C (4:37)

Yes. Remember, sometime I feel like I am in a high performance, very strong SUV car and Trump is a driver.

B (4:48)

Oh dear.

C (4:48)

And I'm there in the backseat and he's telling me, strap up young boy, like an Amin. It's gonna be a bumpy ride. I'm gonna be turning sharply here and there. Even when it happens, I will still be surprised. And so you still can have that jolt. And that's exactly what happened. So he threatened all kinds of things to happen on Tuesday night. And then surprise, surprise, there was finally some breakthrough from the Iranian side led by parliamentary speaker, former IRGC general, former mayor of Tehran, Mahmoud Galiba. So the Galiba said, okay, fine, we have 10 points we're going to present. Now this is of course, basically we'll be talking about these 10 points later. And the 15 points of Trump, we will not mention them all, basically, but nonetheless, we will focus on the most important ones. So what happened here is the fact that 80 minutes before deadline expired, President Trump comes out and says, that's it. We're going to have two weeks ceasefire in which we will have some negotiations taking place place in Pakistan, in Islamabad. And of course, that was preceded by a rather clumsy choreography by the White House and the Prime Minister of Pakistan, where he was given a text, a draft, in which he was supposed to copy and paste only the body of the text. However, he copied and pasted the whole thing that came to him from the White House and then put it on Twitter where it says a draft for the. For Pakistan's pm. You know, it's like

B (6:36)

Eamon immediately. It does make me just want to. We have to talk about President Trump. We have to talk about this man's personality and the consequences of that personality on, on this war and on global politics. You know, you have said that this war would happen whether it was Trump in the White House, whether it was a Democrat in the White House. You've made it clear the war would happen differently. Different theatrics, as you've called it. Because behind the scenes and underneath the surface, there is both a national security apparatus and in fact, a global international security apparatus, which overlaps with finance and all sorts of things that has been preparing the ground for a conflict with, or a confrontation with the Islamic Republic since the 7th of October. You've made this case, it seems absolutely accurate. And the other day when Trump threatened to kind of destroy Iranian civilization, an incredible tweet which, you know, I think justifiably caused a lot of scandal and outrage. Cuz it's a kind of absurd thing to say. You immediately texted me a video of Hillary Clinton, I think, from her campaign back in 2007 against Barack Obama, in which in much more diplomatic, much more reasonable, let's say, language, the sort of language you'd expect a woman or a person like Hillary Clinton to use, she more or less said the same thing. A sign that this kind of the policy, a robust, aggressive, confrontational policy towards the Islamic Republic is not something like in itself outrageous for an American president or an American administration to have. It's an old story. Nonetheless. Donald Trump is different.

C (8:22)

Yes.

B (8:23)

Everything about him is different. And you're there in the region, in the gcc, talking to decision makers with direct access to leaders, you know, and you have to be diplomatic, we understand. You can't necessarily spill all the Beans. But it must be very frustrating to be a top level ally of America right now. Even when the policies correspond, you favor the policy, but the personality leading, driving that SUV is so erratic, so not sort of inclined to coordinate properly, to speak honestly, it must be very frustrating.

C (9:04)

Okay, I will try to explain this as much as I could without ruffling some feathers here. First of all, President Trump is difficult to deal with even in the best of times. But having said that, having said that, he is difficult, yet he is the best president so far as far as the GCC is concerned. When we talk about the gcc, as well as Israel and Jordan, the countries that generally align with the US Global security vision. And why is that? Because while he is a difficult person, he still give you what you want, but after much haggling, unlike, for example, with the Democrats, who will give you nothing even after so much haggling. So at the end of the day, people here in Arabia in particular, they always say that the ultimate wisdom of the story is how it ends. And so from their point of view with Trump, it's gonna be so much drama before the end comes. But we know that the end will be better in a sense. So now some people say this is a misled faith.

B (10:20)

Well, I can imagine why people might say that given the destruction so far that the war has caused. And at the moment, I mean, if this is the Star wars trilogy, Eamon, we are very much at the end of the Empire Strikes Back. Like, it seems like we've reached a very low point in that the Islamic Republic has played a very weak hand of cards very well. Much has shifted in the meantime, but at this moment, there are analysts who say, well, you know, the Islamic Republic is to some extent politically stronger. I mean, of course this is contestable, but it seems like we're in a dark place. But nonetheless, you're saying the GCC leaders are optimistic still or still feel that the White House is someone they can play ball with.

C (11:00)

You see, this is one of the most brilliant times for, you know, and I'm not being arrogant here, but for people like me, it's one of the most brilliant times where I feel that I am the one eyed man in the kingdom of the blind. And people all across the world, pundits, academics, retired military, even former politicians, current serving politicians, you know, foreign ministers, even in places like the UK and France, you know, including Yvette Cooper, who is, as you know, as dumb as she looks. So they all miss the point. I love it basically because I see them all missing the point you see, they all focus on the rhetoric. They all focus on the rhetoric from the Islamic Republic, the rhetoric from Trump in particular. And they get exercised with it. They get angry about it because they are angry with Trump about other things. Greenland, NATO, tariffs. There are many other things to be angry with him. But this is a battle that is actually crucial for the longevity of whatever left of the Western civilization. So therefore, it is important that we do not lose this war. So for me, I enjoy the fact that the vast majority of these people, including the politicians basically, and the military and the academics and all that, miss the point. They focus on the rhetoric. For me, we have a saying in Arabic, al kalimatul Maidan, that the final word is for the battlefield. The battlefield decide everything. And I am focused as an amateur student of war. For me, I focus on military deployments. Not only the deployment of frontline equipment such as fighter jets and, you know, air defense and navy assets. No, I focus also on other things. Early warning things, refueling aircrafts, you know, and the shipments. The C17s, the C130s, the C5 Galaxy. I look at all of that and I really sometimes spend time, you know, basically calculating. I'm a geek, you know, basically, I'm really a nerd here.

B (13:26)

You don't say.

C (13:28)

I look at all of these things and I see like in basically, look, this is my advice to all our dearest listeners. Please do not pay attention to what President Trump says. Everything he does is basically the exaggeration and his own showmanship, flavor, which is a bit cartoonish and clownish sometime, of what his generals are asking him to do. You know, Mr. President, we need five days to accomplish this, this, and this. Buy us some time. Mr. President, our intelligence community require you to focus on this island, this island, and this island for the purpose of drawing some attention. We need the enemy to move more assets towards these places because it will become easier for us to focus on other locations. Just like with the Rescue of the F15 Pilot, he was focusing on certain areas in his rhetor. He blinded the Iranians as to where the pilot was really there and they went and rescued him. It's like I started to see it. Basically. He is actually reflecting in a very showmankind situation what his generals are asking him to do in terms of buying time or focusing on certain strategic areas. But the reality is this, the last word is for the generals at the moment.

B (14:50)

I think it's interesting, Eamon, what you said, and I want to get back to the question of the GCC leadership. And what it's like to work with Trump. But it's interesting what you said about how, you know, retired generals, sitting politicians, et cetera, they get so distracted in their anger at Trump. And it's not just sort of general anger, it's a specific kind of moral outrage. And I'm aware of it too, just in my conversations with certain friends who seem to be unable to resist that lovely pleasure of moral outrage. And maybe this tells you a lot about the kind of people that have been governing the Western world for a few decades. A kind of officious, righteous kind of character, rather rational, rather controlled, professional, all of that. That sort of person, a kind of self righteous person, really feels entitled to govern, feels like they know it all. And compared to this sort of person who, you know, people like this, they occupy the chancelleries and the high level bureaucracies and, you know, they're the ones who studied well at school and went to the Ivy Leagues and they followed the rules and they like rules and they like things to be done rationally. In comparison to such a person, Donald Trump is just like a massive bull in a china shop. But he has a certain, you know, in the narcissism, there's a certain wisdom there in the sense that he knows that he knows how easy it is to stimulate moral outrage in his rivals or in his enemies or in his opponents. Knowing that anger of that type blinds in a state of moral outrage, you can't see clearly just cause you feel very convinced that you know the truth. You feel very convinced you understand everything. And that serves Donald Trump. I mean, politically, you're saying that it might serve some military purpose, but this is what I find just amazing on the Internet and just in general, the way in which so many people cannot resist the temptation to fly into moral outrage and haven't realized yet that that serves their opponent, Donald Trump, perfectly exact.

C (16:58)

Also, don't forget that it serves another reason, which is diplomatic. The geostrategic and diplomatic strategy here. If you are unpredictable, it's very difficult for the other side to try to outsmart you strategically. Now many people are saying Trump is dumb. Look what happened. The Strait of Hormuz is closed. And that is again where we have a problem. People need to understand that wars take time. The problem, Thomas, is the fact that we have become so complacent in confronting eschatological, terror based regime such as the Ayatollah's theocracy is the fact that there are no wars without casualties. Sorry. I'm sorry. I know that Basically it hurts. But there is no single war that can basically execute without casualties, without sacrifices, without side effects, severe side effects. I mean, it pains me that many people are blindly saying there should be no ceasefire in Ukraine, the war must continue. That's the line that Macron and Starmer and Boris Johnson before him and everyone, and I understand it and everyone knows my position that basically I lean far more towards the Ukrainians and their struggle to resist a blatant Russian aggression. And you and I also did an episode where we also understood the genuine Russian grievances.

B (18:39)

We try to see the whole story. We try.

C (18:40)

Yeah, exactly. However, in this case, the same people who are supporting the prolonging of the suffering in Ukraine and the war which claimed now hundreds of thousands of casualties and cause significant damage to European economy in terms of inflation and the energy prices and everything are the same people who are saying, no, no, no, no, we can't have any casualties in Iran, any side effects in the strait of hormones, this will have severe effects. They are the same people.

B (19:11)

What do you think is the reason for that, Eamon? Why should European, let's say politicians and diplomats especially, be so kind of hard nosed when it comes to the Ukraine war, but so naive, idealistic when it comes to the Iran war? Is it because it actually suits their own geostrategic interests or their own power play? Maybe they're calculating that America is on the decline and therefore this is an opportunity for Europe to strike a different position in a new multipolar world. I certainly think that's what France is doing, which is the old game. I mean, France has been doing that for decades.

C (19:48)

Yeah, I'm sorry to say basically that Europe is in a decline, not the United States.

B (19:52)

Well, I mean, that might be the case, but Europeans don't seem to understand that.

C (19:58)

Exactly. Well, of course they are sleepwalking into a massive disaster and that's only in 10, 15 years we can see it happening. So they themselves actually have committed suicide by allowing millions of undocumented illegal migration basically into their societies. And you can see the cracks in that European societal unity happening. And even in the uk, so the last thing they can do, the Europeans is basically to say America is in decline. Well, in fact, basically it's the other way around. So when it comes to the Europeans, why did they do that? Is because for them, you see, for them, and also within that Atlantic alliance between North America, us, Canada and as well as the European Union, Norway and UK and Ireland, if you look at all of that, there was always two camps when it comes to Iran. It's very important that the listener pay attention to this. There were always two camps, the containment camp and the confrontation camp. Now in the United States specifically, but more importantly because they are the bigger muscle, no one else come even close. If you put Canada, Australia, Japan, Korea, the whole of European Union, UK and Canada on one side and the America on the other side, America will still be 10 times bigger and more powerful in terms of military. So forget it. So they are basically the loop sided giant here. So the Americans, they have a stronger voice within the confrontation camp, which is the Republicans and some even hawkish Democrats. However, for many years, especially from 2005 all the way until 2000, you know, 18, the, the louder voice in the United States was always the containment camp, which is represented by Obama and many other people who, you know, basically follow his line of politics. Within the Democrats, Democratic Party, however, in Europe, the confrontation camp is none, almost lacking, basically. It's like almost zero. You know, they are hardly heard of or heard from in the U.S. no, they are vociferously loud. They won the argument in 2018 when Trump tore up the JCOPA, which I agreed with, basically there was solid intelligence that led him to the.

B (22:24)

Oh yeah, we've talked about it. Yeah, absolutely.

C (22:27)

So what happened is the Europeans are now seeing themselves tragically, just like Neville Chamberlain saw himself in 1938, as the voice of reason, the voice for avoiding global conflicts. We are not supposed to poke basically an important regional player like Iran. Iran should be, basically we have a dialogue with. Then I tell them, okay, lovely bureaucrats and Democrats and liberal, basically elite. Would you like to have a dialogue with Putin and Russia? No, hell not. We are not gonna do that. We don't reason with tyrants. Okay, thank you so much then go fuck yourselves.

B (23:10)

It's interesting, Eamon. It's interesting because, you know, during those same decades, you know, one perspective and you know, I'm quite sympathetic to this sort of more what they call, I don't know, realist perspective, although, you know, these words mean very little to me. But it does seem that over those decades, whereas America was pursuing, or I should say the Western world was pursuing what some people say was a, was a confrontational stance towards Russia and as you've just pointed out, a containment stance towards Iran. Possibly it should have been the other way around. We should have maintained a containment stance towards Russia and pursued more aggressively a confrontational stance towards Iran earlier. And you know, the other day I did an interview with Jack Carr, the novelist, former Navy seal, sniper, now historian about his recent book called Targeted Beirut in which it tells the story very, very in a detailed way, in a very dramatic way of the 1983 IRGC led attack of the US Marines barracks in Beirut. And he says that, look, that's for him and for people of his generation and for people in the intelligence and military community who would have always expected and supported a more confrontational and robust attitude towards the Islamic Republic. He says that was the turning point really, that then cast a shadow for several decades where despite that incredibly gruesome, incredibly violent attack, two US Marine forces who were there as UN backed peacekeepers after all, and had been invited in by the Lebanese president, they weren't like invading the country. America, Ronald Reagan, president at that time really didn't do anything. And he says that in the course of his book he actually interviewed one of Ronald Reagan's children and it said that that sort of tormented Reagan to the end of his life. That event, the attack and the response, the weak response.

C (25:07)

Exactly.

B (25:08)

So I think people could very reasonably argue that America pursued a weak containment strategy towards what was always a very subversive, very actively malign, revolutionary, ideologically committed regime in Tehran. And now, okay, now confronting someone bad, late is harder than early. But anyway, it's what's going on.

C (25:35)

But you see for some people, especially on the European, not only the European left, but also surprisingly, even the European right, people are telling me, oh no, containment and dialogue, my dear friend, dialogue. And I say we will. The only dialogue we heard from them is death to the shah which was theirs, but also death to every shah which is our kings and sheikhs and rulers. And of course, basically they mean the oil rich monarchies of the Gulf. And I will come to this right now, why it is important, because it's important within the ceasefire context here.

B (26:14)

Yeah. Good.

C (26:14)

Now we have Trump announcing that there will be a ceasefire for two weeks. Hooray. There will be talks in Islamabad. Hooray. And the US will submit 15 points plan. The Iranians will submit 10 points plan. And these two will be the basis for the negotiations. Fine. But as conditions need to be somewhat perfect for the talks to start on Saturday 11th April in Islamabad between JD Vance and Galibouf. They will meet there, barring any other surprises, and there are many surprises that could happen any hour. The idea that it would have come into effect immediately by, you know, roughly 3, 4am Gulf Standard Time. Perfect. And on the condition that this strait of hormones will, you know, reopen again for international navigations freely, without any obstructions did all this go to plan? We'll find out soon.

B (27:13)

Yes, exactly, Eamonn. Let's just take a quick commercial break, as they say. And when we get back, we will focus like lasers on the ceasefire and you know, really, is it even a ceasefire? Eamon, you're going to tell us all about it. We'll be right back. We're back. Okay, Eamon, tell us what happened with the ceasefire. The, you know, Donald Trump, Trump on Monday said he was going to destroy Iranian civilization unless X, Y and Z happened. It seemed like that was what was going to happen in the sense that the United States military was going to seriously escalate. But then in the wee hours of Tuesday morning, as you say, this announcement was made very maladroitly, you know, in many cases, but an announcement was made declaring a ceasefire. What happened and what's happened since?

C (28:12)

Well, the straight of Hormuzzi until now remains closed to shipping unless if you pay $2 million in crypto to the Iranian IRGC, you will get a pass. So basically only four vessels in the past since the ceasefire happened. And we are recording this at 2pm Dubai time on Thursday 9th April, which is 11am UK time. So you can see here that since then there hasn't been any serious movement on the Strait of Hormuz. So that's in itself a ceasefire violation. So that's number one. Number two, there has been 11 ceasefire violations in the immediate hours after that. So Kuwait was attacked, UAE was viciously attacked with severe damage to some gas and oil facilities. Saudi Arabia was attacked with severe damage to Sator petrochemical plant in Jubail, which basically some of my cousins and nephews actually work there, in the same vicinity in the same petrochemical complex there in the eastern province of Saudi Arabia. And then Bahrain was attacked and Israel continued to be attacked. And so it's like, wow, what a ceasefire. And then roughly about 10:00am Gulf Standard Time, after all of these attacks happened mysteriously, and some people accuse the UAE of doing it because the US and Israel said it wasn't us.

B (29:39)

This is on Tuesday now? Yeah. So two days ago.

C (29:42)

Yeah. So on Tuesday, the refinery in Levan, L E V A N Levan was attacked. That's an Iranian refinery. And the Iranians said it's the Emiratis who did it, it's the uae. The UAE didn't deny, they did not confirm. Perfect. All they put out is, look, violations of ceasefires are not going to be tolerated. So it was a kind of a direct message that, look, do not Shoot at us just because the Americans stop. Because the Americans stopped. Now we are free to attack back if we want to. So do not test us. And since then, it seems the ceasefire is holding since yesterday, Wednesday evening, all the way until now.

B (30:35)

I mean, some people have said that those violations in the initial hours after the ceasefire may be a consequence of this radically decentralized way in which the Islamic Republic is now run. And that in fact, it takes time to communicate to commanders on the ground that they should stop firing. Because I think it's true to say that, that the commanders on the ground in Iran have been given a lot of leeway as to the targets and when they fire and what they fire. So maybe that was part of that story.

C (31:04)

Exactly. And that's why if we believe the story that the UAE did retaliate, not saying that they did, but if they did retaliate, it was their intention to speed up the passage of that memo from the leadership to the disparate units that stopped firing at us. And they destroyed really an important refinery for the Iranian side. Now, however, all of these events are happening and the idea is that, okay, the Strait of Hormuz is not yet open. Of course, this is causing considerable contention, but it is not a lethal violation of the ceasefire. Yet it's not a lethal violation of the ceasefire. And I think based on people who I talk to here, they believe that the US Will turn a blind eye to this right now until Saturday when the meeting really happened in Islamabad. So we will know whether the Iranians are really going to open the Strait of Hormuz in honor of this ceasefire negotiations. Now, there were so many, so many back and forth contentions between what was the Iranian 10 point plan, the real one, and what was the 15 points presented by Trump. So now the Pakistanis are being accused of actually giving the Iranians a slightly modified version, kind of like a softer version of what the US 15 points were. And they gave the Americans an even softer version of the 10 points presented by Iran.

B (32:51)

Goodness.

C (32:51)

So there is already some chicanery going on here. That's the first thing. And that's why there is a confusion. And Trump is going on truth social several times saying CNN is publishing, I mean, wrong 10 points plan. That's not what we have received. And actually the Iranian side confirming to CNN these are the points that we give to the Pakistanis.

B (33:12)

And it's like I saw those truth social posts and I do want to tell President Trump, well, like the boy who Wolf, it's a bit rich now for you to start claiming misinformation. People are saying things that aren't true because you know, Donald Trump, you perfected the art of spreading stuff on the Internet that isn't true.

C (33:30)

Exactly. So he has only himself to blame to be honest here. So we already started here to see that the expectations, management, you know, sleight of hand that the Pakistanis are, you know, practicing might backfire on them. Because once these two sides meet in Islamabad, I'm gonna tell you, you know, sparks will fly because when Galiboff meets J.D. vance and I'm worried about that because Gallivant is a former general, former mayor of Tehran, speaker of the parliament, like an unseasoned military guy and politician, he's going to meet JD Vance who's rather like basically inexperienced and soft. And so the question is what's going to happen there? And also the management of the expectations might actually backfire on the Pakistanis in the sense that that Galibov is turning up expecting that he is going to get some far more concessions than the Americans are ready to give. The same will apply to JD Vance turning up there thinking Galiboff is going to give him some uranium, basically 460 kg of uranium on a golden plate. I think. This is why I believe that, this is why I believe that these talks are going to fail. Because the expectations of both sides are not bridged enough. That this gap is not bridged enough. No way, there is not enough steel in the wall to build a bridge that far between the two sides positions. That's the first reason why I believe the negotiations will fail.

B (35:01)

Before we talk about the second reason though, Eamon, I just want to ask you for your analysis on another issue. Really it's a kind of broader issue because often on conflicted we present very much the GCC perspective on things and therefore you know, the gcc, Jordanian, Israeli, US kind of perspective on world politics or geopolitics especially in the region. But then there are these other allies of the United States, Pakistan, Turkey, Egypt, you know, big land based allies, big armies, you know, they often are, they're sort of, let's say less sexy places than the gcc, than Israel. They seem to be less charismatic, important but, but I think in this war they have played a role. I mean that's what I'm seeing Egypt, Turkey and Pakistan working, they're never supporting this war, opposing it and now working behind the scenes, especially Pakistan, but those other countries as well to lay the grounds for the ceasefire and these talks which okay, you say will fail but what geopolitical geostrategic kind of influence does Egypt, Turkey and Pakistan have the other half of America's regional alliance infrastructure?

C (36:09)

First of all, we have to understand that Pakistan and Egypt are the two faces of one coin. And that is the military enterprise coin. And by the military state enterprise, I mean that a military that is in control of the economy of the country in which they are supposed to protect.

B (36:27)

Not unlike Iran.

C (36:29)

Exactly. So they share with Iran. Turkey used to be like this in the past. Now of course, basically like, I mean we have now long, you know, basically said goodbye to Turkey being a military governed place. Thank God for that. You know, it's not exactly like any, I mean the best place, you know, democratically speaking still we have the Ottoman Sultan Erdogan. But you know, but at least, I mean the military is no longer like,

B (36:54)

you know, I mean the calling the shots there. No, Exactly.

C (36:57)

In Pakistan and Egypt, however, the military is like everything, you know, and they control the economy, they control politics, the media narrative, everything. And however, there is also two very important as well with Turkey. There are two very important unique things about these three countries that actually show the divide is really not between, let's say military governments and the GCC or Turkey and the gcc. Basically we are looking at energy rich countries versus energy import dependent countries. We start to see energy rich, energy poor. This is where we see the divide right now.

B (37:42)

I mean that divide may also inform that discussion we had earlier about Europe's perspective on this war. Because it's also energy poor and America's energy rich.

C (37:51)

Exactly. So the reality is that Pakistan and Egypt oppose this war by the way, more than Turkey. Turkey is like a little bit like in the backseat, let's say, like basically it's like an aircraft where pilot is Pakistani, the co pilot is Egyptian and the navigator in the back, like it basically is, you know, a Turkish guy. And so Pakistan was in the driving seat as well as with Egypt because why for them, they are the energy poor and poorly led governments when it comes to managing their economies. So it's their fault and therefore they oppose this war because of how much it could impact them. Second reason is also because these two countries, their entire dependence is on the Gulf being their best ally, their best buddy. And that cannot happen if Iran the ghost, Iran the ghoul, Iran the enemy, Iran the scarecrow is no longer there and it's replaced by a far better government for the people in Iran. So and of course far better government for the Gulf. And so therefore they don't like the idea of A regime, they want to prolong the life of the regime because the regime acts as the invisible pump on these fresh sweet dollars that come into both Pakistan and Egypt from the alliance with the Gulf. Especially when it comes to the millions upon millions of Pakistani and Egyptian expats living in the Gulf that pump tens of billions of dollars of cash into both economies. That is where the national economic and geostrategic interest of both Pakistan and Egypt comes into is extremely cynical. And that's why the Pakistani Emirati and the Pakistani Kuwaiti and Pakistani Bahraini relationships are now in the gutter. And the Egyptian GCC as a whole, including Saudi Arabia relationship, are also in the gutter because of the fact that seriously, you're trying to prolong the life of the Frankenstein that basically been haunting us for about 47 years and now you're trying to save it. So there are these considerations that makes sense.

B (40:16)

You know, any economic and energy shock would be particularly debilitating to Egypt and Pakistan. And their model, their working model heretofore has relied on Iran being powerful so that the Gulf states basically will remain closely tied to Pakistan and Egypt for, they thought, security reasons, although that, that did not pay off and is not paying off. So Eamon, what about the second reason why you think this ceasefire will not last? We talked about the first one, that Vance and Golubov will be meeting in Islamabad, but that there's no real coordination at all between the expectations on both sides and so that it'll just sort of fall at the first hurdle. What about the second reason?

C (40:56)

The second reason of course, is Lebanon and this is just a very contentious issue. So I already predicted that the moment there is a ceasefire between the US and Israel on one hand and Iran on the other, that the 90% of Israel's air force might, that was devoted to attacking Iran will divert towards Lebanon immediately because they, they are determined. I've been talking to people from there in Israel. They are determined to finish this problem once and for all. They don't want to keep fighting one war after another. They were surprised this time by how ready and rebuilt Hezbollah was.

B (41:37)

But Eamon, what about the first question everyone's saying was Lebanon included in the ceasefire agreement? This was being contested from the first moment. People were saying, yes, there will be no more fighting in Lebanon. Israel was like, uh huh, we don't. So what's the truth there?

C (41:53)

Well, first of all, this is why I'm saying there is definitely some chicanery from the Pakistani side to the point that they really, and I'm sorry, they ducked up this whole thing. So it has become like basically very Dagestani kind of way of making, of conducting ceasefire,

B (42:18)

conducting. Goodness gracious, we're going to create a whole new thing where people are going to say duck instead of the other one. Okay, so Pakistan, you think is chicanery in the sense that Pakistan's the one saying that Lebanon is included, but no one necessarily confirmed that.

C (42:34)

Exactly. I am absolutely saying that the Islamic Republic of Dukistan is actually responsible for this mess. And I will tell you why, because I know Pakistanis quite well. I lived there for a while. You know, basically, like, I mean, I know the country and its systems, you know, from the, how the ISI work, how the army work, how the political system work, like in a goodness, like, you know, basically I, you know, I know many parliamentarians there from several parties, including, by the way, like, you know, the band mqm. So it's not like, you know, basically for my Pakistani listeners, I know that, you know, the whole Karachi Mafia thing and all of that and the liar in neighborhood. So do not like, you know, tell, oh, Ayman, whether you would know about Pakistan. I know. So, you know, it's like it's all Baqwas and Pagal system, you know what I'm talking about. So let me go back basically to the fact that I know how the Pakistani mediators here, which is General Asim Munir and Prime Minister Shahbaz Sharif, would have conducted this in order for in their desperation to get this kind of ceasefire deal, just the deal of having a ceasefire over the threshold. They told the Iranians, okay, you know, what do you need? Like in a few ceasefire. The ceasefire must include, you know, all the front lines that our regional allies are engaged in that include Iraq, Lebanon and Yemen. So they went to the Americans and said, look, the Iranians are asking for, you know, 1, 2, 3. And the Americans are saying, well, nothing to do with us, basically, we're not attacking Lebanon. And so as for the Israelis, we have nothing to do with them. So they went back and they said to the Iranian side right there, I got your back, I got the confirmation from there, Lebanon is not going to be attacked. Lebanon is included. And it's like you can see the sleight of hand in the chicanery here again, they a very, very, very unique Pakistani chicanery of actually conducting these kind of basic negotiations. So Iran accepted in good faith that Lebanon is going to be spared.

B (44:46)

But it doesn't only reflect Pakistani chicanery, as you say. It also reflects the way that the Trump White House operates. Because I think it's believable that Benjamin Netanyahu and Israel woke up on Tuesday as well, a little bit surprised to find that a ceasefire had been agreed. A ceasefire which does directly impact their own foreign policy preferences. And if America says we've got nothing to do with Israel, well, that's just not true. They've got a lot to do with Israel. So how was the ceasefire agreement met with in Jerusalem? I mean, and this will get us back to the question of the Lebanon campaign, which is ongoing.

C (45:25)

Okay, I want the listeners to indulge me here a little bit. Anyone who believes that Bibi Netanyahu woke up just like this to find out about the ceasefire and that all of this happened behind his back, you have to be really, really geopolitically naive to believe that this whole strategy agreed between these two men and between the institutions of both countries months in advance, every step of it, including the coordination in the military side, logistics side, political side, diplomatic side, espionage, sabotage, everything you can imagine. And the financial part of it, of course. So this idea that somehow Bibi wasn't aware. Bibi is upset. No, no, no, no. It's like. Just get this out of your mind. Bibi Netanyahu knew in advance. Well, in advance what was going to happen. And he was already knew the real reason why. There is a two weeks delay and I will reveal the real reason.

B (46:27)

Well, one second, one second, we're gonna get to that at the end. Let's keep talking about Lebanon. What's happened in Lebanon in the last couple of days?

C (46:33)

So Ben, Ben taking advantage of this gap, whatever you wanted, because he wanted to, he desperately needed the Israeli air force assets to be far more dedicated towards the Lebanese problem rather than the Iranian problem problem, because that is where the vast majority of the impacts within Israel over the past four weeks came from, from Lebanon. And so he wanted to deal with it. So. And there was also indications of a coup being organized inside Lebanon by Hezbollah and some of their allies.

B (47:13)

Wow. Really? What indications? Gosh.

C (47:16)

Well, well, I mean, basically like, as you know, I'm half Lebanese. I have some relatives, like in, basically in certain. Oh yeah, we know institutions and bodies like in basically of the Lebanese state. And there was, you know, significant talk of a coup being organized by Hezbollah and some of their Christian and Shiite allies who are non aligned with Hezbollah in the past to actually depose the President and the Prime Minister in particular and to take over certain parts of the government. There was a possibility that there would be Some army leaders who will be joining them in this coup. And so there was going to be a 80 member plus, including political figures from Hezbollah and other groups. And of course, military commanders on the ground for Hezbollah organized a Zoom meeting. I'm not kidding. Seriously. They organized a secret Zoom meeting, all 80 of them, more than 80, actually, to talk about the plans for this. And actually three of the deceased political leaders, including Sadaq Nabulsi, including Muhammad Mahmoud Kumati, like quite a few others, you know, leading members and some. One other leading member who I'm not going to mention here, but he is a prominent Christian leader in Lebanon who is very much aligned with Hezbollah and Assad regime in the past, who also tweeted. So you see three tweets from some of the deceased happened just one hour before the Zoom meeting, where they are talking about the hour for the hour for accountability for those who betrayed the resistance is coming soon. And then he, this Christian leader who wasn't in the meeting, you know, lucky for him, otherwise he would have been dead. And he said that, look, if the resistance lose, I'm going to lose with them with honor, and if they win, I will be up to the task of whatever they need me to be. In other words, basically, he was putting himself to be a president now. Perfect. He was caught in the act. Then 100 Israeli aircrafts flew over Lebanon and simultaneously dropped 120 bombs on more than 80 locations where the 80 conspirators were actually talking on Zoom. Because the Israeli signal intelligence picked up the Zoom link, highlighted all the IP addresses, and then attacked with extreme precision. 300 people died, 1,400 people wounded all across Lebanon, including in the neighborhoods in Beirut. No one expected that the bombing will happen. But what happened here is. I'm sorry to say this, but that attack, despite the fact it came from the Israeli side, despite the fact that it came from Bibi Netanyahu's side, might have saved Lebanon from a far darker fate.

B (50:13)

So really, outline for us, who are these people who were killed? What is the consequences of this extraordinary. I mean, just attack. Gosh. The Israelis once again pull out a rabbit from the hat. What they can do. It is incredible. My goodness.

C (50:26)

Exactly, exactly, exactly. And I know many people will be upset. I'm saying that I'm actually fully much in support of this operation despite basically the extremely tragic consequences of what happened. But nonetheless, they have prevented something even worse. And I will tell you why. Because Sadaq Nabulsi, Mahmoud Kamati, and 80 other commanders and political figures of Hezbollah, they were planning a coup against the country to replace the president, replace the prime minister. They could have massacred thousands upon thousands of their opponents within the Sunni and Christian communities. It would have been much worse, and it would have plunged the country into a bloody civil war. And so what the Israelis did is the fact that they decapitated the leaders of that conspiracy and that Laqn Amin was. Is the big talk right now in Lebanon is that there was supposed to be a couple. And so somehow they don't want to say it, but it was the Israelis who saved them from the school. Not because of the goodness of the hearts of the Israelis, but because the Israelis don't want Hezbollah to be in control of a country. And it shows how brazen the Iranians were in trying to take over Lebanon. Now it's a zoom meeting. It's amazing. Basically, if you think of it, it's another pager operation. You remember the pagers, of course.

B (51:50)

Yeah, yeah, yeah.

C (51:51)

Booby trapped and all of that. And so if it was booby trapped and Hezbollah operative was a female, would that mean basically that, like in a basic.

B (52:00)

No, no, no, no. I'm putting a stop to this one right away, Eamon. No, no, no, no, no, no. So let's keep talking.

C (52:08)

So this zoom meeting, you know, amazingly, like, I mean, you know, the Israelis decided to remove the Z and put the B in zoom. It became the boom meeting.

B (52:20)

From one dad joke to another.

C (52:21)

Amen.

B (52:22)

Good.

C (52:22)

Goodness gracious, I couldn't resist. Sorry.

B (52:25)

Okay, so there's been this boom meeting that means that the ceasefire certainly does not apply to Lebanon. Yes, let's zoom out now. And why. So this means that the ceasefire will fail because of things happening in Lebanon. But if the ceasefire doesn't apply to Lebanon, why will Israeli actions in Lebanon cause the ceasefire to fail?

C (52:43)

Well, because, you see, the Iranians came out multiple times and highlighted the text that they were given. Even they published the text that they were given by the Pakistanis, which clearly said, this ceasefire include Lebanon. They highlighted it in yellow there for everyone to see online. And even Prime Minister Shahbaz Sharif, embarrassed by all of this, came out and said, we believe that this ceasefire does indeed include Lebanon. But the Israelis are saying, no, it doesn't. You know, Netanyahu said it four times in the space of 24 hours. He said, this ceasefire does not apply to Lebanon. Lebanon is still an existential threat for us. So, however, J.D. vance, when he landed in Budapest, on his way, of course, like, I mean, to Islamabad, these two cities couldn't have been More different Budapest in Islamabad. So he landed in Budapest and he said on the tarmac in a press conference, he said that the ceasefire does not apply to Lebanon. If Iran wants to collapse the ceasefire because of Lebanon, so be it. That's their choice. So he was very clear about it. However, he also dropped a hint. He said, if Israel were to voluntarily restrain themselves a little bit in Lebanon to allow for this expected talks in Saturday to happen in good faith, then I would deeply appreciate it. So he was laying the ground for that. And that's why the tempo of attacks over the past eight hours has been different between Lebanon and Israel.

B (54:30)

We want to move now to the question of why this two week ceasefire was agreed on the American side. But before we do that, Eamon, I have one question for you. A geopolitical dimension that we tend to overlook on conflicted. And I really want us to scrutinize this question carefully. And it reminds me, since we're talking about Lebanon, of the episode we did in season three where we covered the 1958 Lebanon crisis. This is when, in pursuit of the Eisenhower Doctrine, the United States sent an expeditionary force to Lebanon to prevent what was considered to be an ongoing possible civil war in pursuit of Arab nationalist ames led by Colonel Nasser at the time. Now then in 1958, Khrushchev, the premier of the Soviet Union, basically got on the phone and told President Eisenhower, look, buddy, you will not escalate this into a full scale invasion. You certainly will not spread it beyond Lebanon, and if you try to do so, we will go nuclear on your ass. And it actually was an early instance of the sort of Cold War diplomacy or Cold War intervention that the Soviet Union was able to do because it was a nuclear power. Okay, flash forward to today. For the last six weeks, the United States has been prosecuting an extremely violent assault on Iran, an ally of Russia, which remains a very big nuclear power. And yet it seems that overtly, Russia is not making anything like that kind of an intervention, warning the United States that its geopolitical and geostrategic interests in the Middle east need to be taken into consideration. And, and absent that they might go nuclear, they're not playing the same game that they used to. However, we know that Russia has been helping Iran. Russia has been giving Iran intelligence that is helping Iranian units target quite precisely, in many instances, American and other military assets in the region. And I believe there is some serious Russian skullduggery going on in Yemen with the Houthis. And that was coming out in the days preceding the ceasefire. So is there something like a Russian dimension to this where Russia is threatening to escalate if America doesn't pull back?

C (56:49)

Okay, there are three issues that we have to discuss here in order to answer this question. First of all, we must understand that Putin is not the absolute czar of Russia. Putin, at the end of the day, he is an arbiter between 400 plus oligarchs. You know, you have to understand that Russia, you know, basically we have a czar who's powerful, but also he has 400 boyars. You know, if you see anyone like, you know, who's familiar with Russian history will understand what I mean. And these oligarchs do have a say. It's not like basically that Putin is a one man show and, you know, he's a Kim Jong Un and no one else could challenge him. No, he still have to rely to some extent on the goodwill of the 400 plus oligarchs that are really lacking in control of Russia's vast mineral and energy wealth. Now that's the first thing we need to understand. What makes that equation even more difficult is the fact he is entangled in a war in Ukraine and he already sacrificed so many young lives, young Russian lives there in Ukraine. The second thing we have to understand is that despite everything, there is actually an excellent interpersonal relationship between Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump. The two, despite the enmity between their institutions, they have a cordial relationship on a personal level. And therefore Putin cannot go head to head with Trump right now. Now he cannot, because he knows Trump is unpredictable. And that Trump could switch so quickly from being a sympathetic ear, which is the lone sympathetic ear in the Western camp, to a deadly rival. He doesn't want that to happen, especially when he's fighting a war in Ukraine. And the third reason why the Russians, and Vladimir Putin in particular, did not rush to provide overt military aid or even military threats to help Iran and the Iranian regime right now is because of the special relationship with the gcc. He can push it to the limit, he can stretch it to the point of almost breaking, but he cannot break it. He cannot afford that. Because the oligarchs who are residing in places like Dubai and Abu Dhabi and Doha and Rasah and Oman, and benefiting significantly from having a banking system where they can park 200 or $300 billion of their assets, they will tell President Putin, do not fuck this up for us for the sake of a. For the towel heads across the water. They mean Iran.

B (59:47)

How interesting, Eamon, because that's. That the degree to which the Emiratis have been in bed with the Russians and this kind of secret underground finance gold network that is all funneled through Dubai, often understandably it is characterized as an example of kind of Emirati bad faith dealing and kind of cynicism. But now we see that actually the Emiratis, in addition to everything else, were playing a pretty clever geostrategic game there, neutralizing Russia's ability to do whatever is not in the interests of the gcc.

C (60:25)

Absolutely. At the end of the day, the Emiratis wanted to have zero problems with everyone. But nonetheless, even though they were cordial towards the Iranians, look what happened. But also they were cordial towards the Russians. But the Russians are pushing the envelope right now. So between now and then, mbs, MBZ and other leaders of the GCC do give a call to President Putin and remind him that, you know what I mean, we have hundreds of your oligarchs here, parking a lot of your money here, hundreds of billions of dollars, just remember that. And so he would say in return to them, oh, I'm only helping Iran just a little bit to hurt the Americans who are hurting me in Ukraine, but no more than that. I will not aid Iran to the extent where they will have a significant advantage against you. There is no way he can do that. So because not only the GCC will be angry with him, the oligarchs will be angry with him. Remember that? The 400 oligarchs, they will be angry with him. And so the idea is it really

B (61:30)

is a game, Eamon. It's just a game that these men with power play. It's incredible. They're just sort of trading well frankly on humans lives. It's really depressing. Exactly. So you don't think then that any Russian moves in recent days had any influence at all in the ceasefire being agreed to by the Americans? Fine. Then let's talk about the American strategic outlook. Exactly why did they agree to a two week ceasefire when every indication is that the ceasefire is not going to work? Now I can already see two possible answers and if they're right, just say yes and we can move on to something that we haven't already considered. One, market manipulation. Once again, two, getting some military assets in the region. I think that that's very necessary. I understand that there is a shortage of American missile, particularly interceptor assets at the moment. Maybe they need to restock those. I even heard some whispers that maybe they're in talks with Taiwan to get some of their interceptors, which is a very Interesting kind of dangerous move if that's true.

C (62:33)

And the Greeks and quite a few other.

B (62:36)

Yeah, that the George H.W. bush aircraft carrier group is on its way to the region. So you know, again, there might be just a need for a pause to get the military assets in place for another escalation. So market manipulation and military readiness, you know, if that's it, if that's why they've agreed to a two week ceasefire, well then that makes perfect sense. But there may be other considerations.

C (62:57)

Well, first of all, yes and no. I mean, yes to both. What you said, you're right, it's about market manipulation to bring down the oil prices to an acceptable level, like to the 80s, possibly like in the basically high 70s. And then when the hostilities resume, they will actually start to rise from a lower base rather than from a higher base. So that's typical market manipulation for you. And that shows the benefit of having a businessman as a president. Sometimes he takes that into account. Account. And I'm sure he is profiting also from it personally. How? I have no idea.

B (63:31)

Anyway, I did an interview with Oliver Bolo who talks about money laundering and all sorts of ways in which powerful people make money.

C (63:41)

Exactly. But also at the same time he also see that allied countries in the region, Israel, the gcc, they are telling him individually and collectively that look past you want to go and kaboom on Iran. Look, some countries are down 60% or 64% or 65% on their interceptors. So they are really dangerously low. We need to restock. And so they are diverting a lot of interceptors right now, as you said, Taiwan, they are diverting it from Korea, they are diverting even from Greece and from even countries further afield. And so sometime through agreement with the Americans and sometime through regional countries doing bilateral agreements with some of these countries because that will be far more appealing and more lucrative to be honest, basically than if the request came from the Americans themselves. And so also they need the US lost roughly about 17mq9 reapers, these very sophisticated and rather expensive drone aircrafts over Iran. So they are going to ship in 18 more, plus few more assets, which I can't talk about. And of course the aircraft carrier, the George H.W. bush aircraft carrier, it will be here next Thursday and that will bring the total aircraft carriers to about. And also it will come with its destroyers. They have used 900 Tomahawk cruise missiles. My understanding is that they are bringing 600 to replenish some of that lost stock and that will bring the total of Tomahawk cruise missiles around Iran to up to 1200 to really boost up the firepower and to give the Americans far more option. In addition, they are flying in more 82nd Airborne Division. They are bringing in more Marines and all sorts of ammunitions. Yes, they are gearing up for another fight, but it doesn't mean that it necessarily must happen, because they hope that all of this firepower coming and on display for everyone to see will persuade the Iranians that, come on, guys, you've seen what we can do. You've seen what we can do, and what you can do is 1% of what we can do. So your damage was 99% higher than the damage being inflicted in the Gulf countries. Seriously, the damage in Iran is way, like, way far greater and widespread than what happened to the Gulf countries in Israel. So come on, see the writing on the wall? Your economy got more, roughly 2, 3, 4 weeks maximum before it collapses. So can you see wisdom here and just allow us the access to go and recover the 460kg of highly enriched uranium to collect and destroy the centrifuges? And for you to have one sentence, you see, Trump is looking for one sentence, and one sentence only will end the war. When the Iranian Ayatollah comes out, when Ayatollah Mashtabah Khamenei, he comes out and say, we have now closed the chapter on Iran's nuclear program forever. Now, of course, whatever it entails, still, it's a surrender. He's asking them to surrender. And I think for President Trump, because of his New York upbringing, you know, basically, like, I mean, being that kind of, you know, how can I say? Like, I mean, hustler, grifter, gangster adjacent kind of person, Mafia, like, you know, don. After all, his name is Donald, so he's the don for real. He cannot understand when the other side is behaving like an ideological radical, religious, theocratic way of thinking. He cannot fathom it.

B (67:57)

So you think he's. You think he's not gonna get the surrender that he's after? They just won't surrender.

C (68:02)

Yeah. And therefore, he gets angry and he decides, you know, I'm gonna wipe out their civilization. However, I want to stress one thing here. He did not mean civilization as in, I'm gonna wipe out their historic cities and murals and all of that, and Persepolis and, you know, Alamut or whatever. No, he didn't say that, but he meant by civilization is the civilization in the modern meaning of the word. That is, they will have no electricity or Internet or phones by the morning that's what he meant. He didn't mean that it's a civilizational vandalism. But the problem is like, that's Trump for you.

B (68:38)

Well, Eamonn, you know, on the Internet on Monday, after Donald Trump said he was going to wipe out Iranian civilization, many people pointed out that in the 6th century BC the Delphic Oracle told King Croesus of Lydia that if Croesus goes to war, he will destroy a great empire. And in his vanity, I suppose Croesus thought, oh, that must mean if I attack the Persian empire, their empire will fall. Well, Eamon, that is not what happened. And the Delphic oracle in its wisdom had tricked him. And his intervention against the Persian empire brought, brought the downfall of his own kingdom. I know you don't like people to be too pessimistic about this war so much as riding on an American victory, but I think we need to point out that it is possible that the writing is on the wall for the American led world order and that things down the line will become much, much less ordered as a result. We have to at least, least accept that that's a real possibility. Here it is.

C (69:50)

I mean, this is the problem with getting involved in conflicts. I mean, the British Empire went to its last war in the Suez, and that was a disaster. But because why? Because there was a bigger empire telling them, you know, stop right there. Now, the risk here to the US is not a bigger empire telling them to stop. Actually, they are the biggest empire the world has ever seen. The risk is from within the empire itself, the loud defeatist voices that are telling them to stop. When in fact, if there is a unity, at least some unity, that, okay, maybe we did not agree with the timing or the execution of the war, but we cannot lose it. Because if they lose it, that will be a loss for every single, not only American, but every single freedom loving person on earth. We cannot allow the idolas backed up by Xi Jinping and Putin to have the final word here. And yet the American empire here doesn't have any bigger empire to tell them to stop. The voices are not coming from a bigger empire. America is the largest empire the world has ever seen, the most powerful, the most prosperous, the wealthy. However, the voices are coming from within the empire itself. The containment camp are screaming at Donald Trump, telling him to stop. It's not a good war, it's not a good timing, it wasn't the right thing to do. Confronting Iran was a bad idea. Confronting Russia is better. So of course all of these contradicting messages coming out of them. But nonetheless, no problem. But those defeatist voices should understand that despite whatever they think of Donald Trump, they might think of him as a charlatan, as a usurper, as a clown, as unbefitting for the office. No problem. Okay, believe all of that, please. I support you in this belief, but do not let your hatred of the man take your eyes off the prize. And that is finally to get rid of this regime. Now the war has happened. Whether you had reservations about it starting from the beginning, I agree with you. But please do not let your hatred of the man and your political differences with him or his administration blind you to the fact that the world will be a far better place if we finally get rid of the Ayatollahs. Do not give the Ayatollah a chance to breathe. Do not let them to have another lifeline. Because finally we need the ninth life of this Persian cat to be extinguished.

B (72:35)

Well, Eamon, I don't disagree. I think that people who look at the Middle east and see all sorts of problems there, and especially I think people who are particularly animated by the Israeli policies as regards the Palestinians, you know, especially now with this very ironclad right wing Israeli, the center of power in Israel, you know, people who want a solution to problems like the Israel Palestinian problem. I wish they would see that the first step towards anything like a permanent and equitable solution to a problem like that one. And there are other problems that need addressing throughout the region. The first step is getting rid of the Islamic Republic. This is the, of Iran. This is the first step. And I wish people would understand this. A lot of people have their eyes on other problems that they wish also to be solved or they wish to be solved. And they don't see that it is Iran that actually is the proximate obstacle, the initial obstacle to any of those other problems. People don't believe that because people sort of, they have a different view. They might say that the fundamental problem is the existence of Israel, for example. That's one perspective. I disagree with that perspective. I think that it is the Islamic Republic of Iran that is the first problem that must be addressed. And until it is addressed properly, not through containment, but through real confrontation, confrontation, nothing else will happen. And this kind of sclerotic kick the can down the road management policy, which the Obama administration kind of perfected, let's say, will continue. But the truth is, Eamonn, it couldn't continue. It was not, not at any point, a real long term solution. You could never just manage that situation forever. Because as America and its international allies in that class were managing the Middle east in that way, we're managing Iran by balancing its interests against other interests and treating it like it was a legitimate political actor in the region. All the while, under the surface, Iran was continuing its own ideologically charged aim of spoiling the whole region and taking it over as best it could based on its millenarian goals. This is not on my side, I don't think an ideologically charged analysis of the situation. I think it's just objective. That's what was going on. And the containment camp was underestimating that aspect of the Islamic Republic. They just didn't want to accept it because it seems to them and their Harvard educated brains completely unbelievable. But that's the point. That is the truth.

C (75:27)

I want to remind the listeners, because every word you said here resonated with me. I want to remind the listeners that from 1933 until 1938, they were the worst years of Winston Churchill's life. He called them these years the wilderness years. He was out, cast out completely. Why? Because he was warning that the Nazis, and the rise of the Nazis in Germany is going to result in a expansionist policy in Europe and is going to plunge Europe back into the darkness of the Great War that preceded it. Now we call it the First World War. You have no idea, when you read some of the books and some of the work that was written around that period, the viciousness of the British political and civil service class that were attacking Churchill so passionately and defending the Nazis so passionately and saying that you are misinterpreting their rhetoric, you are exaggerating their threat. You are a warmonger, you know, you don't know what you're talking about. And then, of course, culminating in Neville Chamberlain's speech, Peace in Our Time, brandishing that like a famous letter. But then, of course, Hitler proved every one of them wrong and did exactly what he did. And we had that moment, you know, we had that moment when in October 7, 2023, Iran crossed that threshold. They used one of their proxies as not a tool of deterrence, but as a means of geostrategic sabotage against the region. And before that, they used the Houthis also as a strategic tool of sabotage in the region. The question is, can we tolerate this anymore? Remember that? Hate Israel all you want. Hate Saudi Arabia all you want. But these countries need to defend themselves at some point. You can't just tell people not to defend themselves because you don't like them. And so Speaking here as someone who was born in Saudi Arabia and growing up there, the question is, what do you want the Saudis to do? Cower basically, like say, no, we can't defend ourselves? Because why? Because some liberals in Europe said basically Iran and misunderstood. You know, it can be contained, when in fact, they already poured across the border and recruited 700,000 men under arms, you know, within so many proxies. How do you deal with these people? How do you deal? I mean, and that's exactly why I agree with you. This is the moment that Europe should realize that the Iranians, as you can see from their military performance, they were prepared for this war for 40 years. And it shows.

B (78:30)

Well, Eamon, thank you very much. You've got to go back to your day job now, trying to make sense of what's going on. And we're grateful to you for helping us make sense of it. Dear listeners, that's it for today. Thank you for listening. Another long episode. Goodness gracious, Eamon, we said this one would be 45 minutes. Let's wrap it up. That's it. That's it. Goodbye Speaks. You'll hear from us soon.

C (78:51)

Goodbye, everyone.

B (78:52)

Conflicted is a Message Heard Production. Our executive executive producers are Max Warren and Jake Warren. This episode was produced and edited by Thomas Small.