CONFLICTED Podcast

Episode: "Mali: When Jihadists Win"

Hosts: Aimen Dean & Thomas Small
Release Date: January 27, 2026

Overview

In this incisive episode, ex-Al Qaeda member turned MI6 spy Aimen Dean and former monk-turned-filmmaker Thomas Small return to West Africa to dissect the meteoric rise of Al Qaeda’s influence in Mali. The hosts chart the labyrinthine history of jihadism in the Sahel, the dissolution of the Malian state, and the uncomfortable pragmatism that emerges when jihadists become the de facto rulers. Using first-hand knowledge and a signature mix of dark humor and hard-won insight, they illuminate why, in their words, “when the state fails, the demons chase out the devils”—and why letting the jihadists take power might, shockingly, be the least bad outcome.

Key Discussion Points & Insights

1. Why Mali? Why Now?

• Context: The recent escalation of Al Qaeda activities in Mali throughout 2024-2025 has regional and global implications ([05:31]).
• JNIM (Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin): The dominant Al Qaeda affiliate in Mali, also involving Tuareg and Fulani elements; operates across a territory "almost the size of the European continent" ([05:31]-[05:46]).
• Collapse of State Authority: Mali’s vast, sparsely populated terrain is nearly ungovernable, likened to “Arrakis from the universe of Dune.” This allowed jihadist groups to flourish ([07:46]).

"How do you control an ocean of sand dunes? ... There are more dunes than people."
— Eamon ([07:46])

2. From Algerian Civil War to Sahel Jihadism:

• Origins: Jihadist momentum in the Sahel traces back to the 1990s Algerian Civil War, with factions evolving from GIA → GSPC → AQIM ([10:56]-[12:37]).
• Evolution: These groups were motivated less by global jihad, more by regional grievances, local political struggles, and the opportunities presented by weak governance ([12:37]).

"Deep down, jihadism in North Africa and the Sahel... is less a question of global aims and more a question of regional geopolitics."
— Thomas Small ([12:37])

3. Criminal Enterprise: Smuggling, Kidnapping, and Ransom

• Key Figures:
  • Mokhtar Belmokhtar: Emblematic of “jihadist privateers,” adept at criminal networks, smuggling, and cross-Sahel relationships ([14:43]-[16:33]).
  • Abu Zayd: Partnered with Belmokhtar, pioneered lucrative kidnapping-for-ransom operations; Western governments paid millions, inadvertently fueling jihadism ([16:33]-[18:28]).
• Massive Influence: Early ransom payments may have totaled $100 million—money that armed further violence.

"You pay, people will die. You arm them with 100 million bullets... just to release one white hostage."
— Eamon ([17:38])

4. The Fragmented Emirate & Rise of JNIM

• Internal Fissures: The post-2012 jihadist emirate in northern Mali suffered from infighting: Belmokhtar, Abu Zayd, and others founded rival groups, e.g., Al-Murabitun, Ansar Dine ([22:58]-[27:08]).
• Unification: By 2017, these factions merged into JNIM under Iyad Ag Ghaly, consolidating various jihadist, ethno-nationalist, and political ambitions ([41:42]-[43:06]).

5. Deeper Roots: Slavery & Ethnic Tensions

• Persistence of Slavery: Slavery, often racialized (Tuareg, Arabs, Fulani as "white"; others as "black"), remains deeply embedded, exploited by jihadist networks, and has reversed under jihadist rule ([29:04]-[32:54]).
• Social Fragmentation: The Malian state’s historic failure to address these divisions allowed radical Islamism to outflank both secular governance and ethnic nationalism ([34:21]-[36:52]).

"Slavery in Mali is racialized... the much darker shade of brown are the people who would be... hunted and put into chains..."
— Eamon ([32:14])

6. The Rise of Pragmatic Islamist Leadership

• Iyad Ag Ghaly: A Tuareg aristocrat with pan-Sahel war experience, transformed from nationalist rebel to Islamist opportunist, leveraging missionary networks for power ([34:21]-[36:40]).
• Amadou Koufa: Fulani preacher, singer, and satirist, radicalized post-2012, galvanized Fulani-led jihadism in central Mali—exacerbating grassroots, ethnically-motivated violence ([38:41]-[40:51]).

"What [Iyad al-Ghali] is at the core of his heart is a cold, calculating politician."
— Eamon ([37:46])

7. The Failure of the State and the Perverse Appeal of Jihadist Governance

• Collapse of Authority: JNIM began offering tax collection, dispute arbitration, and market regulation—delivering some stability in the vacuum left by a corrupt, absent state ([43:56]-[45:16]).
• Villainous Choices: Locals face a “devils vs. demons” dilemma, sometimes preferring jihadist order to other forms of chaos ([45:16]).

"That's the problem with demons. They scare away the devils."
— Eamon ([45:16])

8. Contemporary Developments & The Bleak Future

• 2025-2026 Escalations:
  • JNIM attacks on army bases, economic blockades, targeted attacks on infrastructure (fuel, gold mines) ([47:11]).
  • The government’s reliance on brutal ethnic militias has worsened insecurity and civilian suffering ([45:39]-[46:24]).
• Strategic Shift: JNIM's combined tactics of violence and economic disruption threaten imminent state collapse.

"JNIM has come to combine classic insurgent violence with economic and political pressure against the state."
— Thomas Small ([47:11])

9. Provocative Conclusion: Should Jihadists Win?

• Aimen’s Bombshell: Suggests the least bloody solution may be to “let JNIM take over” — likening the scenario to the Taliban’s resurgence in Afghanistan ([49:19]-[49:44]).
• Rationale: State collapse has made jihadist rule not only inevitable but, perhaps paradoxically, preferable to ongoing chaos and carnage. He advocates negotiating with pragmatic, “political demons” to create future stability—potentially in the form of new “kingdoms” or sultanates ([51:28]-[52:37]).
• Thomas’s Reaction: Shock and disbelief, yet uncertain how else to contest the argument.

"The kindest solution now... is just to allow JNIM to take over the entire country... Because what could be worse than the current incompetent, corrupt, and bloodthirsty government in Bamako?"
— Eamon ([49:44], [52:37])

Memorable Quotes & Moments

• On State Collapse:
  “Where are the leaders in Bamaku? Most of them have nice apartments in Paris, in Lyon, in Nice. That’s the reality.”
  — Eamon ([43:14])
• On Jihadist Incentives:
  "Jihad is a loaded gun and you don't give it basically to people with intellectual limitations."
  — Eamon ([41:33])
• On the Uncomfortable Pragmatism of Jihadist Governance:
  "From one point of view, it could be said that a lot of ordinary people are more or less satisfied with the governance that JNIM is providing."
  — Thomas Small ([45:16])
• On What’s Next:
  "It's inevitable... let's be pragmatist and let's make it as least painful for the people who will be conquered."
  — Eamon ([53:21])

Important Timestamps

• [04:20] Setting today’s focus: why Mali, why now?
• [07:46] The impossibility of state control in the Sahel
• [10:48]-[13:24] The transformation from Algerian groups to AQIM
• [17:38] The economics and ethics of paying ransoms
• [22:58]-[27:08] The rise and fall of the Northern Mali “emirate”
• [29:04]-[32:54] Slavery and racial hierarchies in Mali
• [34:21]-[36:40] Iyad Ag Ghaly’s political trajectory
• [41:42]-[43:06] How four jihadist groups merged into JNIM
• [45:16] The uncomfortable benefits of jihadist governance
• [47:11]-[47:59] The new strategy: insurgency and economic war
• [49:19]-[49:44] Eamon’s argument: let JNIM take over
• [51:28]-[52:37] On making “kings” out of pragmatic jihadists
• [53:21]-[54:00] Predictions for JNIM overrunning Bamako

Structure & Attribution Guide

• Thomas Small — Guides the narrative, probes for clarity, often voicing the audience’s incredulity or confusion.
• Aimen Dean — Provides insider details, bleak humor, and controversial pragmatism; repeatedly calls out uncomfortable truths about state failure, geopolitics, and the ethics of counter-terrorism.

Tone and Style

• Candid and unflinching: Both hosts avoid euphemism, embracing the "mess" of Sahel geopolitics.
• Wry, dark humor: Dad jokes and black comedy offset grim analysis (e.g., piracy analogies, “demons vs. devils”).
• World-weary yet analytical: Both draw on extensive historical and personal experience, questioning idealistic solutions in favor of “dirty” pragmatism.

Bottom Line

This episode delivers a brutally honest, historically-grounded account of why Mali may soon—or already has—slipped irretrievably under jihadist control. Through the voices of two men who have witnessed the wars and betrayals of both West Africa and the broader Middle East, listeners are forced to reconsider whether “victory” can mean anything in a land where the state’s collapse leaves only “demons” and “devils” to pick up the pieces.