Mali’s Crisis is Not What it Seems

Summary

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Podcast Summary: CONFLICTED – “Mali’s Crisis is Not What it Seems”

Hosts: Thomas Small, Wasim Nasser
Date: May 12, 2026

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Episode Overview

In this episode, host Thomas Small welcomes journalist and Sahel expert Wasim Nasser to unpack the recent seismic events in Mali. The conversation delves into Mali's complex conflict landscape—disentangling the evolving alliances between Tuareg separatists and Al Qaeda-linked jihadists, the legacy of failed international interventions, the collapse of state authority, and the prospects of political Islam becoming the dominant force in Mali. Through rich first-hand insight, Wasim provides a nuanced perspective on the interplay of ethnic, political, and religious factors fueling Mali's turbulence.

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Key Discussion Points & Insights

1. Background: The Sahel’s Tumult and Foreign Intervention

• French Involvement (2013–2022):
  • France’s interventions, Operation Serval and Barkhane, sought to contain jihadism but failed strategically despite tactical successes ([04:09]–[07:40]).
    • Wasim Nasser:
      “What happened in 2013 was a reaction of the takeover by northern Mali by many jihadi groups… actually, Jinim, when it was created, united groups that were active in northern Mali and not Akim per se.” ([04:09])
  • The French found themselves propping up an unsteady state, unable to disengage due to domestic and international political pressures.
    • Wasim Nasser:
      “Many people here in France now, like 10 years later, are advocating and saying we should have left after Serval… But if you put yourself in the political dynamic of that time… it was politically impossible to justify a retreat from Mali.” ([07:40])

2. The Evolution of Armed Groups: AQIM, JNIM, FLA

• Nationalist and Islamist Flows:
  • Tuareg rebels, many former Gaddafi fighters, initially allied with various jihadist factions. Betrayed, they became adversaries ([05:15]–[06:54]).
• Iyad al Ghali’s Rise:
  • A veteran Tuareg nationalist leader who shifted to Islamist politics, now helming JNIM—a multi-ethnic, Al Qaeda–linked force ([09:56]–[15:29]).
    • Thomas Small:
      “He has a long history of militant work, initially on the side of Tawareg nationalism, although he made a shift and adopted an Islamist framing of his political activities in the 90s and naughties.” ([10:43])
• Transcending Ethnic Divides:
  • Under al Ghali, JNIM has grown into a coalition transcending Tuareg, Fulani, and even Dogon communities ([14:03]–[15:29]).
    • Wasim Nasser:
      “Under the banner of Jinim and the leadership of Iyad Agrali made Jinim the sole trans-ethnic jihadi group in the region… able to recruit among the Fulani population… and even among the Dogon.” ([14:22])

3. Turning Points: Alliances, Battles, and the Fall of the State

• Collapse of the Bamako State & Russian Involvement:
  • After double coups (2020–2021), the junta expelled Western actors and brought in Russia’s Wagner Group, now Africa Corps ([20:31]).
• FLA–JNIM Alliance:
  • Years of tension and intermittent fighting between the rebel FLA (Tuareg nationalist) and JNIM turned into explicit alliance, especially after Bamako violated previous peace accords.
    • Wasim Nasser:
      “They made the talk happen with Iyad al Ghali and they said, okay, we have to get along. In early 2025, they got an agreement and… full and recognized alliance and coordination on the ground between the two groups who were foes a few years back.” ([19:53])

4. Key Battles and the Shift in Power

• Tinzawatin Battle (July 2024):
  • Joint rebel/jihadist victory delivered a “huge loss for Wagner… first huge defeat of Wagner in Western Africa” and forced Russian tactical changes. This operational cooperation paved the way for political alliance ([25:00]–[27:21]).
• Agreement on Governance:
  • The division of responsibilities: JNIM would rule countryside with Sharia, FLA more present in towns, both finding compromise on “softer” application of Sharia.
    • Wasim Nasser:
      “The appliance of Sharia law would be the same in the countryside and in cities… it’s all in the implementation.” ([31:03])

5. April 2026 Offensive: The New Reality

• Coordinated Attacks Across Mali ([35:31]):
  • FLA and JNIM launched simultaneous assaults, stunning the junta. JNIM focused on the south and center; FLA primarily engaged in the north alongside JNIM ([35:31]).
    • Wasim Nasser:
      “The only places they fought together… it was Gao and Kidal in the north. All the operations in Central Mali and Bama Kokati… solely Jinim fighters.” ([35:31])
  • Major blow: assassinating Mali’s Defense Minister, Sadio Camaro, in Kati, using sophisticated tactics and suicide bombing ([37:08]–[37:16]).
    • Wasim Nasser:
      “They monitored the area with Google Earth and… used the teachings in order to succeed this time. At the same time they attacked Bamakoz airport…” ([37:16])

6. Political and Ethnic Dynamics: Beyond the Jihadi Narrative

• Not a Simple Islamist Takeover:
  • JNIM’s participation in a broad anti-junta front, including exiled opposition and civil society figures, even non-Muslims, blurs the familiar “jihadist conquest” narrative ([23:30]).
    • Wasim Nasser (On opposition’s outreach):
      “The spokesperson… was on France 24… 'I’m a Christian Catholic and… calling for an agreement with Jinim in order to stop the bloodshed… the junta [is] the sole responsible of the actual situation.'” ([21:32])
• Ethnic Cleavages and JNIM’s Approach:
  • JNIM has adapted to local dynamics, recruiting from dispossessed Fulani and reaching out to Bamabara populations, aiming for broad-based legitimacy ([44:48]–[45:18]).
    • Wasim Nasser:
      “Inside each community, of course, you have people with them and people who are against them… the poorest Fulanis… are more positive towards Jinim… It’s a change of social status for them too.” ([44:50])

7. Iyad al Ghali’s Political Calculations and Regional Impact

• Outreach to Russia:
  • JNIM signaled to Moscow its willingness to negotiate, leveraging the release of Russian hostages and tactical withdrawals ([32:18]).
    • Wasim Nasser:
      “He was asking Russia to drop the junta in order to have future balance, good relations. So this is politics…” ([32:18])
• Siege of Bamako:
  • On April 28, JNIM declared a “total siege” of the capital, intensifying pressure on the junta and other elites ([42:31]).
• Jihadist Governance Evolution:
  • Drawing parallels with Syria’s HTS, the hosts discuss how “breaking” with Al Qaeda may come through gradual governance compromises, not forced preconditions ([50:03]–[52:01]).
    • Wasim Nasser:
      “The break with Al Qaeda will come through governance because when they ally with… Imam Diko, with people… of the FLA and they govern together, while they’re bound to an organization [JNIM] breaks by itself…” ([50:54])

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Notable Quotes & Memorable Moments

• On Foreign Intervention Failure:

  • “Many people here in France now… are advocating and saying we should have left after Serval… but at the time… it was politically impossible to justify a retreat from Mali.”
    —Wasim Nasser ([07:40])

• On the Political Complexity:

  • “What’s going on is so different from what would be a lazy framing… that a kind of radical Islamist group is taking over the country. It’s not so simple.”
    —Thomas Small ([23:20])

• On Shifting Jihadi Alliances:

  • “The paradox today is that Iyad al Ghali himself… are today the people who are preventing the Islamic State from going further south into the Gulf of Guinea.”
    —Wasim Nasser ([17:02])

• On Political Islam’s Pragmatism:

  • “Islamism provides a much more powerful narrative… but in the hands of a genius like Iyad al Ghali, he can prevent it from tipping into ISIS-style extremism. He can kind of shepherd it in this way.”
    —Thomas Small ([47:20])

• On Prospects for JNIM’s Political Acceptance:

  • “Imagining that he [Iyad al Ghali] will be recognized and accepted as Ahmed al Shar’a [HTS in Syria], I think… it is far-fetched. And this is why… he needs others, meaning the Malian opposition.”
    —Wasim Nasser ([53:41])

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Timeline of Important Segments

| Timestamp | Segment/Theme | |-------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| | [03:11] | Thomas asks Wasim to provide context on French involvement in Mali | | [05:15] | Origins of alliances between Tuareg rebels and jihadists in 2012 | | [09:56] | Iyad al Ghali: biography, significance, and leadership of JNIM | | [14:03] | JNIM’s unique trans-ethnic structure and political breakthrough | | [19:53] | FLA and JNIM formalize political and military alliance | | [25:00] | Battle of Tinzawatin: FLA & JNIM defeat Russian-backed Malian forces | | [31:03] | Wasim clarifies real-world implementation of Sharia across Mali | | [32:18] | JNIM’s diplomatic outreach to Russia, political maneuvering | | [35:31] | April 25: Coordinated national offensive by FLA and JNIM | | [37:08] | Assassination of Mali’s Defense Minister (Sadio Camaro) in Kati | | [41:26] | The logic of concessions between FLA and JNIM in pursuit of autonomy and stability | | [42:31] | JNIM declares siege on Bamako; pressure tactics on the junta | | [44:50] | Ethnic dynamics, Fulani caste divisions, and JNIM’s local recruitment | | [50:03] | The case for accepting political Islamism as a force for stability | | [52:01] | The process of breaking with Al Qaeda is slow and tied to governance, not preconditions | | [53:41] | International appetite for recognizing Iyad al Ghali as a legitimate ruler |

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Conclusion & Takeaways

This episode vividly illustrates Mali’s current crisis as an outcome of years of fractured intervention, evolving jihadist strategies, and cynical political maneuvering. The emerging JNIM–FLA alliance is not a case of simple terrorist conquest but reflects the forging of a new order from the failures of state and international actors. Political Islam, in the form of Iyad al Ghali’s movement, seems poised to fill the void, negotiating alliances and moderating religious practice for broader acceptance. Recognizing this new reality may be uncomfortable for international policymakers but, as Wasim Nasser argues, is necessary for any hope at stability.

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Suggested Listening:
Listen from [35:31] for detailed coverage of the April 2026 offensive and Wasim’s on-the-ground insights into the evolving new order in Mali.
For JNIM’s origins and Iyad al Ghali’s political genius, focus on [09:56]–[15:29].

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Tone & Style:
The conversation is both rigorous and informal—probing, occasionally humorous, but always rich with insider perspective and accessible explanations for those less familiar with Sahelian politics.

Transcript

[Thomas Small]

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When you're ready to join them, shop apmex.com. that's apmex.com oh. Dear listeners, welcome back to Conflicted. I'm Thomas Small, and today we're giving you another Friend of the show episode because I'm really pleased to say that Wasim Nasser, a truly old friend of the show now, is here with us today. Hello, Waseem.

[Wasim Nasser]

How are you doing? Hello, Thomas. Thank you for having me again. You cut your hair. You cut your hair.

[Thomas Small]

No, I didn't cut it. I'm just styling it better. I need to cut my beard, dude. That's what I need. No. Oh, that's kind of you to say. Everyone hates it. I love it.

[Wasim Nasser]

Oh, brilliant.

[Thomas Small]

Thank you. No, we're gonna put that in the episode. It's always such a joy to see your friendly, smiling face and to have access to your enormous brain full of information, specifically information about Mali. This time I've asked you on to help us make sense of the events that began in Mali on the 25th of April. So just a couple of weeks ago, even less. And back in we with AIM and I with Eamon, did an episode on Molly Aim and forecast something like what happened. So you're here. You're gonna tell us what happened. You're gonna help us maybe understand what's gonna happen. Let's get right into it. Okay, Waseem, Molly, you just to remind me the dear listeners, because they may associate you mainly with Syria. You've been on the show mainly to talk about Syria, but actually you have equally cut your teeth in the Sahel region. I mean, you are really one of the world experts on the jihadist groups that have come to dominate, terrorize, pillage, and possibly govern that region for a long time. And, you know, you're very trusted by the jihadist groups, you know the leaders to some extent. You've broken many important stories. So you are a genuine expert on the Sahil and on Mali in particular.

[Wasim Nasser]

Thank you so much for your kind words and I'll try to answer your questions as I can, but to tell you how it happened, actually, we should. As you know, a few people kept following the Sahel because of what was happening in Syria because the war with Iran, etc. Etc. But actually what happened was cooking since like a while now. And if you remember, I broke the story back in March 2025, so more than a year, a half now, of the alliance between the rebels, majority Tuareg rebels of northern Mali, and the jihadis of Jinnah, meaning the Al Qaeda affiliate in the Sahel.

[Thomas Small]

You did, you did, you did. But I don't want to go straight into it because I want to set the scene better first, because you are French, I would like for you to kind of help us, to ground us, really, in the French perspective on the last 12, 13, 14 years in that region. Because in 2013, the French launched Operation Serval, which lasted about a year and was immediately followed by Operation Bar Khan, which lasted until 2022. So that's a long time. The French really invested a lot of resources in Mali and in the surrounding regions to try to bring this jihadist problem under control, and they failed. As a Frenchman and with your ear to the ground there in France, how. How do the French think about that period, that experience of war and counterterrorism activities in the Sahel?

[Wasim Nasser]

Well, actually, what happened in 2013 was a reaction of the takeover by northern Mali by many jihadi groups, among them Aqeem and rebel groups. We are talking about the same rebel groups who took over part of the north now.

[Thomas Small]

So Aqeem is Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, which is one of the strains that eventually all unified into creating jihad a n I m, which is now very powerful there. So, yeah, so they were responding. The French were responding to Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghrebs rise.

[Wasim Nasser]

Yes, the one. They were not alone. There were other jihadi groups. But just to clarify one thing that you said, actually Jinim, when it was created, it united groups that were active in northern Mali and not Akim per se.

[Thomas Small]

Okay, here we go. That period is very con. Confusing, because AQIM in mali, even in 2011. 2012. 2013 was kind of a Frankenstein's monster. It wasn't wholly unified. There were different commanders. It broke up very quickly. It was chaotic. The whole thing is very hard to keep in one's mind.

[Wasim Nasser]

Exactly. I'll try to make it simple.

[Thomas Small]

Thank you.

[Wasim Nasser]

So back in 2012. Back in 2012, there was an alliance with Tuareg rebels in northern Mali between three or four jihadi groups in northern Mali, among them Akim, to take over northern Mali and ousted the Malian military from the north. That was done in 2012. Many of those Tuareg fighters were actually part of the green legions of Muammar Al Qaddafi in Libya.

[Thomas Small]

Yeah, that's right.

[Wasim Nasser]

And when the Libyan army was dismantled, those people who were originally from Mali, they are not Libyans, they went back to their own territory and they took part of the north. But once they took part of the north, meaning and major towns like Thombuktu and Kidal, which is where they were betrayed by the jihadi, jihadi friends at the time, and they were ousted themselves from the north. And this is what triggered the call from Malian authorities to French, the former French colonizer, in order to come and help them oost the jihadis from the north. And this being said, the French army, as you said, conducted Operation Serval, which was a military and a tactical success against the jihadis. But once they were on the ground, they had to cooperate with local forces, meaning the same Tuareg rebels that were betrayed by the jihadis in 2012. And this wasn't very much liked by Bamako, which did not have a choice, because one thing was very clear, it was those Tuareg and Arab fighters in the north who knew the landscape and who were the most efficient partners in countering whom. Akim.

[Thomas Small]

So just to make sure that the listener realizes, Bamako is the capital of Mali. It's where the central government, to the extent it even has one, and we'll get to that question later, it's where the central government is based. So now, in retrospect, you know, to return to the original question, how is this period thought of by the French? Because in 2022, they withdrew from Mali. They withdrew, you know, the whole operation wound down. Russia came to the fore in that part of the world. A new Malian regime, a junta that came to power through coups, double coups in 2020 and 2021, decided to ally with Russia. And so, you know, maybe the French, a bit like Americans thinking about Afghanistan or other such, they just think they've got egg on their face. It didn't work.

[Wasim Nasser]

Sure what worked in 2012, 2013. Well, did not work in 2014 with Barcan. Why? Well, actually, because there was a military objectives, there was a capacity of containing jihadi groups, but there was another other solution following from the Malian government. So only the military solution was not enough. And this is why France found itself not to be very long doing counter terror operations and never ending counter operations with tactical results on the ground, meaning killing the head of Hakim, killing the head of the Islamic State, killing many commanders etc. Etc. But no political or strategic outcome on the ground except. Except containing jihadi groups, either Jinim or either the actually the Islamic State. But this being said, many people here in France now, like 10 years later, are advocating and saying we should have left after serval, right? But if you put yourself in the, in the political dynamic of that time, meaning we are in 2014-2015-2016-2015 was the year where France was targeted by Al Qaeda in January and by the Islamic State in November. The war was raging against the Islamic state in the 11th, right? And for the politicians who were in charge in France, they couldn't have said we are fighting the jihadis in the 11th and we are retreating from Mali because for the public opinion, all those bearded people with black flags were the same. Meaning that the Frenchman who left Normandy to fight in Iraq for the French public opinion was the same as the Fulani and the Tuareg fighting in the ranks of a Jali group in the Zaha. So it was politically impossible to justify a retreat from Mali. And at the time too, Bamako didn't want France to retreat because they were relying on the French military in order to solve their own problems. So this is how it became something difficult to end and it took the time it took to end in 2022. But the main AV or opinion now is that we should have retreated. But few people, as I'm telling you, don't understand what was the political environment at the time.

[Thomas Small]

Well, Waseem, as an American, it warms the cockles of my heart to hear that the French can find themselves in the compromising position, strategic and tactical, that the Americans consistently find themselves in, including right now over Iran. But we don't wanna talk about that. So while we're laying the scene, please would you give us a brief summary of the life of JNIM's leader, Iyad Al Ghali? Ayman and I did it in detail back in January, but still just to set the scene. You know, he was born in 1954, so he's in his early 70s. He is a veteran of Gaddafi's Libya linked militia networks that he built up. He fought in Lebanon, he fought in Chad, so he.

[Wasim Nasser]

Right, you know that. Right.

[Thomas Small]

He has a long history of militant work, initially on the side of Tawareg nationalism, although he made a shift and adopted an Islamist framing of his political activities in the 90s and naughties. And now is the head of JNIM having. This is a story that you broke successfully finally negotiated a union with the Azawid Liberation Front, the fla, a Tuareg nationalist group. So he is a fascinating figure. We have to understand him before we understand what happened a couple of weeks ago. First of all, have you met him?

[Wasim Nasser]

Not yet.

[Thomas Small]

Oh, that's very foreboding, or rather a little not yet.

[Wasim Nasser]

So.

[Thomas Small]

But your bags are packed, you're on your way.

[Wasim Nasser]

I'm not saying this, but I'm saying that you never know. You never know when I say not yet. But I had the occasion to address him questions that he answered many times.

[Thomas Small]

What's your impression of him based on what contact you have had with him through emails and stuff?

[Wasim Nasser]

Well, I never had direct contact, this should be said, but the impression that I had is that he's, as you said, a Jihadi leader, but he's also a very. A politician and he's really into Tuareg dynamics in the north. But not only because he succeeded actually through the creation of Jinim to unite many Jihadi factions who were active on ethnic basis. And they were united under the banner of Jinim, which made the expansion of Jin impossible. You see? And let me tell you one thing, and I'm sure you'll appreciate it. We're talking about French operations, right, In Northern Mali. Well, actually without French operations and killing of HVTs in the ranks of Akim.

[Thomas Small]

HVTs?

[Wasim Nasser]

High value targets. Okay, High value targets that were active in the ranks of Akim. Those people who caused problems for akim back in 2012 because they didn't listen to Drugdel who told them, let the people alone, don't apply Sharia forcefully in a hard way, don't destroy the mausoleums of Baktu.

[Thomas Small]

Yep. Let me just contextualize this for the listener. So he's just referred to this guy Drukdel, who was a leader of Al Qaeda from Algeria and is remembered as more moderate. He'd always been advocating for his cadres in Mali or across the Sahel. Don't go extreme. But they ignored him. Which part? Which created the conditions for that huge inter Jihadi, inter Tuarig Civil War in 2012, 2013.

[Wasim Nasser]

Exactly, exactly. You are explaining it well. So what I'm gonna tell you is actually those people who didn't listen to him, like Mukhtar bin Mukhtar and others,

[Thomas Small]

were actually were killed by the French.

[Wasim Nasser]

Exactly. So the killing of those prominent hard headed people made the existence of Jinim under the command of a Tuareg and not of an Arab, meaning Ayat Agari, possible.

[Thomas Small]

Yeah, he's a Tuareg. I see. So that's already paving the way for a solution to the political crisis amongst the militant groups in the north.

[Wasim Nasser]

Local entrenchment. Local entrenchment, you see. But. And his number two was Mohammed Kufa, who I interviewed, and he's a Fulani.

[Thomas Small]

So you interviewed Kufa now? She has a reputation.

[Wasim Nasser]

I'm the only one who did.

[Thomas Small]

He's really. He's really brutal, that guy.

[Wasim Nasser]

I interviewed him. Meaning I sent him questions that he answered.

[Thomas Small]

Oh, okay, okay.

[Wasim Nasser]

And it's in CTC West Point if you want to check it a few months back. Anyways, so under the banner of Jenim and the leadership of Iyad Agrali made, made Jinim the sole trans ethnic jihadi group in the region. I'm not talking about Tuareg dynamics, I'm talking about other dynamics. Meaning they were able to recruit among the Fulani population, meaning further reach central and, and west, east, southern Mali and Burkina Faso and Niger, et cetera. And even among the Dogon. When Brukdel was killed with the French, he had the Dugong preacher with him, you see. So the ethnic conflict, the ethnic dynamics and warring, that is like ages old. In a way, it was Jinim who succeeded in transcending all that. Okay, this being said, let's go back to the Tuareg dynamics. Belongs to a prominent family, a Tuareg family, but less influential than before. And so he had issues with another Tuareg figure, very important. Bilal Aksharif. Bilal Ak Sharif. He's the actual head of fla.

[Thomas Small]

He's the head of the Azawid Liberation Front. The fla.

[Wasim Nasser]

Yes, but before that he was the head of the mnla, another name for the Musli Tuareg rebellion. And at the time he was in mla, he cut a deal with the French in order to confront Iyad Al Ghali.

[Thomas Small]

I see. So the French were not helping Iyad Al Ghali intentionally. Cause I was gonna ask you if IAD Al Ghali is to the French a little bit like Ahmed Ashara was to the United States.

[Wasim Nasser]

No.

[Thomas Small]

Behind the scenes, no. They. They didn't have a relationship like that. No, no.

[Wasim Nasser]

Yeah, the galley had the blood of 60 Frenchmen on his hands.

[Thomas Small]

Right. Okay.

[Wasim Nasser]

And French hostages and. Etc, and etc. But indirectly by killing those hbt. Actually they had. In a non direct way. I'll give you an American example of that. Permit me the, the, the comparison, which is in the 11th, okay. When the Americans killed Abu Omar Al Baghdadi, the head of the Islamic State at the time, in 2010 last and his second in command. And Abu Bakr al Baghdadi took command in 2010. The Islamic State in Iraq was like a very small organization with no leadership. And they had so much low consideration for Abu Bakr al Baghdadi that they lowered the bounty on his head from 10 million to 5 million. Right. We are. In 2010. In 2012, Abak Al Baghdadi exported the Islamic State to Syria. And you know the rest of the story. Yeah, right. So killing HVTs is like a lottery.

[Thomas Small]

Yeah, yeah, yeah.

[Wasim Nasser]

You don't know what's going to come next. And this is exactly what happened. This is exactly what happened with the. With the killing of prominent Akim leaders, which permitted the creation of. Of Ginim. And the paradox today. The paradox today is that Yada Gari himself and Muhammad Kufa and Jafar Diko, meaning Jinim, in Burkina Faso, who were HVT targets for the French for like a decade. They are today the people who are preventing the Islamic State from going further south into the Gulf of Guinea.

[Thomas Small]

It's all very confusing. Gosh.

[Wasim Nasser]

So imagine they were killed. So imagine they were killed. What would happen today?

[Thomas Small]

So let's go back to the leader of the FLA and his relations, his dealings with the French. You were talking about that.

[Wasim Nasser]

So many Tuareg fighters, when the French commanders, when they. Or even Arab, when the French intervened in the north, they helped the French in order to counter the jihadis. Okay. And they fought with the jihadis. For example, Bilal Sharif, the head of the FLA that you mentioned, lost family members fighting the people of Iyad. Right. And the man who is. Who tried to reconciliate both is a person called Al Abbas.

[Thomas Small]

Say that again. That's a tough one.

[Wasim Nasser]

Al Abbas ag inter.

[Thomas Small]

I see. Al Abbas Al. Okay, These names, man. Dear listeners, I'm sorry. I know it's hard. We're trying our best here.

[Wasim Nasser]

You can Google them.

[Thomas Small]

Yeah, I mean, they'll be like. How do you spell it? Anyway, so keep going. So this guy was trying to broker, you know, between the two sides, between the FLA and the jnim.

[Wasim Nasser]

Yeah. Yes. He didn't succeed quite well all the time, since occasional fighting still occurred between them. And the last fight between Tuareg rebel fighters and Jinim fighters happened in April 2024 on the Mauritanian borders. And 10 tens were killed on both sides. And the reason for that is what? Rebel fighters at the time were trying to go through Jinim territory to attack the Malian army. And Ginim said, you won't go through, you see? So the relation isn't that like friendly relation? Right. Okay, but the. But and one last thing about this, what brought them together with the help of Al Rabazak Intala.

[Thomas Small]

Yeah.

[Wasim Nasser]

Is the fact that Bamako in 24 denounced the agreement of Algiers, which one of the of the elements of that agreement is that the rebels will put down arms. So they denounced the agreement and they sent Wagner troops and their army back to Kidal and back to the north to fight those rebels who signed an agreement already with Bamako and labeled them as terrorists.

[Thomas Small]

Yeah, that was a massive mistake.

[Wasim Nasser]

Yes. This being done, the man we are talking about went back to his. His friend Bilal Agashir, the head of the LA fla. And. And they talked and they made the talk happen with Iyada Gali and they said, okay, we have to get along. And this is what when, as I told you, in early 2025, they got an agreement and they signed an agreement which led to the outcome that we saw a few days ago, meaning full and recognized and claimed alliance and coordination on the ground between the two groups who were foes a few years back.

[Thomas Small]

So as I said, this Malian junta came to power through the two coups 2020, 2021. Eventually the French were expelled. The whole UN security architect there was neutralized and expelled NGOs, everybody, everybody, everyone was gone. The new junta turned to Russia first to the Wagner group. We've done an episode on that. And then after Wagner cracked up a bit, to the more directly Kremlin linked Africa core. Now, you have argued, I think extremely persuasively, as you've just laid out for us, that Bamako, the junta, the government in Bamako, created the conditions for what's going on now by labeling their opponents terrorists. I mean, these are opponents that actually where the government had actually assigned an accord with basically, you know, doing the silencing the press, the NGOs, jailing their opponents, driving political figures into exile, basically being an unjust junta has created the conditions for what happened now.

[Wasim Nasser]

Yes, exactly. And they are, they are still on the path of creating those conditions, as I said with other Himalayan counterparts, because when the attacks happened, they put many opponents in jail. They even the former Prime Minister Shogelmaiga, who was one of the most like outspoken backers of the cousin of the junta. He's in jail now. A lawyer, Mr. Tal, a very respected lawyer in Mali. He's in jail. Omar Mariko, which I interviewed a few days back and who succeeded. He's in exile. He succeeded to go back into Mali illegally to extract four hostages from Jinim and to take them back home for military, where he is accused of being involved in the Bamako attacks while. And listen well. Omar Mariko, he's a doctor, he's a three times presidential candidate. He was a deputy and he's a Marxist. He is a Marxist, so he can't accuse him of being an Islamist. And today. And he's an assumed Marxist, you know, and today we have. Today we also have a new formation of the opposition under the patronage of Imam Diko. So Imam Diko, he's in exile in Algiers. Very prominent, prominent political Islamist figure in Mali, also pushed to exile. And the spokesperson of this coalition of the opposition was on France 24 yesterday to talk about what happened and what they're proposing now. And guess what he said on I'm a Christian Catholic and I'm speaking on behalf of the Imam Diko, and I'm calling for an entente or for an agreement with Jinim in order to stop the bloodshed. And he accused the junta of being the sole responsible of the actual situation.

[Thomas Small]

So, so different from what would be a lazy framing of what's going on, which is that a kind of radical Islamist group is taking over the country. It's not so simple.

[Wasim Nasser]

No, no, no.

[Thomas Small]

The radical Islamist group JNIM is at the center of a growing political alliance across Mali that are uniting to overthrow or somehow neutralize or fix the problem of this junta. It's a. It's a different story from the lazy story you're likely to hear. And you've been, you know, articulating this story for a long time. I do want to interrogate it a bit at the end. And dear listeners, one thing that it's very important to. To. To remember about JNIM and which I'm sure will come up later in the episode, is that they remain technically an affiliate or affiliated with Al Qaeda. This is one of the political dimensions of this situation, which we'll discuss at the end. But to stick to the history, in July of 2024, so this is like nine months before the 2025 agreement between JN and the FLA that you broke, a story that you broke. But In July of 2024, there was a battle at Tinzawatin. Okay, I'd like you to describe this battle because I think it's important, you know, in the battle, Malian forces and their Wagner group or their Russian mercenary allies suffered a major defeat against, you know, a group of fighters, including JNIM militiamen And it was psychologically and sort of operationally important. Their success, the success of the anti junta fighters in Tinsawatin was very important for them and paved the way for their alliance.

[Wasim Nasser]

It's a very good example because this was a huge loss for Wagner. We are talking about 58 men who were killed and we are talking about more than 80 million soldiers being killed. And why is it important? It's important because of what happened, of course. But another thing is actually the battle took place on three days, right on the. On the outskirts of Sinz. 110, which. Which is the town on the Algerian border and which the Malian army was planning to take. The fight on the outskirts happened mainly with FLA fighters with some Ginim elements who were already in the town because they lived there. We're talking about people who belong to the same tribes, to the same towns, etc. Etc. On the second day, the convoy was purchased by FLA fighters too. But on the third day the convoy was pushed into Jinim territory, like hardcore Jenim territory. And this is where the killing happened. And the massacre. This is where the massacre happened. And why is it important? Because at the time the FLA and Ginim didn't get along well. And on the communication issues, the FLA was saying Jinim doesn't have anything to do with that. Before we saw the images of the massacre of the soldiers, you see, it's our fight, we kick them out, etc. Etc. But then you had issuing videos where you saw them walking amongst the corpses of Wagner fighters and they weren't at all okay with what happened on the communication level, because each one wanted the victory for himself at that time. And when you look at what happened in Kidal, like lately, Kidal is a

[Thomas Small]

very important city in the northeast of Mali.

[Wasim Nasser]

Exactly. And Kidal was the sole success of Wagner and Mali. They took it in November 2023. The fight that happened lately in Kidal, when they took the town. The only communication you had from the town was FLA communication. We had very rare footage of Ginnim fighters who were present there. Meaning that was one of the clauses of the agreement between them. When it's about towns, it's the FLA who administrates town. We don't want black flags in the towns, we don't want to scare the international community. And this is like we saw it play. One of the agreements happened. And to go back to the Wagner issue, that was the first huge defeat of Wagner in Western Africa.

[Thomas Small]

This is July 2024. Yep. At this, in this fight.

[Wasim Nasser]

Yep, exactly. But they already had a fight, had a failure in Mozambique. And so they had this defeat. And this is where Wagner changed names and got the Africa Corps label again to like change the image and to make it more disciplined, less venturous as they were, and maybe less, less chaotic in its approach regarding civilian populations and convoys that remind us of like colonial, colonial Kimballs of the 19th century Venturing into the desert and killing everyone on the side of the. On the side of the road.

[Thomas Small]

So, dear listeners, just to summarize what we've just covered, so In July of 2024 there was this battle which FLA and JNIM participated in separately that was a huge setback for the Russian forces. And yet in the aftermath of this battle, both sides, the JNIM and the fla, the Islamists and the Tuareg separatists, they realized that they had to get their acts together. And this happened in early 2025. And as Wasim just explained, a huge part of the deal was that JNIM would basically have control of the countryside areas which would experience a robust Sharia rule the city. The urban areas would fall more in the FLA's sphere of influence. However, a softer customary Sharia law would also apply there. So they were working together to find an accommodation between the robust Islamist Sharia oriented position of JNIM and a more secular, nationalist and skeptical attitude towards Sharia. They reached an accommodation which paved the way for what happened two weeks ago. That's where we're leaving it now. We'll have a quick break and when we get back waseem, you'll explain what happened two weeks ago.

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[Wasim Nasser]

Yeah. And let me tell you one thing you said that is not very accurate, actually. The appliance of Sharia law would be the same in the countryside and in cities.

[Thomas Small]

Oh, so there's a kind of modified Sharia law for the whole.

[Wasim Nasser]

Yes, it's all in the implementation. You see, for example, before, when they took a thief, Akim, okay, they'll cut his hand, hand and his feet, okay? Today, if they take a thief, Jinim, they forbid him from going to the town where he made the SEF for six months. You see, that's an example. So it's all in the implementation.

[Thomas Small]

I see. Oh, I misunderstood that. Okay, so dear listeners, sorry, I misunderstood. It's actually that for the whole area that is under the control of this new alliance, Sharia law is being imposed in the same way. But it's not so extreme. I think that's the most important point.

[Wasim Nasser]

Yes, yes.

[Thomas Small]

Before we go straight into what happened two weeks ago, Wasim, I want you to explain the outreach that Jnim, that Iyad Al Ghali, its leader, recently undertook with Russia. Because it's clear that behind the scenes, Iyad Al Ghali, consummate politician, on a long trajectory to taking over Mali, let's be honest, he has reached out to Russia and laid the foundations there for Russia to possibly remove its support for the junta. Tell us that story.

[Wasim Nasser]

Well, actually, the first communique regarding the last fights, in the first communique issued by Ginim, the last part of it was addressing Russia. You are right. And he was saying he was asking Russia to drop the junta in order to have future balance, good relations. So this is politics, knowing that a few days prior to that, the two hostages, Russian hostages, Wagner operatives that were like working on geology, that were caught by Ginim in Niger, were released. So those two, like Ukrainians on Russian passports, Ukrainians from the Donbas, as per the details. But they were released, released. And we did not know why they were released. And then the photo and what we saw also is that for example, in Kidal, the Russians retreated. In Tisit, the Russians retreated. Those are like really isolated towns or Military facility, barracks and facilities in Thessalyt without a shot being a bullet being shot on them. So the deal on the front pages were like with the FLA on the images it was with the fla, Right. But they have to cross GENIM territory. And so this is a deal that was done with the fla, but also of course with Gene. But this being said, we don't know how it's going to unfold because Russians are still in some military facilities in the north, at least Tombuktu as we speak, and Agilhok. And we don't know if they're gonna respect the deal of being, saying a stuff. Okay, we're gonna get out of autonomous. But as you, as you are saying, this is a political move and this is unprecedented and it for genie. And this reminds us of, for example, the communications that were issued by HCS in Syria while they were going to make Assad fall. And they addressed the Russians, they addressed the Iraqis, they addressed the Jordanians, etc. Etc. So like the Syrian blueprint is being also used in the Sahelbad. Iyad Al Ghali, who was of course aware that those things could be done because as you said, he's also a former diplomat. Yeah, yeah, he's a former Malian diplomat in Saudi Arabia.

[Thomas Small]

Lots of resonances with HTS, which we will discuss at the end. Now, on the 25th of April, JNIM and the FLA launched coordinated attacks across Mali. This happens in the, in the context of reaching out to Russia behind the scenes as, as we've just described. But even more importantly, for months and months and months, JNIM and its allies have been subjecting the capital, Bamako and other areas essentially to an energy siege. They have been practicing siege warfare for months on the country. As their strength grows, as their political network grows. You know, they really have been very clever. So it's. This doesn't come out of the blue, but on the 25th of having put all their ducks in a row, JNIM and the FLA launch coordinated attacks across Mali. Explain to us what happened.

[Wasim Nasser]

Let's be accurate about this. Yes, the attacks were launched on a coordinated way all over the country, on the scale of the country, which means there was very detailed planning and military issues. You don't coordinate operations on a scale of a country like that. That meaning it's a very well prepared operation. But the only places they fought together, meaning the FLA and Jinim and not along each other, but together, it was Gao and Kidal in the north. All the operations in Central Mali and Bama Kokati, it was solely Ginim fighters because the FLA doesn't have any presence there on one hand. And on the other hand because they are smart. As you said, if they put Arab and Tuareg fighters in Fulani and Bambara areas, it will backfire. Because their aim also, it's not only military, is also gaining hearts and minds, you see. So in the north, the attacks coordinated on the scale of the country, fought together in the north. But the center and Bamako, it's only Jinim fighters. And they put pressure on Kati, the heart of the Malian junta, by killing the Minister of Defense.

[Thomas Small]

So Kati is a. Is a sort of suburb of Bamako, to the northwest of Bamako barracks.

[Wasim Nasser]

It's military barracks.

[Thomas Small]

Yeah, it's a big military suburb.

[Wasim Nasser]

Yeah, military barracks with the families of the military, etc. This is not the first time Zhenim attacks Katy, but it is the first time they succeed breaching the defenses and reaching the house of the Minister of Defense and killing him.

[Thomas Small]

Yes. So the Minister of Defense, Sadio Camaro, was. Was killed in a suicide bomb attack. Am I right about that?

[Wasim Nasser]

Yes, yes. Svbid a car bomb driven by Kamikaze. And so he was killed. And because why? And maybe this, and this is interesting too, because they monitored the area with Google Earth and they made what they call a retext, meaning like about the former attacks, what failed, what made them fail, why did they fail? And they used the teachings in order to succeed this time. And at the same time they attacked Bamakoz airport, which was pretty well defended by Africa Corp. To be honest, because they didn't breach the airport at this time, but at the same time they attacked military facilities in the center, like Sevare, they took it Mopti Gawo in the north. And so this be attacking simultaneously forced the Russians and the Mali military to make choices. Do we keep our forces in the north or we cut a deal, as we were saying, in order to avoid another Tin Zwatan massacre, since we know they won't have air support. And they. Because all our air support assets are actually focused on the capital and on the center. So they had people who say, who are saying the Russians didn't put a fight. That's not true. The Russians tried with what they have, you see, but what they had was enough to sustain and to protect the junta, but not to protect the whole territory, you see? And this is what happened actually. But this being said, what happened in the center, militarily speaking, and in Narang, Babaku is classical, meaning they took facilities, they went out, they took facilities. They didn't try to hold land as they did in the north. Because holding land in the north is also part of the agreement with the fla, who wants to hold the land?

[Thomas Small]

Because the fla, you know, their DNA is to achieve Tuarig separatism, to have their own state. Although I understand part of the deal with the JNIM is the FLA conceding that maybe autonomy, you know, within a federal system or something is better or more likely than pure independence. A little bit like the negotiations that Ahmed Ashara has been in with the SDF with the Kurds of Northeast Syria. I mean, trying to make the nationalist, more secular aspirations of the Tuaregs understand that you can have a lot of what you want within a new federal Mali governed by Iyad Al Ghali. I mean, that's what's going on.

[Wasim Nasser]

Well, governed by Ayat Al Ghari. I wouldn't say that. Yes, because. Governed with the coalition that includes the Eyad. Egh. Yes, because Iyad Al Ghari is the military power on the ground.

[Thomas Small]

Ground.

[Wasim Nasser]

It's not the fla. The FLA are powerful in the north, and still GENIM is more powerful than them in the north, but they are the most powerful military force in the country. I'll get you through a little bit the agreements they had. This way you'll understand the dynamic of what the FLA conceded and what Ginim conceded in order to achieve this agreement. Actually, Ginim addressed the FLA telling them, you will never have a country, independent country, because no country in the region, including Algeria, Mauritania, wherever, no country in the world will accept to create a new country in Africa. So you won't have it. You have. You have to downplay your ambition to autonomy. Okay, this being said, how would you achieve autonomy? To make it simple is by oosting the junta and going back to the agreements of 2015, at least. Okay, how do you use the junta? Well, you have to put pressure on Bamako and the center. Okay, how would Jinnim put pressure on Bamako and on the center if it's not for Sharia law? So you have to accept Sharia law in order to ally with us. So they accepted Sharia law. They downplayed their independence prerequisite. And at the same time, Jinim also downplayed his prerequisite by accepting to ally with people who were mostly secular. You see? So everybody needed each other. And now both FLA and Jenim need the opposition? Why? Because the opposition.

[Thomas Small]

You mean the political opposition in Bamako?

[Wasim Nasser]

Exactly, exactly. Because without the political opposition in Bamako, Ginim would never be able to take Bamako. Like with black flags and 4x4 pickups. They have to have a coalition. Because the population in Bamako, let's be honest, and it's part of the south of the country, are hostile to Japan.

[Thomas Small]

Of course, it's similar dynamics to a country like Nigeria. North and south are very different.

[Wasim Nasser]

Voila. This being said, Jinem is more and more recruiting among the Bambara populations, meaning the Malay majority. So if there is no political agreement now to content the Fulanis who fought and who paid the highest price in the ranks of Ginim for the latest fight and for the fight with the Islamic State, if they are not content with a political solution, they can still wait for a military solution, which will take more time. Right. But the more time passes, the less Jillian has to make concessions. And instead of witnessing something similar to what happened in Syria, we'll witness something similar to what happened in Afghanistan. Right? Is it clear?

[Thomas Small]

It's clear. I mean, it's as clear as it possibly can be. It will seem, especially for a moron like me. I'm trying my best to. I'm trying to keep up with it, but it is difficult. On 28 April, JNIM announced a total siege of Bamako. Starting today, they announced we are blocking Bamako. No one will enter anymore. So, you know, they are putting serious pressure on the junta and on the political establishment down in the south to make some deal, concessions, to do something. I want to talk about Iyad Al Ghali and his ambitions in a second. Before we do that, could we just describe briefly or discuss the ethnic dimension of Mali and how if Jnim cannot keep. Because you know, Mali is complex. We haven't talked about the Fulani that much. The Fulani ethnicity plays a big role in this story. The Fulani have their own historic grievances. Like the Tuareg. They are up to this point largely reconciled with Jnim and they're part of this patchwork. But that could break down at any moment. So what ethnic problems really in that central north part of Mali might I and the other leadership in JNIM be facing thing?

[Wasim Nasser]

Listen, as I said in the beginning of this for discussion, the DNA of Genim is to be trans ethnic. They succeeded from being an Arab Tuareg organization to be an Arab Tuaric Fulani organization, an Arab Tuareg organization. And now they are reaching out for the Bambara, you see, that's what they want, actually. But inside each of community, of course, you have people with them and people who are against them. If we talk about the Fulani, if we go granular about it, the poorest Fulanis, meaning not owners of cattle. Not the owners, but the people who handle the cattle, the shepherds. Exactly, are more positive towards Jinim than those who are the owners, because the owners are mostly with the government.

[Thomas Small]

How surprising.

[Wasim Nasser]

And so to try to make it simple, when Ginim takes a. Goes and takes a Fulani majority area or is active in this area, well, the people who still work with the government are the ones, are the owners. Because you have castes also among the Fulanis. Yeah, you see? And so the poorest ones, when Jenny takes over, it's the. It's their revenge, like they are. Okay. It's. It's a change of social status for them too. You understand?

[Thomas Small]

I do, yeah.

[Wasim Nasser]

It's not only about ethnicity. It's also amongst the ethnic groups, you have also grievances that are being played or used by a group or. Or another. You see, for example, when Gillim took the areas where you had the dozo, the dozo fighters, or the Dodo, as we say, well, the dozo fighters were historically with the government, but now they are. They are seeing that they are being abandoned by the government. So they are cutting. They are not joining Genesis, but some of them, some of their notable, some of their figures, local figures, of course, are cutting deals with Jinim, meaning we won't have the army anymore. But let us alone. Why? Because Jinim took some. Some very important geographic areas, strongholds that belong to those people, you see? So now when we talk about the blockers of Bamako, of course, as I told you, it's not Arabs and Tuaregs making the blocus, because if they do, it will backfire on Genim. So it's locals, meaningful Fulanis and some Bambaras. You talked about the siege. The person announcing the siege each and every time is a Bambara, meaning it's the ruling caste in Mali. Why actually they want to win those people? Because if they don't win those people, they will have never been able to take the center with the Tuaregs, and they will never be able to take Bamako without the Bambara, you see? So those dynamics are being played smartly, actually, by. By Ginim. And this also is helping them in the fight against the Islamic State. Why? Because the Islamic State is being contained to Niger because they are only Being able to recruit among the Fulani, the toll B Fulani of Niger. All other Fulanis are more attracted by Jinim Jafar Dikon, Burkina Faso and Mohammed Kufa that you mentioned earlier in in Mali. You see, so the ethnic dynamics, you are right, are very important. And playing them is crucial for one group or the other.

[Thomas Small]

And this is, you know, Iyad Al Ghali's genius. You can see on the one hand why he went from being a Tuareg nationalist to an Islamist, because Islamism provides a much more powerful narrative, political narrative to the underclass that historically in Mali suffered in this caste system. Islamic can present itself as, you know, universal brotherhood, the dignity of every individual, the just distribution of resources. So Islamism as a narrative has these resources, but in the hands of a genius, really a political genius like Iyad Al Ghali, he can prevent it from tipping into ISIS style extremism. He can kind of shepherd it in this way. Which means, and we've got to bring this conversation to a close because you have to go. Then let's talk about Iyad Al Ghali. In January, Ayman, my co host, our friend, he created a bit of a stir because he said, look, it is inevitable that Mali, like Syria, will fall to an Islamist group in some sense. And that Islamist group, he said, inevitably will be led by Iyad Al Ghali, who will inevitably become the Ahmad Ashar of the of Mali. And we should be okay with that because we're in a new era where the old war on terror paradigm no longer applies and we have to distinguish between Islamists and Islamists and simply concede that the Islamist militant energy is politically powerful and will create state structures in places where a vacuum of power has opened up through incompetence, injustice, military dictatorship, Western malfeasance, etc. Etc. You also argued that last year unconflicted. So this is, broadly speaking, your view, but as I say, it caused a stir. People still do not like the idea of Islamist groups conquering territory and being recognized as legitimate rulers of countries. They just don't like the idea. And I can see why. Obviously, you know, I think Ahmed Ashara is doing a great job so far. I hope it works out for him. It seems Yad Al Ghali's not like some crazy Abu Bakr Baghdadi. He seems like a genuine Muslim Malian political figure who is using the tools at his disposal to create what he hopes to be more just rule for Mali. Fine. But then we see in the, you know, Iran war that's happening. This kind of unwillingness to accept ultimately that an Islamic government, in this case the Islamic Republic of Iran, can provide justice. So how are we going to see work our way through this contradiction in this new post war on terror era, you know, especially in Mali?

[Wasim Nasser]

Well, I think that of course those are the ideas that I'm developing too, as you said. But the path is still long in Mali it's happening, but the path is still long. And people have to acknowledge that when you have a counterpart that is willing to negotiate, you have to negotiate. Because we now know 20 years after, more than 20 years after that killing them all encounter terrorism, full blown counterterrorism, militarily speaking, doesn't work alone. If you go into counterinsurgency, well, you have to make concessions on both sides, you know, and just to give you a very clear example where the comparison with Syria stops actually, because the Nusra Front in Syria, when they broke with Al Qaeda, Al Qaeda had a representative in Syria and Zawahiri was alive. And so they, they had, they handled the issue without going into detail details of breaking with Al Qaeda in a soft smooth way. But today, if Iyad Lagari wants to break, who does he send the letter to? Al Qaeda didn't recognize even the Zawaris that didn't name a man to replace him. They have no like official emissary in the area. So the thing is not to make it too long. Things have been taken the other way around in the Sahel. Like breaking with Al Qaeda shouldn't be a prerequisite. It the break with Al Qaeda will come through governance because when they ally with people with the people like Imam Diko, with people like the heads, the Bilal AGI Sharif of the FLA and they govern together while they're bound to an organization breaks by itself because they are not on the Jihadi path that was driven or drawn by this group. So people have to have an open mind to think out of the box and not to squeeze them too much into this prerequisite because it could be very costly for them.

[Thomas Small]

The prerequisite that Jnim break with their Al Qaeda affiliation.

[Wasim Nasser]

Yes, because as the Nusra Front, JNIM never plotted anything in the west, for example, following the AKU playbook, you see. But today the problem they could have is for example, when I interviewed for the first time Ahmad Sharifier, he told me when I broke with the Islamic State, I had to go into the ranks of Al Qaeda because already I lost 70% of my men. I would have Lost everybody. If I broke like as a whole with the jihadi group, it had to be done smoothly. And today the same thing with Jinem. If today they break in a chaotic way and not chariatically explained or justified way through governance or something else. Well, actually score of their troops could leave for the other actor in the region. Growing actor, meaning the Islamic State, you see. So each case is very particular. And just one thing to add. Being an Islamist helped also Yada Gali go beyond internal Tuareg cleavages, you see. So it helped him on local level then on the level of Mali, as I said. So it is something which is at play. And if you recognize them as someone that we could talk to, maybe things could be achieved, you know, but still the path is long. Remember hcs, it took eight years. We don't have that much time in the Sahel, so we have to try to make it go faster and see which outcome is possible or not.

[Thomas Small]

And do you think there is an appetite in Paris, in Washington, in other places, to speak with Jnim, to speak with Iyad Al Ghali and to treat him like a. A negotiating partner, a political player that they can do business with?

[Wasim Nasser]

Well, you see, this is why I told you also that at some points the comparison with the S stops. You know, Ahmed Shara doesn't have Western blood on his hands except the blood of Western jihadis of the Islamic State, right? Iyada Gali has the blood of Westerners on his hands and this the long history of hostages, you see. So he could be part of the equation as he is the military force on the ground. And he, he is the one that could change the equilibrium in Mali, of course. But imagining that he will be recognized and accepted as Ahmad Al Shara, I think. I think it is far fetched. And this is why, as I was telling you, he needs others, meaning the Malian opposition.

[Thomas Small]

Right?

[Wasim Nasser]

You see?

[Thomas Small]

I see.

[Wasim Nasser]

This is the thing, you see, so you can make a comparison. And of course Gillim is looking at what HCS did. And as I told you so many times on this show, when I first went to Idlib in 2023, I went there April and I met Shara and Shibani and all the people in charge today because I sensed that we have a blueprint for conflict resolution and jihadi wars that is different from other places. And actually everybody is looking at it. The Syrians made it possible, you know. But it is not like a copy on each scene.

[Thomas Small]

No, of course, because each place is different.

[Wasim Nasser]

Voila. In Afghanistan, what Was did with the Americans. What the Americans will leave and the Taliban are still doing Taliban things, but they are containing the Islamic State. They are not involved in international terror in Syria. It's another something. Something very different where Shara had to make huge concessions in order to stabilize the situation. And of course, in Mali, it will be different. Knowing that Jinny was also active in other countries. What would happen to those affiliates? Would they accept the deal that is cut by Erda Ghali or not? If they do, what would they gain or not? And what would the Islamic State do in this sense?

[Thomas Small]

Oh, it's complicated.

[Wasim Nasser]

You know, the Islamic State in the issue. One last thing. The Islamic State in the. Its issue last week issue, its editorial was to attack the alliance between Jinim and the fla, Comparing them to Sharah. They sense the danger where it is. And this should be something that the international community should be aware of.

[Thomas Small]

I wonder if the blood on Iyad al Ghali's hands, as you put it, really is a huge stumbling block. I mean, the history of the way in which the British and the French withdrew from their colonies, involved, frequently involved, ultimately making deals with people who had Western blood on their hands, Western soldiers, Western civilians. I don't think it's a total stumbling block, but we shall see.

[Wasim Nasser]

No, no, no, no. I'm not saying it disqualifies him. I'm saying imagining him being welcomed in Paris and Washington as shah is something else.

[Thomas Small]

I see. I see. Well, Waseem. No, I've got to let you go. Thanks for coming on the show. We love you.

[Wasim Nasser]

Thank you.

[Thomas Small]

I love your face. I love your humor. I love your jolliness and your knowledge. Gosh, it's always great to have you on the show. Our listeners love you, too. Everyone loves you, Waseem. Take care, man. Thanks for coming on.

[Wasim Nasser]

Thank you, Thomas. Cheers.

[Thomas Small]

Conflicted is a message heard. Production. Our executive producers are Jake Warren and Max Warren. This episode was produced and edited by Thomas Smith Small.