bennett Chapter 10 of Our Knowledge of the Existence of a God 1. We are capable of knowing certainly that there is a God. Though God has given us no innate ideas of himself, though he has stamped no original characters on our minds, wherein we may read his being, yet having furnished us with those faculties our minds are endowed with, he hath not left himself without witness, since we have sense, perception, and reason, and cannot want a clear proof of him, as long as we carry ourselves about us us. Nor can we justly complain of our ignorance in this great point, since he has so plentifully provided us with the means to discover and know him so far as is necessary to the end of our being, and the great concernment of our happiness. But though this be the most obvious truth that reason discovers, and though its evidence be, if I mistake, not equal to mathematical certainty, yet it requires thought and attention, and the mind must apply itself to a regular deduction of it from some part of our intuitive knowledge, or else we shall be as uncertain and ignorant of this as of other propositions, which are in themselves capable of clear demonstration. To show, therefore, that we are capable of knowing, that is, being certain that there is a God, and how we may come by this certain certainty, I think we need go no further than ourselves, and that undoubted knowledge we have of our own existence. 2. For man knows that he himself exists. I think it is beyond question that man has a clear idea of his own being he knows certainly he exists, and that he is something. He that can doubt whether he be anything or no, I speak not to no more than I would argue with pure nothing, or endeavour to convince nonentity that it were something. If any one pretends to be so sceptical as to deny his own existence, for really to doubt of it is manifestly impossible, let him for me enjoy his beloved happiness of being nothing, until hunger or some other pain convince him of the contrary. This then I think I may take for a truth which every one's certain knowledge assures him of beyond the liberty of doubting, viz. That he is something that actually exists. 3 He knows also that nothing cannot produce a being therefore something must have existed from eternity. In the next place man knows by an intuitive certainty that bare nothing can no more produce any real being being than it can be equal to two right angles. If a man knows not that nonentity or the absence of all being cannot be equal to two right angles, it is impossible that he should know any demonstration in Euclid. If, therefore, we know there is some real being, and that nonentity cannot produce any real being, it is an evident demonstration that from eternity there has been something since what was not from eternity had a beginning, and what had a beginning must be produced by Something Else. 4 and that eternal being must be most powerful. Next it is evident that what had its being and beginning from another, must also have all that which is in and belongs to its being from another too all the powers it has must be owing to and received from the same source. This eternal source, then of all being must also be the source and original of all power and so this eternal being must be also the most powerful. Five and most knowing. Again a man finds in himself perception and knowledge. We have then got one step further, and we are certain now that there is not only some being, but some knowing intelligent being in the world. There was a time then when there was no knowing being, and when knowledge began to be or else there has been also a knowing being from eternity.
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If it be said there was a
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time when no being had any knowledge, when that eternal being was void of all understanding, I reply that then it was impossible there should ever have been any knowledge knowledge it being as impossible that things wholly void of knowledge, and operating blindly and without any perception, should produce a knowing being as it is impossible that a triangle should make itself three angles bigger than two right ones. For it is as repugnant to the idea of senseless matter that it should put into itself sense perception and knowledge, as it is repugnant to the idea of a triangle will that it should put into itself greater angles than two right ones. 6 and therefore God thus from the consideration of ourselves and what we infallibly find in our own constitutions, our reason leads us to the knowledge of this certain and evident truth that there is an eternal, most powerful, and most knowing being, which, whether anyone will please to call God, it matters not. The thing is evident, and from this idea duly considered, will easily be deduced all those other attributes which we ought to ascribe to this eternal being. If, nevertheless, anyone should be found so senselessly arrogant as to suppose man alone knowing and wise, but yet the product of mere ignorance and chance, and that all the rest of the universe acted only by that blind haphazard, I shall leave him with that very rational and emphatical rebuke of Tully, to be considered at his leisure. What can be more sillily arrogant and misbecoming than for a man to think that he has a mind and understanding in him, but yet in all the universe beside there is no such thing. Or that those things which with the utmost stretch of his reason he can scarce comprehend, should be moved and managed without any reason at all? Quid est inim varius quam neminem esse operere tam stulte arrogantem ut incilementem et rationem putet in esse in cuelo mundo che non putet aut ea quoi vi summa ingeni rationi comprehendat nulla rationi muveri putet. From what has been said, it is plain to me we have a more certain knowledge, knowledge of the existence of a God, than of anything our senses have not immediately discovered to us. Nay, I presume I may say that we more certainly know that there is a God than that there is anything else without us. When I say we know, I mean there is such a knowledge within our reach, which we cannot miss, if we will but apply our minds to that, as we do to several other inquiries. 7. Our idea of a most perfect being, not the sole proof of a God. How far the idea of a most perfect being which a man may frame in his mind, does or does not prove the existence of a God, I will not here examine. For in the different make of men's tempers and application of their thoughts, some arguments prevail more on one, and some on another for the confirmation of the same truth. But yet I think this I may say that it is an ill way of establishing this truth and silencing atheists to lay the whole stress of so important a point as this upon that sole foundation. And take some men's having that idea of God in their minds, for it is evident some men have none, and some worse than none, and the most very different. For the only proof of a deity, and out of an over fondness of that darling invention cashier, or at least endeavour to invalidate all other arguments, and forbid us to hearken to those proofs as being weak or fallacious which our own existence and the sensible parts of the universe offer so clearly and cogently to our thoughts, that I deem it impossible for a considering man to withstand them. For I judge it as certain and clear a truth as can anywhere be delivered, that the invisible things of God are clearly seen from the creation of the world, being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal power and Godhead, though our own being furnishes us, as I have shown, with an evident and incontestable proof of a deity and I believe nobody can avoid the cogency of it, who will but as carefully attend to it as to any other demonstration of so many parts yet this being so fundamental a truth, and of that consequence, that all religion and genuine morality depend thereon, I doubt not but I shall be forgiven by my reader if I go over some parts of this argument again, and enlarge a little more upon them. 8. Recapitulation Something from eternity. There is no truth more evident than that something must be from eternity. I never yet heard of any one so unreasonable, or that could suppose so manifest a contradiction as a time wherein there was perfectly nothing. This being of all absurdities the greatest to imagine that pure nothing, the perfect negation and absence of all beings, should ever produce any real existence, it being then unavoidable for all rational creatures to conclude that something has existed from eternity. Let us next see what kind of thing that must be. 9. Two sorts of Beings Cogitative and incogitative. There are but two sorts of beings in the world that man knows or conceives. First, such as are purely material, without sense perception, or thought, as the clippings of our beards and parings of our nails. Secondly, sensible thinking, perceiving beings such as we find ourselves to be, which, if you please, we will hereafter call cogitative and incogitative beings, which to our present purpose if for nothing else, are perhaps better terms than material and immaterial. 10. Incogitative being cannot produce a cogitative being. If then there must be something eternal, let us see what sort of being it must be. And to that it is very obvious to reason that it must necessarily be a cogitative being for it is as impossible to conceive that ever bare incognito cogitative matter should produce a thinking intelligent being, as that nothing should of itself produce matter. Let us suppose any parcel of matter eternal, great or small, we shall find it in itself able to produce nothing. For example, let us suppose the matter of the next pebble we meet with Eternal, closely united, and the parts firmly at rest. If there were no other being in the world, must it it not eternally remain so, a dead, inactive lump? Is it possible to conceive it can add motion to itself, being purely matter, or produce anything? Matter, then, by its own strength, cannot produce in itself so much as motion. The motion it has must also be from eternity, or else be produced and added to matter by some other being more powerful than matter. Matter, as is evident, having not power to produce motion in itself. But let us suppose motion eternal too. Yet matter in cogitative matter and motion, whatever changes it might produce of figure and bulk, could never produce thought. Knowledge will still be as far beyond the power of motion and matter to produce, as matter is beyond the power of nothing or nonentity to produce. Produce, and I appeal to every one's own thoughts, whether he cannot as easily conceive matter produced by nothing as thought to be produced by pure matter, when before there was no such thing as thought, or an intelligent being existing. Divide matter into as many parts as you will, which we are apt to imagine a sort of spiritualizing or making a thinking thing of it. Vary the figure and motion of it as much as you please. A globe, cube, cone, prism, cylinder, etc. Whose diameters are but 100,000th part of a GRY. Will operate no otherwise upon other bodies of proportional bulk than those of an inch or foot diameter. And you may as rationally expect to produce sense thought and knowledge by putting together in a certain figure and motion gross particles of matter, as by those that are the very minutest that do anywhere exist, they knock, impel, and resist one another, just as the greater do. And that is all they can do. So that if we will suppose nothing first or eternal, matter can never begin to be if we suppose bare matter without motion, eternal motion can never begin to be. If we suppose only matter and motion first, or eternal thought can never begin to be. For it is impossible to conceive that matter, either with or without motion, could have originally in and from itself, sense perception and knowledge, as is evident from hence, that then sense perception and knowledge must be a property eternally inseparable from matter and every particle of it. Not to add that though our general or specific conception of of matter makes us speak of it as one thing, yet really all matter is not one individual thing. Neither is there any such thing existing as one material being, or one single body that we know or can conceive. And therefore, if matter were the eternal first cogitative being, there would not be one eternal infinite cogitative being, but an infinite number of eternal finite cogitative beings, independent one of another, of limited force and distinct thoughts, which could never produce that order, harmony, and beauty which are to be found in nature. Since therefore whatsoever is the first eternal being must necessarily be cogitative, and whatsoever is first of all things must necessarily contain in it, and actually have at least all the perfections that can ever after exist nor can it ever give to another any perfection that it hath not, either actually in itself, or at least in a higher degree, it necessarily follows that the first eternal being cannot be matter. 11. Therefore there has been an eternal wisdom. If, therefore it be evident that some something necessarily must exist from eternity, it is also as evident that that something must necessarily be a cogitative being. For it is as impossible that incogitative matter should produce a cogitative being, as that nothing or the negation of all being should produce a positive being or matter. 12. The attributes of the Eternal Cogitative Being Though this discovery of the necessary existence of a eternal mind does sufficiently lead us into the knowledge of God, since it will hence follow that all other knowing beings that have a beginning must depend on him, and have in other ways of knowledge or extent of power than what he gives them and therefore if he made those, he made all the less excellent pieces of this universe, all inanimate beings, whereby his omniscience, power, and providence will be established, and all his other attributes necessarily follow. Yet to clear this up a little further, we will see what doubt can be raised against it. 13. Whether the eternal mind may be also material or no. First, perhaps it will be said that though it be as clear as demonstration can make it that there must be an eternal being, and that being must also be knowing, yet it does not follow but that thinking being may also be material let it be so it equally still follows that there is a God, for there be an eternal, omniscient, omnipotent being. It is certain that there is a God, whether you imagine that being to be material or no. But herein, I suppose, suppose lies the danger and deceit of that supposition. There being no way to avoid the demonstration that there is an eternal knowing being. Men devoted to matter would willingly have it granted that that knowing being is material, and then letting slide out of their minds or the discourse, the demonstration whereby an eternal knowing being was proved necessarily to exist, would argue all to be matter matter, and so deny a God that is an eternal cogitative being, whereby they are so far from establishing that they destroy their own hypothesis. For if there can be, in their opinion, eternal matter without any eternal cogitative being, they manifestly separate matter and thinking, and suppose no necessary connexion of the one with the other, and so establish the necessity of an eternal spirit, but not of matter, since it has been proved already that an eternal cogitative being is unavoidably to be granted. Now, if thinking and matter may be separated, the eternal existence of matter will not follow from the eternal existence of a cogitative being, and they suppose it to no purpose. 14. Not material first, because each particle of matter is not cogitative but now let us see how they can satisfy themselves or others that this eternal thinking being is material. 1. I would ask them whether they imagine that all matter, every particle of matter, thinks this I suppose they will scarce say, since there would be as many eternal thinking beings as there are particles, particles of matter, and so an infinity of gods. And yet if they will not allow matter as matter, that is every particle of matter to be as well cogitative as extended, they will have as hard a task to make out to their own reasons a cogitative being out of incogitative particles, as an extended being out of unextended parts, if I may so speak. 15 2. Secondly, because one particle alone of matter cannot be cogitative if all matter does not think, I next ask whether it be only one atom that does so. This has as many absurdities as the other. For then this atom of matter must be alone, eternal or not. If this alone be eternal, then this alone by its powerful thought or will, made all the rest of matter. And so we have the creation of matter by a powerful thought, which is that the materialists stick at for if they suppose one single thinking atom to have produced all the rest of matter, they cannot ascribe that pre eminency to it upon any other account than that of its thinking, the only supposed difference but allow it to be by some other way which is above our conception, it must still be creation. And these men must give up their great maxim, ex nihilo nil fit. If it be said that all the rest of matter is equally eternal as that thinking atom, it will be to say anything at pleasure, though ever so absurd for to suppose all matter eternal, and yet one small particle in knowledge and power infinitely above all the rest, is without any the least appearance of reason to frame an hypothesis. Every particle of matter as matter is
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capable of all the same figures and
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motions of any other and I challenge anyone in his thoughts to add anything else to one above another. 16 3. Thirdly, because a system of incogitative matter cannot be cogitative, if then neither one particular atom alone can be this eternal thinking being, nor all matter as matter, that is, every particle of matter can be only remains that it is some certain system of matter duly put together, that is this thinking eternal being. This is that which I imagine, is that notion which men are aptest to have of God, who would have him a material material being, as most readily suggested to them by the ordinary conceit they have of themselves and other men, which they take to be material thinking beings. But this imagination, however more natural, is no less absurd than the other. For to suppose the eternal thinking being to be nothing else but a composition of particles of matter, each whereof is incogitative, is to ascribe all the wisdom and knowledge of that eternal being only to the juxtaposition of parts, than which nothing can be more absurd. For unthinking particles of matter, however put together, can have nothing thereby added to them but a new relation of position, which it is impossible should give thought and knowledge to them. 17. And whether this corporeal system is in motion or at rest but further, this corporeal system either has all its parts at rest, or it is a certain motion of the parts wherein its thinking consists. If it be perfectly at rest, it is but one lump, and so can have no privileges above one atom, if it be the motion of its parts on which its thinking depends. All the thoughts there must be unavoidably accidental and limited, since all the particles that by motion cause thought, being each of them in itself without any thought, cannot regulate its own motions, much less be regulated by the thought of the whole, since that thought is not the cause of motion for then it must be antecedent to it, and so without it, but the consequence of it, whereby freedom, power, choice, and all rational and wise thinking or acting will be quite taken away, so that such a thinking being will be no better nor wiser than pure blind matter since to resolve all into the accidental unguided motions of blind matter, or into thought depending on unguided motions of blind matter, is the same thing not to mention the narrowness of such thoughts and knowledge that must depend on the motion of such parts. But there needs no innumerable enumeration of any more absurdities and impossibilities in this hypothesis, however full of them it may be, than that before mentioned since let this thinking system be all or a part of the matter of the universe, it is Impossible that any one particle should either know its own, or the motion of any other particle, or the whole, know the motion of every particle, and so regulate its own thoughts or motions.
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Motions.
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Or indeed have any thought resulting from such motion. 18. Matter not coeternal with an eternal mind. Secondly, others would have matter to be eternal, notwithstanding that they allow an eternal cogitative, immaterial being. This, though it not take away the being of a God, yet since it denies one and the first great piece of his workmanship, the creation, let us consider it a little. Matter must be allowed eternal. Why? Because you cannot conceive how it can be made out of nothing. Why do you not also think yourself eternal? You will answer perhaps because about 20 or 40 years since you began to be. But if I ask you what that you is which began then to be, you can scarce tell me. The matter whereof you are made began not then to be. For if it did, then it is not eternal, but it began to be put together in such a fashion and frame as makes up your body. But yet that frame of particles is not you. It makes not that thinking thing you are. For I have now to do with one who allows an eternal, immaterial, thinking being, but would have unthinking matter eternal too. Therefore when did that thinking thing begin to be? If it did never begin to be, Then have you always been a thinking thing from eternity? The absurdity whereof I need not confute till I meet with one who is so void of understanding as to own it. If, therefore you can allow a thinking thing to be made out of nothing, as all things that are not eternal must be, why also can you not allow it possible, Possible for a material being to be made out of nothing by an equal power, but that you have the experience of the one in view and not of the other? Though, when well considered, creation of a spirit will be found to require no less power than the creation of matter. Nay, possibly, if we would emancipate ourselves from vulgar notions and raise our thoughts as far as they would reach to a closer contemplation, contemplation of things, we might be able to aim at some dim and seeming conception how matter might at first be made and begin to exist by the power of that eternal first being. But to give beginning and being to a spirit would be found a more inconceivable effect of omnipotent power. But this being what would perhaps lead us too far from the notions on which the philosophy now in the world world is built. It would not be pardonable to deviate so far from them, or to inquire so far as grammar itself would authorize, if the common settled opinion opposes it, especially in this place where the received doctrine serves well enough to our present purpose, and leaves this past doubt that the creation or beginning of any one substance out of nothing being once admitted the creation of all other being but the Creator himself may with the same ease be supposed. 19. Objection. Creation out of nothing. But you will say, is it not impossible to admit of the making anything out of nothing, since we cannot possibly conceive it? I answer no, because it is not reasonable to deny the power of an infinite being, because we cannot comprehend its operations. We do not deny other effects upon this ground, because we cannot possibly conceive the matter of their production. We cannot conceive how anything but impulse of body can move body. And yet that is not a reason sufficient to make us deny it possible against the constant experience we have of it in ourselves, in all our voluntary motions, which are produced in us only by the free action or thought of our own minds, and are not, nor can be the effects of the impulse or determination of the motion of blind matter in or upon our own bodies. For then it could not be in our power or choice to alter it. For example, my right hand writes, whilst my left hand is still what causes rest in one, and motion in the other nothing but my will, a thought of my mind, my thought only changing the right hand rests, and the left hand moves. This is a matter of fact which cannot be denied. Explain this, and make it intelligible, and then the next step will be to understand creation, for the giving a new determination to the motion of the animal spirits, which some make use of to explain voluntary motion, clears not the difficulty one jot to alter the determination of motion, being in this case no easier nor less than to give motion itself, since the new determination given to the animal spirits must be either immediately by thought, or by some other body put in their way by thought which was not in their way before, and so must owe its motion to thought, either of which leaves voluntary motion as unintelligible as it was before. In the mean time it is an overvaluing ourselves to reduce all to the narrow measure of our capacities, and to conclude all things impossible to be done, whose manner of doing exceeds our comprehension. This is to make our comprehension infinite, or God finite, when what he can do is limited to what we can conceive of it. If you do not understand the operations of your own finite mind, that thinking thing within you do not deem it strange that you cannot comprehend the operations of that eternal infinite mind who made and governs all things, and whom the heaven of heavens cannot contain.
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Narrator (Podcast Library Advertisement)
End of section 11.
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Narrator (McDonald's Advertisement)
Section 12 of an essay Concerning Humane Understanding by John Locke Book four of Knowledge and Probability this is a Librivox recording. All Librivox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit Librivox.org recording by Morgan Scorpion. Check out my YouTube channel. Chapter 11 of our knowledge of the existence of other things 1. Knowledge of the existence of other finite beings is to be had only by actual sensation. The knowledge of our own being we have by intuition the existence of a God. Reason clearly makes known to us, as has been shown, the knowledge of the existence of any other thing we can have only by sensation. For there being no necessary connection of real existence with any idea a man hath in his memory, nor of any other existence but that of God with the existence of any particular man. No particular man can know the existence of any other being, but only when by actual operating upon him, it makes itself perceived by him. For the having the idea of anything in our mind no more proves the existence of that thing, than the picture of a man evidences his being in the world, or the visions of a dream make thereby a true history. 2. Instance whiteness of this paper. It is therefore the actual receiving of ideas from without, that gives us notice of the existence of other things, and makes us know that something doth exist at that time without us, which causes that idea in us though perhaps we neither know nor consider how it does it for it takes not from the certainty of our senses and the ideas we receive by them, that we know not the manner wherein they are produced. VG Whilst I write this, I have by the paper affecting my eyes that idea produced in my mind, which whatever object causes, I call white, by which I know that that quality or accident, I. E. Whose appearance before my eyes always causes that idea, doth really exist, and hath a being without me and of this the greatest assurance I can possibly have, and to which my faculties can attain, is the testimony of my eyes, which are the proper and sole judges of this thing, whose testimony I have reason to rely on as so so certain that I can no more doubt whilst I write this, that I see white and black, and that something really exists that causes that sensation in me, than that I write or move my hand, which is a certainty as great as human nature is capable of, concerning the existence of anything but a man's self alone and of God. 3. This notice by our senses, which, though not so certain as demonstration, yet may be called knowledge and proves the existence of things without us. The notice we have by our senses of the existing of things without us, though it be not altogether so certain as our intuitive knowledge or the deductions of our reason employed about the clear abstract ideas of our own minds, yet it is an assurance that deserves the name of knowledge. If we persuade ourselves that our faculties act and inform us right concerning the existence of those objects that affect them, it cannot pass from ill grounded confidence. For I think nobody can in earnest be so sceptical as to be uncertain of the existence of those things which he sees and feels. At least he that can doubt so far whatever he may have with his own thoughts, will never have any controversy with me, since he never can be sure I say anything contrary to his own opinion. As to myself, I think God has given me assurance enough of the existence of things without me, since by their different application I can produce in myself both pleasure and pain, which is one great concernment of my present state. This is certain. The confidence that our faculties do not herein deceive us is the greatest assurance we are capable of concerning the existence of material beings. For we cannot act anything but by our faculties, nor talk of knowledge itself, but by the help of those faculties which are fitted to apprehend even what knowledge is. But besides the assurance we have from our senses themselves that they do not err in the information they give us of the existence of things without us when they are affected by them, we are further confirmed in this assurance by other concurrent reasons. Confirmed by concurrent reasons. First, because we cannot have ideas of sensation but by the inlet of the senses, it is plain those perceptions are produced in us by exterior causes affecting our senses. Because those that want the organs of any sense never can have the ideas belonging to that sense produced in their minds. This is too evident to be doubted, and therefore we cannot but be assured that they come in by the organs of that sense, and no other way. The organs themselves, it is plain, do not produce them. For then the eyes of a man in the dark would produce colours, and his nose smell roses in the winter. But we see nobody gets the relish of a pine apple till he goes to the Indies where it is and tastes it. 5:2. Secondly, because we find that an idea from actual sensation and another from memory are very distinct perceptions. Because sometimes I find that I cannot avoid the having those ideas produced in my mind. For though when my eyes are shut or windows fast I can at pleasure recall to my mind the ideas of light or the sun which former sensations had lodged in my memory. So I can at pleasure lay by that idea and take into my view that of the smell of a rose or taste of sugar. But if I turn my eyes at noon towards the sun, I cannot avoid the ideas which the light or sun then produces in me. So that there is a manifestation, express difference between the ideas laid up in my memory over which, if they were there only I should have constantly the same power to dispose of them and lay them by at pleasure and those which force themselves upon me. And I cannot avoid having. And therefore it must needs be some exterior cause and the brisk acting of some objects without me, whose efficacy I cannot resist, that produces those ideas in my mind which, whether I will or no. Besides, there is nobody who doth not perceive the difference in himself between contemplating the sun as he hath the idea of it in his memory, and actually looking upon it, of which, too, his perception is so distinct that few of his ideas are more distinguishable one from another. And therefore he hath certain knowledge that they are not both memory or the actions of his mind and fancies only within him. But that actual seeing hath a cause without. Thirdly, because pleasure or pain, which accompanies actual sensation. Accompanies not the returning of those ideas without the external objects. Add to this that many of those ideas are produced in us with pain which afterwards we remember without the least offence. Thus the pain of heat or cold, when the idea of it is revived in our minds, gives us no disturbance which, when felt was very troublesome. And is again, when actually repeated, which is occasioned by the disorder the external object causes in our bodies when applied to them. And we remember the pains of hunger, thirst, or the headache without any pain at all, which would either never disturb us or or else constantly do it as often as we thought of it. Were there nothing more but ideas floating in our minds and appearances, entertaining our fancies without the real existence of things affecting us from abroad. The same may be said of pleasure accompanying several actual sensations. And though mathematical demonstration depends not upon sense, yet the examining them by diagrams gives great credit credit to the evidence of our sight and seems to give it a certainty approaching to that of demonstration itself. For it would be very strange that a man should allow it for an undeniable truth that two angles of a figure which he measures by lines and angles of a diagram should be bigger one than the other. And yet doubt of the existence of those lines and angles which by Looking on, he makes use of to measure that by seven, four. Fourthly, because our senses assist one another's testimony of the existence of outward things, and enable us to predict our senses in many cases bear witness to the truth of each other's report concerning the existence of sensible things without us, he that sees a fire may, if he doubt whether it be anything more than a bare fancy, feel it too, and be convinced by putting his hand in it, which certainly could never be put into such exquisite pain by a bare idea or phantom, unless that the pain be a fancy too, which yet he cannot, when the burn is well, by raising the idea of it, bring upon himself again. Thus I see whilst I write this, I can change the appearance of the paper, and by designing the letters, tell beforehand what new idea it shall exhibit the very next moment, by barely drawing my pen over it, which will neither appear, let me fancy as much as I will if my hands stand still, although I move my pen, if my eyes be shut nor when those characters are once made on the paper, can I choose afterwards but see them as they are, that is, have the ideas of such letters as I have made, whence it is manifest that they are not barely the sport and play of my own imagination, when I find that the characters that were made at the pleasure of my own thoughts do not obey them, nor yet cease to be whenever I shall fancy it, but continue to affect my senses constantly and regularly, according to the figures I made them to which, if we will add that the sight of those shall from another man draw such sounds as I beforehand design they shall stand for there will be little reason left to to doubt that those words I write do really exist without me, when they cause a long series of regular sounds to affect my ears, which could not be the effect of my imagination, nor could my memory retain them in that order. 8. This certainty is as great as our condition needs. But yet, if, after all this, any one will be so sceptical as to distrust, trust his senses, and to affirm that we all see and hear, feel and taste, think and do during our whole being is but the series and deluding appearances of a long dream, whereof there is no reality, and therefore will question the existence of all things, or our knowledge of any thing, I must desire him to consider that if all be a dream, then he doth but dream that he makes the question and so it is not much matter that a waking man should answer him. But yet, if he pleases, he may dream that I make him this answer, that the certainty of things existing in rerum natura. When we have the testimony of our senses for it is not only as great as our frame can attain to, but as our condition needs for our faculties being suited not to the full extent of being, nor to a perfect, clear, comprehensive knowledge of things free from all doubt and scruple, but to the preservation of us in whom they are, and accommodated to the use of life, they serve to our purpose well enough, if they will but give us certain notice of these things which are convenient or inconvenient to us. For he that sees a candle burning and hath experimented the force of its flame by putting his fist finger in it, will little doubt that this is something existing without him which does him harm and puts him to great pain. Which is assurance enough when no man requires greater certainty to govern his actions by than what is as certain as his actions themselves. And if our dreamer pleases to try whether the glowing heat of a glass furnace be barely a wandering imagination in a drowsy man's fancy, by putting his hand into it he may perhaps be wakened into a certainty greater than he could wish. That it is something more than bare imagination. So that this evidence is as great as we can desire. Being as certain to us as our pleasure or pain, that is, happiness or misery, beyond which we have no concernment either of knowing or being. Such an assurance of the existence of things without us is sufficient to direct in us the attaining the good and avoiding the evil which is caused by them, which is the important concernment we have of being made acquainted with them. 9. But reaches no further than actual sensation in fine Then, when our senses do actually convey into our understandings any idea, we cannot but be satisfied that there doth something at that time really exist without us which doth affect our senses and by them give notice of itself to our apprehensive faculties and actually produce that idea which we then perceive. And we cannot so far distrust their testimony as to doubt that such collections of simple ideas as we have observed by our senses to be united together do really exist together. But this knowledge extends as far as the present testimony of our senses employed about particular objects that do then affect them, and no further. For if I saw such a collection of simple ideas as is wont to be called man existing together one minute since and am now alone, I cannot be certain that the same man exists now, since there is no necessary connection of his existence A minute since with his existence now by a thousand ways he may cease to be since I had the testimony of my senses for his existence and if I cannot be certain that the man I saw last to day is now in being, I can less be certain than he is so who hath been longer removed from my senses, and I have not seen since yesterday or since the last year and much less can I be certain of the existence of men that I never saw. And therefore, though it be highly probable that millions of men do now exist, yet whilst I am alone writing this, I have not that certainty of it which we strictly call knowledge, though the great likelihood of it puts me past doubt. And it be reasonable for me to do several things upon the confidence that there are men, and men also of my acquaintance with whom I have to do now in the world. But this is but probability, not knowledge. 10. Folly to expect demonstration in every thing, whereby yet we may observe how foolish and vain a thing it is for a man of narrow knowledge, who, having reason given him to judge of the different evidence and probability of things, and to be swayed accordingly. How vain I say it is to expect demonstration and certainty in things not capable of it, and refuse assent to very rational propositions, and act contrary to very plain and clear truths, because they cannot be made out so evident as to surmount every the least I will not say reason but pretence of doubting. He that in the ordinary affairs of life would admit of nothing but direct, plain demonstration would be sure of nothing in this world but of perishing quickly. The wholesomeness of his meat or drink would not give him reason to venture on it. And I would fain know what it is he could do upon such grounds as are capable of no doubt, no objection. 11. Past existence of other things is known by memory. As when our senses are actually employed about any object, we do know that it does exist. So by our memory we may be assured that heretofore things that affected our senses have existed. And thus we have knowledge of the past existence of several things, whereof our senses having informed us, our memories still retain the ideas and of this we are past all doubt, so long as we remember well. But this knowledge also reaches no further than our senses have formerly assured us. Thus, seeing water at this instant, it is an unquestionable truth to me that water doth exist, and remembering that I saw it yesterday, it will also be always true and as long as my memory retains it always an undoubted proposition to me that water did exist 10 July, 1688 as it will also be equally true that a certain number of very fine colours did exist, which at the same time I saw upon a bubble of that water but being now quite out of sight both of the water and bubbles too, it is no more certainly known to me that the water doth now exist, than that the bubbles or colours therein do so it being no more necessary that water should exist to day, because it existed yesterday, than that the colours or bubbles exist to day, because they existed yesterday day, though it be exceedingly much more probable, because water hath been observed to continue long in existence, but bubbles and the colours on them quickly cease to be. 12. The existence of other finite spirits not knowable and rests on faith. What ideas we have of spirits, and how we come by them, I have already shown. But though we have those ideas in our minds, and know we have them there, the having the ideas of spirits does not make us know that any such things do exist without us, or that there are any finite spirits, or any other spiritual beings but the eternal God. We have ground from revelation and several other reasons to believe with assurance that there are such creatures, but our senses not being able to discover them, we want the means of knowing their particular existences. For we can no more know that there are finite spirits really existing by the idea we have of such beings in our minds, than by the ideas anyone has of fairies or centaurs, he can come to know that things answering those ideas do really exist. And therefore, concerning the existence of finite spirits, as well as several other things, we must content ourselves with the evidence of faith but universal certain propositions concerning this matter are beyond our reach for however true it may be, VG that all the intelligent spirits that God ever created do still exist, yet it can never make a part of our certain knowledge. These and the like propositions we may assent to as highly probable, but are not, I fear, in this state capable of knowing. We are not then to put others upon demonstrating, nor ourselves upon search of universal certainty in all those matters wherein we are not capable of any other knowledge but what our senses give us in this or that particular. 13. Only particular propositions concerning concrete existences are knowable by which it appears that there are two sorts of propositions. 1. There is one sort of propositions concerning the existence of anything answerable to such an idea as having the idea of an elephant, phoenix, motion, or an angel. In my mind the first and natural inquiry is whether such a thing does anywhere exist, and this knowledge is only of particulars. No existence of anything without us, but only God can certainly be known further than our senses inform us. 2. There is another sort of propositions wherein is expressed the agreement or disagreement of our abstract ideas and their dependence on one another, such propositions may be universal and certain. So having the idea of God and myself of fear and obedience, I cannot but be sure that God is to be feared and obeyed by me and this proposition will be certain concerning man in general, if I have made an abstract idea of such a species, whereof I am one particular. Yet this proposition, how certain soever, that men ought to fear and obey God, proves not to me the existence of men in the world, but will be true of all such creatures whenever they do exist which certainty of such general propositions depends on the agreement or disagreement to be discovered in those abstract ideas. 14. And all general propositions that are known to be true concern abstract ideas. In the former case our knowledge is the consequence of the existence of things proper producing ideas in our minds by our senses. In the latter, knowledge is the consequence of the ideas, be they what they will, that are in our minds producing there general certain propositions. Many of these are called aeternitae veritates, and all of them indeed are so not from being written all or any of them in the minds of all men, or that they were any of them propositions in any one's mind, till he having got the abstract ideas joined, or separated them by affirmation or negation. But wheresoever we can suppose such a creature as man is endowed with such faculties, and thereby furnished with such ideas as we have, we must conclude he must needs, when he applies his thought to the consideration of his ideas, know the truth of certain propositions that will arise from from the agreement or disagreement which he will perceive in his own ideas. Such propositions are therefore called eternal truths, not because they are eternal propositions, actually formed and antecedent to the understanding that at any time makes them nor because they are imprinted on the mind from any patterns that are anywhere out of the mind and existed before but because being once made about abstract ideas so as to be true, they will, whenever they can, be supposed to be made again at any time past or come by a mind having those ideas always actually be true for names being supposed to stand perpetually for the same ideas, and the same ideas having immutably the same habitudes one to another. Propositions concerning any abstract ideas that that are once true must needs be eternal verities. End of section 11. Section 13 of An Essay Concerning Humane Understanding by John Locke, book 4 of Knowledge and Probability. This is a Librivox recording. All Librivox recordings are in the public domain for more information or to volunteer, please visit Librivox.org. Chapter 12 of the Improvement of Our Knowledge Chapter 12 of the Improvement of Our Knowledge 1. Knowledge is not got from maxims it having been the common received opinion amongst men of letters, that maxims were the foundation of all knowledge, and that the sciences were each of them built upon certain precognita, from whence the understanding was to take its rise, and by which it was to conduct itself in its inquiries into the matters belonging to that science. The beaten road of the schools has been to lay down in the beginning one or more general propositions as foundations whereon to build the knowledge that was to be had of that subject. These doctrines thus laid down for foundations of any science, were called principles, as the beginnings from which we must set out, and look no further backwards in our inquiries, as we have already observed. 2. The occasion of that opinion One thing which might probably give an occasion to this way of proceeding in other sciences, was, as I suppose, the good success it seemed to have in mathematics, where in men being observed to attain a great certainty of knowledge, these sciences came by pre eminence to be called Mathemata and mathesis, learning, or things learned thoroughly learned, as having of all others the greatest certainty, clearness, and evidence in them. 3. But from comparing clear and distinct ideas. But if anyone will consider, he will, I guess, find that the great advancement and certainty of real knowledge which men arrived to in these sciences, was not owing to the influence of these principles principles nor derived from any peculiar advantage they received from two or three general maxims laid down in the beginning, but from the clear, distinct, complete ideas their thoughts were employed about and the relation of equality and excess so clear between some of them, that they had an intuitive knowledge, and by that a way to discover it in others and this without the help of those maxims. For, I ask, is it not possible for a young lad to know that his whole body is bigger than his little finger, but by virtue of this axiom, that the whole is bigger than a part, nor be assured of it till he has learned that maxim? Or cannot a country wench know that having received a shilling from one that owes her three, and a shilling also from another that owes her three, the remaining debts in each of their hands are equal? Cannot she know this, I say, unless she fetch the certainty of it from this maxim, that if you take equals from equals, the remainder will be equals, a maxim which possibly she never heard or thought of. I desire any one to consider from what has been elsewhere said, which is known first and clearest by most people, the particular instance, or the general rule, and which it is that gives life and birth to the other. These general rules are but comparing our more general and abstract ideas, which are the workmanship of the mind made, and names given to them for the easier dispatch in its reasonings, and drawing into comprehensive terms and short rules its various and multiplied observations. But knowledge began in the mind, and was founded on particulars, though afterwards perhaps no notice was taken thereof, it being natural for the mind forward still to enlarge its knowledge most attentively to lay up those general notions, and make proper use of them, which is to disburden the memory of the cumbersome load of particulars. For I desire it may be considered what more certainty there is to a child or anyone, that his body, little finger and all, is bigger than his little finger alone, after you have given to his body the name whole, and to his little finger the name part than he could have had before. Or what new knowledge concerning his body can these two relative terms give him, which he could not have without them? Could he not know that his body was bigger than his little finger? He if his language were yet so imperfect, that he had no such relative terms as whole and part. I ask further, when he has got these names, how is he more certain that his body is a whole, and his little finger a part, than he was or might be certain, before he learnt those terms, that his body was bigger than his little finger? Any one may as reasonably doubt or deny that his little finger is a part of his body as that it is less than his body and he that can doubt whether it be less will as certainly doubt whether it be a part so that the maxim the whole is bigger than a part can never be made use of to prove the little finger less than the body. But when it is useless by being brought to convince one of a truth which he knows already. For he that does not certainly know that any parcel of matter, with another parcel of matter joined to to it, is bigger than either of them alone, will never be able to know it by help of these two relative terms, whole and part, make of them what maxim you please. 4. Dangerous to build upon Precarious principles. But be it in the mathematics as it will, whether it be clearer that taking an inch from a black line of 2 inches, and an inch from from a red line of 2 inches, the remaining parts of the two lines will be equal or that if you take equals from equals, the remainder will be equals which I say of these two is the clearest and first known I leave to any one to determine it, not being material to my present occasion. That which I have here to do is to inquire whether if it be the readiest way to acknowledge, to begin with general maxims and build upon them, it be yet a safe way to take the principles which are laid down in any other science as unquestionable truths, and so receive them without examination, and adhere to them without suffering them to be doubted of, because mathematicians have been so happy or so fair to use none but self evident and undeniable. If this be so, I know not what may not pass for truth in morality, what may not be introduced and proved in natural philosophy. Let that principle of some of the old philosophers, that all is matter, and that there is nothing else, be received for certain and indubitable and it will be easy to be seen by the writings of some that have revived it again in our days, what consequences it will lead to. Let any one with Polemox take the world, or with the Stoics the ether, or the sun, or with Anaximenes the air, to be God, and what a divinity religion and worship must we needs have. Nothing can be so dangerous as principles thus taken up without questioning or examination especially if they be such as concern morality, which influence men's lives, and give a bias to all their actions. Who might not justly expect another kind of life in Aristippus, who placed happiness in bodily pleasure, and Antisthenes, who made virtue sufficient to felicity. And he who with Plato shall place beatitude in the knowledge of God, will have his thoughts raised to other contemplations than those who look not beyond this spot of earth, and those perishing things which are are to be had in it, he that with Archelaus shall lay it down as a principle that right and wrong, honest and dishonest, are defined only by laws, and not by nature, will have other measures of moral rectitude and gravity than those who take it for granted that we are under obligations antecedent to all human constitutions. 5. To do so is no certain way to trust truth. If, therefore, those that pass for principles are not certain, which we must have some way to know, that we may be able to distinguish them from those that are doubtful, but are only made so to us by our blind assent, we are liable to be misled by them, and instead of being guided into truth, we shall by principles be only confirmed in mistake and error. 6. But to compare clear, complete ideas under steady names but since the knowledge of the certainty of principles, as well as of all other truths, depend only upon the perception we have of the agreement or disagreement of our ideas. The way to improve our knowledge is not, I am sure, blindly and with an implicit faith to receive and swallow principles, but is, I think, to get and fix in our minds clear, distinct, and complete ideas as far as they are to be had, and annex to them proper and constant names and thus perhaps without any other principles, but barely considering those perfect ideas, and by comparing them one with another, finding their agreement and disagreement, and their several relations and habitudes, we shall get more true and clear knowledge by the common conduct of this one rule, than by taking up principles, and thereby putting our minds into the disposal of others. 7. The true method of advancing knowledge is by considering our abstract ideas. We must, therefore, if we will proceed as reason advises, adapt our methods of inquiry to the nature of the ideas we examine and the truth we search after. CHAPTER General and certain truths are only founded in the habitudes and relations of abstract ideas. A sagacious and methodical application of our thoughts for the finding out these relations is the only way to discover all that can be put with truth and certainty concerning them into general propositions. By what steps we are to proceed in these is to be learned in the schools of the mathematicians, who from very plain and easy beginnings, by gentle degrees and a continued chain of reasonings, proceed to the discovery and demonstration of truths that appear at first sight beyond human capacity. The art of finding proofs, and the admirable methods they have invented for the singling out and laying in order those intermediate ideas that demonstratively show the equality or inequality of unapplicable quantities, is that which has carried them so far, and produced such wonderful and unexpected discoveries. But whether something like this in respect of other ideas, as well as those of magnitude, may not in time be found out, I will not determine this. I think I may say, that if other ideas that are the real as well as nominal essences of their species, which were pursued in the way familiar to mathematicians, they would carry our thoughts further and with greater evidence and clearness than possibly we are apt to imagine, 8 by which morality also may be made clearer. This gave me the confidence to advance that conjecture which I suggest. Chapter 3 viz. That morality is capable of demonstration as well as mathematics. For the ideas that ethics are conversant about, being all real essences and such as I imagine, have a discoverable connexion and agreement one with another, so far as we can find their habitudes and relations, so far we shall be possessed of certain real and general truths. And I doubt not but if a right method were taken, a greater part of morality might be made out with that claim clearness that could leave to a considering man no more reason to doubt than he could have to doubt of the truth of propositions in mathematics which have been demonstrated to him. 9. Our knowledge of substances is to be improved not by contemplation of abstract ideas, but only by experience. In our search after the knowledge of substances, our want of ideas that are suitable to such a way of proceeding obliges us to a quite different method. We advance not here as in the other, where our abstract ideas are real as well as nominal essences, by contemplating our ideas and considering their relations and correspondences, that helps us very little, for the reasons that in another place we have at large set by which I think it is evident that substances afford matter of very little general knowledge, and the bare contemplation of their abstract ideas will carry us but a very little way in the search of truth and certainty. What, then, are we to do for the improvement of our knowledge in substantial beings? Here we are to take a quite contrary course the want of ideas of their real essences such sends us from our own thoughts to the things themselves as they exist. Experience here must teach me what reason cannot and it is by trying alone that I can certainly know what other qualities coexist with those of my complex idea. V. G. Whether that yellow heavy fusible body I call gold be malleable or no, which experience, experience, which way ever it prove in that particular body I examine, makes me not certain that it is so in all or any other yellow heavy fusible bodies but that which I have tried, because it is no consequence one way or the other from my complex idea. The necessity or inconsistence of malleability hath no visible connexion with the combination of that colour which weight and fusibility in any body. What I have said here of the nominal essence of gold, supposed to consist of a body of such a determinate colour, weight, and fusibility will hold true if malleableness, fixedness, and solubility in aqua regia be added to it. Our reasonings from these ideas will carry us but a little way in the certain discovery of the other properties in those masses of matter wherein all these are, are to be found. Because the other properties of such bodies, depending not on these, but on that unknown real essence of which these also depend, we cannot by them discover the rest. We can go no further than the simple ideas of our nominal essence will carry us, which is very little beyond themselves, and so afford us but very sparingly any certain universal and useful truths. For upon trial, having found that particular piece, and all others of that colour, weight, and fusibility that I ever tried malleable, that also makes now perhaps a part of my complex idea, part of my nominal essence of gold, whereby, though I make my complex idea, to which I affix the name gold, to consist of more simple ideas than before, yet still in its not containing the real essence of any species of bodies, it helps me not certainly to know, I say, to know. Perhaps it may be to conjecture the other remaining properties of that body further than they have a visible connexion with some or all of the simple ideas that make up my nominal essence. For example, I cannot be certain from this complex idea whether gold be fixed or no, because, as before, there is no necessary connexion or inconsistence to be discovered betwixt a complex idea of a body, yellow, heavy, fusible, malleable, betwixt these, I say, and fixedness, so that I may certainly know that in whatsoever body these are found, their fixedness is sure to be Here again for assurance I I must apply myself to experience. As far as that reaches I may have certain knowledge, but no further. 10. Experience may procure is convenience, not science, I deny not but a man accustomed to rational and regular experiments shall be able to see further into the nature of bodies, and guess righter at their yet un unknown properties than one that is a stranger to them. But yet, as I have said, this is but judgment and opinion, not knowledge and certainty. This way of getting and improving our knowledge in substances only by experience and history, which is all that the weakness of our faculties in this state of mediocrity which we are in this world can attain to, makes me suspect that natural philosophy is not capable is being made a science. We are able, I imagine, to reach very little general knowledge concerning the species of bodies and their several properties, experiments, and historical observations we may have, from which we may draw advantages of ease and health, and thereby increase our stock of conveniences for this life. But beyond this I fear, our talents reach not, nor are our faculties, as I guess, able to advance. 11. We are fitted for moral science, but only for probable interpretations of external nature, from whence it is obvious to conclude that since our faculties are not fitted to penetrate into the internal fabric and real essence of bodies, but yet plainly discover to us the being of a God, and the knowledge of ourselves enough to lead us into a full and clear discovery of our duty and great concernment. It will become us, as rational creatures, to employ those faculties we have about what they are most adapted to and follow the direction of nature, where it seems to point us out the way. For it is rational to conclude that our proper employment lies in those inquiries and in that sort of of knowledge which is most suited to our natural capacities and carries in it our greatest interest, that is the condition of our eternal estate. Hence I think I may conclude that morality is the proper science and business of mankind in general, who are both concerned and fitted to search out their summum bonum. As several arts conversant about several parts of nature are the lot and private talent of particular men for the common use of human life and their own particular subsistence in this world. Of what consequence the discovery of one natural body and its properties may be to human life. The whole great continent of America is a convincing instance Whose ignorance in useful arts and want of the greatest part of the conveniences of life in a country that above abounded with all sorts of natural plenty, I think may be attributed to their ignorance of what was to be found in a very ordinary despicable stone. I mean the mineral of iron. And whatever we think of our parts or improvements in this part of the world where knowledge and plenty seem to vie with each other. Yet to any one that will seriously reflect upon it, I suppose it will appear past doubt that were the use of iron lost among us, we should in a few ages be unavoidably reduced to the wants and ignorance of the ancient savage Americans, whose natural endowments and provisions come no way short of those of the most flourishing and polite nations. So that he who first made known the use of that contemptible mineral may be truly styled the father of arts and the Author of Plenty. 12. In the study of nature we must beware of hypotheses and wrong principles. I would not, therefore, be thought to disesteem or dissuade the study of nature. I readily agree. The contemplation of his works gives us occasion to admire, revere, and glorify their author and, if rightly directed, may be of greater benefit to mankind than the monuments of exemplary charity that have as had so great charge been raised by the founders of hospitals and almshouses. He that first invented printing, discovered the use of the compass, or made public the virtue and the right use of kin Kina did more for the propagation of knowledge, for the supply and increase of useful commodities, and saved more from the grave than those who built colleges, workhouses and hospitals. All that I would say is, that we should not be too forwardly possessed with the opinion or expectation of knowledge where it is not to be had, or by ways that will not attain to it. That we should not take doubtful systems for complete sciences, nor unintelligible notions for scientifical demonstrations. In the knowledge of bodies we must be content to glean what we can from particular experience experiments, since we cannot from a discovery of their real essences, grasp at a time whole sheaves and in bundles comprehend the nature and properties of whole species together. Where our inquiry is concerning co existence or repugnancy to coexist, which by contemplation of our ideas we cannot discover, there experience, observation, and natural history must be give us by our senses and by retail an insight into corporeal substances. The knowledge of bodies we must get by our senses warily employed in taking notice of their qualities and operations on one another. And what we hope to know of separate spirits in this world we must, I think, expect only from revelation he that shall consider. How little general maxims, precarious principles and hypotheses laid down at pleasure have promoted true knowledge or helped to satisfy the inquiries of rational men after real improvements. How little, I say, the setting out at that end has for many ages together advanced men's progress towards the knowledge of natural philosophy. We'll think we have reason to thank those who in this latter age have taken another course. Course. And have trod out to us, though not an easier way to learned ignorance, yet a surer way to profitable knowledge. 13. The true use of hypotheses. Not that we may not to explain any phenomena of nature, make use of any probable hypothesis whatsoever, Hypotheses, if they are well made, are at least great helps to the memory, and often direct us to new discoveries. But my meaning is, that we should not take up any one too hastily which the mind that would always penetrate into the causes of things and have principles to rest on, is very apt to do, till we have very well examined particulars and made several experiments in that thing, which we would explain by her hypothesis, and see whether it will agree to them all, whether our principles will carry us quite through, and not be as inconsistent with one phenomenon of nature as they seem to accommodate and explain another and at least that we take care that the name of principles deceive us not, nor impose on us by making us receive that for an unquestionable truth, which is really at best but a very doubtful conjecture, such as are most. I had almost said all of the hypothesis in natural philosophy. 14. Clear and distinct ideas with settled names, and the finding of those intermediate ideas which show their agreement or disagreement, are the ways to enlarge our knowledge. But whether natural philosophy be capable of certainty or no, the ways to enlarge our knowledge as far as we are capable, and seems to me, in short, to be these two first. The first is to get and settle in our minds determined ideas of those things whereof we have general or specific names, at least so many of them as we would consider and improve our knowledge in, or reason about and if they be specific ideas of substances, we should endeavour also to make them as complete as we can whereby I mean, that we should put together as many simple ideas as being constantly observed to coexist may perfectly determine the species and each of those simple ideas which are the ingredients of our complex ones, should be clear and distinct in our minds. For it being evident that our knowledge cannot exceed our ideas as far as they are either imperfect, confused, or obscure, we cannot expect to have certain perfect or clear knowledge. Secondly, the other is the art of finding out those intermediate ideas which may show us the agreement or repugnancy of other ideas which cannot be immediately compared. 15. Mathematics an instance of this, that these two, and not the relying on maxims and and drawing consequences from some general propositions, are the right methods of improving our knowledge in the ideas of other modes besides those of quantity. The consideration of mathematical knowledge will easily inform us where first we shall find that he has not a perfect and clear idea of those angles or figures of which he desires to know any thing, is utterly thereby incapable of any knowledge about them. Suppose, but a man not to have a perfect exact idea of a right angle, a scalenum, or trapezium, and there is nothing more certain than that he will in vain seek any demonstration about them. Further, it is evident that it was not the influence of those maxims which are taken for principles in mathematics, that hath led the masters of that science into those wonderful discoveries they have made. Let a man of good parts know all the maxims generally made use of in mathematics ever so perfectly, and contemplate their extent and consequences as much as he pleases. He will, by their assistance, I suppose, scarce ever come to know that the square of the hypothenuse in a right angled triangle is equal to the squares of the other two sides. The knowledge that the whole is equal to all its parts, and if you take equals from equals, the remainder will be equal, etc. Helped him not, I presume, to this demonstration and a man may, I think, pore long enough on those axioms, without ever seeing one jot the more of mathematical truths they have been discovered by the thoughts otherwise applied the mind had other objects. Are the views before it far different from those maxims when it first got the knowledge of such truths in mathematics, which men, well enough acquainted with those received axioms, but ignorant of their method, who first made these demonstrations, can never sufficiently admire? And who knows what methods to enlarge our knowledge in other parts of science may hereafter be invented, answering that of algebra in mathematics, which so readily finds out the ideas of quantities to measure others, by whose equality or proportion we could otherwise very hardly, or perhaps never come to know. End of section 13.
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Narrator (Librivox Reading - John Locke)
Section 14 of an essay Concerning Human Understanding by John Locke, Book four of Knowledge and Probability. This is a Librivox recording. All Librivox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit Librivox.org Chapter 13 Some further considerations concerning our knowledge 1. Our knowledge partly necessary, partly voluntary. Our knowledge, as in other things, so in this, has so great a conformity with our sight, that it is neither wholly necessary nor wholly voluntary. If our knowledge were altogether necessary, all men's knowledge would not only be alike, but every man would know all that is knowable and if it were wholly voluntary, some men so little regard or value it, that they would have extreme little, or none at all. Men that have senses cannot choose but receive some ideas by them and if they have memory, they cannot but retain some of them and if they have any distinguishing faculty, cannot but perceive the agreement or disagreement of some of them one with another, as he that has eyes, if he will open them by day, cannot but see some objects, and perceive a difference in them. But though man, with his eyes open in the light, cannot but see, yet there be certain objects which he may choose whether he will turn his eyes to there may be in his reach a book containing pictures and discourses, capable to delight or instruct him, which yet he may never have the will to open, never take the pains to look into. 2. The application of our faculties voluntary, but they being employed, we know as things are not as we please. There is also another thing in a man's power and that is, though he turns his eyes sometimes towards an object, yet he may choose whether he will curiously survey it, and with an intent application, endeavor to observe accurately all that is visible in it. But yet what he does see, he cannot see otherwise than he does it depends not on his will to see that black, which appears yellow nor to persuade himself that what actually scolds him feels cold, the earth will not appear painted with flowers, nor the fields covered with verdure, whenever he has a mind to it in the cold winter, he cannot help seeing it white and hoary, if he will look abroad. Just this is it with our understanding. All that is voluntary in our knowledge is the employing or withholding any of our faculties from this or that sort of objects, and a more or less out accurate survey of them. But they, being employed, our will have no power to determine the knowledge of the mind one way or another. That is done only by the objects themselves, as far as they are clearly discovered. And therefore as far as men's senses are conversant about external objects, the mind cannot but receive those ideas which are presented by them, and be informed of the existence of things without and so far as men's thoughts converse with their own determined ideas, they cannot but in some measure observe the agreement or disagreement that is to be found amongst some of them, which is so far knowledge. And if they have names for those ideas which they have thus considered, they must needs be assured of the truth of those propositions which express that agreement or disagreement they perceive in them, and be undoubtedly convinced of those truths. Truths. For what a man sees he cannot but see, and what he perceives he cannot but know that he perceives. 3. Instance in numbers. Thus he that has got the ideas of numbers, and hath taken the pains to compare 1, 2, and 3 to 6, cannot choose but know that they are equal. He that hath got the idea of a triangle, and found the ways to measure its angles and their magnitudes, is certain that its three angles are equal to two right ones and can as little doubt of that as of this truth, that it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be four. Instance in natural religion. He also that has the idea of an intelligent but frail and weak being made by and depending on another, who is eternal omnipotent, perfectly wise, and and good will as certainly know that man is to honour, fear, and obey God, as that the sun shines when he sees it. For if he hath but the ideas of two such beings in his mind, and will turn his thoughts that way and consider them, he will as certainly find that the inferior, finite, and dependent, is under an obligation to obey the supreme and infinite, as he is certain to find that 3, 4, and 7 are less than 50, if he will consider and compute these numbers nor can he be surer in a clear morning, when the sun is risen, if he will but open his eyes, and turn them that way. But yet these truths, being ever so certain, ever so clear, he may be ignorant of either or all of them, who will never take the pains to employ his faculties as he should to inform himself about them. End of section 14. Section 15 of an essay Concerning Human Understanding by John Locke Book four of Knowledge and Probability this is a Librivox recording. All Librivox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit Librivox.org Chapter 14 of Judgment 1. Our knowledge being short, we want something else. The understanding faculties being given to man, not barely for speculation, but also for the conduct of his life, man would be at a great loss if he had nothing to direct him but what has the certainty of true knowledge. For that, being very short and scanty, as we have seen, it, would be often utterly in the dark, and in most of the action of his life perfectly at his stand, had he nothing to guide him in the absence of clear and certain knowledge. He that will not eat till he has demonstration that it will nourish him he that will not stir till infallibly knows the business he goes about, will succeed, will have little else to do, but to sit still and perish. 2. What used to be made of this twilight state? Therefore, as God has set some things in broad daylight, as he has given us some certain knowledge, though limited to a few things, in comparison, probably as it is to what intellectual creatures are capable of, to excite in us a desire and endeavour after a better state, so in the greatest part of our concernments, he has afforded us only the twilight, as I may so say, of probability suitable, I presume, to that state of mediocrity and probationership he has been pleased to place us in here, wherein, to check our overconfidence and presumption, we might by every day's experience be made sensible of our short sightedness and liableness to error. The sense whereof might be a constant admonition to us to spend the days of this our pilgrimage with industry and care in the search and following of that way which might lead us to a state of greater perfection it being highly rational to think even were revelation silent, in the case that as men employ those talents God has given them here, they shall accordingly receive their rewards at the close of the day, when their sun shall set, and night shall put an end to their labors. 3. Judgment, or assent to probability, supplies our want of knowledge. The faculty which God has given man to supply the want of clear and certain knowledge, in cases where that cannot be had, is judgment whereby the man takes its ideas to agree or disagree, or which is the same any proposition to be true or false, without perceiving a demonstrative evidence in the proofs. The mind sometimes exercises this judgment out of necessity, where demonstrative proofs and certain knowledge are not to be had, and sometimes out of laziness, unskilfulness, or haste. Even where demonstrative and certain proofs are to be had, men often stay not warily to examine the agreement or disagreement of two ideas which they are desirous or concerned to know, but either incapable of such attention as is requisite in a long train of gradations, or impatient of delay, lightly cast their eyes on, or wholly pass by the proofs, and so without making out the demonstration, determine of the agreement or disagreement of two ideas, as it were, by a view of them as they are at a distance, and take it to be the one or the other as seems most likely to them upon such a loose survey. This faculty of the mind, when it is exercised immediately about things, is called judgment when about truths delivered in words, is most commonly called assent or dissent, which being the most usual way wherein the mind has occasion to employ this faculty, I shall under these terms treat of it as least liable in our language to equivocation. 4. Judgment is the presuming things to be so without perceiving it Thus the minus two faculties conversant about truth and falsehood first, Knowledge, whereby it certainly perceives and is undoubtedly satisfied of the agreement or or disagreement of any ideas. Secondly. Judgment, which is the putting ideas together, or separating them from one another in the mind, when their certain agreement or disagreement is not perceived, but presumed to be so which is as the word imports, taken to be so before it certainly appears and if it so unites or separates them, as in reality things are in it is right judgment. End of section 15.
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Narrator (Grainger Advertisement)
Section 16 of an essay Concerning Human Understanding by John Locke, Book four of Knowledge and Probability this is a Librivox recording. All Librivox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit Librivox.org recording by Jennifer Henry Chapter 15 of Probability 1. Probability is the appearance of agreement upon fallible proofs as demonstration is the showing the agreement or disagreement of two ideas by the intervention of one or more proofs, which have a constant in immutable and visible connexion one with another. So probability is nothing but the appearance of such an agreement or disagreement by the intervention of proofs whose connection is not constant and immutable, or at least is not perceived to be so, but is or appears for the most part to be so, and is enough to induce the mind to judge the proposition to be true, true or false, rather than the contrary. For example, in the demonstration of it, a man perceives the certain immutable connexion there is of equality between the three angles of a triangle and those intermediate ones which are made use of to show their equality to two right ones. And so by an intuitive knowledge of the agreement or disagreement of the intermediate ideas in each step of the progress, the whole series is continued with an evidence which clearly shows the agreement or disagreement of those three angles in equality to two right ones and thus he has certain knowledge that it is so. But another man, who never took the pains to observe the demonstration, hearing a mathematician, a man of credit, affirm the three angles of a triangle to be equal to two right ones, assents to it, that is, receives it for true, in which case the foundation of his assent is the probability of the thing, the proof being such as for the most part carries truth with it the man on whose testimony he receives it not being wont to affirm anything contrary to or besides his knowledge, especially in matters of this kind. So that that which causes his assent to this proposition, that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right ones, that which makes him take these ideas to agree without knowings them to do so, is the wonted veracity of the speaker in other cases, or his supposed veracity in this. 2. It is to supply our want of knowledge, our knowledge, as has been shown, being very narrow, and we not happy enough to find certain truth in everything which we have occasion to consider. Most of the propositions we think reason discourse, nay, act upon, are such as we cannot have undoubted knowledge of their truth yet some of them will border so near upon certainty that we make no act according to the assent, as resolutely as if they were infallibly demonstrated, and that our knowledge of them was perfect and certain. But there being degrees herein from the very neighbourhood of certainty and demonstration, quite down to improbability and unlikeness, even to the confines of impossibility, and also degrees of assent from full assurance and confidence, quite down to conjecture, doubt, and distrust. I shall come now, having, as I think, found out the bounds of human knowledge and certainty in the next place to consider the several degrees and grounds of probability and assent or faith.
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3.
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Being that which makes us presume things to be true before we know them to be so. Probability is likeliness to be true. The very notation of the word signifying such a proposition, for which there be arguments or proofs to make it pass or be received for true. The entertainment the mind gives this sort of proposition is called belief, assent, or opinion, which is the admitting or receiving any proposition for true upon arguments or proofs that are found to persuade us to receive it as true, without certain knowledge that it is so. And herein lies the difference between probability and certainty, faith and knowledge. That in all the parts of knowledge there is intuition, each immediate idea, each step, has its visible and certain connection in belief. Not so. That which makes me believe is something extraneous to the thing I believe, something not evidently joined on both sides to, and so not manifestly showing the agreement or disagreement of those ideas that are under consideration.
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Narrator (McDonald's Advertisement)
4.
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Narrator (Grainger Advertisement)
The grounds of probability are conformity with our own experience or the testimony of others. Probability, then, being to supply the defect of our knowledge, and to guide us where that fails, is always conversant about propositions whereof we have no certainty, but only some inducements to receive them for true. The grounds of it are, in short, these two. First, the conformity of anything with our own knowledge, observation, and experience. Secondly, the testimony of others, vouching their observation and experience in the testimony of others, is to be considered 1. The number. 2. The integrity.
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3.
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The skill of the witnesses.
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4.
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The design of the author, where it is a testimony out of a book cited.
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Narrator (Librivox Reading - John Locke)
5.
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The consistency of the parts and circumstances of the relation. 6. Contrary testimonies.
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Narrator (Librivox Reading - John Locke)
5.
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In this all the arguments pro and con, ought to be examined before we come to a judgment.
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Probability.
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Wanting that intuitive evidence which infallibly determines the understanding and produces certain knowledge, the mind, if it will proceed rationally, ought to examine all the grounds of probability, and see how they make more or less for or against any proposition before it assents to, or dissents from it, and upon a due, balancing the whole, reject, or receive it with a more or less firm assent, proportionably to the preponderancy of the greater grounds of probability on one side or the other. For example, if I myself see a man walk on the ice, it is past probability, it is knowledge. But if another tells me he saw a man in England in the midst of a sharp winter, walk upon water hardened with cold, this has so great conformity with what is usually observed to happen, that I am disposed by the nature of the thing itself to assent to it, unless some manifest suspicion attend the relation of that matter of fact. But if the same thing be told to one born between the tropics, who never saw nor heard of any such thing before there the whole probability relies on testimony and as the relaters are more in number, and of more credit, and have no interest to speak contrary to the truth, so that matter of fact is like to find more or less belief though to a man whose experience has always been quite contrary, and who has never heard of anything like it, the most untainted credit of a witness would will scarce be able to find belief as it happened to a Dutch ambassador, who, entertaining the king of Siam with the particularities of Holland, which he was inquisitive after, amongst other things, told him that the water in his country would sometimes in cold weather be so hard that men walked upon it, and that it would bear an elephant if he were there. To which the king replied, hitherto I have believed the strange things you have told me, because I look upon you as a sober, fair man but now I am sure you lie. 6. Probable arguments capable of great variety. Upon these grounds depends the probability of any proposition and as the conformity of our knowledge, as the certainty of observations, as the frequency and constancy of experience, and the number and credibility of testimonies do more or less agree or disagree with it, so is any proposition in itself more or less probable. There is another, I confess, which, though by itself it be no true ground of probability, yet is often made use of for one by which men most commonly regulate their assent, and upon which they pin their faith more than anything else and that is the opinion of others though there cannot be a more dangerous thing to rely on, nor more likely to mislead one since there is much more falsehood and error among men than truth and knowledge and if the opinions and persuasions of others, whom we know and think well of, be a ground of assent and men have reason to be heathens in Japan, Mahatmatans in Turkey, Papists in Spain, Protestants in England, and the Lutherans in Sweden. But of this wrong ground of assent I shall have occasion to speak more at large in another place. Recording by jennifer henry. Section 17 of An Essay Concerning Human Understanding by John Locke, book 4 of Knowledge and Probability. This is a Librivox recording. All Librivox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit Librivox.org Recording by Jennifer Henry Chapter 16 of the Degrees of Ascent 1. Our ascent ought to be regulated by the grounds of probability. The grounds of probability we have laid down in the FOREGOING chapter As they are the foundations on which our ascent is built, so are they also the measure whereby its several degrees are or ought to be regulated. Only we are to take notice that whatever grounds of probability there may be, they yet operate no further on the mind which searches after truth, and endeavours to judge right than they appear, at least in the first judgment or search that the mind makes. I confess, in the opinions men have and firmly stick to in the world, their assent is not always from an actual view of the reasons that at first prevailed with them it being in many cases almost impossible, and in most very hard, even for those who have very admirable memories, to retain all the proofs which, upon a due examination made them embrace that side of the question, it suffices that they have once, with care and fairness sifted the matter as far as they could, and that they have searched into all the particulars that they could imagine to give any light to the question, and with the best of their skill cast up the account upon the whole evidence. And thus having once found, found on which side the probability appeared to them after as full and exact an inquiry as they can make, they lay up the conclusion in their memories as a truth they have discovered and for the future they remain satisfied with the testimony of their memories. That this is the opinion that by the proofs they have once seen of it deserves such a degree of their assent that as they afford it. 2. These cannot always be actually in view, and then we must content ourselves with the remembrance that we once saw ground for such a degree of assent. This is all that the greatest part of men are capable of doing in regulating their opinions and judgments, unless a man will exact of them either to retain distinct distinctly in their memories all the proofs concerning any probable truth, and that too, in the same order and regular deduction of consequences in which they have formerly placed or seen them which sometimes is enough to fill a large volume on one single question or else they must require a man for every opinion that he embraces every day to examine the proofs, both which are impossible. It is unavoidable, therefore, that the memory be relied on in the case, and that men be persuaded of several opinions whereof the proofs are not actually in their thoughts, nay, which perhaps they are not able actually to recall. Without this the greatest part of men must be either very sceptics, or change every moment, and yield themselves up to whoever, having lately studied the question, offers them arguments which, for want of memory, they are not able to presently answer. 3. The ill consequence of this, if our former judgments were not rightly made, I cannot but own that men's sticking to their past judgment, judgment, and adhering firmly to conclusions formerly made is often the cause of great obstinacy in error and mistake. But the fault is not that they rely on their memories for what they have before well judged, but because they judged before they had well examined. May we not find a great number, not to say the greatest part, part, of men that think they have formed right judgments of several matters, and that for no other reason but because they never thought otherwise, that themselves to have judged right only because they never questioned, never examined their own opinions. Which is indeed to think they judged right, because they never judged at all. And yet these of all men hold their opinions with the greatest stiffness, those being generally the most fierce and firm in their tenets who have least examined them. What we once know, we are certain is so. And we may be secure that there are no latent proofs undiscovered which may overturn our knowledge or bring it in doubt. But in matters of probability it is not. In every case we can be sure that we have all the particulars before us that any way concern the question and that there is no evidence behind and yet unseen, which may cast the probability on the other side and outweigh all that at present seems to preponderate with us. Who almost is there that hath the leisure, patience, and means to collect together all the proofs concerning most of the opinions he has so as safely to conclude that he hath a clear and full view, and that there is no more to be alleged for his better information. And yet we are forced to determine ourselves on the one side or other. The conduct of our lives and the management of our great concerns will not bear delay. For those depend for the most part on the determination of our judgment in points wherein we are not capable of certain and demonstrative knowledge and wherein it is necessary for us to embrace the one side or the other.
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4.
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The right use of it, mutual charity and forbearance in a necessary diversity of opinions. Since, therefore, it is unavoidable to the greatest part of men, if not all, to have several opinions without certain and indubitable proofs of their truth. And it carries too great an imputation of ignorance, lightness, or folly, for men to quit and renounce their former tenants presently upon the offer of an argument which they cannot immediately answer and show the insufficiency of it would methinks become all men to maintain peace and the common offices. Of humanity and friendship in the diversity of opinions since we cannot reasonably expect that any one should readily and obsequiously quit his own opinion, and embrace ours with a blind resignation to an authority which the understanding of man acknowledges not for, however it may often mistake, it can own no other guide but reason, nor blindly submit to to the will and dictates of another. If he you would bring over to your sentiments, be one that examines before he assents, you must give him leave at his leisure to go over the account again, and, recalling what is out of his mind, examine all the particulars, to see on which side the advantage lies and if he will not think our arguments of of weight enough to engage him anew in so much pains, it is but what we often do ourselves in the like case, and we should take it amiss if others should prescribe to us what points we should study. And if he be one who takes his opinions upon trust, how can we imagine that he should renounce those tenets which time and custom have so settled in his mind, and that he thinks them self evident, and of an unquestionably certainty, or which he takes to be impressions he has received from God himself, or from men sent by him? How can we expect, I say, that opinions thus settled should be given up to the arguments or authority of a stranger or adversary especially if there be any suspicion of interest or design, as there never fails to be, where men find themselves ill trusted, we should do well to commiserate our mutual ignorance, and endeavour to remove it in all the gentle and fair ways of information, and not instantly treat others ill as obstinate and perverse, because they will not renounce their own and receive our opinions, or at least those we would force upon them, when it is more than probable that we are no less obstinate in not embracing some of theirs. For where is the man that has incontestable evidence of the truth of all that he holds, or of the falsehood of all he condemns, or can say that he has examined to the bottom all his own or other men's opinions? The necessity of believing without knowledge, nay, often upon very slight grounds in this fleeting state of action and blindness we are in, should make us more busy and careful to inform ourselves than constrain others. At least those who have not thoroughly examined to the bottom all their own tenets, must confess they are unfit to prescribe to others, and are unreasonable in imposing that as truth on other men's belief, which they themselves have not searched into nor weighed the arguments of probability on which they should receive or reject it. Those who have fairly and truly examined, and are thereby got past doubt in all the doctrines they profess and govern themselves by, would have a juster pretence to require others to follow them. But these are so few in number, and find so little reason to be magisterial in their opinions, that nothing insolent and imperious is to be expected from them and there is reason to think that if men were better instructed themselves, they would be less imposing on others. 5. Probability is either of sensible matter of fact capable of human testimony, or of what is beyond the evidence of our senses. But to return to the grounds of assent, and the several degrees of it, we are to take notice that the propositions we receive upon inducements of probability are of two sorts of either concerning some particular existence, or, as it is usually termed, matter of fact, which, falling under observation, is capable of human testimony, or else concerning things which, being beyond the discovery of our senses, are not capable of any such testimony. 6. Concerning the first of these, viz. Particular matter of fact, 1. The concurrent experience of all other men with ours produces assurance approaching to knowledge, where any particular thing consonant to the constant observation of ourselves and others in the like case comes attested by the concurrent reports of all that mention it, we receive it as easily, and build as firmly upon it as if it were certain knowledge and we reason and act thereupon with as little doubt as if it were perfect demonstration. Thus if all Englishmen who have occasion to mention it, should affirm that it froze in England the last winter, or that there were sweet swallows seen there in the summer, I think a man could almost as little doubt of it as that. 7 and 4 are. 11. The first, therefore, and highest degree of probability is when the general consent of all men in all ages, as far as it can be known, concurs with a man's constant and never failing experience in like cases to confirm the truth of any particular matter of fact attested by fair witnesses. Such are all the stated constitutions and properties of bodies, and the regular proceedings of causes and effects in the ordinary course of nature. This we call an argument from the nature of things themselves for what our own and other men's good constant observation has found always to be after the same manner that we with reason conclude to be the effect of steady and regular causes, though they come not within the reach of our knowledge. Thus that fire warmed a man made lead fluid, and changed the color or consistency in wood or charcoal that iron sunk in water, and swam in quicksilver these and the like propositions about particular facts being agreeable to our constant experience, as often as we have to do with these matters, and being generally spoke of when mentioned by others, as things found constantly to be so, and therefore not so much as controverted by anybody, we are put past doubt that a relation affirming any such thing to have been, or any predication that it will happen again in the same manner, is very true. These probabilities rise so near to certainty that they govern our thoughts as absolutely as, and influence all our actions as fully as the most evident demonstration and in what concerns us, we make little or no difference between them and certain knowledge. Our belief thus grounded, rises to assurance. 7. 2. Unquestionable testimony and our own experience. Experience that a thing is for the most part so produce confidence. The next degree of probability is when I find by my own experience, and the agreement of all others that mention it, a thing to be for the most part so, and that the particular instance of it is attested by many and undoubted witnesses. V. G. History Giving us such an account of men in all ages, and my own experience, as far as I had an opportunity to observe, confirming it, that most men prefer their private advantage to the public. If all historians that write of Tiberius say that Tiberius did so, it is extremely probable and in this case our assent has a sufficient foundation to raise itself to a degree which we may call confidence. 8. 3. Fair testimony and the nature of the thing indifferent produce unavoidable assent in things that happen indifferently, as that a bird should fly this or that way, that it should thunder on a man's right or left hand, et cetera. When any particular matter of fact is vouched by the concurrent testimony of unsuspected witnesses there our assent is also unavoidable. Thus, that there is such a city in Italy as rome, that about 1,700 years ago there lived in it a man called Julius Caesar, that he was a general, and that he won a battle against another called Pompey. This though in the nature of the thing there be nothing for nor against it yet being related by historians of credit, and contradicted by no one writer, a man cannot avoid believing it, and can as little doubt of it as he does of the being and actions of his own acquaintance whereof he himself is a witness. 9. Experience and testimonies, clashing infinitely, vary the degrees of probability. Thus far the matter goes easy enough. Probability upon such grounds carries so much evidence with it, that it naturally determines the judgment, and leaves us as little liberty to believe or Disbelieve, as a demonstration does, whether we will know or be ignorant. The difficulty is, when testimonies contradict common experience, and the reports of history and witnesses clash with the ordinary course of nature, or with one another. There it is, where diligence, attention, and exactness are required to form a right judgment, and to proportion the assent to the different evidence and probability of the thing which rises and falls according as those two foundations of credibility, viz. Common observation in like cases, and particular testimonies in that particular instance, favor or contradict it. These are liable to so great variety of contrary observations, circumstances, reports, different qualifications, tempers, designs, oversights, etc. Of the reporters, that it is impossible to reduce to precise rules the various degrees wherein men give their assent. This only may be said in general, that as the arguments and proofs pro and con, upon due examination, nicely weighing every particular circumstance, shall to any one appear upon the whole matter in a greater or less degree to preponderate on either side, so they are fitted to produce in the mind to such different entertainments as we call belief, conjecture, guess, doubt, wavering, distrust, disbelief, etc. 10. Traditional testimonies. The further removed, the less their proof becomes. This is what concerns assent in matters wherein testimony is made use of, of, concerning which I think it may not be amiss to take notice of a rule observed in the law of England, which is, that though the attested copy of a record be good proof, yet the copy of a copy ever so well attested, and by ever so credible witnesses, will not be admitted as a proof in judicature. This is so generally approved as reasonable and suited to the wisdom and caution to be used in our inquiry after material truths that I never yet heard of any one that blamed it. This practice, if it be allowable in the decisions of right and wrong, carries this observation along with it, viz. That any testimony, the further off it is from the original truth, truth, the less force and proof it has, the being and existence of the thing itself is what I call the original truth. A credible man vouching his knowledge of it is a good proof but if another, equally credible, do witness it from his report, the testimony is weaker, and a third that attests the hearsay of, of an hearsay is yet less considerable, so that in traditional truths each remove weakens the force of the proof, and the more hands the tradition has successively passed through, the less strength and evidence does it receive from them. This I thought necessary to be taken notice of, because I find amongst some men the quite contrary commonly practised, who look on opinions to gain force by growing older, and what a thousand years since would not to a rational man contemporary with the first voucher have appeared at all probable, is now urged as certain beyond all question only because several have since from him said it one after another. Upon this ground propositions evidently false or doubtful enough in their first beginning, come by an inverted rule of probability to pass for authentic truths and those which found or deserved little credit from the mouths of their first authors are thought to grow venerable by age, are urged as undeniable. 11. Yet history is of great use. I would not be thought here to lessen the credit and use of history. It is all the light we have in many cases, and we receive from it a great part of the useful truths we have with a convincing evidence. I think nothing more valuable than the records of antiquity. I wish we had more of them, and more uncorrupted. But this truth itself forces me to say that no probability can rise higher than its first original. What has no other evidence than the single testimony of one only witnessed, must stand or fall by his only testimony, whether good, bad, or indifferent, and though cited afterwards by hundreds of others, one after another is so far from receiving any strength thereby, that it is only the weaker passion, interest, inadvertency, mistake of his meaning, and a thousand odd reasons or or capricious men's minds are acted by impossible to be discovered, may make one man quote another man's words or meaning wrong he that has but ever so little examined. The citations of writers cannot doubt how little credit the quotations deserve where the originals are wanting, and consequently how much less quotations of quote quotations can be relied on. This is certain, that what in one age was affirmed upon slight grounds, can never after come to be more valid in future ages by being often repeated. But the further still it is from the original, the less valid it is, and has always less force in the mouth or writing of him that last made use of it than in his from whom he received it. 12. Secondly, in things which sense cannot discover, analogy is the great rule of probability. Secondly, the probabilities we have hitherto mentioned are only such as concern matter of fact, and such things as are capable of observation and testimony, there remains that other sort concerning which men entertain opinions with variety of assent. Though the things be such that, falling not under the reach of our senses, they are not capable of testimony such the existence, nature, and operations of finite immaterial beings, without us as spirits, angels, devils, c. Or the existence of material beings, which either for their smallness in themselves, or remoteness from us, our senses cannot take notice of, as whether there be any plants, animals, and intelligent inhabitants in the planets and other mansions of the vast universe. 2. Concerning the manner of operation in most parts of the works of nature, wherein, though we see the sensible effects, yet their causes are unknown, and we perceive not the ways and manner how they are produced, we see animals are generated, nourished, and move, the loadstone draws iron, and the parts of a candle, successively melting, turn into flame, and give us both light and heat. These and the like effects we see and know. But the causes that operate, and the manner they are produced in, we can only guess and probably conjecture. For these and the like, coming not within the scrutiny of human senses, cannot be examined by them, or be attested by anybody, and therefore can appear more or less probable only as they more or less agree to truths that are established in our minds, and as they hold proportion to other parts of our knowledge and observation. Analogy in these matters is the only help we have, and it is from that alone which we draw all our grounds of probability. Thus observing that the bare rubbing of two bodies violently one upon another, produces heat, and very often fire itself, we have reason to think that what we call heat and fire consists in a violent agitation of the imperceptible minute parts of the burning matter. Observing likewise that the different refractions of pellucid bodies produce in our eyes the different appearances of several colours, and also that the different ranging and layering the superficial parts of several bodies, as of Velvet, watered silk, etc. Does the like, we think it proper probable that the colour and shining of bodies is in them nothing but the different arrangement and refraction of their minute and insensible parts. Thus finding in all parts of the creation that fall under human observation, that there is a gradual connection of one with another, without any great or discernible gaps between between in all that great variety of things we see in the world, which are so closely linked together that in the several ranks of beings it is not easy to discover the bounds betwixt them, we have reason to be persuaded that by such gentle steps things ascend upward in degrees of perfection. It is a hard matter to say where sensible and rational begin, and where insensible and irrational end. And who is there quick sighted enough to determine precisely which is the lowest species of living things, and which the first of those which have no life things, as far as we can observe, lessen and augment, as the quantity does in a regular cone, where, though there be a manifest odds betwixt the bigness of the diameter at a remote distance yet the difference between the upper and under where they touch one another is hardly discernible. The difference is exceeding great between some men and some animals but if we will compare the understanding and abilities of some some men and some brutes, we shall find so little difference that it will be hard to say that that of man is either clearer or larger, observing, I say, such gradual and gentle descents downward in those parts of the creation that are beneath man. The rule of analogy may make it probable that it is so also in things above us and our observation and that there are several ranks of intelligent beings excelling us in several degrees of perfection, ascending upwards towards the infinite perfection of the Creator, by gentle steps and differences that are every one at no great distance from the next to it. This sort of probability, which is the best conduct of rational experiments and the rise of hypothesis, has also its use and influence and a wary reasoning from analogy leads us often into the discovery of truths and useful productions which would otherwise lie concealed. 13. One case where contrary experience lessens not the testimony. Though the common experience and the ordinary course of things have justly a mighty influence on the minds of men, to make them give or refuse credit to anything proposed to their belief. Yet there is one case wherein the strangeness of the fact lessens not the assent to a fair testimony given of it. For where such supernatural events are suitable to ends aimed at by him who has the power to change the course of nature there, under such circumstances, that may be the fitter to produce belief by how much the more they are beyond or contrary to ordinary observation. This is the problem proper case of miracles, which well attested, do not only find credit themselves, but give it also to other truths which need such confirmation. 14. The bare testimony of divine revelation is the highest certainty besides those we have hitherto mentioned. There is one sort of propositions and that challenge the highest degree of our assent upon bare testimony, whether the thing proposed agree or disagree with common experience, and the ordinary course of things, or no. The reason whereof is because the testimony is of such an one as cannot deceive nor be deceived, and that is of God himself. This carries with it an assurance beyond doubt, evidence beyond exception. This is called by a peculiar name revelation, and our assent to it faith, which as absolutely determines our minds, and as perfectly excludes all waverings as our knowledge itself and we may as well doubt other of our own being as we can, whether any revelation from God be true. So that faith is a settled and sure principle of assent and assurance, and leaves no manner of room for doubt or hesitation. Only we must be sure that it be a divine revelation, and that we understand it right else we shall expose ourselves to all the extravagancy of enthusiasm, and all the error of wrong principles, if we have faith and assurance in what is not divine revelation and therefore in those cases our assent can be rationally no higher than the evidence of its being a revelation and that this is the meaning of the expression expression it is delivered in. If the evidence of its being a revelation, or that this is its true sense, be only on probable proofs, our assent can reach no higher than an assurance or diffidence arising from the more or less apparent probability of the proofs but of faith, and the precedency it ought to have before other arguments of persuasion. I shall speak more hereafter where I treat it as it is ordinarily placed, in contradistinction to reason, though in truth it being nothing else but an assent founded on the highest reason. End of Section 17 recording by Jennifer Henry.
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Chapter 17 of an essay Concerning Human Understanding. This is a Librivox recording. All Librivox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit Librivox.org An Essay Concerning Human Understanding by John Locke Chapter 17 of Reason Various Significations of the Word Reason the word reason in the English language has different significations. Sometimes it is taken for true and clear principles, sometimes for clear and fair deductions from those principles, and sometimes for the cause, and particularly the final cause. But the consideration I shall have of it here is in a signification different from all these and that is as it stands for a faculty in man, that faculty whereby man is supposed to be distinguished from beasts, and wherein it is evident, he much surpasses them, wherein reasoning consists. If general knowledge, as been shown, consists in a perception of the agreement or disagreement of our own ideas, and the knowledge of the existence of all things without us, except only of a God, whose existence every man may certainly know and demonstrate to himself from his own existence, be had only by our senses, what room is there for the exercise of any other faculty, but outward sense and inward perception? What need is there of reason very much both for the enlargement of our knowledge, and regulating our ascent for it hath to do both in knowledge and opinion, and is necessary and assisting to all our other intellectual faculties, and indeed contains two of them, viz. Sagacity and elation, by the one it finds out, and by the other it so orders the intermediate ideas as to discover what connection there is to in each link of the chain whereby the extremes are held together, and thereby, as it were, to draw into view the truth sought for which is that which we call elation or inference, and consists in nothing but the perception of the connection there is between the ideas in each step of the deduction, whereby the mind comes to see either the certain agreement or disagreement of any two ideas, as in demonstration in which it arrives at knowledge, or their probable connection on which it gives or withholds its assent, as in opinion, sense and intuition reach but a very little way, the greatest part of our knowledge depends upon deductions and intermediate ideas. And in those cases where we are fain to substitute assent instead of knowledge, and take propositions for true without being certain they are so, we have need to find out, examine, and compare the grounds of their probability. In both these cases, the faculty which finds out the means and rightly applies them to discover certainty in the one and probability in the other, is that which we call reason. For as reason perceives the necessary and indubitable connection of all the ideas or proofs one to another in each step of any demonstration that produces knowledge, so it likewise perceives the probable connection of all the ideas or proofs, one to another, in every step of a discourse to which it will think assent due. This is the lowest degree of that which can truly be called reason. For where the mind does not perceive this probable connection, where it does not discern whether there be any such connection or no, there men's opinions are not the product of judgment or the consequence of reason, but the effects of chance and hazard of a mind floating at all adventures without choice and without direction. Reason and its 4 degrees. So that we may reason. Consider these 4 degrees. The first and highest is the discovering and finding out of truths the second, the regular and methodical disposition of them, and laying them in a clear and fit order to make their connection and force be plainly and easily perceived. The third is the perceiving their connection and the fourth, a making a right conclusion. These several degrees may be observed in any mathematical demonstration, it being one thing to perceive the connection of each part, as the demonstration is made by another another to perceive the dependence of the conclusion on all the parts. A third to make out a demonstration clearly and neatly one's self and something different from all these, to have first found out these intermediate ideas or proofs by which it is made. Whether syllogism is the great instrument of reason. There is one thing more which I shall desire to be considered concerning reason and that is, whether syllogism, as is generally thought, be the proper instrument of it, and the usefulest way of exercising this faculty. The causes I have to doubt are these. First cause to doubt this first, because syllogism serves our reason, but in one only of the forementioned parts of it and that is to show the connection of the proofs in any one instance, and no more. But in this it is of no great use, since the mind can perceive such connection where it really is, as easily, nay, perhaps better, without it. Men can reason well who cannot make a syllogism. If we will observe the actings of our own minds, we shall find that we reason best and clearest when we only observe the connection of the proof, without reducing our thoughts to any rule of syllogism. And therefore we may take notice that there are many men that reason exceedingly clear and rightly, who know not how to make a syllogism. He that will look into many parts of Asia and America will find men reason there, perhaps as acutely as himself, who yet never heard of a syllogism, nor can reduce any one argument to those forms. And I believe scarce any one makes syllogisms in reasoning within himself. Indeed, syllogism is made use of on occasion to discover a fallacy hid in a rhetorical flourish, or cunningly wrapped up in a smooth period and stripping an absurdity of the COVID of wit and good language, show it in its naked deformity. But the mind is not taught to reason by these rules. It has a native faculty to perceive the coherence or incoherence of its ideas, and can range them right without any such perplexing repetitions. Tell a country gentlewoman that the wind is southwest and the weather lowering and like to rain, and she will easily understand it is not safe for her to go abroad thin clad in such a day after a fever. She clearly sees the probable connection of all these, these southwest wind and clouds, rain, wetting, taking, cold, relapse, and danger of death, without tying them together in those artificial and cumbersome fetters of several syllogisms that clog and hinder the mind, which proceeds from one part to another quicker and clearer without them. And the probability which she easily perceives in things thus in their native state, would be quite lost if this argument were managed learnedly and proposed in mode and figure for it very often confounds the connection. And I think everyone will perceive in mathematical demonstrations that the knowledge gained thereby comes shortest and clearest without syllogism. Secondly, because, though syllogism serves to show the force or fallacy of an argument made use of in the usual way of discoursing, by supplying the absent proposition, and so setting it before the view in a clear light, yet it no less engages the mind in the perplexity of obscure, equivocal, and fallacious terms, wherewith this artificial way of reasoning always abounds, it being adapted more to the attaining of victory in dispute than the discovery and confirmation of truth in fair inquiries. Syllogism helps little in demonstration, less in probability. But however it be in knowledge, I think I may truly say it is of far less or no use at all in probabilities, for the assent there being to be determined by the preponderance, after due weighing, of all the proofs, with all circumstances on both sides, nothing is so unfit to assist the mind in that as syllogism, which, running away with one assumed probability or one topical argument, pursues that till it has led the mind quite out of sight of the thing under consideration, and forcing it upon some remote difficulty, holds it fast there entangled, perhaps, and as it were, manacled in the chain of syllogisms, without allowing it the liberty, much less affording it the helps requisite to show on which side all things considered is the greater. Probability serves not to increase our knowledge, but to fence with the knowledge we suppose we have. But let it help us, as perhaps may be said, in convincing men of their errors and mistakes. And yet I would fain see the man that was forced out of his opinion by dint of syllogism. Yet still it fails our reason in that part which, if not its highest perfection, is yet certainly its hardest task, and that which we most need its help in, and that is the finding out of proofs and making of new discoveries. The rules of syllogism serve not to furnish the mind with those intermediate ideas that may show the connection of remote ones. This way of reasoning discovers no new proofs, but is the art of marshalling and ranging the old ones we have already. The 47th proposition of the first book of Euclid is very true, but the discovery of it I think, not owing to any rules of common logic. A man knows first, and then he is able to prove syllogistically. So that syllogism comes after knowledge, and then a man has little or no need of it. But it is chiefly by the finding out of those ideas that show the connection of distant ones, that our stock of knowledge is increased, and that useful arts and sciences are advanced. Syllogism at best is but the art of fencing, with the little knowledge we have, without making any addition to it. And if a man should employ his reason all this way, he will not do much otherwise than he who, having got some iron out of the bowels of the earth, should have it beaten up all into swords, and put it in his servants hands to fence with, and bang one another. Had the king of Spain employed the hands of his people and his Spanish irons, so he had brought to light but little of that treasure that lay so long hid in the dark entrails of America. And I am apt to think that he who shall employ all the force of his reason only in brandishing of syllogisms, will discover very little of that mass knowledge which lies yet concealed in the secret recesses of nature, and which I, I am apt to think native rustic reason, as it formerly has done, is likelier to open a way to and add to the common stock of mankind, rather than any scholastic proceeding by the strict rules of mode and figure. Other helps to reason than syllogism should be sought. I doubt not, nevertheless, that there are ways to be found to assist our reason. In this most useful part. And this the judicious Hooker encourages me to say, who in his Ecclesiastical politic book I, section 6, speaks. If there might be added the right steps of true art and learning which helps, I must plainly confess, this age of the world, carrying the name of a learned age, doth neither much know nor generally a regard. There would undoubtedly be almost as much difference in maturity of judgment between the men therewith inured and that which men now are, as between men that are now and innocents. I do not pretend to have found or discovered here any of those right helps of art this great man of deep thought mentions. But that is plain, that syllogism and the logic now in use, which were as well known in his days, can be none of those he means. It is sufficient for me, if by a discourse, perhaps something out of the way, I am sure, as to me wholly new and unborrowed, I shall have given occasion to others to cast about for new discoveries and to seek in their own thoughts for those right helps of art, which will be scarce found, I fear, by those who servily confine themselves to the rules and dictates of others. For beaten tracks lead this sort of cattle, as an observing Roman calls them, whose thoughts reach only to imitation. Non quo eendam est sed quo I Tur. But I can be bold to say that this age is adorned with some men of that strength of judgment and largeness of comprehension, that, if they would employ their thoughts on this subject, could open new and undiscovered ways to the advancement of knowledge. We can reason about particulars, and the immediate object of our reasonings is nothing but particular ideas. Having here had occasion to speak of syllogism in general, and the use of it in reasoning, and the improvement of our knowledge, it is fit, before I leave this subject, to take notice of one manifest mistake in the rules of syllogism, viz. That no syllogistical reasoning can be right and conclusive, but what has at least one general proposition in it, as if we could not reason and have knowledge about particulars whereas in truth, the matter rightly considered, the immediate object of all our reasoning and knowledge is nothing but particulars. Every man's reasoning and knowledge is only about the ideas existing in his own mind, which are truly every one of them particular existences and our knowledge and reason about other things is only as they correspond with with those, our particular ideas so that the perception of the agreement or disagreement of our particular ideas is the whole and utmost of all our knowledge. Universality is but accidental to it, and consists only in that the particular ideas about which it is are such as more than one particular thing can correspond with and be represented by but the perception of the agreement or disagreement of our particular ideas and consequently our knowledge is equally clear and certain, whether either or both, or neither of those ideas be capable of representing more real beings than one or no. Our reason often fails us. Reason, though it penetrates into the depths of the sea and earth, elevates our thoughts as high as the stars, and leads us through the vast spaces and large rooms of this mighty fabric. Yet it comes far short of the real extent of even corporal being. And there are many instances wherein it fails us, as first, in cases when we have no ideas, it perfectly fails us where our ideas fail, it neither does nor can extend itself further than they do and therefore wherever we have no ideas, our reasoning stops, and we are at an end of our reckoning and if at any time we reason about words which do not stand for any ideas, it is only about those sounds, and nothing else. Secondly, because our ideas are often obscure or imperfect, our reason is often puzzled and at a loss because of the obscurity, confusion, or imperfection of the ideas it is employed about and there we are involved in difficulties and contradictions, thus not having any perfect idea of the least extension of matter, nor of infinity, we are at a loss about the divisibility of matter. But having perfect, clear, and distinct ideas of number, our reason meets with none of those inextricable difficulties in numbers, nor finds itself involved in any contradictions about them. Thus we, having but imperfect ideas of the operations of our minds, and of the beginning of motion or thought, how the mind produces either of them in us, and much imperfecter yet of the operation of God, run into great difficulties about free created agents, which reason cannot well extricate itself out of. Thirdly, because we perceive not intermediate ideas to show conclusions, our reason is often at a stand because it perceives not those ideas which could serve to show the certain or probable agreement or disagreement of any other two ideas. And in this some men's faculties far outgo others till algebra, that great instrument and instance of human sagacity, was discovered. Men with amazement looked on several of the demonstrations of ancient mathematicians, and could scarce forbear to think the finding several of those to be something more than human. Fourthly, because we often proceed upon wrong principles, the mind, by proceeding upon false principles, is often engaged in absurdities and difficulties, brought into straits and contradictions, without knowing how to free itself. And in that case it is in vain to implore the help of reason, unless it be to discover the falsehood and reject the influence of those wrong principles. Reason is so far from clearing the difficulties which the building upon false foundation brings a man into, that if he will pursue it, it entangles him the more and engages him deeper in perplexities. Fifthly, because we often employ doubtful terms, as obscure and imperfect ideas often involve our reason, so upon the same ground do dubious words and uncertain signs, often in discourses and arguings, when not warily attended to, puzzle men's reason, and bring them to a non plus. But these two latter are our fault, and not the fault of reason. But yet the consequences of them are nevertheless obvious, and the perplexities or errors they fill man's minds with are everywhere observable. Our highest degree of knowledge is intuitive without reasoning. Some of the ideas that are in the mind are so there that they can be by themselves immediately compared with one another. And in these the mind is able to perceive that they agree or disagree as clearly as as that it has them. Thus the mind perceives that an arc of a circle is less than the whole circle, as clearly as it does the idea of a circle. And this therefore, as has been said, I call intuitive knowledge, which is certain beyond all doubt, and needs no probation. Nor can have any this being the highest of all human certainty. In this consists the evidence of all those maxims which nobody has any doubt about. But every man does not, as is said, only assents to, but knows to be true as soon as ever they are proposed to his understanding. In the discovery of an assent to these truths there is no use of the discursive faculty, no need of reasoning, but they are known by a superior and higher degree of evidence. And such, if I may guess at things unknown, I am apt to think that angels have now and the spirits of just men made perfect, shall have in a future state of thousands of things which now either wholly escape our apprehensions, or which our short sighted reason, having got some faint glimpse of, we in the dark grope after the next, is got by reasoning. But though we have here and there a little of this clear light, some sparks of bright knowledge, yet the greatest part of our ideas are such that we cannot discern their agreement or disagreement by an immediate comparing them. And in all these we have need of reasoning, and must by discourse and inference make our discoveries. Now, of these are two sorts, which I shall take the liberty to mention here again. First, through reasonings that are demonstrative. First, those whose agreement or disagreement, though it cannot be seen by an immediate putting them together, yet may be examined by the intervention of other ideas which can be compared with them. In this case, when the agreement or disagreement of the intermediate idea on both sides with those which we would compare is plainly discerned, there it amounts to demonstration whereby knowledge is produced, which, though it be certain, yet it is not so easy nor altogether so clear as intuitive knowledge. Because in that there is barely one simple intuition, wherein there is no room for any the least mistake or doubt, the truth is seen all perfectly at once. In demonstration it is true, there is intuition too, but not altogether at once. For there must be a remembrance of the intuition of the agreement of the medium or intermediate idea with that we compared it with before, when we compare it with the other. And where there be many mediums, there the danger of the mistake is the greater. For each agreement or disagreement of the ideas must be observed and seen in each step of the whole train, and retained in the memory just as it is. And the mind must be sure that no part of what is necessary to make up the demonstration is omitted or overlooked. This makes some demonstrations long and perplexed and too hard for those who have not strength of parts distinctly to perceive and exactly carry so many particulars orderly in their heads. And even those who are able to Master, such intricate speculations are fain sometimes to go over them again, and there is need of more than one review before they can arrive at certainty. But yet where the mind clearly retains the intuition it had of the agreement of any idea with another, and that with a third, and that with a fourth, etc. There the agreement of the first and the fourth is a demonstration, and produces certain knowledge, which may be called rational knowledge, as the other is intuitive. Secondly, to supply the narrowness of demonstrative and intuitive knowledge, we have nothing but judgment upon probable reasoning. Secondly, there are other ideas whose agreement or disagreement can no otherwise be judged of, but by the intervention of others, which have not a certain agreement with the extremes, but an usual or likely one and in these is that the judgment is properly exercised, which is the acquiescing of the mind, that any ideas do agree by comparing them with such probable mediums. This, though it never amounts to knowledge, no, not to that which is the lowest degree of it. Yet sometimes the intermediate ideas tie the extremes so firmly together, and the probability is so clear and strong, that assent as necessarily follows it as knowledge does, demonstration the great excellency and use of the judgment, is to observe right, and take a true estimate of the force and weight of each probability, and then, casting them up all right together, choose that side which has the overbalance. Intuition, Demonstration, Judgment. Intuitive knowledge is the perception of the certain agreement or disagreement of two ideas immediately compared together. Rational knowledge is the perception of the certain agreement or disagreement of any two ideas by the intervention of one or more other ideas. Judgment is the thinking or taking two ideas to agree or disagree by the intervention of one or more ideas whose certain agreement or disagreement with them is it does not perceive, but hath observed to be frequent and usual consequences of words and consequences of ideas, though the deducing one proposition from another, or making inferences in words, be a great part of reason, and that which it is usually employed about. Yet the principal act of ratiocination is, is the finding the agreement or disagreement of two ideas, one with another, by the intervention of a third, as a man by a yard finds two houses to be of the same length, which could not be brought together to measure their equality by juxtaposition. Words have their consequences as the signs of such ideas, and things agree or disagree, as really they are but we observe it only by our ideas. Four Sorts of arguments before we quit this subject, it may be worth our while a little to reflect on four sorts of arguments that men in their reasonings with others do ordinarily make use of to prevail on their assent, or at least so to awe them as to silence their opposition. First, argumentum ad the first is to allege the opinions of men whose parts, learning, eminency, power, or some other cause, has gained a name and settled their reputation in the common esteem with some kind of authority. When men are established in any kind of dignity, it is thought a breach of modesty for others to derogate any way from it, and question the authority of men who are in possession of it. This is apt to be censured as carrying with it too much pride when a man does not readily yield to the determination of approved authors, which is wont to be received with respect and submission by others and it is looked upon as insolence for a man to set up and adhere to his own opinion against the current stream of antiquity, or to put it in the balance against that of some learned doctor or otherwise approved writer. Whoever backs his tenants with such authorities, thinks he ought thereby to carry the cause, and is ready to style it impudence in any one who shall stand out against them. This I think, may be called argumentum ad vericundiam. Secondly, argumentum ad ignoratium. Secondly, another way that men ordinarily use to drive others and force them to submit their judgments and receive the opinion in debate, is to require the adversary to admit what they allege as proof, or to assign a better and this I call argumentum ad ignorantium. Thirdly, argumentum ad hominem. Thirdly, a third way is to press a man with consequences drawn from his own principles or concessions. This is already known under the name of argumentum ad hominem. Fourthly, argumentum ad justicium. The fourth alone advances us in knowledge and judgment. The fourth is the using of proofs drawn from any of the foundations of knowledge or probability. This I call argumentum ad justicium. This alone of all the four, brings true instruction with it, and advances us in our way to knowledge. It argues that another man's opinion be right, because I, out of respect or any other consideration but that of conviction, will not contradict him. 2. It proves not another man to be in the right way, nor that I ought to take the same with him, because I know not a better. 3. Nor does it follow that another man is in the right way, because he has shown me that I am in the wrong. I may be modest, and therefore not oppose another man's persuasion. I may be ignorant, and not be able to produce a better I may be in an error, and another may show me that I am so. This may dispose me perhaps for the reception of truth, but helps me not to it that must come from proofs and arguments, and light arising from the nature of things themselves, and not from my shamefacedness, ignorance, or error. Above, contrary, and according to reason. By what has been before said of reason, we may be able to make some guess of the distinction of things into those that we are according to above and contrary to reason. 1. According to reason are such propositions whose truth we can discover by examining and tracing those ideas we have from sensation and reflection, and by natural deduction find to be true or probable. 2. Above reason are such propositions whose truth or probability we cannot by reason derive from those principles. 3. Contrary to reason are such propositions as are inconsistent with or irreconcilable to our clear and distinct ideas. Thus the existence of one God is according to reason. The existence of more than one God contrary to reason, the resurrection of the dead above reason, above reason, also may be taken in a double sense, viz. Either as signifying above probability or above certainty. And in that large sense also contrary to reason, is, I suppose, sometimes taken reason and faith not opposite. For faith must be regulated by reason. There is another use of the word reason, wherein it is opposed to faith, which, though it be in itself a very improper way of speaking, yet common use has so authorized it, that it would be folly either to oppose or hope to remedy it. Only I think it may be amiss to take notice that however faith be opposed to reason, faith is nothing but a firm assent of the mind, which, if it be regulated as is our duty, cannot be afforded to anything but upon good reason, and so cannot be opposite to it. He that believes without having any reason for believing, may be in love with his own fancies, but neither seeks truth as he ought, nor pays obedience due to his Maker, who would have him use those discerning faculties he has given him, to keep him out of mistake and error. He that does not this to the best of his power, however he sometimes lights on truth is in the right but by chance and I know not whether the luckiness of the accident will excuse the irregularity of his proceeding. This at least is certain, that he must be accountable for whatever mistakes he runs into whereas he that makes use of the light and faculties God has given him, and seeks sincerely to discover truth by those helps and abilities he has, may have this satisfaction in doing his duty as a rational creature that though he should miss the truth, he will not miss the reward of it for he governs his assent right, and places it as he should who in any case or matter whatsoever, believes or disbelieves according as reason, directs him he that doth otherwise transgresses against his own light, and misuses those faculties which were given him to no other end but to search and follow the clearer evidence and greater probability. But since reason and faith are by some men opposed, we will so consider them in the following chapter. End of section 18.
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Narrator (Librivox Reading - John Locke)
Section 19 of an essay Concerning Human Understanding by John Locke, Book four of Knowledge and Probability this is a Librivox recording. All Librivox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit Librivox.org Recording by Matthew Bennett Chapter 18 of Faith and Reason and Their Distinct Provinces 1. Necessary to know their boundaries it has been above shown. 1. That we are of necessity ignorant, and want knowledge of all sorts, where we want ideas.
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Narrator (Librivox Recording Introduction)
2.
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Narrator (Librivox Reading - John Locke)
That we are ignorant and want rational knowledge where we want proofs. 3. That we want certain knowledge and certainty, as far as we want clear and determined specific ideas. 4. That we want probability to direct our ascent in matters where we have neither knowledge of our own, nor testimony of other men to bottom our reason upon from these things thus premised, I think we may come to lay down the measures and boundaries between faith and reason, the want whereof may possibly have been the cause, if not of great disorders, yet at least of great disputes, and and perhaps mistakes in the world for till it be resolved how far we are to be guided by reason, and how far by faith, we shall in vain dispute and endeavour to convince one another in matters of religion.
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Faith and reason what as contradistinguished, I find every sect, as far as reason, will help them make use of it gladly and where it fails them, they cry out, it is matter of faith and above reason. And I do not see how they can argue with anyone, or ever convince a gainsayer who makes use of the same plea, without setting down strict boundaries between faith and reason, which ought to be the first point established in all questions where faith has anything to do. Reason. Therefore here, as contradistinguished to faith, I take to be the discovery of the certainty or probability of such propositions or truths, which the mind arrives at by deduction made from such ideas which it has got by the use of its natural faculties, viz. By sensation or reflection. Faith, on the other side, is the assent to any proposition not thus made out by the deductions of reason, but upon the credit of the proposer, as coming from God God in some extraordinary way of communication. This way of discovering truths to men we call revelation. 3. First, no new simple idea can be conveyed by traditional revelation. First, then, I say that no man inspired by God can by any revelation communicate to others any new simple ideas which they had not before from sensation or reflection for whatsoever impressions he himself may have from the immediate hand of God, this revelation, if it be of new simple ideas, cannot be conveyed to another either by words or any other signs because words, by their immediate operation on us, cause no other ideas but of their natural sense sounds and it is by the custom of using them for signs that they excite and revive in our minds latent ideas. But yet only such ideas as were there before. For words seen or heard recall to our thoughts those ideas only which to us they have been wont to be signs of, but cannot introduce any perfectly new and formerly unknown simple ideas. The same holds in all other signs, which cannot signify to us things of which we have before never had any idea at all. Thus whatever things were discovered to St. Paul, when he was wrapped up into the third heaven, whatever new ideas his mind there received, all the description he can make to others of that place is only this, that there are such things as I hath not seen, nor ear heard, nor hath it entered into the heart of man to conceive and supposing God should discover to any one supernaturally a species of creatures inhabiting, for example, Jupiter or Saturn for that it is possible there may be such nobody can deny, which had six senses, and imprint on his mind the ideas conveyed to theirs by that sixth sense he could no more by words produce in the minds of other men those ideas imprinted by that sixth sense, than one of us could convey the idea of any colour by the sound of words into a man who, having the other four senses perfect, had always totally one of the fifth of seeing. For our simple ideas, then, which are the foundation and sole matter of all our notions and knowledge, knowledge we must depend wholly on our reason, I mean our natural faculties, and can by no means receive them or any of them from traditional revelation. I say traditional revelation in distinction to original revelation. By the one I mean that first impression which is made immediately by God on the mind of any man to which we cannot set any bounds and by the other those impressions delivered over to others in words, and the ordinary ways of conveying our conceptions one to another.
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Secondly, traditional revelation may make us know propositions knowable also by reason, but not with the same certainty that reason doth. Secondly, I say that the same truths may be discovered and conveyed down from revelation, which are discernible to us by reason, and by those ideas we naturally may have. So God might by revelation discover the truth of any proposition in Euclid, as well as men, by the natural use of their faculties, come to make the discovery themselves. In all things of this kind there is little need or use of revelation God having furnished us with natural and surer means to arrive at the knowledge of them for whatsoever truth we come to the clear discovery of from the knowledge and contemplation of our own ideas, will always be certainer to us than those which are conveyed to us by traditional revelation for the knowledge we have that this revelation came at first from God, can never be so sure as the knowledge we have from the clearance and distinct perception of the agreement or disagreement of our own ideas. V. G If it were reveal'd some ages since, that the three angles of a triangle were equal to two right ones, I might assent to the truth of that proposition, upon the credit of the tradition that it was reveal'd but that would never amount to so great a certainty as the knowledge of it, upon the comparing and measuring my own ideas of two right angles, and the three angles of a triangle. The like holds in matter of fact knowable by our senses. V. G The history of the deluge is conveyed to us by writings which had their original from Revelation and yet nobody, I think, will say he has as certain and clear a knowledge of the flood as Noah that saw it, or that he himself would have had, had he then been alive and seen it for he has no greater an assurance than that of his senses that it is writ in the book supposed writ by Moses inspired but he has not so great an assurance that Moses wrote the book, as if he had seen Moses write it so that the assurance of its being a revelation is less still than the assurance of his senses. 5. Even original revelation cannot be admitted against the clear evidence of reason in propositions, then, whose certainty is built upon the clear perception of the agreement or disagreement of our ideas, attained either by immediate intuition, as in self evident propositions, or by evident deductions of reason in demonstrations. We need not the assistance of revelation as necessary to gain our assent and introduce them into our minds, because the natural ways of knowledge could settle them there, or had done it already. Which is the greatest assurance we can possibly have of anything, unless where God immediately reveals it to us, and there too our assurance can be no greater than our knowledge, is that it is a revelation from God but yet nothing, I think, can under that title shake or overrule plain knowledge, or rationally prevail with any man to admit it for true in a direct contradiction to the clear evidence of his own understanding. For since no evidence of our faculties by which we receive such revelations can exceed, if equal, the certainty of our intuitive knowledge, we can never receive for a truth anything that is directly contrary to our clear and distinct knowledge. VG the ideal ideas of one body and one place do so clearly agree, and the mind has so evident a perception of their agreement, that we can never assent to a proposition that affirms the same body to be in two distant places at once. However, it should pretend to the authority of a divine revelation, since the evidence first, that we deceive not ourselves in ascribing it to God secondly, that we understand it right, can never be so great as the evidence of our own intuitive knowledge, whereby we discern it impossible for the same body to be in two places at once. And therefore no proposition can be received for divine revelation, or obtain the assent due to all such if it be contradictory to our clear intuitive knowledge, because this would be to subvert the principles and foundations of all knowledge, evidence, and assent whatsoever, and there would be left no difference between truth and falsehood, no measures of credible and incredible in the world, if doubtful propositions shall take place before self evident, and what we certainly know give way to what we may possibly be mistaken in in propositions. Therefore contrary to the clear perception of the agreement or disagreement of any of our ideas, it will be in vain to urge the them as matters of faith they cannot move our assent under that or any other title whatsoever. For faith can never convince us of anything that contradicts our knowledge. Because though faith be founded on the testimony of God, who cannot lie revealing any proposition to us, yet we cannot have an assurance of the truth of its being a divine revelation greater than our own knowledge, since the whole strength of the certainty depends on our knowledge that God revealed it, which in this case, where the proposition supposed revealed contradicts our knowledge or reason, will always have this objection hanging to it, viz. That we cannot tell how to conceive that to come from God, the bountiful author of our being, which if received for true, must overturn all the principles and foundations of knowledge he has given given us, render our faculties useless, wholly destroy the most excellent part of his workmanship our understandings, and put a man in a condition wherein he will have less light, less conduct than the beast that perisheth. For if the mind of man can never have a clearer, and perhaps not so clear evidence of anything to be a divine revelation as it has of the principles of its own reason. It can never have a ground to quit the clear evidence of its reason to give a place to a proposition whose revelation has not a greater evidence than those principles have. 6. Traditional revelation Much less Thus far a man has use of reason, and ought to hearken to it even in immediate and original revelation, where it is supposed to be made to himself but to to all those who pretend not to immediate revelation, but are required to pay obedience, and to receive the truths revealed to others, which by the tradition of writings or word of mouth, are conveyed down to them, reason has a great deal more to do, and is that only which can induce us to receive them. For matter of faith being only divine revelation and nothing else, faith, as we use the word called commonly divine faith, has to do with no propositions but those which are supposed to be divinely revealed. So that I do not see how those who make revelation alone the sole object of faith, can say that it is a matter of faith, and not of reason, to believe that such or such a proposition to be found in such or such a book, is of divine inspiration, unless it be revealed that that proposition or all in that book, was communicated by divine inspiration. Without such a revelation, the believing or not believing that proposition or book to be of divine authority can never be matter of faith, but matter of reason and such as I must come to an assent to only by the use of my reason, which can never require or enable me to believe that which is contrary to itself, it being impossible for reason ever to procure any assent to that which to itself appears unreasonable in all things. Therefore, where we have clear evidence from our ideas and those principles of knowledge I have above mentioned, reason is the proper judge and revelation, though it may in consenting with it, confirm its dictates, yet cannot in such cases cases invalidate its decrees nor can we be obliged, where we have the clear and evident sentence of reason, to quit it for the contrary opinion, under a pretense that it is matter of faith which can have no authority against the plain and clear dictates of reason. 7. Thirdly, things above reason are when revealed, the proper matter of faith. But thirdly, there being many things wherein we have very imperfect notions, or none at all, and other things of whose past, present, or future existence, by the natural use of our faculties, we can have no knowledge at all these as being beyond the discovery of our natural faculties and above reason, are when revealed the proper matter of faith. Thus that part of the angels rebelled against God, and thereby lost their first happy state, and that the dead shall rise and live again. These and the like, being beyond the discovery of reason, are purely matters of faith, with which reason has directly nothing to do. 8. Or not contrary to reason, if revealed, are matter of faith, and must carry it against probable conjectures of reason. But since God, in giving us the light of reason, has not thereby tied up his own hands from affording us, when he thinks fit the light of revelation in any of those matters wherein our natural faculties are able to give a probable determination, revelation, where God has been pleased to give it, must carry it against the probable conjectures of reason because the mind, not being certain of of the truth of that it does not evidently know, but only yielding to the probability that appears in it, is bound to give up its assent to such a testimony which it is satisfied, comes from one who cannot err, and will not deceive but yet it still belongs to reason to judge of the truth of its being a revelation, and of the signification of the words wherein it is delivered. Indeed, if anything shall be thought revelation, which is contrary to the plain principles of reason, and the evident knowledge the mind has of its own clear and distinct ideas, there reason must be hearkened to as to a matter within its province since a man can never have so certain a knowledge that a proposition which contradicts the clear principles and evidence of his own knowledge was divinely revealed, or that he understands the words right rightly, wherein it is delivered as he has that the contrary is true, and so is bound to consider and judge of it as a matter of reason, and not swallow it without examination as a matter of faith. 9. Revelation in matters where reason cannot judge, or but probably ought to be hearkened to first, whatever proposition is revealed of whose truth truth our mind, by its natural faculties and notions cannot judge, that is purely matter of faith, and above reason. Secondly, all propositions whereof the mind by use of its natural faculties can come to determine and judge from naturally acquired ideas, are matter of reason with this difference still that in those concerning which it has but an uncertain evidence, and some so as persuaded of their truth only upon probable grounds, which still admit a possibility of the contrary to be true, without doing violence to the certain evidence of its own knowledge, and overturning the principles of all reason in such probable propositions, I say, an evident revelation ought to determine our assent, even against probability. For where the principles of reason have not evidence, does proposition to be certainly true or false, their clear revelation as another principle of truth and ground of assent may determine and so it may be matter of faith, and be also above reason, because reason in that particular matter being able to reach no higher than probability, faith gave the determination where reason came short, and revelation discovered on which side side the truth lay. 10. In matters where reason can afford certain knowledge that is to be hearkened to thus far the dominion of faith reaches, and that without any violence or hindrance to reason, which is not injured or disturbed, but assisted and improved by new discoveries of truth coming from the eternal fountain of all knowledge, whatever God hath revealed is certainly true, no doubt can be made of it this is the proper object of faith. But whether it be a divine revelation or no, reason must judge, which can never permit the mind to reject a greater evidence, to embrace what is less evident, nor allow it to entertain probability in opposition to knowledge and certainty. There can be no evidence that any traditional revelation is of divine original in the words we receive it, and in the sense we understand it, so clear and so certain as that of the principles of reason. And therefore nothing that is contrary to and inconsistent with the clear and self evident dictates of reason, has a right to be urged or assented to. As a matter of faith, wherein reason hath nothing to do whatsoever, is divine reflection, revelation ought to overrule all our opinions, prejudices, and interest, and hath a right to be received with full assent. Such a submission as this of our reason to faith takes not away the landmarks of knowledge. This shakes not the foundations of reason, but leaves us that use of our faculties for which they were given us. 11. If the boundaries be not set set between faith and reason, no enthusiasm or extravagancy in religion can be contradicted. If the provinces of faith and reason are not kept distinct by these boundaries, there will in matters of religion be no room for reason at all and those extravagant opinions and ceremonies that are to be found in the several religions of the world will not deserve to be blamed for. To this crying up of faith in opposition to reason, we may, I think, in good measure ascribe those absurdities that fill almost all the religions which possess and divide mankind. For men, having been principled with an opinion that they must not consult reason and the things of religion, however apparently contradictory to common sense and the very principles of all their knowledge, have let loose their fancies and natural superstition, and have been by them led into so strange opinions and extravagant practices in religion, that a considerate man cannot but stand amazed at their follies, and judge them so far from being acceptable to the great and wise God, that he cannot avoid thinking them ridiculous and offensive to a sober good man. So that in effect, religion, which should most distinguish us from beasts, and ought most peculiarly to elevate us as rational creatures above brutes, is that wherein men often appear most irrational and more senseless than beasts themselves. Credo quia impossibile est, I believe, because it is impossible, might in a good man pass for a sally of zeal, but would prove a very ill rule for men to choose their opinions or religion by end of section 19.
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Section 20 of an essay Concerning Human
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Understanding by John Locke Book four of Knowledge and Probability. This is a Librivox recording. All Librivox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit Librivox.org Chapter 19 of Enthusiasm Footnote this chapter was not in early editions. End of Footnote one. He that would seriously set upon the search of truth, ought in the first place to prepare his mind with a love of it for he that loves it not will not take much pains to get it, nor be much concerned when he misses it. There is nobody in the commonwealth of learning who does not profess himself a lover of truth and there is not a rational creature that would not take it amiss to be thought otherwise of and yet for all this one may truly say that there are very few lovers of truth, truth for truth sake, even amongst those who persuade themselves that they are so. How a man may know whether he be so in earnest is worth inquiry and I think there is one unerring mark of it, viz. The not entertaining any proposition with greater assurance than the proofs it is built upon, will warrant warrant. Whoever goes beyond this measure of assent, it is plain, receives not truth in the love of it loves not truth for truth's sake, but for some other by end. For the evidence that any proposition is true, except such as are self evident, lying only in the proofs a man has of it, whatsoever degrees of assent he affords it beyond the degrees of that evidence, it is plain that all the surplusage of assurance is owing to some other affection, and not to the love of truth, it being as impossible that the love of truth should carry my assent above the evidence there is to me that it is true, as that the love of truth should make me assent to any proposition. The sake of that evidence which it has not that it is true, which is in effect to love it as a truth, because it is possible or probable that it may not be true in any truth that gets not possession of our minds by the irresistible light of self evidence, or by the force of demonstration. The arguments that gain it assent are the vultures and gauge of its probability to us, and we can receive it for no other than such as they deliver it to our understandings. Whatsoever credit or authority we give to any proposition more than it receives from the principles and proofs it supports itself upon, is owing to our inclinations that way, and is so far a derogation from the love of truth as such which as it can receive no evidence from our passions or interests, so it should receive no tincture from them. 2. The Assuming an authority of dictating to others, and a forwardness to prescribe to their opinions, is a constant concomitant of this bias and corruption of our judgments. For how almost can it be otherwise but that he should be ready to impose on another's belief, who has already imposed on his own, who can reasonably expect arguments and conviction from him in dealing with others, whose understanding is not accustomed to them in his dealing with himself, who does violence to his own faculties, tyrannizes over his own mind, and usurps the paradise prerogative that belongs to truth alone, which is to command assent by only its own authority, that is, by and in proportion to that evidence which it carries with it. 3. Upon this occasion I shall take the liberty to consider a third ground of assent, which with some men has the same authority, and is as confidently relied on as as either faith or reason, I mean enthusiasm, which lain by reason would set up revelation without it whereby in effect it takes away both reason and revelation, and substitutes in the room of it the ungrounded fancies of a man's own brain, and assumes them for a foundation both of opinion and conduct. 4. Reason is natural revelation, whereby the Eternal Father of light and fountain of all knowledge, communicates to mankind that portion of truth which he has laid within the reach of their natural faculties. Revelation is natural reason enlarged by a new set of discoveries, communicated by God immediately, which reason vouches the truth of by the testimony and proofs it gives, that they come from God so that he that takes away reason to make way for revelation, puts out the light of both, and does much what the same as if he would persuade a man to put out his eyes, the better to receive the remote light of an invisible star by a telescope. 5. Immediate revelation being a much easier way for men to establish their opinions and regulate their conduct, than the tedious and not always successful labor of strict reasoning, it is no wonder that some have been very apt to pretend to revelation, and to persuade themselves that they are under the peculiar guidance of heaven, Heaven in their actions and opinions, especially in those of them, which they cannot account for by the ordinary methods of knowledge and principles of reason. Hence we see that in all ages men in whom melancholy has mixed with devotion, or whose conceit of themselves has raised them into an opinion of a greater familiarity with God, and a nearer admittance to his favor than is afforded to others, have often flattered themselves with the persuasion of an immediate intercourse with the Deity, and frequent communication from the Divine Spirit. God, I own, cannot be denied to be able to enlighten the understanding by a ray darted into the mind immediately from the fountain of light. This they understand he has promised to do and who then has so good a title to expect it, as those who are his peculiar people chosen by him, and depending on him. 6. Their minds being thus prepared, whatever groundless opinion comes to settle itself strongly upon their fancies, is an illumination from the Spirit of God in and presently of divine authority, and whatsoever odd action they find in themselves a strong inclination to do. That impulse is concluded to be a call or direction from heaven, and must be obeyed it is a commission from above, and they cannot err in executing it. 7. This I take to be properly enthusiasm, which, though founded neither on reason nor divine revelation, but rising from the conceits of a warmed or overweening brain, works yet where it once gets footing more powerfully on the persuasions and actions of men, than either of those two or both together men, being most forwardly obedient to the impulses they receive from themselves and the whole man is sure to act more vigorously where the whole man is carried by a natural motion for strong conceit, like a new principle, carries all easily with it. When got above common sense, and freed from all restraint of reason and check of reflection, it is heightened into a divine authority, in concurrence with our own temper and inclined explanation.
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8.
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Though the odd opinions and extravagant actions enthusiasm has run men were enough to warn them against this wrong principle, so apt to misguide them both in their belief and conduct. Yet the love of something extraordinary, the ease and glory it is to be inspired, and be above the common and natural ways of knowledge, so flatters many men's laziness, ignorance, and vanity, that when once they are got into this way of immediate revelation, of illumination without search, and of certainty without proof, and without examination, it is a hard matter to get them out of it reason is lost upon them they are above it. They see the light infused into their understandings, and cannot be mistaken. It is clear and visible there, like the light of a bright sunshine, shows itself, and needs no other proof but its own evidence. They feel the hand of God moving them within, and the impulses of the Spirit, and cannot be mistaken in what they feel. Thus they support themselves, and are sure Reason hath nothing to do with what they see and feel, feel in themselves. What they have a sensible experience of admits no doubt, needs no probation. Would he not be ridiculous, who should require to have it prove to him that the light shines, and that he sees is his own proof, and can have no other. When the Spirit brings light into our minds, it dispels darkness. We see it as we do that of the sun at noon, and need not the twilight of reason to show it us. This light from heaven is strong, clear, and pure, carries its own demonstration with it and we may as naturally take a glow worm to assist us to discover the sun, as to examine the celestial ray by our dim candle. Reason.
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9.
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This is the way of talking of these men. They are sure, because they are sure, and their persuasions are right, because they are strong in them. For when what they say is stripped of the metaphor of seeing and feeling, this is all it amounts to. And yet these similes so impose on them, that they serve them for certainty in themselves, and demonstration to others. 10. But to examine a little soberly this internal light and this feeling on which they build so much, these men have, they say, clear light, and they see, they have awakened sense, and they feel this cannot, they are sure, be disputed them for when a man says he sees or feels, nobody can deny it him that he does so. But here let me ask this seeing is it the perception of the truth of the proposition, or of this, that it is a revelation from God? This feeling? Is it a perception of an inclination or fancy to do something, or of the Spirit of God moving that inclination? These are two very different perceptions, and must be carefully distinguished, if we would not impose upon ourselves. I may perceive the truth of a proposition, and yet not perceive that it is an immediate revelation from God. I may perceive the truth of a proposition in Euclid, without it being, or my perceiving it to be a revelation. Nay, I may perceive I came not by this knowledge in a natural way, and so may conclude it revealed, without perceiving that it is a revelation from God because there be spirits which, without being divinely commissioned, may excite those ideas in me and lay them in such order before my mind that I may perceive their connection, so that the knowledge of any proposition coming into my mind may I know not how, is not a perception that is from God much less is a strong persuasion that it is true, a perception that it is from God, or so much as true. But however it be called light and seeing, I suppose it is at most but belief and assurance and the proposition taken for revelation is not such as they know to be true, but take to be true. For where a proposition is known to be true, revelation is needless, and it is hard to conceive how there can be a revelation to anyone of what he knows already. If, therefore it be a proposition which they are persuaded but do not know to be true, whatever they may call it, it is not seen but believing. For these are two ways whereby truth comes into the mind wholly distinct, so that one is not the other. What I see, I know to be so by the evidence of the thing itself what I believe I take to be so upon the testimony of another. But this testimony I must know to be given, or else what ground have I of believing? I must see that it is God that reveals this to me, or else I see nothing. The question then here, how do I know that God is the revealer of this to me? That this impression is made upon my mind by the Holy Spirit, and that therefore I ought to obey it? If I know not this, how great soever the assurance is that I am possessed with it is groundless. Whatever light I pretend to it is but enthusiasm for whether the proposition supposed to be revealed be in itself evidently true, or visibly probable, or by the natural ways of knowledge uncertain. The proposition that must be well grounded and manifested to be true is that God is the revealer of it, and that what I take to be a revelation is certainly put into my mind by him, and is not an illusion dropped in by some other spirit, or raised by my own fancy. For if I mistake not, these men receive it for true, because they presume God revealed it, does it not then stand them upon to examine on what grounds they presume it to be a revelation from God or else all their confidence is mere presumption, and this light they are so dazzled with is nothing but an ignis fatuus that leads them constantly round in this circle. It is a revelation because they firmly believe it, and they believe it because it is a revelation. 11. In all that is of divine revelation there is need of no other proof but that it is an inspiration from God, for he cannot deceive, nor be deceived. But how shall it be known that any proposition in our minds is a truth infused by God, a truth that is revealed to us by him, which he declares to us, and therefore we ought to believe? Here it is that enthusiasm fails of the evidence it pretends to for men thus possessed boast of a light whereby they say they are enlightened, and brought into the knowledge of this or that truth. But if they know it to be a truth, they must know it to be so, either by its own self evidence to natural reason, or by the rational proofs that make it out to be so. If they see and know it to be a truth either of these two ways, they in vain suppose it to be a revelation, for they know it to be true, the same way that any other man naturally may know that it is so without the help of revelation. For thus all the truths of what kind soever, that men inspired are enlightened with, came into their minds, and are established there. If they say they know it to be true, because it is a revelation from God, the reason is good, but then it will be demanded. How they know it to be a revelation from God? If they say by the light it brings with it, which shines bright in their minds, and they cannot resist, I beseech them to consider whether this be any more than what we have taken notice of on already, viz. That it is a revelation, because they strongly believe it to be true. For all the light they speak of is but a strong, though ungrounded, persuasion of their own minds that it is a truth for rational grounds from proofs that it is a truth, they must acknowledge to have none for then it is not received as revelation, but upon the ordinary grounds that other truths are received. And if they believe it to be true, because it is a revelation, and have no other reason for its being a revelation, but because they are fully persuaded, without any other reason, that it is true, they believe it to be a revelation only because they strongly believe it to be a revelation, which is a very unsafe ground to proceed on, either in our tenets or actions. And what readier way can there be to run ourselves into the most extravagant errors and miscarriages than thus to set up fancy for our supreme and sole guide, and to believe any proposition to be true, any action to be right, only because we believe it to be so? The strength of our persuasions is no evidence at all of their own rectitude. Crooked things may be as stiff and inflexible as straight, and men may be as positive and peremptory in error as in truth. How come else the untractable zealots in different and opposite parties? For if the light which everyone thinks he has in his mind, which in this case is nothing but the strength of his own persuasion, be an evidence that it is from God, contrary opinions have the same title to inspirations and God will be not only the Father of lights, but the opposite and contrary lights leading men contrary ways and contradictory propositions will be divine truths, if an ungrounded strength of assurance be an evidence that any proposition is a divine revelation. 12 this cannot be otherwise. Whilst firmness of persuasion is made the cause of believing, and confidence of being in the right, is made an argument of truth. St. Paul himself believed he did well, and that he had a call to it when he persecuted the Christians, whom he confidently thought in the wrong but yet it was he, not they, who were mistaken. Good men are men still liable to mistakes, and are sometimes warmly engaged in errors which they take for divine truths shining in their minds with the quiet clearest light. 13. Light, true light in the mind, can be nothing else but the evidence of the truth of any proposition and if it be not a self evident proposition, all the light it has or can have is from the clearness and validity of those proofs upon which it is received. To talk of any other light in the understanding is to put ourselves in the dark, or in the power of the Prince of darkness, and by our own consent to give ourselves up to
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delusion to believe a lie.
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For if strength of persuasion be the light which must guide us, I ask, how shall anyone distinguish between the delusions of Satan and the inspirations of the holy Holy Ghost? He can transform himself into an angel of light and they who are led by this sun of the morning are as fully satisfied of the illumination, that is, are as strongly persuaded that they are enlightened by the Spirit of God as anyone who is so they acquiesce and rejoice in it, are acted by it and nobody can be more sure nor more in the right, if, if their own strong belief may be judged, then they 14 he therefore, that will not give himself up to all the extravagancies of delusion and error, must bring this guide of his light within to the trial. God, when he makes the prophet, does not unmake the man he leaves all his faculties in the natural state to enable him to judge of his inspirations, whether they be of divine original or no. When he illuminates the mind with supernatural light, he does not extinguish that which is natural. If he would have us assent to the truth of any proposition, he either evidences that truth by the usual methods of natural reason, or else makes it known to be a truth which he would have us assent to by his authority, and convinces us that it is from him. By some marks which reason cannot be
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mistaken in, reason must be our last judge and guide in everything.
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I do not mean that we must consult reason and examine whether a proposition revealed from God can be made out
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by natural principles and if it cannot
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that then we must reject it, but consult it we must and by it examine whether it be a revelation from God or no. And if reason finds it to be revealed from God, reason then declares for it as much as for any other truth, and makes it one of her dictates. Every conceit that thoroughly warms our fancies must pass for an inspiration. If there be nothing but the strength of our persuasions, whereby to judge of our persuasions, if reason must not examine their truth by something extrinsical to the persuasions themselves, inspirations and delusions, truth and falsehood, will have the same measure, and will not be possible to be distinguished.
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15.
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If this internal light, or any proposition which under that title we take for inspired, be conformable to the principles of reason, or to the word of God, which is a tested revelation, reason warrants it, and we may safely receive it for true, and be guided by it in our belief and actions. If it receive no testimony nor evidence from either of these rules, we cannot take it for a revelation, or so much as for true, till we have some other mark that it is a revelation besides our believing that it be so. Thus we see the holy men of old, who had revelations from God, had something else besides an internal light of assurance in their own minds to testify to them that it was from God they were not left to their own persuasions alone, that those persuasions were from God, but had outward signs to convince them of the author of those revelations and when they were to convince others, they had a power given them to justify the truth of their commission from heaven, and by visible signs, to assert the divine authority of a message they were sent with. Moses saw the bush burn without being consumed, and her a voice out of it. This is something besides finding an impulse upon his mind to go to Pharaoh, that he might bring his brethren out of Egypt and yet he thought this not enough to authorize him to go with that message, till God by another miracle of his rod turned into a serpent, had assured him of a power to testify his mission by the same miracle repeated before them whom he was sent to Gideon was sent by an angel to deliver Israel from the Midianites, and yet he desired a sign to convince him that this commission was from God. These and several the like instances to be found among the prophets of old, are enough to show that they thought not an inward seeing or persuasion of their minds, without either any other proof of sufficient evidence that it was from God, though the Scripture does not everywhere mention their demanding or having such proofs. 16 in what I have said, I am far from denying that God can or doth sometimes enlighten men's minds in the apprehending of certain truths, or excite them to good actions by the immediate influence, influence, and assistance of the Holy Spirit, without any extraordinary signs accompanying it. But in such cases, too we have reason and Scripture unerring rules to know
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whether it be from God or no.
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Where the truth embraced is consonant to the revelation in the written word of God, or the action conformable to the dictates of right reason or holy Writ, we may be assured that we run no risk in entertaining it as such, because though perhaps it be not an immediate revelation from God extraordinarily operating on our minds, yet we are sure it is warranted by that revelation which he has given us of truth. But it is not the strength of our private persuasion within ourselves that can warrant in it to be a light or motion from heaven. Nothing can do that but the written word of God without us, or that standard of reason which is common to us with all men, where reason or Scripture is expressed. For any opinion or action, we may receive it of Divine authority but it is not the strength of our own persuasions, which can by itself keep give it that stamp the bent of our own minds may favor it as much as we please that may show it to be a fondling of our own, but will by no means prove it to be an offspring of heaven and of divine original end of section 20.
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Section 21 of an essay Concerning Human Understanding by John Locke Book four of Knowledge and Probability this is a Librivox recording. All Librivox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit Librivox.org Chapter 20 of Wrong Ascent or Error 1. Causes of Error, or How men come to give Assent Contrary to probability knowledge being to be had only a visible and certain truth. Error is not a fault of our knowledge, but a mistake of our judgment, giving assent to that which is not true. But if assent be grounded on likelihood. If the proper object and motive of our assent be probability and that probability consists in what is laid down in the foregoing chapters, it will be demanded how men come to give their assents contrary to probability. For there is nothing more common than contrariety of opinion, nothing more obvious than that one man wholly disbelieves what another only doubts of and a third steadfastly believes and firmly adheres to the reasons whereof, though they may be very various, yet I suppose may all be reduced to these four. 1. Want of proofs. 2. Want of ability to use them. 3. Want of will to see them 4. Wrong measures of probability. 2. First cause of air want of proofs. First, by want of proofs I do not mean only the want of those proofs which are nowhere extant and so are nowhere to be had, but the want even of those proofs which which are in being, or might be procured. And thus men want proofs who have not the convenience or opportunity to make experiments and observations themselves tending to the proof of any proposition, nor likewise the convenience to inquire into and collect the testimonies of others. And in this state are the greatest part of mankind who are given up to labor, and enslaved to the necessity of their mean condition, whose lives are worn out only in the provisions for living. These men's opportunities of knowledge and inquiry are commonly as narrow as their fortunes, and their understandings are but little instructed when all their whole time and pains is laid out to still the cross croaking of their own bellies, or the cries of their children. It is not to be expected that a man who drudges on all his life in a laborious trade should be more knowing in the variety of things done in the world than a pack horse who is driven constantly forwards and backwards in a narrow lane and dirty road only to market, should be skilled in the geography of the country. Nor is it at all more possible that he who wants leisure books and languages, and the opportunity of conversing with variety of men, should be in a condition to collect those testimonies and observations which are in being, and are necessary to make out many, nay, most of the propositions that in the societies of men are judged of the greatest moment, or to find out grounds of assurance so great as the belief of the points he would build on them, is thought necessary so that a great part of mankind are by the natural and unalterable state of things in this world, and the constitution of human affairs, unavoidably given over to invincible ignorance of those proofs on which Others build and which are necessary to establish those opinions. The greatest part of men, having much to do to get the means of living, are not in a condition to look after those of learned and laborious inquiries? 3. Objection. What shall become of those who want proofs answered? What shall we say, then? Are the greatest part of mankind, by the necessity of their condition, subjected to unavoidable ignorance in those things which are of greatest importance to them? For of those, it is obvious to inquire, have the bulk of mankind no other guide but accident and blind chance to conduct them to their happiness or misery. Are the current opinions and licensed guides of every country sufficient evidence and security to every man to venture his great concernments on, nay, his everlasting happiness or misery? Or can those be the certain and infallible oracles and standards of truth which teach one thing in Christendom and another in Turkey? Or shall a poor countryman be eternally happy for having the chance to be born an age Italy, or a day labourer be unavoidably lost because he had the ill luck to be born in England? How ready some men may be to say some of these things I will not here examine. But this I am sure, that men must allow one or other of these to be true. Let them choose which they please or else grant that God has furnished men with faculties sufficient to direct them in the way they should take, if they will but seriously employ them that way, when their ordinary vocations allow them the leisure. No man is so wholly taken up with the attendance on the means of living as to have no spare time at all to think of his soul and inform himself in matters of religion. Were men as intent upon this as they are on things of lower concernment, there are none so enslaved to the necessities of life who might not find some vacancies that might be husbanded to this advantage of their knowledge.
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4.
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People hindered from inquiry. Besides those whose improvements and informations are straitened by the narrowness of their fortunes, there are others whose largeness of fortune would place plentifully enough supply books and other requisites for clearing of doubts and discovering of truth. But they are cooped up in close by the laws of their countries and the strict guards of those whose interest it is to keep them ignorant, lest, knowing more, they should believe the less in them. These are as far, nay, further from the liberty and opportunity of a fair inquiry than these poor and wretched labourers we before spoke of. And however they may seem, high and great, are confined to narrowness of thought and enslaved in that which should be the freest part of man their understandings. This is generally the case of all those who live in places where care is taken to propagate truth without knowledge where men are forced at a venture to be the religion of the country, and must therefore swallow down opinions, as silly people do. Empiric's pills, without knowing what they are made of, or how they will work, and having nothing to do but believe that they will do the cure but in this are much more miserable than they in that they are not at liberty to refuse sweet swallowing what perhaps they had rather let alone, and to choose the physician to whose conduct they would trust themselves. 5. Second cause of air want of skill to use proofs. Secondly, those who want skill to use those evidences they have of probabilities, who cannot carry a train of consequences in their heads and nor we exactly the preponderance of contrary proofs and testimonies, making every circumstance's due allowance, may be easily misled to assent to propositions that are not probable. There are some men of one, some but of two syllogisms, and no more, and others that can but advance one step further. These cannot always discern that side on which the strongest proofs lie, cannot constantly follow that which in itself is the more probable opinion. Now that there is such a difference between men in respect to their understandings, I think nobody who has had any conversation with his neighbours will question, though he never was at Westminster hall, or the Exchange on the one hand, nor at almshouses or, or Bedlam on the other, which great difference in men's intellectuals, whether it rises from any defect in the organs of the body particularly adapted to thinking, or in the dullness and untractableness of those faculties for want of use, or, as some think, in the natural differences of men's souls themselves, or some or all of these together, it matters not here to examine only this is evident, that there is a difference of degrees in men's understandings, apprehensions, and reasonings to so great a latitude that one may, without doing injury to mankind, affirm that there is a greater distance between some men and others in this respect respect, than between some men and some beasts. But how this comes about is a speculation, though of great consequence, yet not necessary to our present purpose. 6. Third cause of error want of will to use them. Thirdly, there is another sort of people who want proofs, not because they are out of their reach, but because they will not use them who, though they have riches and leisure enough, and want Neither parts nor learning may yet through their hot pursuit of pleasure or business, or else out of laziness or fear, that the doctrines whose truths they would inquire into would not suit well with their opinions, lives, or designs, may never come to the knowledge of, nor give their assent to those possibilities which lie so much within their view that to be convinced of them they need but turn their eyes that way. We know some men will not read a letter which is supposed to bring ill news and many men forbear to cast up their accounts, or so much as think upon their estates, who have reason to fear their affairs are. Are in no very good posture. How men whose plentiful fortunes allow them leisure to improve their understandings can satisfy themselves with a lazy ignorance, I cannot tell. But methinks they have a low opinion of their souls who lay out all their incomes in provisions for the body, and employ none of it to procure the means and helps of knowledge who take great care to appear always in a neat and splendid outside, and would think themselves miserable in coarse clothes or a patched coat, and yet constantly suffer their minds to appear abroad in a piebald livery of coarse patches and borrowed shreds, such as it has pleased chance or their country tailor. I mean the common opinion of those they have conversed with to clothe them in. I will not here mention how unreasonable this is for men that ever think of a future state, and their concernment with it, which no rational man can avoid to do sometimes. Nor shall I take notice what a shame and confusion it is to the greatest contempt hammers of knowledge, to be found ignorant in things they are concerned to know. But this at least, is worth the consideration of those who call themselves gentlemen. That however they may think, credit, respect, power and authority, the concomitants of their birth and fortune, yet they will find all these still carried away from them by men of lower condition who surpass them in knowledge. They who are blind will always be led by those that see, or else fall into the ditch. And he is certainly the most subjected, the most enslaved, who is so in his understanding. In the foregoing instances some of the causes have been shown of wrong assent. And how it comes to pass that probable doctrines are not always received with an assent proportionable to the reasons which are to be had for their probability. But hitherto we have considered only such probabilities whose proofs do exist, but do not appear to him who embraced the air. Seven. Fourth cause of error. Wrong measures of probability, which are fourthly. There remains yet the last sort who, even where the real probabilities appear, and are plainly laid before them, do not admit of the conviction, nor yield unto manifest reasons, but do either suspend their assent or give it to the least precious probable opinion. And to this danger are those opposed who have taken up wrong measures of probability, which are 1. Propositions that are in themselves certain and evident, but doubtful and false taken up for principles. 2. Received hypothesis. 3. Predominant passions or inclinations. 4. Authority. 8. 1. Doubtful propositions taken for principles. The first and firmest ground of probability is the conformity anything has to our own knowledge, especially that part of our knowledge which we have embraced and continue to look on as principles. These have so great an influence upon our opinions, that it is usually by them we judge of truth, and measure probability to that degree that what is inconsistent with our principles is so far from passing for probable with us, that it will not be allowed possible. The reverence borne to these principles is so great, and their authority so paramount to all other, that the testimony not only of other men, but the evidence of our own senses, are often rejected when they offer to vouch anything contrary to these established rules. How much the doctrine of innate principles, and that principles are not to be proved or questioned, has contributed to this, I will not here examine this. I readily grant that one truth cannot contradict another but withal I take leave also to say that every one ought very carefully to beware what he admits for a principle, to examine it strictly, and see whether he certainly knows it to be true of itself by its own evidence, or whether he does only with assurance believe it to be so upon the authority of others. For he hath a strong bias put into his understanding, which will unavoidably misguide his assent who hath imbibed wrong principles, and has blindly given himself up to the authority of any opinion in itself not evidently true. 9. Instilled in childhood there is nothing more ordinary than children's receiving into their minds propositions, especially about matters of religion, from their parents, nurses, or those about them which, being insinuated into their unwary as well as unbiased understandings, and fastened by degrees, are at least equally, whether true or false, riveted there by long custom and education, beyond all possibility of being pulled out again. For men, when they are grown up, reflecting upon their opinions, and finding those of this sort to be as ancient in their minds as their very memories, not having observed their early insinuation, nor by what means they got them, they are apt to reverence them as sacred things, and not to suffer them to be profaned, touched, or questioned, they look on them as the Urim and Thummim set up in their minds immediately by God himself, to be the great and unerring deciders of truth and falsehood, and the judges to which they are to appear in all manner of controversies. 10. Of irresistible efficiency this opinion of his principles, let them be what they will. Being once established in any one's mind, it is easy to be imagined what reception any proposition shall find, how clearly soever proved, that shall invalidate their authority, or at all thwart with these internal oracles, whereas the grossest absurdities and improbabilities being but agreeable to such principles, go down glibly, and are easily digested. The great obstinacy that is to be found in men firmly believing quite contrary opinions, though many times equally absurd, observed in the various religions of mankind, are as evident a proof as they are an unavoidable consequence of this way of reasoning from received traditional principles, so that men will disbelieve their own eyes, renounce the evidence of their senses, and give their own experience the lie, rather than admit of anything disagreeable to these sacred tenants. Take an intelligent Romanist, that from the first dawning of any notions in his understanding, hath had this principle constantly inculcated, viz. That he must believe as the Church, I. E. Those of his communion believes, or that the Pope is infallible and this he never so much as heard questioned, till at 40 or 50 years old he met with one of other principles. How is he prepared easily to swallow, not only against all probability, but even the clear evidence of his senses, the doctrine of transubstantiation. This principle has such an influence on his mind, that he will believe that to be flesh which he sees to be bread. And what way will you take to convince a man of any improbable opinion opinion he holds, who with some philosophers hath laid down this as a foundation of reasoning, that he must believe his reason. For so men improperly call arguments drawn from their principles against his senses. Let any enthusiast be principled, that he and his teacher is inspired and acted by an immediate communication of the Divine Spirit. Spirit, and you in vain bring the evidence of clear reasons against his doctrine. Whoever therefore have imbibed wrong principles, are not in things inconsistent with these principles, to be moved by the most apparent and convincing probabilities, till they are so candid and ingenious to themselves as to be persuaded to examine each other, even those very principles which many never suffer themselves to do. 11. Received hypothesis next to these are men whose understandings are cast into a mold and fashioned just to the size of a received hypothesis. The difference between these and the former is, that they will admit of matter of fact, fact, and agree with dissenters in that, but differ only in assigning of reasons and explaining the manner of operation. These are not at that open defiance with their senses. With the former they can endure to hearken to their information a little more patiently, but will by no means admit of their reports in the explanation of things, nor be prevailed on by probabilities which would convince them that things are not brought about just after the same manner that they have decreed within themselves that they are. Would it not be an insufferable thing for a learned professor, and that which his scarlet would blush at, to have his authority of 46 years standing wrought out of hard rock, Greek and Latin, with no small expense of time and candle, and confirmed by general tradition and a Reverend Beard in an instant overturned by an upstart novelist? Can any one expect that he should be made to confess that what he taught his scholars 30 years ago was all air and mysterious stake, and that he sold them wrong words and ignorance at a very dear rate? What probabilities, I say, are sufficient to prevail in such a case? And whoever by the most cogent arguments will be prevailed with, to disrobe himself at once of all his old opinions and pretences to knowledge and learning, which with hard study he hath all this time been labouring for, for, and turn him out stark naked in quest afresh of new notions. All the arguments that can be used will be as little able to prevail as the wind did with the traveller to part with his cloak, which he held only the faster to this of wrong hypothesis may be reduced. The errors that may be occasioned by a true hypothesis or right principles, but not rightly understood. There is nothing more familiar than this. The instances of men contending for different opinions, which they all derive from the infallible truth of the Scripture, are an undeniable proof of it. All that call themselves Christians allow the text that says a word in Greek to carry in it the obligation of a very weighty duty. But yet how very erroneous will one of these practices be, who, understanding nothing but the French, take this rule with one translation to be repentos vous repent, or with the other fatis pentis du penance. 12. Three predominant passions, probabilities which cross men's appetites and prevailing passions, run the same fate, that ever so much probability hang on one side of a covetous man's reasoning and money on the other, it is easy to foresee which will outweigh Earthly minds like mud walls, resist the strongest batteries and though perhaps sometimes the force of a clear argument may make some impression, yet they nevertheless stand firm and keep out the enemy truth which would captivate or disturb them. Tell a man passionately in love that he is jilted, bring a score of witnesses of the falsehood of his mistress. It is ten to one but three kind words of hers shall invalidate all their testimonies. Quod volumus facile credimus. What suits our wishes is forwardly believed, is, I suppose, what every one hath more than once experimented. And though men cannot always openly gainsay or resist the force of manifold probabilities that make against them, yet yield they not to the argument not, but that it is the nature of the understanding constantly to close with the more probable side. But yet a man hath a power to suspend and restrain his inquiries, and not permit a full and satisfactory examination as far as the matter in question is capable, and and will bear it to be made. Until that is done, there will be always these two ways left of evading the most apparent probabilities. 13. Two means of evading probabilities 1. Supposed fallacy latent in the words employed. First, that the arguments being as for the most part they are brought in words, there may be a fallacy latent in them, and the consequences being perhaps many in train, they may be some of them incoherent. There are very few discourses so short, clear and consistent, to which most men may not with satisfaction enough to themselves raise this doubt, and from whose conviction they may not, without reproach of disingenuity or unreasonableness, set themselves free with the old reply, non persuadibus e diamse persuasaires though I cannot answer, I will not yield. 14. Supposed unknown arguments for the contrary. Secondly, manifest probabilities may be evaded, and the assent withheld upon this suggestion that I know not yet all that may be said on the contrary side and therefore, though I be beaten, it is not necessary I should yield, not knowing what forces there are in reserve behind. This is a refuge against convictions so open and so wide, that it is hard to determine when a man is quite out of the verge of it. 15. What probabilities naturally determine the ascent, but yet there is some end of it and a man, having carefully inquired into all the grounds of probability and unlikeliness, done his utmost to inform himself in all particulars fairly and and cast up the sum total on both sides may in most cases come to acknowledge upon the whole matter on which side the probability rests wherein some proofs in matter of reason being suppositions upon universal experience, are so cogent and clear, and some testimonies in matter of fact so universal, that he cannot refuse his assent. So that I think we may conclude that in propositions where though the proofs in view are of most moment, yet there are sufficient grounds to suspect that there is either fallacy in words, or certain proofs as considerable to be produced on the contrary side their assent, suspense, or dissent are often voluntary actions. But where the proofs are such as make it highly probable, and there is not sufficient ground to suspect that there is either a fallacy of words which sober and serious consideration may discover, nor equally valid proofs yet undiscovered latent on the other side, which also the nature of the thing may in some cases make plain to the considerate man there, I think a man who has weighed them can scarce refuse his assent to the side on which the greater probability appears. Whether it be probable that a promiscuous jumble of printing letters should often fall into a method and order which should stamp on paper a coherent discourse or that a blind, fortuitous concourse of atoms, not guided by an understanding agent, should frequently constitute the bodies of any species of animals. In these cases and the like cases, I think nobody that considers them can be one jot at a stand which side to take, nor at all waver in his assent. Lastly, when there can be no supposition, the thing in its own nature indifferent, and wholly depending upon the testimony of witnesses, that there is as fair testimony against as for the matter of fact attested, which by inquiry is to be learned. VG Whether there was 1,700 years ago such a man at Rome, and as Julius Caesar in all such cases, I say, I think it is not in any rational man's power to refuse his assent, but that it necessarily follows and closes with such probabilities. In other less clear cases, I think it is in man's power to suspend his assent, and perhaps content himself with the proofs he has, if they favor the opinion which suits with his inclination or interest, and to stop from further search but that a man should afford his assent to that side on which the less probability appears to him, seems to me utterly impracticable and as impossible as it is to believe the same thing probable and improbable at the same time. Time. 16. Where it is in our power to suspend our judgment as knowledge is no more arbitrary than perception, so I think assent is no more in our power than knowledge. When the agreement of any two ideas appear to our minds, whether immediately or by the assistance of reason, I can no more refuse to perceive, no more avoid knowing it, than I can avoid seeing those objects which I turn my eyes to and look on in daylight, and what, upon full examination, I find the most probable, I cannot deny my assent. But though we cannot hinder our knowledge where the agreement is once perceived, nor our assent where the probability manifestly appears upon due consideration of all the measures of it, yet we can hinder both knowledge and assent by stopping our inquiry, and not employing our faculties in the search of any truth. If it were not so, ignorance, err, or infidelity could not in any case be the fault. Thus in some cases we can prevent or suspend our assent. But can a man versed in modern or ancient history, doubt whether there is such a place as Rome, or whether there was such a man as Julius Caesar? Indeed there are millions of truths that a man is not, or may not think himself concerned to know, as whether our King Richard V third was crooked or no, or whether Roger Bacon was a mathematician or a magician. In these and such like cases, where the ascent one way or other is of no importance to the interest of anyone, no action, no concernment of his following or depending thereon, there it is not strange that the mind should give itself up to the common opinion, or render itself to the first comer. These and the like opinions are of so little weight and moment, that, like motes in the sun, their tendencies are very rarely taken notice of, they are there, as it were by chance, and the mind lets them float at liberty. But where the mind judges that the proposition has concernment in it, where the assent or not assenting is thought to draw consequences of moment after it, and good and evil to depend on choosing or refusing the right side, the mind sets itself seriously to inquire and examine the probability there. I think it is not in our choice to take which side we please. If manifest odds appear on either, the greater probability, I think, in that case, will determine the assent and a man can no more avoid assenting or taking it to be true where he perceives the greater probability, than he can avoid knowing it to be true where he perceives the agreement or disagreement of any two ideas. If this be so, the foundation of error will lie in wrong measures of probability, as the foundation of vice in wrong measures of good. 17 5. Authority. The fourth and last, wrong measure of probability I shall take notice of, and which keeps in ignorance or air more people than all the other together is that which I have mentioned in the foregoing chapter. I mean the giving up of our assent to the common received opinions, either of our friends or party, neighborhood, or country. How many men have no other grounds for their tenets than the supposed honesty or learning or number of those of the same profession, as if honest or bookish men could not err, or truth were to be established by the vote of of the multitude. Yet this with most men serves the turn the tenet has had the attestation of reverend antiquity. It comes to me with the passport of former ages, and therefore I am secure in the reception I give it. Other men have been and are of the same opinion. For that is, all is said, and therefore it is reasonable to for me to embrace it. A man may more justifiably throw up, cross and pile for his opinions than take them up. By such measures all men are liable to error and most men are in many points by passion or interest under temptation to it. If we could but see the secret motives that influenced the men of name and learning in the world, and the leaders of the parties, we shall not always find that it was the embracing of truth for its own sake that made them espouse the doctrines they owned and maintained. This at least is certain. There is not an opinion so absurd which a man may not receive upon this ground. There is no heir to be named which has not had its professors and a man shall never want crooked paths to walk in, if he thinks that he is in the right way, wherever he has the footsteps of others to follow. 18. Not so many men in heirs as is commonly supposed. But notwithstanding the great noise is made in the world about errors and opinions, I must do mankind that right as to say, there are not so many men in errors and wrong opinions as is commonly supposed. Not that I think they embrace the truth but indeed, because concerning those doctrines they keep such a stir about, they have no thoughts, no opinion at all. For if any one should a little catechise the greatest part of the partisans of most of the sects in the world, he would not find concerning those matters they are so zealous for that they have any opinions of their own, much less would he have reason to think that they took them upon the examination of arguments and appearance of probability. They are resolved to stick to a party that education or interest has engaged them in and there, like the common soldiers of an army, show their courage and warmth, as their leaders direct, without ever examining, or so much as knowing, the cause they contend for. If a man's life shows that he has no serious regard for religion, for what reason should we think that he beats his head about the opinions of his church, and troubles himself to examine the grounds of this or that doctrine? It is enough for him to obey his leaders, to have his hand and his tongue ready for the support of the common cause, and thereby approve himself to those who can give him credit, preferment, or protection in that society. Thus men become professors of, and combatants for, those opinions they were never convinced of, nor proselytes to, no, nor ever had so much as floating in their heads. And though one cannot say there are fewer improbable or erroneous opinions in the world than there are, yet this is certain there are fewer that actually assent to them, and mistake them for truths than I imagined. End of section 21.
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Section 22 An Essay Concerning Human Understanding
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by John Locke Book 4 of Knowledge and Problem Probability this is a Librivox recording. All Librivox recordings are in the public domain. For more information or to volunteer, please visit Librivox.org recording by Chad Horner from
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Ballyclere in Cuniandra, Northern Ireland, situated in
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the north east of the island of Ireland. Chapter 21 of the Division of the Sciences 1. Science may be divided into three sorts, all that can fall within the compass of human understanding, being either, first, the nature of things as they are in themselves, their relations, and their manner of operation or secondly, that which man himself ought to do as a rational and voluntary agent for the attainment of any end, especially happiness or thirdly, the ways and means whereby the knowledge of both the one and the other of these
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is attained and communicated. I think science may be divided properly
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into these three sorts. 2. First, physica. First, the knowledge of things as they
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are in their own proper beings their
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constitution, properties, and operations whereby I mean
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not only matter and body, but spirits
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also, which have their proper natures, constitutions, and operations, as well as bodies.
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This in a little more enlarged sense
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of the word, I call word in Greek physica, or natural philosophy. The end of this is bare speculative
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truth and whatsoever can afford the mind
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of man, any such falls under this branch, whether it be God himself, angels, spirits, bodies, or any of their affections, as numbers and figures, etc. 3. Secondly, practica. Secondly word in Greek, practica, the skill of right applying our own powers and actions for the attainment of things good and useful, the most considerable under this head is ethics, which is the seeking out those rules and measures of human actions which lead to happiness and the
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means to practice them.
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The end of this is not bare speculation and the knowledge of truth, but right and a conduct suitable to it. 4. Thirdly word in Greek semioutica thirdly, the
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third branch may be called semiutica, or the doctrine of signs.
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The most usual whereof being words, it is aptly enough termed also word in Greek logica logic. The business whereof is to consider the nature of signs the mind makes use
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of for the understanding of things, or conveying its knowledge to others. For since the things the mind contemplates are none of them besides itself present to the understanding, it is necessary that
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something else, as a sign or representation of the thing it considers, should be present to it. And these are ideas.
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And because the scene of ideas that makes one man's thoughts cannot be laid
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open to the immediate view of another, nor laid up anywhere but in the
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memory and no very sure repository, therefore to communicate art thoughts to one another, as well as record them for our
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own use, signs of our ideas are also necessary.
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Those which men have found most convenient, and therefore generally make use of, are articulate signs. The consideration, then, of ideas in words,
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as the great instruments of knowledge, makes
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no despicable part of their contemplation.
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Who would take a view of human knowledge in the whole extent of it?
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And perhaps if they were distinctly weighed and duly considered, they would afford us another sort of logic and critic than
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what we have been hitherto acquainted with.
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5.
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This is the first and most general division of the objects of our understanding.
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This seems to me the first and
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most general as well as natural division
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of the objects of our understanding. For a man can employ his thoughts about nothing but either the contemplation of
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things themselves for the discovery of truth, or or about the things in his
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own power which are his own actions
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for the attainment of his own ends
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or the signs the mind makes use of both in the one and the other, and the right ordering of them
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for its clearer information all which three, viz.
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Things as they are in themselves knowable actions, as they depend on us in
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order to happiness, and the right use of signs in order to knowledge being Tutu Coelho different they seemed to me to be the three great provinces of
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the intellectual world, holy, separate and distinct one from another.
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The end end of Section 22 recording
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by Chad Horner from Ballyclere in Cony Hunter, Northern Ireland Situated in the north
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east of the island of Ireland end
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of An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Book
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four of Knowledge and Probability by John Locke.