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- [00:00]
A
Hello, dear listeners, welcome back to Conflicted. I'm Thomas Small, with me is Amon Dean, possibly the newly crowned recrowned, I should say Oracle of Arabia, because Aemon war has come back to the Middle East.
- [00:15]
B
Yeah, goodness. Basically I never thought I would be relieved, but ain't a war is terrible, man. But in a sense I thought, oh my God, I don't understand the region anymore, I'm losing my touch. But then things started to happen according to what we more or less predicted about four months ago when we said two things really. The first thing we said that this is going to be a multi phase war. The dear listeners will remember what we said about it in February. We said it will be a multi phase war. It's not going to be like, I mean a one continuous war. So there will be phases, it will die down and then start again. The second thing we said, which more or less started to appear to happen, we said Banter Abbas is going to be another Gaza. You remember we said this before?
- [01:02]
A
Yeah, yeah. I mean I didn't like the sound of it and I don't like the sound of it now. But anyway, yeah.
- [01:06]
B
And just over the past two nights you see footage of all the bridges and tunnels and other roads linking Bandar Abbas to the rest of the Iranian mainland completely severed. It's very clear that there is a strategy here. So this is the second prediction that, you know, more or less started to, you know, materialize. But there is one prediction also we like with the fact that no matter what, the IRGC is not going to give up the Strait of Hormones that easy. We were right about it. And I think the trouble in the street will continue for a very long time to come. So this is what this episode is all about.
- [01:41]
A
Exactly. Eamon, you and I last spoke on the Fourth of July, as it happens, the 250th anniversary of the United States coming into being. And in that time the war resumed in Iran. And so we are going to take you dear listeners, step by step, day by day and tell you exactly what's happened since on 7 July, the MoU, the memorandum of Misunderstanding broke down. I think for good. Let's get right into it. Right. I think it's fair to say, Eamon, that the MoU collapsed over a fundamentally different interpretation of what that document meant. Now notoriously, poorly drafted the document, but both sides, the United States and Iran, interpreted it differently, especially as regards the question of who controls the Strait of Hormuz. The US thought that the MOU guaranteed free commercial navigation and rejected the idea that, that Iran was sort of allowed, you know, to do what it liked, to inspect vessels, to control the flow of vessels, especially vessels outside its own territorial waters, that is, ships using the southern route through the strait through Omani waters. Now, Iran believed the MOU actually recognized its right to determine the arrangements by which any ships could pass through the straits. And, you know, in a way, I think that the, the MOU to some extent justifies that interpretation, which is a reason why it was a bad document, because in paragraph 5, it states, upon the signing of this MoU, the Islamic Republic of Iran, quote, right, here we go, will make arrangements, using its best efforts for the safe passage of commercial vessels, with no charge for 60 days only from the Persian Gulf to the Sea of Oman and vice versa. Now, on the face of it, I think the Islamic Republic can say, like, look, this is what you agree to. Look, you've. You've conceded to us the principle that we might charge in the future. You've conceded to us that we are the ones making arrangements for the flow of vessels from one sea to the other. So the Trump administration, I think, in the signing of the mou, was played, and it led to this difference of opinion, which then broke down spectacularly on the 7th of July. Do you think that's right?
- [04:22]
B
You summarize it extremely well. That's what happened. When you send amateurs such as the vice president and Witkoff and Kushner, who are not international legal scholars, they didn't take legal scholars with them and seasoned diplomats. Remember, the US State Department stayed completely out of it, and the absence of the State Department from these negotiations is what led to its collapse. Now, the wording of that paragraph, it implies that Iran is the sole authority which can make arrangements. In other words, you now conceded, you, the US Conceded that I am the one with the power to make arrangements for the safety, which means I'm in charge of security. Now, the wording is completely disastrous, especially
- [05:15]
A
when you analyze, you know, what comes at the end of paragraph 5 of the MoU, where it says, the Islamic Republic of Iran will conduct dialogue with the Sultanate of Oman to define the future administration and maritime services in the Strait of Hormuz in discussions with other Persian Gulf littoral states in line with applicable international law and the sovereign rights of coastal states of the Strait of Hormuz. So it's like it's a real dog's dinner, that paragraph. It's mashing together mutually irreconcilable principles in this question of the Strait of Hormuz, when in fact there should be no concessions here. The Strait of Hormuz is international waters. It needs to be open for free navigation. That is international law. Why the Trump administration would concede anything else is beyond me.
- [06:02]
B
Well, the Iranians are arguing that every nation has the right of up to 12 nautical miles from their coast. These are their territorial waters. And if the territorial waters, let's say, like basically the Strait of Hormuz is 21 miles at its narrowest between Oman and Iran, then half and half. So there will be hardly any international waters between them. So that's what they say. Okay, fine. No problem at all. Let's say we accept in principle the Iranian argument that they own, own half of the strait. Okay, what about the other half, dear? Iran, I mean, the other half belong to the Sultanate of Oman, which means that if they, if His Majesty the Sultan of Oman, if he chooses to allow safe and free passage of shipping across his part, his domains, part of the strait, his own territorial waters, the Iranians have no right whatsoever to intervene, to interfere, to do anything, to harass the shipping on his side. Did they do that or not?
- [07:13]
A
Well, on the 7th of July, this was a Tuesday. Just to set the scene, dear listeners, remember, the NATO summit in Ankara had begun. President Trump was there in Turkey, and Iran attacked commercial ships using the Omani route through the strait. The US Retaliated on a much bigger scale than after previous violations of the ceasefire. The sanctions waiver that the MOU had put into place, permitting Iranian oil sales, was revoked, and there was a sort of immediate breakdown of the mou. So exactly over this question, does Oman have the right to determine who can sail through its waters or not?
- [07:56]
B
Well, if Iran can determine who sails through their waters, so does Oman. And if Oman, if the Sultan of Oman decides to grant free, unharassed, you know, shipping through his domains, part of the water, then the Iranians should not, in principle or in practice or in theory, interfere or attack, because that attack will be against Omani sovereignty itself.
- [08:26]
A
Well, you know, as I say, the US retaliated, then Iran immediately retaliated against Bahrain and Kuwait. They said that America's interference in Iran's right to oversee transit through the Strait of Hormuz and as another pretext, Israel's continuing operations in Lebanon. They used those two justifications to justify their attack on Bahrain and Kuwait. I mean, American military installations in those two countries. It was funny. Israeli intelligence then told Trump in Ankara that they had uncovered plans by Iran to assassinate him. And this is the context behind Trump in that really quite funny moment, you know, that sort of interview, TV interview he did when he described the Iranian leadership as scum. I mean, that was quite funny when he said that is scum, basically. We can't deal with, with these people. This comes a couple of weeks after him saying that they were geniuses. So, you know, it's very confusing. Trump's views on these things change all the time.
- [09:24]
B
Actually when he was confronted about that, you know, oh, just two weeks ago, you said like, they were amazing and they were geniuses. He said, yeah, I got to know them now. So it's like, okay, okay, well, okay, at least you are learning, you know, on the job. Thank you so much. Almost seven years of conflicted, we've been saying this.
- [09:42]
A
So on the next day, Wednesday 8 July, an even bigger wave of US strikes in retaliation for Iran strikes were launched across, you know, the Gulf, Iran's Gulf, and the Gulf of Oman coastline. Two railway bridges in northern Iran were struck. And then in the wake of these retaliatory strikes, Iran accused the US of striking its nuclear power plant in Bushehr. This accusation will come up again and again over the next, you know, 10 days or so. So I should say, Eamon, is there any reality behind those accusations? Would the United States have been so foolish as to attack the Bushehr nuclear plant?
- [10:21]
B
Yes, they did attack the electrical substation attached to the Bushar nuclear plant. Why? We have to understand the why. Very close. Only about several kilometers from the nuclear plant in Bushar sits at least two subterranean missile cities. So these are used to launch ballistic missiles against the Gulf and also against Jordan and Israel. So this is very important location. So the substation that was feeding electricity to these cities was attacked to these underground missile cities.
- [11:01]
A
Well, in retaliation against those US strikes, Iran once again struck Kuwait and Bahrain and but extended its strikes to include now Jordan and Qatar as well. And in the context of this escalation, the GCC struck back. Eamon, describe the GCC's actions there. On Wednesday 8 July, Kuwait and Bahrain conducted actual strikes using fighter aircraft. Aircraft from, I think the uae, maybe not, but certainly from Jordan were deployed as well in support of those airstrikes. Jordan's role described as sort of providing some defensive cover rather than a direct attack. But nonetheless, the GCC strikes back. What is the meaning of that move?
- [11:49]
B
Well, they had to because at the end of the day the Saudis are very cautious. They did not participate in that. It was a Bahraini, Kuwaiti decision with a Jordanian support and an Emirati cover. The Emirati cover came in terms of early warning aircrafts and the Emirati fighter jets providing target selection and defensive cover should there be a significant retaliation from the Iranian side. It was a message to the Iranians that, you know, you need to stop. Of course, the message wasn't heeded because the Iranians never stopped.
- [12:23]
A
Well, following those attacks on Thursday 9 July, President Trump promised a huge wave of strikes for that night, which he then canceled at the last minute, saying that Qatar, Pakistan and other mediators were trying to revive the negotiations. Now, when this happened, Amon, I thought, oh, here we go. I mean, he said the ceasefire is over. He told Israel, however, not to join in, in the resumption of fighting. So clearly, it seems to me Trump was still primarily after a deal. Is that the case?
- [13:01]
B
Don't forget that Trump is dealing with a completely, utterly divided administration. So you have the Vice President, the White House Chief of Staff, and several others who would completely just say, give the Iranians what they want and just let us be out of this mess. The appeasement party. But then you have the three most powerful men in the cabinet, the Secretary of State Rubio, the Secretary of Treasury Besant, and the Secretary of War Hexith, saying, hell, no way we should give the Iranians whatever they want. No, we want peace, but through strength, not through appeasement. And the two sides are colliding over that. And this is why Trump was saying, okay, let's give them the final chance.
- [13:49]
A
Yes, okay, they said, let's give Iran a final chance. But what about these mediators? Qatar, which had already been struck again by Iran, Pakistan, what? Why are they still dragging their feet? Why don't they just, you know, throw up their hands and say, these people, this Islamic Republic cannot be dealt with? Clearly they cannot.
- [14:12]
B
The problem is what Iran wants, what unfortunately the Vice President of the US want to give them, is something that could actually fundamentally break down almost a century or more of maritime free trade across the globe. When you allow one nation any kind of safety, security or whatever, control that actually would lead then later to monetization of the waterway that pass by it, not even through it, buy it, even unlike Turkey, which has several waterways, important waterways passing by it or whatever, or Singapore and Malaysia and Indonesia, all of these countries have straits and waterways going through them that are not man made. So when you allow that principle to happen, then other nations across the world will start doing it. And the fundamentals of maritime, global maritime, free trade and free movement of goods and services would collapse overnight. That is why the appeasement party in the US do not understand the implications of that. Pakistan and Qatar insist, even they insist, of complete freedom. But they think that, and this is where the danger is, Thomas. They think that the Iranians and the IRGC in particular is sticking to their guns over the Strait of Hormuz because it is a bargaining chip. What they don't understand is that the IRGC and the Supreme Leader, if he's alive, are sticking to controlling the Stratiformis as a, as we said before many times here, and conflicted as a war game. Do you remember when we talked about it long time ago.
- [15:59]
A
Yes. A spoil of war.
- [16:01]
B
It's a spoil of war. We won it. It's ours. That's it. It's done. Do not even think, we are not bargaining. This is ours now. Why can't you drill it into these thick skulls of yours that this strait is ours now? We are not gonna give it back. You know, we are not bargaining here. We are not saying, oh, we might give it back or not. No, it's ours by right of conquest. It's ours. The problem is that the Americans, the Pakistanis, the, you know, the Saudis, the Turks and the Qataris, all of them are still struggling to actually comprehend that the Iranians and the IRGC mean what they say when they say that this is ours now. And they always think that, no, actually this is just rhetoric. If we really bargain with them more, if we try to reason with them more, they will say, okay, okay, we will allow it to happen. That is the fundamental problem which JD Vance don't understand, which General Asam Munir just only started to understand in Pakistan and the Qataris started to understand that, wow, they are willing to risk a war over the straits, which means it's not a bargaining chip anymore. This is really part of their psyche that it is theirs and they want to control it.
- [17:16]
A
Well, Also on Friday 10th July, in addition to President Trump canceling another planned strike, hoping that mediation might work, he said that he had left instructions for an unprecedented bombing campaign against Iran should they assassinate him. So I'd like to talk a little bit about the threat of assassination against President Trump coming from the Islamic Republic. Part of me thought that that declaration was, on the one hand, rather cowardly, I thought, to say such a thing. It seemed to me to express that President Trump was genuinely scared of being assassinated. Not exactly the image that I think he wants to present, but that's how it struck me also, it seemed very, very royal in its. In Its style, the idea that if I am killed, I've already put down instructions that, you know, in retaliation, this should happen. It, it's like, well, sir, you know, it is a republic. You're not really like a monarch here, you know. You see what I mean? It was funny. It was like, are we back in the, in the Middle Ages? It was a very strange moment. But what do you think is the salience of the Israeli intelligence saying that there is a real potential for the Islamic Republic to assassinate the President?
- [18:33]
B
There are two things I want to say here. The first one is that the Americans, especially the CIA and the NSA and the Secret Service in the US because the Secret Service is responsible. The entire Secret Service existence is to protect the President and his family and close advisors and cabinet members. And so here is a question. Will they just accept point blank intel coming from the Israelis without corroboration, without evidence? And the answer is in the current atmosphere and the very anti Israeli narrative, gripping parts of the US political discord at the moment, the answer is they will not take that intelligence at face value. It has to be corroborated. And I have two of my friends within the European intelligence community saying that actually it was corroborated by one more European, one of the major European intelligence agencies, a credible one. And it's an intelligence agency that is not friendly to the Israelis. And the evidence presented was like, yes, there was a genuine, genuine threat against him. This is why he said what he said. And if I was in his place, I will say the same. Actually, it was clever. It was absolutely strategically clever. Because why he was not talking from his own point of view or from the point of view of the American audience, he was directing it to an Iranian audience that do not think killing me is the end of the story. Once you pull the trigger on me, you will be pulling the trigger on your entire existence. You need to issue such threat in order for the other side to understand that, oh, so if we kill him, we will also basically be pulling the trigger on ourselves.
- [20:29]
A
But Eamon, what is someone objectively to make of all this? Because the late Ayatollah Ali Khamenei's funeral procession had just ended the day before. And that was a reminder that four months ago, the United States, working with Israel, assassinated the head of state of Iran. So, you know, in a kind of all's fair and love and war situation, aren't we supposed to be like, well, if you've let that genie out of the bottle, you know, if you've decided that it's okay to assassinate the head of state, you know, of your, of your enemy or your rival, then, you know, they can assassinate you back. I mean, wasn't that principle conceded to Iran back in February?
- [21:09]
B
Yes, of course, Lakhna. I mean, if they kill your head of state, morally you're entitled to kill the other side, head of the state in retaliation. But we don't live in a black and white world. We live in a very complex world where the other head of a state is a state that is armed with nuclear weapons to the teeth and who has the military capability to return your country into the Stone Age. Look, if Mike Tyson, you know, basically were to slap you in the face, of course, morally, you know, basically me as five foot seven, Amon Dean, you know, basically with lots of comorbidities, including heart condition and everything, I could, you know, well, I mean, morally, like, you know, basically I'm entitled to slap Mike Tyson back on the face, but what will happen to me after that is entirely basically the consequences of my decisions. It's the same thing here. It's Mike Tyson against a scrawny, basically like 5 foot 7, chronically sick Iran. Iran is entitled to slap Mike Tyson back on the face, but they should actually understand that the consequences of that slap will be considerably dangerous, including a concussion that could lead to brain damage.
- [22:27]
A
Well, when Saturday 11 July rolled around, it seemed to some observers that the US's retaliatory strikes and maybe some of those diplomatic efforts behind the scenes of Qatar and Pakistan had achieved something since Iran, out of the blue, blamed some errant units, like basically a couple of renegade IRGC units had fired on these commercial vessels. They said they usually. To try to dampen down the situation, the Iranian Foreign Minister Aragchi traveled to Muscat in Oman for discussions, including with your favorite Field Marshal Asim Munir of Pakistan. Eamon, he was there as well. Now, America demanded that Iran declare the Strait of Hormuz fully open. And this is because, from what I understand insurance companies, the insurance industry globally was saying that the US's guarantees were no longer enough at all. Because clearly, you know, the US had many times said, the Strait of Hormuz is open, the Strait of Hormuz is open, when it wasn't open. So the insurance industry was saying Iran needed to say so. Another sign, though, this is, I know when I read this, I thought, you know, this is another sign of Iran actually being in control.
- [23:50]
B
Exactly.
- [23:51]
A
Even now the insurance industries are saying, you know, Iran actually has control of the Strait of Hormuz. That was a dangerous precedent in itself, wasn't it?
- [23:58]
B
Exactly. This is the problem, is the fact that the insurance industry, when they receive guarantees from the us, they need to see that in reality, in action, these guarantees worth their weight in gold or in salt or whatever. The problem is, ships pass by, they get attacked by the Iranians even. There were fatalities, there were fatalities, there were casualties and there was so much damage there. They were not attacking with a drone, with a small payload, they were attacking with anti ship cruise missiles that actually caused fatalities and injuries among the crew members of these ships. So the US have to retaliate. You see, the insurance industry said that Iran must, before start of work on Monday, Iran must declare that from their side ships are safe to pass through the Strait of Hormuz as if it was on the 27th of February of 2026. That's it, that's all we want. And then we will start issuing policies and the policy pricing and the premiums will be reasonable. So the Trump administration accordingly issued that declaration that Iran must declare that because it is from their point of view, according to their own interpretation of the very poorly written MoU, that Iran must declare at least for 60 days. Just do your part. We lifted our own blockade, we gave you waiver to sell your bloody oil. At least do your part, declare a safe passage. And the team led by Iranian Foreign Minister Arakchi, when they were in Muscat meeting with the Omani Foreign Minister and with the Field Marshal of Pakistan, Asan Munir, they wanted to get out of it by saying we don't have the authority to give that declaration. You know, we as people, luckily we don't have, we have to go back to Iran and consult. And in addition, during that time, Arakchi was bullying, truly, truly with information I got like from a private source, like, I mean, bullying the Omani side to accept a joint running of the Strait of Hormuz between Oman and Iran, but under Iranian terms and that Iranians will have access to the Omani side, which the Omani said, no way. And this is when veiled threats by the Foreign Minister saying that don't think we are blind to the fact that you are acting as logistical hub for the American Navy. Do not think like anywhere blind to that. It's like, okay. And this is like, I mean where things even started to sour with Oman, Oman, which paid dear price for its neutrality and its closeness with Iran. But when Oman wanted to assert its sovereignty over its own waters, own side of the water, this is when the Iranians flipped on them. And this is when finally we see the mosque fell. We can see through the bullshit that it's not about protection of Iranian sovereign waters, it's about blackmail of the global economy.
- [27:08]
A
Well, there was clearly no breakthrough in MO Muscat. And America's demand that Iran declare the Strait of Hormuz fully open was answered by the IRGC the following day, Sunday 12th July, when it attacked a Cyprus flagged container ship, the GFS Galaxy, and then announced the strait entirely closed before striking another vessel. So they made it perfectly clear that the negotiations in Muscat certainly had no bearing on their activities. The US then launched another massive retaliation. 140 targets, meaning that over the previous, you know, those three nights of strikes, 300 targets had been struck across Iran. So, you know, mainly in the coastal area, of course, but not only there. It became clear that the US had pressed go on a systematic campaign to destroy Iran's coastal military network. And so Iran struck at Jordan again, basically the entire Gulf except for Saudi Arabia. And on Monday 13 July, Trump announced the resumption of the naval blockade against Iranian shipping. So we're going to take a quick break for a commercial break here and when we get back, we're going to talk about that declaration because I think Eamon, and you might disagree, Trump said something a little bit silly when he made that announcement. We'll be right back. So, Eamonn, on Monday 13 July, Trump announced that the naval blockade that the United States had imposed on Iranian shipping before the MOU was signed was back in force. And stupidly, I think said something I kind of, it surprised me when it came out, you know, that the US would become, he called it the guardian of the Hormuz Strait and would charge a fee equal to 20% of cargo value for providing security for ships. Now, the military notice that the US issued to formally declare the embargo back in action did not include this. And eventually Trump rolled it back. But it did strike me as a sign that Donald Trump himself is not entirely aware of the principles that are really being fought over. Because you can't exactly say to Iran, how dare you think you can charge ships to pass through the Strait of Hormuz and then say, no, but we're going to charge 20% of the cargo value. I mean, that's, that's kind of crazy, isn't it, Eamon? What was going on there?
- [29:51]
B
Even the Foreign Minister and the speaker of the Parliament of the Iranian Islamic Republic, both of them, Galiba and Arakchi mocked him on Twitter, saying, oh, you're right, you know, basically like, you know, we are absolutely with you, like, you know, here, except, you know, our rates will be cheaper.
- [30:07]
A
It's like, so what, what's, what was going on in the President's mind, Eamon,
- [30:12]
B
honestly, because from Trump's point of view, he is a transactional president. Look, look, I'm not going to like any, I mean, spend treasure and blood defending this waterway unless lucky, basically, if there is something in it for us. However, I understand that discreetly, certain Gulf leaders, without mentioning names, but almost, basically most of them, the big ones, reached out to him and said, look, you want to defend the street, we need you to do it. We are welcome to it, but who will not pay a single penny for it, you know, the way you are trying to do? However, however, we can bargain on other things, such as increased investments in the US such as lacking, I mean, more favorable terms to American companies in the GCC operating in the oil and gas sector. You know, with that Lacan, I mean, work, at the end of the day, there will be no loss for the gcc. You know, it's just exchanging Germans to Americans, exchanging French to American. You know, it's like reprioritizing their suppliers. Basically, Trump said, oh, yeah, okay, that's it. So it was more of a bargaining with the gcc and it worked.
- [31:26]
A
Yeah, it may have worked in the short term, but I do think it also worked to concede the point again to Iran. And I just think that kind of stupid rhetoric, that kind of bargaining is stupid. It's dangerous.
- [31:38]
B
Yes, absolutely.
- [31:39]
A
On that day, Monday 13th July, Trump also formally notified Congress that fighting with Iran had resumed and therefore the debate began again. Does the President have the authority to do so? Because, you know, technically, according to the United States Constitution, Congress declares war, not the President. So I don't know, what do you think about the behind the scenes politics between the White House, between Congress is the Senate, is the House of Representatives, Are they going to go along with a prolonged war in Iran? What do you think the politics are there, especially given the sad, I mean, for the War Hawk party, the sad sudden death of Lindsey Graham, the senator from South Carolina, who was such an important interlocutor between Gulf states and Israel and the White House over many decades now trying to kind of triangulate different interests. So what do you think the politics in Washington are at the moment about this resumption of fighting?
- [32:40]
B
Ironically, Iran's behavior more or less made it easy for the war party to persuade more and more representatives and senators that, look, guys, they want the strait. Do you want to give it to them? And there will be no senator in his right mind and no representative in his right mind or her right mind. But then there are quite few people who are not in their right mind in the House. But no one will say that, yes, give them the straight, what can we do for the sake of peace? Let's undermine a whole century of a global maritime free trade order. No one is going to say that. It's going to rebound on everyone's face and it will start an age of basically state sponsored piracy. And I think this is where President Trump is feeling far more secure now that, look, guys, we went the extra mile for the Iranians. We hosted them in Switzerland, we hosted them in Pakistan. We did everything. We gave peace every possible bloody chance. And they just are going after the one thing that we can't give them. We offered them $300 billion fund for reconstruction. We offered them to unfreeze $24 billion of their assets. You know, we did all of this, you know, and more. But guess what? They are still sticking to, you know, violating a very important pillar of the global maritime trading order. You know. You know, they are threatening the global commerce. So do you blame us here? And it's like, well, you were, you were not supposed to start the war. Okay, forget about starting the war. But the question here is we are in it now. Do you want to concede the Strait to them? No. Okay, then shut up and let us do our job.
- [34:35]
A
It is a sign though, how this war has not gone as planned because nobody is talking about Iran's nuclear capability anymore.
- [34:42]
B
Exactly.
- [34:43]
A
They're all talking about the Strait of Hormuz. It's such a shit show on Tuesday, 14th July. So this is just a few days ago, Just this Tuesday, because this is Saturday, the 18th of July, we're recording this. So on Tuesday, Iran, you know, Iran's really showing where it stands. It attacks two Emirati tankers with cruise missiles. It attacks a Dutch tanker, it attacks Kuwait, Jordan and Bahrain with what could have been cluster ballistic missiles. What do you think about this, Eamon? Is this a real escalation? Cluster ballistic missiles against a GCC state?
- [35:19]
B
Yes, it is a pure escalation. There is no question about it. Actually, my nephews were there in Bahrain, like as, you know, like. And I have a big family in Bahrain, a big family in Saudi. So they saw the cluster munitions like in a, basically like in a falling on the streets and causing Significant panic
- [35:36]
A
among the population and much harder to intercept.
- [35:39]
B
Exactly. And then of course, the Iranians are keeping saying we are defending our sovereign rights. Again, it's about defending sovereignty. What do they mean by that? I asked a friend of mine, an Iranian who knows the Iranian government mentality and knows exactly what they want. And the question is, how do we stop this current new round of hostilities? And the answer is two things. Either temporary ceasefire again, or for the global powers to concede that the Strait of Hormuz belong to Iran in its entirety. Both sides, the Omani side and the Iranian side, which is they are asking for something that no one can give. You know, this is, this is the problem. They are asking for something no one can give them.
- [36:28]
A
The U.S. s resumed blockade against Iranian shipping began at midnight on Wednesday, the 15th of July. And later that day in Washington, Trump convened a meeting in the Situation Room. And I imagine there was a very high octane debate about whether the offensive should be expanded, should be widened beyond Hormuz. Meanwhile, the US Military attacks Greater Tunb and Hangam Islands. Right? So this seemed maybe to be paving the way for something like a ground operation. The operation that we thought might happen back in March, maybe this is back on the agenda. Iran is clearly a bit spooked. It says Katahb Hezbollah in Iraq will immediately join this war if a ground operation were to happen. Ayman, talk about Katah Ab Hezbollah. Why hasn't Iran activated it already in a big way?
- [37:27]
B
The reason why they haven't been activated so far is because Iran want to use them at the optimal timing, because now is optimal timing. The Prime Minister of Iraq is in D.C. and trying to please Trump, appease him and is trying to limit the power of the PMUs, the popular mobilization units, Alhajd Al Shabi and among them of course Katab Hezbollah. Any militias that are outside of the state control in Iraq. And he gave them until the 1st of September to hand over their heavy weapons, drones and any other long range capabilities. So this is why their declaration that if there is a ground operation against Iran, that they will interfere and intervene is in itself an indication that the Iranians want to challenge the new prevailing narrative in Baghdad with the new Iraqi Prime Minister, that he is more pro American and that Iran influential days in Iraq are numbered. So that's the first thing. It's not just only by the way, Katab Hezbollah also the Houthis are becoming more and more restless and they said we will close Bab El Mandab if there is a ground operation against The Islamic Republic.
- [38:41]
A
Very shortly, we are going to talk about the Houthis, because the war is widening, dear listeners. But before we get there, I just want to ask. So on Thursday, this is the 16th of July, Thursday, just two days ago, as of this recording, Iran announced that it was going to release an Iranian American woman, Dina Karai, I suppose her name is pronounced, 53 years old, an Iranian American citizen. A citizen of America. She comes from California, who since December 2024 had been prevented from leaving Iran and according to most, you know, reporting, was subjected to several intelligence interrogations in that time. Now, this woman runs a California registered charity, the Children of Meher foundation, which funds educational programs in rural Iran. The Islamic Republic accused her of being a spy, of course. Now, why would they have chosen Thursday to release this woman? It seems maybe Iran was a bit worried about the resumption of US Strikes. Maybe the strikes were sending a message. Or is this just that schizophrenic nature of the Iranian regime, that maybe that was a decision taken by the political wing of the regime, not the military wing? It was very strange timing.
- [39:57]
B
It was a strange timing, yes, it was strange timing. And actually it was denied later by the judiciary and by the irgc. So you have the office of the President confirming it. You have the office of the head of the judiciary and the office of the IRGC denying it, and so never happened. Again, it's the problematic relationship between the centers of power in Iran. I've asked many of my friends, can we read too much into this? And they say most likely one center of power wanted to appease D.C. but then the other two centers immediately shut them.
- [40:34]
A
Well, clearly the real power center is the IRGC anyway, because on that same Thursday, they said that Iranian control, full Iranian control of the Strait of Hormuz was a red line and threatened to retaliate against any attacks to its national infrastructure with attacks on Gulf infrastructure. So the rhetoric is growing. And they clearly also instructed the Houthis to be ready to close the Bab El Mandeb, as you said, the Strait of Bab El Mandeb. Now, on Monday 13th July, so a few days before, Saudi Arabia bombed the Runway of Sana' A airport to prevent an Iranian aircraft carrying the Houthi delegation to Khamenei's funeral from landing. Eamon, tell us that story. What was going on there?
- [41:24]
B
Oh, wow. So there was a Mahan Air aircraft bringing the Houthi delegation, but the intelligence provided, you know, by the US and by the Israelis, you know, well, the Israelis Provided it to the us. The US provided it to Saudi Arabia. This is the chain. So no one can accuse me like saying, oh, Aymandir is saying that the Saudis basically are taking intel from the Israelis. No, the chain was that the Israelis who infiltrate Iran and treating Iran like a Swiss cheese slab full of holes. I mean, they informed the Americans and the Americans informed the Saudis that the airplane is carrying a lot of important sensitive equipments, including guidance systems for ballistic missiles and drones. And other important parts were also part of the cargo of the plane. They were not only carrying the delegation, they were carrying a lot of important parts of the Houthis ballistic and long range drone arsenal. So the Saudis sent a warning through the Omanis to the Houthis that don't you dare even land. Don't you dare. So the Iranian pilot, along with the delegation gave the Saudis the proverbial middle finger and they just kept flying towards Sana' a airport. So the Saudis did what they haven't done since April of 2022. So they broke a four years truce and they went and they dropped eight big bombs on the Runway in Sana' A airport, destroying the runways, making the airport inoperable. So of course what the Iranian pilot did was crazy because the Houthis themselves were mostly crazy because I think the Houthis inside like anywhere, smoking something and the fumes went into the cockpit. And that Lacina basically affected the pilot's cognitive abilities and better judgment. He switched on his transponders, he switched on basically his signal and then went straight to Hodeidah Airport and just landed there. And the Houthis instructed from the aircraft, instructed their followers to congregate in their hundreds in the airport to make sure that when they land, even if the Saudis were to attack the airport, there will be significant civilian casualties.
- [43:46]
A
So why is that crazy? That actually sounds, that sounds pretty reasonable given the fact that they did want to land in Yemen. So they succeeded in doing that. They landed in Odeir.
- [43:56]
B
Yeah, yeah. But the crazy thing is that they got a lot of civilians on the Runway.
- [44:00]
A
Oh, I see. Well, I mean crazy in the sense of reckless, dangerous, with no regard for human life. But strategically, tactically, not that crazy. They did succeed in landing, and that's the point now.
- [44:12]
B
But then the Houthis retaliated.
- [44:14]
A
Well, the Houthis claimed then that they attacked Abha Airport in Saudi Arabia. Is that true?
- [44:20]
B
Yes.
- [44:20]
A
So that's true.
- [44:21]
B
They attacked two locations actually in Saudi Arabia. They attacked King Khalid Air Base in Khamehmshet not far away from the border with Yemen with four ballistic missiles and four drones. And they sent six ballistic missiles against Abha airport. And since then there is no aviation there. You know, any flight to Abha has been canceled. You know, they struck the airport, there is no question about it. Most of them, most of the missiles were intercepted, but they did indeed strike the airport.
- [44:45]
A
Okay, so let's talk a little bit about Saudi Arabia then because since the resumption of fighting on the 7th of July, between the 7th of July and you know, Monday, Tuesday, 13th, 14th of July, Saudi Arabia was a bit quiet. What has been going on inside the corridors of power in Saudi Arabia over the last really, let's say two months as they try to find a way forward for themselves in this morass.
- [45:14]
B
Just like the American administration being a
- [45:17]
A
civil war, you know, within itself and the Iranian administration.
- [45:21]
B
Exactly. What we are seeing here is Iran, Saudi and the US and in Iran there are centers of power that are at each other's throats. In the US you have two competing camps. The confrontation and the appeasement camps in Saudi Arabia is the same. In Saudi Arabia you have the camp of the Foreign Minister Faisal Bin Farhan, aided by His Royal Highness Prince Abdel Aziz bin Salman, the older half brother of mbs and the Minister, the very powerful Minister of Energy, Oil and Gas, but also minister recently had portfolio of Minerals and industry. So he's a very powerful prince. These two princes aided by the former head of the Saudi Intelligence, His Royal Highness Prince Durk Al Faisal, they have a more old fashioned mistrustful diagnostics of the conflict. They believe that this is all an Israeli conspiracy to let the GCC fight Iran and Iran fight the gcc. They all both weakened. And then you end up in a situation where Israel is the winner out of the ashes of this conflict.
- [46:29]
A
And if I may ask, Eamon, I assume that the King himself, King Salman, who we don't hear much about these days, one assumes maybe he's not entirely there, but if he were there, I think he might instinctively ally with those voices. He has that old fashioned distrust of Israel sort of more than anything else. Is that right, would you say?
- [46:50]
B
Yes, indeed. By the way, Qatar as an external country is very much influencing the Foreign Minister and the Energy Minister in Saudi Arabia. So Qatar is influencing that side and they are on their side. But then you have the other camp here. Who leads the other camp? Well, ironically, the younger full brother of mbs, the Minister of Defense, Khalid Bin Salman. So Khalid Bin Salman, he is of the opinion that no Iran need to be confronted and every attack by Iran on us need to be retaliated against. Like, I mean, we should be very firm with Iran. No matter what. There has to be a response. There has to be retaliation. That is the Defense Minister, you know, ideas. And he's supported by the Minister of State for Foreign affairs, the one who's beneath Faisal Farhan. I'm talking about Adel Jaber, who's taking a little bit of a backseat. But also he is supported by the head of National Security Council in Saudi Arabia, Mossad Al Iban, who himself signed that Chinese brokered peace deal between Iran and Saudi Arabia in Beijing in March 2023. And again, you have two wings here competing and Mohamed Masalman is in the middle between these two.
- [48:06]
A
So, yeah. What is MBS thinking, do you think? Really, Eamonn, what is MBS's calculations at the moment? He is in a very difficult position. Not just because there's essentially a family feud going on between the two sides of this argument, because it's a royal family, after all, but also, you know, he is entrusted with the security of Saudi Arabia, its development, its prosperity. And Saudi Arabia is in a very difficult position, especially now that the Houthis have reactivated their aggression.
- [48:38]
B
Well, my understanding, I think Mohammed Musalman is going to adopt more, not only strategic patience, but strategic endurance for as long as possible. And he will rely more on the appeasement wing of his government, including his ministers, his older brother Abdulaziz, and his cousin, Faisal bin Barhan, the foreign minister. Well, distant cousin. He's from a different branch of the royal family, but nonetheless, he will rely on them keeping the peace as much as possible. But then there is a limit. So far, MBS has, to his people, presented an image of wisdom because why? We are surrounded not by one enemy, by three. The Iranian irgc, the Iraqi militias and the Houthis. And we are surrounded by enemies from the east, from the north, from the south. So, guys, cut us a slack. You know, give us a break. We are really in a very difficult, vulnerable, strategic position here. So we're trying to survive and we're trying to see if this war can be contained. However, the reality is that Muhammad is calculating that we will wait until we see the cracks in the dam. Once we see the cracks in the dam appearing, then this is when we will make a absolutely final decision that we will go to war.
- [49:59]
A
Well, the cracks in the dam, I think, began appearing on Thursday because Abdul Milik Al Houthi.
- [50:05]
B
Yes.
- [50:05]
A
Gave A fiery speech on television. I mean, he was deranged. Yes, he was enraged. I've never really seen him like this.
- [50:15]
B
Me too. I never seen him like this ever.
- [50:17]
A
And he said that all Saudi oil facilities, all Saudi vital infrastructure, and we know what that means, water, the desalination plants would become targets if Saudi Arabia joined the broader campaign. He said airports for airports, ports for ports, blockade for blockade. So he was not mincing his words. And clearly the entire Houthi movement was preparing its supporters for a return to full scale war with the kingdom.
- [50:49]
B
Yes.
- [50:49]
A
So, you know, cracks in the dam, Eamon, they're there.
- [50:52]
B
I urge the listeners go way back in the catalog. I think it was episode three or episode two of our podcast, like way back. It is March 2019, the episode on Yemen and where we talked clearly about the vulnerability of Saudi oil and water infrastructure and how the Houthis presented that threat. And that was seven years and four months ago. It's not because I had a crystal ball at the time, Thomas. I mean, you know, it's because, you know, I read into the Houthis, you know, ideology, theology and future plans, and we understand that they presented a strategic existential threat even. Remember, you and I, we call them an existential threat to Saudi Arabia. So I think we are back now to square one. The situation could ignite again and again. I think the escalation point is going to be the 20th of July before we get there.
- [51:54]
A
Amy, let me just bring the story to a close here as we wind up this episode. So on Thursday, after Abdul Malik Al Houthi gives this fiery speech with MBS there in Riyadh debating what to do, the cracks in the dam clearly appearing. The US expanded its campaign against Iran as well.
- [52:13]
B
Exactly. Do you remember when we said a few months ago that Bandar Abbas is going to be the Gaza of the Gulf? I meant it at the time. Why? Because I can see it right now in the strategic planning mindset of the US military generals and planners. They are targeting the arteries that are connecting Bandar Abbas to the rest of the Iranian mainland. They targeted seven bridges so far and two tunnels and other roads through the mountain passes that actually connect the city to the rest of the mainland. Why? Because they want to isolate it. They want to make sure that Bandarabas cannot be, you know, the launchpad for how Iran control or projects control of the Strait of Hormuz. Bandar Abbas port, airport facilities, air base in all the missile and drone and cruise missile facilities surrounding it will be destroyed or are being destroyed currently. Why? Because this is going to be ground zero. The islands of the Gulf, Cochem, Hormuz, Abu Musa, the Greater Tomb, the Lesser Tomb, Syri and the ports of Bandar Abbas and Syrik. All of these are going to be the battleground, the ground zero. The Gaza of the Gulf.
- [53:33]
A
Well, Iran is feeling the heat, Ayman, because yesterday, as of this recording, Friday 17th June, Iran once again struck sites across the GCC, including a Kuwaiti desalination plant.
- [53:48]
B
Exactly. The water damage is the equivalent of more than 15% of the country's output. The country itself do not have more than between 5 and 15 days of reserves of drinking water. So we are at a critical point here. Now the good news is that the water grid and the electricity grid between Saudi and Kuwait is well maintained. And so Saudi can quickly intervene and do that. But if Iran's attacks start to extend into Saudi Arabia, this is when we have to worry. And guess what? Early this morning, Saturday of 18 July, Iran sent ballistic missiles, four of them, against two locations in Saudi Arabia. The first one is Prince Sultan Air Base, that we understand, it's a military base. Okay. But the other target was weird. It was two ballistic missiles against the port city of Yambour on the Red Sea, you know, the west of Saudi Arabia. And it is the main oil exporting terminal for Saudi Arabia right now because of the east west pipeline.
- [54:57]
A
So not weird at all, Ayman.
- [54:59]
B
Weird in the sense that it's the first time in four months, it is the absolutely the first time in almost 120 days that Saudi Arabia has been struck and this is a significant escalation.
- [55:14]
A
Well, in summary, I think we need to just talk about two things quickly. First, this war has two dimensions, diplomatic and military. Let's start with the diplomatic. What the hell are the Omanis thinking now? I imagine behind closed doors they are utterly pissed off and even maybe embarrassed. Yes, they expended a lot of diplomatic and political capital being neutral in this fight. Neutral to pro Iranian in this fight. And in thanks, in gratitude, Iran has just bitch slapped it across the face.
- [55:45]
B
Yes.
- [55:46]
A
What are Omanis going to do?
- [55:48]
B
Well, first of all, my understanding from talking to Omani officials is that under no circumstances that they are going to relinquish their control or sovereignty over the Omani part of the Strait of Hormuz. They will abide by international law. They will allow free shipping and free navigation across their part of the strait, come what may. Let the Iranians do their worst. I mean they are not going to budge on this because if they do, they will be subject to lawsuits, sanctions, everything you can imagine by other governmental and non governmental in organizations across the globe. Because if they do join the Iranians in imposing shipping tolls and enabling the IRGC to board ships for safety inspections, because this is what the IRGC is asking that they want to do, that even in the Omani side, then what's going to happen? You know, shipping companies can sue the Omanis in the international court saying like they are enabling piracy. So this is where Oman is going to stick to their guns and, and to say no. We facilitated you, our friends and dear friends across the water in Islamic Republic for so many decades. But this is where we part ways on this particular issue. We will help with diplomacy. We will still be. Our doors are open, our hearts are open, our phone lines are open if you want to talk sense. But if you want to talk nonsense, no, you're not welcome. So that's what Oman is thinking right now.
- [57:23]
A
Okay. The military side, the Houthis have mobilized. The Saudis no doubt are mobilizing, especially after what happened this morning. The Houthis say the Bab El Mandeb will be closed soon, meaning Iran will be exerting its control over the Strait of Hormuz and the route into the Red Sea. This is a recipe for proper war, isn't it? What's going to happen?
- [57:49]
B
But this time I think Iran will be in a much worse light in front of the international community and in front of the global court of public opinion than ever before because now they are the ones who are being unreasonable. These waterways are international waterways. You are acting as blackmailing pirates. Even Oman, which has been exceptionally accommodating to the extent that they harm their own relationship with the US and other GCC countries just for the sake of accommodating the Iranians. Now they are being bullied. Do you know that four locations in Oman has been struck, you know, since the 7th of July? Four locations in Dugum and Khasab and Suhar, you know, and in four Omani locations has been attacked. So you can imagine Omani's anger here. And so in front of the global public opinion, I think Iran is not going to win the hearts and minds of people right now. I think this is where Trump might have lured them into a trap here.
- [58:59]
A
Well, on the 7th of July, the Tuesday that started this recent round of fighting, NATO in its Ankara summit declaration included this statement. NATO allies reiterate that Iran must never have a nuclear weapon. And we call on Iran to fully respect freedom of Navigation in the Strait of Hormuz. Do you think in this next chapter of the Iran war that NATO will be more consciously, intentionally and cooperatively involved?
- [59:34]
B
Yes, I think not directly in the conflict, but NATO countries are going to open their skies and bases and logistics and they will provide whatever help necessary. Because now this is not a conflict or disagreement over nuclear issues. This is one of the most vital international waterways. Possibly too soon, if we add Bab El Mandeb and the Houthis become more crazy than usual. I think the NATO member states are going to allow the US to use their bases airspace and to provide logistical, intelligence and other kinds of help to the US in this conflict.
- [60:12]
A
And what about Israel? When will the White House give the Israeli government the green light to resume its attacks against Iran?
- [60:19]
B
I have a feeling the 20th of July onward. So once the final World cup match between Spain and Argentina happened, and I wish Spain the best of luck, me and my daughter, we are supporting pain. We just bought the jerseys yesterday. So once the final whistle is done in the very early morning of Monday, the Gulf Standard Time, which is the Sunday night, like I mean, US time, after that, all bets are off.
- [60:52]
A
Well, Eamonn, this episode is going to be released on Tuesday, 21 July. So Wednesday, when you listen to this, dear listeners, we will see. Did 20 July mark a real watershed moment in this recent war or will we still wait and see? Who knows? Eamonn, the Iran war, it's never going to end, is it? It's never going to end, no.
- [61:16]
B
I mean, we are now entering into a conflict without any resolution. There is a resolution to it, actually. I mean, you know, the Iranian government can come out and say, full freedom of navigation guaranteed without any interference. You know, in the Strait of Hormuz, they say that the war ends. Unfortunately, it's not going to end because they see it as their own sovereign territory.
- [61:44]
A
Even if they say that Ayman, the war ends for a while, yes, but then it's just back to the status quo ante, the proxies, the nuclear ambition, the ballistic missiles.
- [61:54]
B
Exactly, exactly.
- [61:55]
A
The real problem has not been solved and we're really no closer to solving it, which is this regime.
- [62:00]
B
The fundamentals for peace are missing.
- [62:03]
A
Oh, goodness. Anyway, dear listeners, that's it. Amon Dean's update into the Iran war and all the geopolitics and military toing and froing in the Middle East. Thank you very much, Eamon, Stay safe there. You know, war's back in your part of the world.
- [62:18]
B
Indeed.
- [62:18]
A
And dear listeners, Take care.
- [62:20]
B
Take care, everyone. And stay safe.
- [62:22]
A
Conflicted is a message heard Production. Our executive producers are Jake Warren and Max Warren. This episode was produced and edited by Thomas Small.