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- [00:00]
A
Hello, dear listeners. Welcome back to Conflicted. I'm here, Thomas Small, with Amon Dean, the Oracle of Arabia, looking back at me across the video screen from there, where he lives in Dubai. Hello. Amen.
- [00:12]
B
Now.
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A
Amen. Yesterday, the Christians of the east and those fellow travelers of them in the west celebrated Easter, or Pascha, as we call it, my parish here where I live, we did slaughter the fatted calf in style. And so I'm having a little holy Paschal hangover today as we record. We ended our Lenten fast in style, I can promise you. Oh, now I'm feeling a little bit worse for wear.
- [00:39]
B
Well, you know what, Lachen? I mean, they always say that the best cure for a hangover is to actually have a stimulating episode with Eamon Dean.
- [00:49]
A
You, Eamon, are the supreme hair of the dog. Right, Dearest listeners, or dear listeners, rather. We are going to. Although you should become a dearest listener, if you're not a dearest listener by joining the conflicted community. But today, dear listeners, we will be talking about the peace talks that took place in Islamabad over the weekend, on Saturday, to be exact, which, as everyone now knows, did not succeed in their stated ambitions of ending the Iran war in terms agreeable to both sides, or at least agreeable to the United States, which you know, from their point of view, is the only side that matters. And so in today's episode, we're going to talk about the talks and we're going to talk about the ongoing ceasefire and the soon to begin blockade of Iranian shipping out of the Strait of Hormuz. Let's get right into it. Okay, Eamon Dean, let's talk first about the talks. On last week's episode, which dropped on Friday, you let us know that in your view, the talks were not going to succeed. You gave a number of reasons for it, and lo and behold, you were right. They didn't succeed. When did you? Well, let's start from the beginning. So, you know, basically the delegations from the United States and Iran, they both arrived in Islamabad on Saturday morning. What were you feeling at the time? The Iranian delegation was pretty big. It seemed that they were very serious and they wanted to, you know, signal that they were going to take these talks seriously, that this wasn't just theater. I don't know. What do you think? What was the initial, sort of, let's say, mood in the room?
- [02:38]
B
Well, first of all, the Iranian delegation was about roughly 80 people and they were coming with 168 proposals. I'm not kidding. Seriously, 168. It's like a cornucopia of so many proposals put together. And when I saw this, I thought, oh my God, it's doomed to fail. You know why? Because the Islamic Republic is approaching these negotiations as if they were negotiations for a free trade agreement with another nation or a bloc of nations, or it's a WTO agreement on trade, which could take months or years. And this is when I realized it's doomed.
- [03:16]
A
Because basically, I'm sure the Americans, especially the President himself, would have expected Iran to come like a supplicant before a conqueror. I mean, that's what you've been saying for a long time, that essentially the Americans are expecting a surrender because in the Americans minds, they've blown Iran to smithereens. The army is destroyed, the Navy has sunk, all of these things. And so the fact that Iran comes with this big delegation, with all these points, as if they're coming from a position of strength, that would have got the talks off to a very awkward start, because that's just not what the Americans were feeling like. Is that what you're saying?
- [03:51]
B
Trump doesn't want a supplicant enemy. What he wants is that this nation coming to him and saying, listen, we're going to participate in this game playing by the rules. We will now, from now on, play by the rules. And we want to join the rest of the global community as a full paid member. But we need to talk seriously about few things. One, two, three. That would have been amazing. But the problem is they were coming trying to enforce their own rules through soft intimidation and manipulation, bringing one hundred and sixty eight proposals linked to each other in a way that the outcome would have resulted in, first of all, prolonged process of months, if not more of technical talks that would have led to an agreement with so many loopholes. You can drive a truck through it. In fact, you could even sail a submarine through it. And that's why the Americans were having none of it, because the American side were coming for. Look, this is not going to be difficult. All we want from you, really, really, all we want from you is this sentence. We, as the leaders of the Islamic Republic, are now closing the chapter once and for all on our nuclear program forever. That's it. That's all we need to hear from you.
- [05:32]
A
But only closing the chapter on the nuclear program. What about the proxies? What about some of the other very important points that the Americans seem to be demanding from Iran? I mean, if Iran said, look, we're closing the nuclear chapter, but we're still going to arm Our quote unquote allies across the region. Are you saying that the United States would accept that?
- [05:52]
B
Well, the United States would accept a deferral or a postponement to talk about these issues. The idea is that the Iranians are in desperate need for cash. So the idea is, okay, we will give you $27 billion. I was aware of the amount. We will give you $27 billion of your frozen accounts to immediately pay your salaries and pay your liabilities and do everything you need in exchange for the 460kg of highly enriched uranium. You allow our teams to come in to extract them. The extraction could take weeks, but you allow our teams to come and extract and in return, we're going to give you $27 billion. And of course, like in the with it, you have to allow the Strait of Hormuz to be completely free and open for navigation. We can't bring our teams and bring our people in to extract the highly enriched uranium in an environment where it still feels like a war. And plus, it's an international waterway. You are not supposed to do it. But this is when everything went completely berserk.
- [06:58]
A
Well, it seems that in the early afternoon, both sides held separate meetings with the Pakistani Prime Minister Sharif and that, you know, it's funny that you say that the United States was saying, look, we're going to unfreeze these assets in exchange for the uranium. Because at the time of the, you know, on Saturday afternoon, an Iranian source told Reuters that the US had agreed to unfreeze these assets under those conditions. But US Officials immediately denied this and said, no, the talks haven't even started yet. So in a way, you know, that was a genuine leak of some of the pre talk communication. Okay, then the second thing that came up right away was the sense that the Americans were also demanding that the Strait of Hormuz be opened immediately. And the Iranians said, look, we'd love to, but we can't because we did drop some mines there and we no longer have the ability to locate them or clear them. Do you think that's true?
- [08:00]
B
It is true. But there was even something more weird than that. First of all, let me address this issue of the mines, of the 28 or 29 mines that were dropped in the Strait on the Omani side. Look how they treat their allies. Oman has always been kind to the Iranian people and the Islamic Republic. However, I mean, they've been treated badly. However, somehow the American administration and I have good connections there in the Trump administration. They say, bullshit, they know where they are, they Just like, don't want to take responsibility, and they don't want to admit that they planted them very close, extremely close to the Omani shores, because that would destroy their relationship with Oman. They want to say to Oman, it's the currents that actually brought these mines to your shores, not us. We planted them in the middle of the street, but then they drifted. Of course. This is bullshit. So the Americans are now sending destroyers to locate them first. And then there will be certain underwater drone technology to eliminate them one by one. Provided that we can do that. But this was not the weirdest part of it, Thomas. Okay, the weirdest part is about to happen. It is when the delegation of the Islamic Republic said with complete straight face, and I don't know how they were able to maintain that straight face, they said, well, sorry, but the Strait of Hormuz is actually a war gain for us. This is now our spoils of war. Yeah, they were talking like as if we are talking in the 1500s or the 1400s, you know, this is now my war gain as a spoils of war. I'm not going to give it up anymore. That's it. You have to accept my sovereignty over it. And I'm going to charge $2 million per ship. That will give me a revenue of $64 billion a year. That's my reparation for the next 10, 20 years. And I can tell you the atmosphere in the evening turned a little bit sour. That's why they were talking about mood swings throughout the entire day because of a demand like this. Iran behaving like a medieval power.
- [10:17]
A
Well, it's funny, the talks, as you say, they began in the late afternoon. The real talks finally, after all of preceding bits. Now, if the Iranians come out of the gate saying, look, one of the things is we expect to have the Strait of Hormuz and therefore the entire Arabian or Persian Gulf basically fall within our sovereignty right? Then, yeah, sure, that's going to shock the Americans and be like, what the hell are you talking about? But what about the gcc? I mean, even before the talks began, the UAE had publicly said that, you know, there must be an unconditional reopening of Hormuz right away, and that if Iran gained control of the strait or demanded tolling rights, that the Gulf would just refuse to ship any oil through the strait at all. I mean, so, you know, for the gcc, the idea of Iranian hegemony over the Strait and over the Gulf is just like a non starter. The Americans must have known that. So what role behind the scenes, through mediators, whatever was the GCC playing and maybe especially Saudi, because if I understand correctly, at one point Pakistani Air force units were deployed to Saudi during the talk. So there's some sense of pressure being put from that side. What was going on on the gcc, the Saudi side?
- [11:30]
B
Well, the Saudis and the Qataris sent observers to the talks and the Omanis also were present there. The problem here is that the Emiratis wanted to be present even as an observer, but they were blocked by Iran, said no, we don't want you and understandable. However, not many people understand, but actually the most influential country on the Gulf is not necessarily Saudi Arabia. Now many people understand basically that I'm a Bahraini born and bred in Saudi and living in the uae. But from my position I see that the UAE is far more influential in the Gulf when it comes to trade through the Hormuz trade. So when it comes to the Hormuz trade, the UAE is far bigger. Why? The UAE, through both DP World and Abu Dhabi ports globally control 250 ports and roughly about a thousand logistical hubs across the planet.
- [12:40]
A
This is the notorious UAE Emirati Neo Venetian empire that you hear people talking about. The incredible control that the Emiratis have over world shipping.
- [12:51]
B
Exactly. The neo Genovese Venetian empire that they created for themselves. And Jebel Ali, which is the largest port in the entire Middle east by container size and quantities. Roughly 55% of the entire Middle east maritime trade go through it. And the UAE handles. Just imagine this figure I'm going to tell you now. 1, $2.6 trillion of trade. You know, the UAE controls that trade. That's twice more than Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman, Jordan, Israel combined.
- [13:31]
A
Is it for this reason that the Iranians said they didn't want the Emiratis to be there as observers?
- [13:36]
B
Not only that, because they know that the UAE has threatened that they will spare no expense because at the end of the day the UAE economy is actually like 50% bigger than Iran. Can you believe it? Even though Iran is a nation of 90 million people and the UAE is a nation of 9 million. However, the UAE is 50% in terms of GDP bigger than Iran. But it has $2.7 trillion of sovereign wealth funds collectively and it controls $1.6 trillion of trade. And therefore the power of the UAE is like way it can punch way above its weight. And the Iranians know that the UAE threatened that unless if the hormones strait is released from the grip of the Ayatollahs, then the UAE will spare no expense because for them, they would gladly pay 100 billion. And to see the regime fall, it's
- [14:38]
A
a truly existential threat to the uae. Its entire strategy would collapse.
- [14:42]
B
Because why? How would I trust Jabal Ali? How would I trust the ports of Hamriya and Fujairah and Kzad and Rashid and all of these wonderful, amazing ports? How do I trust the UAE to be the aviation hub? How do I trust the UAE to be the banking hub? The UAE established itself as the trade behemoth in the region here, and therefore it is an existential threat to it. And the Iranians know that and they are pressing so hard at it. But this is why the UAE was blocked by the Iranians from attending. That was a mistake. So, however, the Saudis, I must say, also handle a lot of trade and a lot of energy coming out of the Strait of Hormuz. And they, alongside the Kuwaitis, said, no, no, no, there will be no sovereignty or control or any interference whatsoever or toll collecting from the Iranian side on the Hormuz. Hormuz is an international waterway that cannot be controlled. There is no sovereignty over it, because otherwise. And I liked what the Foreign Minister of Singapore said in front of the Singaporean Parliament when he said that the Strait of Malacca, it's small, it's much smaller and much narrower than the Strait of Hormuz and it's just next door to us. And we never ever thought of charging any tolls. And there is twice the trade that go through the Strait of Malacca than through the Strait of Hormuz. And we never even dreamed of doing this because that will be breaking international law and international treaties. That's why I would say that the Saudis stood up for the whole GCC against this. And in fact, they threatened the Iranians that doing so would mean that we and the Emiratis and the Kuwaitis and the Bahrainis and everyone else in the Qataris, we are not going to export a single drop of oil or lng liquefied natural gas forever as long as you are in control of this. So technically, it's the GCC telling the world, and especially the European Union, that we're going to impose an embargo on the rest of the world if the rest of the world is not going to enforce international law when it comes to the Stratiformis.
- [17:17]
A
So just to finish this GCC dimension, we know that Saudi Arabia and Pakistan are very close allies. You know, the Saudi Pakistani military deal that was signed, you know, last year is a sign of their Closeness. So the fact that Pakistan emerged as the mediator in these talks and that Saudi has such close relations with Pakistan, did that give Saudi and through Saudi, the gcc, some kind of leverage behind the scenes, do you think? How did the Saudi Pakistan, Pakistani relationship impact these talks?
- [17:50]
B
Well, in essence, when the Pakistanis wanted to find a way to exact that leverage on the Iranians, they came up with the suggestion to the Iranians regarding the Strait of Hormuz being open for navigation. But there was some chicanery, unfortunately. Okay, so they said to the Iranians, how about we, the Pakistanis, you, the Iranians, as well as the Omanis and the Saudis, these four nations will take care of the navigation, security and safety in Hormu Strait. And in return, there will be nominal fees paid to cover the expenses of ensuring safety through the Hormones strait. It's not the $2 million that you're talking about, but a smaller fee for that. How about that? Would that break the deadlock? And the Iranians said, no, never. We are not going to accept that. At the same moment, the announcement came from the Pakistani side that they sent 18 fighter jets and 13,000 troops to King Abdelaziz Air Base, in which the home where I grew up in Saudi Arabia in the Al Agrabiya neighborhood in Khobar is literally a kilometer away from the fence of that base.
- [19:17]
A
So that's your neighborhood, it's your backyard.
- [19:19]
B
It's my neighborhood. Exactly. So basically, the Pakistanis were trying to kind of like say to the Iranians, look, you know, you are really testing our patience right now. Come on, please show some flexibility here on the Strait of Hormuz question. But they were not budging. And they were using medieval arguments of spoils of war. This is, you know, we were attacked and therefore whatever we gain is ours to keep. But that does not extend to international waterways. The U.S. won the Pacific War in 1945. That does not make the U.S. the legal owner of the Pacific Ocean. But no matter how many times you explain this to the Iranian delegates, they seem to be fixated on this. And don't get me started on the other two issues of nuclear and proxy.
- [20:26]
A
Well, Eamonn, who would be surprised to find that the Iranian delegation were trapped in some medieval ways of thinking? I think that we should all be used to that. So by the end of Saturday, direct talks had actually started between both sides. So on the US Side, you have, you know, you can imagine there's a table there. On one side of the table sits J.D. vance, the American Vice President. Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, you know, top White House Trump ally, insiders, you know, negotiators extraordinaire, whatever. And on the other side, you have, representing Iran, Golubov, the current speaker of the Iranian Parliament, former military, you know, honcho, so, you know, a lot of muscle there. And Ragchi, the foreign minister, so, you know, well represented as well. When was it clear to you and to people who were, you know, behind the scenes that these talks were definitely going to fail? Because quite up to the last minute, President Trump was saying, oh, no, actually, things are proceeding quite nicely. So when did you know they were going to fail?
- [21:24]
B
I started to realize they are going nowhere when I was told that the Iranians brought with them the head of the Central bank, because, of course, they were hoping for the $27 billion to be unfrozen and then directed towards the Iranian Central bank for the purpose of, well, paying salaries and lucky, I mean, paying for the bills of the state. However, things started to go wrong. One, when they refused flat out to relinquish their current illegal control over the Hormuz Strait. And in fact, one American delegate told the Iranians that you are trespassing over international waters and you are actually in the same position as Saddam Hussein in Kuwait in 1991. He invaded another country. He was trespassing there illegally. You are trespassing illegally on an international waterway causing significant damage. Illegally. It's not yours to blockade. Turkey has a complete control over the Bosphorus and the Dardanelle, but they never blockade anyone, not even Russia, not even Ukraine. No one. I mean, everyone can trade through there because of. And they don't collect any tolls based on international treaties. So do not trespass. But they keep saying, no, you attacked first. We have the right to defend ourselves any way we see fit. Okay? We have a ceasefire. It means basically that you have to withdraw from that international body of water. You have to withdraw. No, we are not. So this is when things started to go sour and then when they started discussing the nuclear issue. Goodness. J.D. vance, who everyone knows as a vice president, has always been a. A war skeptic, the most cautious voice in the entire administration. He did not like the idea at all. He didn't want to start it if it was up to him. But nonetheless, he was sent. And it was a very wise decision by President Trump to send him, because it is the first time he ever encounters the full weight of the Iranian chicanery when it comes to negotiations. He saw for himself what a tough, difficult job it is to convince them that the sun is shining outside and tomorrow is Sunday. And yet he persevered, you know, and he said, look, I know we have asked you to close the chapter completely on the nuclear file. However, I am authorized by President Trump to tell you that you can restart your nuclear program, but after 20 years. So he told them 20 years later. But you know, we're not going to tell you, never do it. But right now, you must allow us access to the sites where the highly enriched uranium stockpiles are located so we can extract them and take them away. 460 kilograms, enough for 12 nuclear weapons. We already talked about them before. In addition to that, we need to destroy all the facilities and all the centrifuges. All of them must be decommissioned. Do that in addition to the opening of the Strait of Hormuz, because it's not yours anyway. And we will release the funds, we will start negotiations over the proxies, and as you start winding down the proxies, we will lift the sanctions one after another as you start to winding down your support for the proxies. So the proxies can either vanish or integrate within their respective countries and societies. So we de escalate across the region. We get rid of non state actors who were not supposed to have existed in the first place. Do that for us and we will lift all the sanctions. We will unfreeze all the frozen assets gradually as we do this. And we promise you, all of this will be done within six to nine months from now. So there will be no years of waiting. However, you have to close the chapter on your nuclear ambitions. And within 20 years, if we see that you have now adopted the rules of the game of the established global order, then you will become a full paid member of this global order. And you will benefit and your people will benefit. What was the response? No, no and no.
- [26:15]
A
Okay, so we're going to take a quick break here. You know, news flash, the talks failed and very shortly thereafter the United States announced that it would be blockading the Strait of Hormuz. Blockading Iranian shipping on the Strait of Hormuz. So when we get back from this break, Eamon, you're going to explain to us what that means. We'll be right back. Right, we're back, Eamon. Quickly now, because we don't have a lot of time. Let's talk about this American plan to blockade Iranian shipping through the Strait of Hormuz. What does this plan entail? What is the legality of this plan and what is the strategy? Of this plan.
- [27:04]
B
Okay, first of all, we have to understand that a blockade is internationally, you know, accepted as an act of war. It is an act of war and therefore it's not supposed to be used lightly. President Kennedy during the Cuban Missile Crisis in late 1962, he actually applied a blockade to Cuba. However, because he knew that a blockade is an act of war, he decided to give it rather cute name. He called it quarantine. So he's quarantining Cuba as if it was a disease ridden degenerate.
- [27:40]
A
Well, before we go on to talk about this specific blockade, let's talk a little more about blockading in general. I remember back in 2017 when the GCC really led by Saudi Arabia at that time, launched a diplomatic boycott of Qatar. It was often by the Qataris and by the press that it was more or less favorable to the Qatari point of view, described as a blockade. And at the time I got quite animated about this, saying, no, it's not a blockade, it's a boycott. They're not actually using their navies to prevent all shipping in and out of Doha. This is not a blockade. And so I think I'm right. 2017 effort was not a blockade. But that this one that the Americans are going to impose now is a blockade. What is a blockade?
- [28:24]
B
A blockade where military assets are deployed in order to make sure that maritime and land crossings are actually blocked physically with military assets being deployed, whether naval assets or ground military assets. So in this case, it's going to be a naval blockade. And the purpose of the blockade is that the nation which is the target of the blockade cannot conduct maritime trade originating from or where the destination of the ships are coming into. So incoming and outgoing trade in a maritime trade through its ports. And as you know, like, basically there is Chabahar, you know, Bandar Imam Khomeini, Bandar Abbas. So there are several ports. Any ship from overseas trying to come into the Strait of Hormuz carrying goods or carrying weapons to Iran, from any nation, whether it is China, Russia, India, you know, Pakistan, whatever, is going to be denied entry. And any ship that has sailed from the Iranian ports, either Bandra Abbas or the others, will be denied exit and they will have to be turnaround. Now, one of the terms associated with blockades is called running the blockade. It's like I'm gonna, you know, ignore all the warnings and let the blockading power do whatever they must. And therefore they first fire warning shots over the ship. If they don't, then the ship is then disabled at the rudder. So basically they try to target the rudder of the ship and then the ship is boarded. There will be no sinking. There would be no killing or damaging or destroying ships. Let me be clear, that's not how a blockade work. A blockade work by the offending ships. The ships that do not obey orders will have their rudders disabled after warning, of course, and then they will be boarded. And the people who are the captain of the ship and the crew of the ship, they will be arrested for the crime of running a blockade. Let's put it this way. So I just want to make sure that the listeners understand the US Is not going to destroy a ship, kill sailors and crew members, but there will be boarding and sieges that is going to happen, possibly even in ascending helicopters with Special Forces Marines basically landing inside and taking full control of the ship.
- [31:15]
A
Well, that's standard procedure. As I mentioned on Friday, I recently interviewed Jack Carr, the novelist who was a Navy SEAL sniper, but early in his career, career as a Navy seal, you know, he was on patrol boats of the Persian Gulf. And they would, at that time, this is before the second Gulf War, they would regularly land on Iraqi vessels that were trying to run the sanctions regime that was on Iraq at the time. And it was like, it was like a police effort, basically. They were like pulling over a speeding car or something and arresting the captain. So this is, this is standard procedure. It's what's the, it's what the United States Navy does to some extent. That's part of its job.
- [31:53]
B
Exactly. But what does President Trump aim from this blockade? Let's ask ourselves this. What does he want? The aim is to apply maximum economic pressure. Now, the Iranians were very clever from the beginning. I mean, they already relocated 27 of their oil tankers filled to the brim to the other side of the Hormu Strait in the Gulf of Oman. And they are there right now. So the idea is that when the blockades start, these ships will be outside of the blockade zone. No problem, let them pass through. But there will be no more shipping of oil anymore by Iran to any other nation. The aim is that. But with the Saudis and other nations pumping more and more oil, and especially through the Red Sea, they hope that this will address the oil shock that might result out of the blockade, the oil price shock, I mean, but the idea is that the world economy could absorb it. But the bigger loser here will be the Iranian economy itself, because now there are some credible estimates once this blockade comes into effect and within a week, if it lasts a Week. The Iranian currency. At the moment the Iranian currency is 1.5 million rial per US dollar. However, give it a week or two after the blockade and it could pass through the 2 million mark. 2 million riyal per. Per dollar. That will be a catastrophe for the Iranian economy. I cannot stress how catastrophic it is because the inflation will be rampant. Trust in the currency will evaporate overnight, and that will cause significant dissatisfaction with how the government is running the show inside Iran. That is why the Iranians don't like the idea of a. A blockade. So what are they doing to mitigate?
- [34:06]
A
Yeah, well, this is the question. Well, in fact, I know what you're gonna talk about in a second, which is the Bab Al Mandeb and the Houthis. Okay, yes. So we're gonna get there. But before we move away, I wanna just talk a little bit more about this blockade, because it's not only the Iranians who are gonna hurt from the blockade. It's going to be the usual recipients of Iranian oil, and that includes China to a large degree. So, you know, I know in general, you have tried to downplay a Chinese dimension to the Iran war in general, you know, that there are the theories out there that the whole war is really about America's rivalry with China. You've always said, no, that's not the case. There are reasons enough to want to bring the Iranian regime down. China is a separate story. However, since the war began, you know, China is there behind the scenes. It is an ally of Iran. It benefits from Iranian oil. It benefits from a discount on that oil, which, you know, because it gets around sanctions and so forth. So what is China doing now in the context of this war? And how will the blockade influence China's ability to maneuver?
- [35:09]
B
Well, recently I had a rather very, very, very tense talk with a senior Chinese security official where he asked me for. And basically, this Chinese security official, he's responsible for Chinese oil companies across the Gulf, not in Iran, but on the other side of the Gulf. So basically Iraq all the way down to Oman, including Saudi Arabia, Kuwait. And so he asked me to come and talk about what do I expect and how do I see this war ending. And that was about maybe two and a half, three weeks ago. I can tell you. It was one of the most tense zoom meetings I ever had in my whole life. I mean, it was tense because he is rather senior in the ccp, in the Chinese Communist Party, as well as being a former, most likely mss, the Ministry of State Security, which is the most powerful, you Know, intelligence and security apparatus in all of China is as powerful as the CCP itself. More powerful than the Foreign Ministry or Defense ministry, even in China. And so I have to stare down that idiot, you know, and I have, you know, I really like lost it with him because he was, he was very pro Iranian. And it's like, listen, dude, I know you and I know Lucky when you go for golf in Dubai and I know all of your buddies and I know basically where you go for cigar and whiskey and all of that, basically, so don't pull this bullshit on me. But nonetheless, he was very much pro Iran through and through. He believes that it is the fault of the GCC this war have happened. He blamed the GCC for that. He believes the GCC are low IQ idiots in comparison to the very smart Iranian people and the Persian civilization. Because he was trying to say that China and Persia are sister civilizations, you know, you, however, Arabs are nobodies, you know, without your oil and you have to bring other people to fight your wars for you. And this is when I told him, you know what, you know, Mr. Whatever your name is, you know, and I'm not going to reveal his name, you know, since you are always Lakina, I mean, lounging in Dubai and Riyadh and Abu Dhabi and all of these places. How about I report this conversation to the leadership of both the UAE and Saudi Arabia because they will be very interested in actually understanding the views of an official not only from the CCP, but also from the Chinese energy industry as a whole. He almost like, I mean, peed and pooped himself, you know, basically on that, when I told him this and he told me, no, no, no, please, Mr. Dean, please, please understand, these are my private views. I told him, your private views are to share with your wife, not with me on this call. I mean, seriously, I lost it with him. So. But what I'm saying is you can see his views. And then I was told by one of his colleagues who actually called me to apologize and to beg me not to report this conversation. But actually, considering, my dear Thomas, you
- [38:40]
A
are reporting it right now.
- [38:45]
B
The fact that many members of the Saudi and Emirati leadership actually listen to our podcast, I might as well have reported it already. But anyway, he called me to say that these views are actually widely shared by members of the CCP and senior ministers in China. They really see this as the Western civilization depending on Arab minions and because of the antisemitism rife within China. Also on Israeli attack dogs attacking a poor, innocent, downtrodden Sister civilization from the East. That is the Chinese view. And that's why I thought I will bring this conversation to show you that I did not hear this from intermediaries. I heard it being said to me in a very tense conversation with a senior Chinese official.
- [39:49]
A
So the Chinese will not like this blockade at all. Will they be able to do anything about it? Will they, you know, do they have any power here, Eamon, Inside Iran, outside Iran?
- [39:58]
B
No, they don't. That's the problem. I mean they will lose the gcc. And the problem is the energy that comes out of the GCC to China is three times what it comes, you know, to China from Iran.
- [40:14]
A
What a terrible thing, you know, for China because China has spent 10 years now forming what I thought were almost cast iron relations with Saudi Arabia and the uae. You know, a lot of investment from China flowing into Saudi Arabia during the Vision 2030 era at the port and the Red Sea you've talked about the role that China played originally to broker a peace deal between Iran and Saudi over Yemen. Like this is an amazing shift. If the Chinese in their shortsightedness have just decided to abandon in a way what, what I've always thought was the Chinese genius for being rather neutral, for triangulating, for keeping all their options open by just adopting a pro Iranian stance here, that seems very short sighted and it's going to blow back on them.
- [40:59]
B
It is. And in fact the Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi is in China today to actually tell them, look, I mean the Iranian regime is threatening our own existence and you need to understand that. And so it's not about Israel. And this is what I tried to convey to the Chinese CCP myself during these conversations. The Iranian regime has always been for 40 years advocating not only for the destruction of Israel, equally if not more, has been advocating for the destruction of the GCC monarchies. Their literature is filled with tens of thousands of examples without exaggerating. That's why when you talk to the Chinese side, however, they still cannot see beyond their anti American, anti Israeli lens and also their rather racism towards the Arabs of the gcc, seeing them as ignorant, easily led, manipulated and without agency or ability to decide for themselves.
- [42:12]
A
Gosh, Eamon, what an interesting insight. Thank you for revealing that. That is gonna make our listeners understand things a lot better. Let's talk about Bab El Mandeb. So this is the strait as everyone knows, indeed from the Arabian Sea into the Red Sea where it links up with the Suez Canal and ships things, you know, mainly to Europe. So again, the EU is gonna be part of this conversation now. So what about the Bab El Mandeb?
- [42:36]
B
Well, the Houthis have already stated publicly and privately and through their own deployments recently in the last 24 hours, that they will blockade Bab El Mandeb. If the US Navy were to blockade Iranian shipping in and out of the Hormuz Strait, and that will have a significant impact, of course, on insurance premiums, on the traffic itself, the maritime traffic, this will most likely affect Egypt significantly. And we talked about how Egypt is vulnerable in the last episode, how vulnerable Egypt it is because Turkey, Egypt and Pakistan, all of these are energy dependent as opposed to energy rich. And Egypt in particular will be hit by a double whammy because forget the energy that is coming to Egypt, it's the Suez Canal. You know, revenues are going to collapse overnight.
- [43:41]
A
Just goes to show you how idiotic the Egyptian leadership is, honestly. Idiotic, to think that they lay themselves open to this kind of situation instead of backing very, very hard the GCC's position in this war. Playing the game that they've been playing. It's foolish. Foolish. Foolish.
- [44:01]
B
Exactly. This Egyptian leadership has made itself gas dependent on Israel and also they made themselves oil dependent on the GCC and they made themselves water dependent on Ethiopia. I mean, seriously. And now they're gonna let the Suez Canal be dependent on the goodwill of an Iranian proxy. So in a sense, I feel that President Sisi has failed on four strategic matters for Egypt, failed miserably. And I think if I was him, I will just basically resign and let someone else with more backbone and someone who can grow a pearl and defend Egypt's interests properly and align themselves with the GCC here because they are more and more dependent on the gcc and their fates are intertwined right now, even if they like it or not.
- [45:02]
A
So it's currently, Eamon, it's currently right at this moment, 12.40pm UK time on Monday 13 April. Let's talk more specifically, because when this episode drops tomorrow morning, Tuesday morning, it's possible that the listener will know that Bab El Mendab has been closed by the Houthis, that the blockade is well underway. So what are the timings likely to be, do you think? And then what will happen next?
- [45:28]
B
Well, this evening I expect that the Iranian IRGC will issue significant warnings that they will be attacking ports across the gcc. So the target will be ports most likely Kuwait, Port Jebel and Rastan, Noora and Dammam in the eastern province of Saudi Arabia, Port Salman and Port Issa and Port Khalifa in Bahrain. They will attack, of course, the ports in Qatar. But the biggest recipients of attacks will be of course, the UAE ports. These will be in terms of importance, Jebel Ali, followed by Kzad in Abu Dhabi and most importantly, Fujairah, where the oil terminal is for the UAE to bypass Bab el Mandeb and to transport the oil away from the Hormuz Strait.
- [46:28]
A
So that's Jebel Ali in Dubai for listeners who don't know. And then the port in Abu Dhabi and then Fujairah on the a Gulf of Oman.
- [46:36]
B
Yes. As well as the port of Kharfakan, which is Asharja port, but it's also on the Gulf of Oman.
- [46:42]
A
So Iran will initially, tonight threaten or actually attack, it wasn't clear these ports.
- [46:48]
B
No, no, threaten and potentially also start the attack if the first Iranian ship were to be turned around and or boarded. Once that happens, the attacks will follow. And also don't forget that we have, as usual, most listeners always overlook the X factor here. Israel, Israel might say that the ceasefire is over and therefore we have every right now to attack targets in Iran at will, especially targets of opportunity, assassinations. So if the Israelis were to carry out assassinations, and most likely they will over the next 48 to 72 hours, then we could see also the attacks on the Gulf states resume. But also if the Houthis were to board the ship or strike a ship or try to hijack a ship in the Bab Al Mandaba and the Red Sea southern region, then we could see a resumption of American Israeli attacks against the Houthis, which could give the pretext for the Yemeni government, you know, the
- [47:57]
A
pro Saudi, the UN recognized government.
- [48:00]
B
Exactly. In Aden, to launch attacks against the Houthis to take advantage as they have been now mobilized properly, you know, unified in command. So watch this space. It's going to be yet another, you know, tumultuous time in the region.
- [48:21]
A
Okay, Eamonn, so clearly this ceasefire is just a pause in a war that has not ended and will not end anytime soon. So but I just want to leave the listener with this question for you. Eamonn, just one more question. Do you think within 24, 48, 72 hours the GCC, and by that I especially mean the Emiratis and the Saudis, who have very, very significant military power to bring to play, if they so choose, will join this war in force
- [48:53]
B
properly if they are attacked significantly. Yes.
- [48:57]
A
Okay, you heard it here, dear listeners. Keep listening to conflicted. We will keep you up to date as best as we can about this war, the Iran war, which is not ending and is growing in strength. It is the most important thing happening in the world today. It has the most consequential outcomes. Whatever happens, the world will never be the same. So, people, you know, you're lucky that you listen to Conflicted. We do our best to tell you what's going on. I think it's fair to say, Eamon, that our listeners understand what's going on better than anyone else. And we have more than anything you to thank for it. Eamon, thank you very much.
- [49:34]
B
Thank you.
- [49:34]
A
Dear listeners, we'll be back. I mean, there'll be an episode on Thursday, me talking to someone else, and then Eamonn next week, Tuesday. You'll tell us everything that's happened in the meantime. And for the dearest listeners, there's a Q and A that will come out on Monday. So if you're not a dearest listener, sign up to the conflicted community. You'll get that Q and A. You'll get an opportunity to have your questions answered by the Oracle of Arabia. The Q&As flesh things out even more than our normal episodes. So, dear listeners, become a dearest listener if you, if you're not already one. That's it for today. Thanks, everyone.
- [50:06]
B
Thank you, everyone, and stay safe and goodbye.
- [50:09]
A
Conflicted is a Message Heard Production. Our executive producers are Jake Warren and Max Warren. This episode was produced and edited by Thomas Small.