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- [00:01]
A
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B
dear listeners, this is Thomas Small here and I'm with Eamon Dean. Amen. You're dialing in from a Middle east at war. How are you doing, man? I mean, you're there in the thick of it. Dubai, the place that was meant to be the oasis of peace and prosperity. It is under attack. And there you are. How's it going?
- [00:48]
C
Oh man, I mean, I'm just trying to sleep. Just, could someone please give me a break? I mean I live right on the beach in Dubai and so what does that mean for me? It means that I will be hearing the fighter jets buzzing around all the time. They try to intercept these hundreds, like literally so far, 550 plus drones coming from Iran fired by the IRGC at us. And so they have to intercept them over the water. And so, you know, so you can hear them, you know, buzzing around, going around along the beach, back and forth, back and forth. Look, I mean, and so the jet engines on all night, it's not a
- [01:28]
B
recipe for a good night's sleep.
- [01:30]
C
And if the jets sound wasn't enough, of course we have the occasional shaking of the house, the house shakes between now and then and we hear the boom, you know, and we know basically that, oh my God, big explosions. I mean I barely went to bed around seven this morning and then I woke up at nine this morning, just two hours with two loud explosions and the house shaking and the windows thudding. And I go outside and just above our heads, like just maybe 2km above us, plumes of smoke of these missiles being intercepted in the air and they could have fallen by any estimation, just maybe 5, 600 meters from where we live.
- [02:13]
B
Well, Eamon, that's terrifying. We are so grateful to you for giving us your time. We're recording this. Dear listeners, in the UK, where I am, is literally 1.38pm on Monday 2nd March. This will drop tomorrow morning for you. So we are going to try to make this as topical as we can. Who knows what's going to happen in the next 12 hours or so, Eamonn, but in this episode, you're going to give us a brief summary of what's gone on so far. Iran's strikes against targets in the GCC and elsewhere, including Israel. We're going to talk about the United States strategy. We're going to talk about Donald Trump and what's in his head. And we are going to talk about the assassination of Ayatollah Khamenei. Rip, the supreme leader of Iran is dead.
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C
Does rip, you know, stands for rest in pieces.
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B
Oh, dear.
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C
Because he was in pieces.
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B
Do you have no respect for the dead, Aemon? Honestly, even your enemy, you know, he's owed a certain honor and death. There's so much to talk about. Let's get right into it. So, Eamon. Yeah. Gosh, Khamenei is dead. He was the supreme leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran since 1989. So that's what?
- [03:32]
C
38 years.
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B
38 years. Incredible.
- [03:35]
C
Absolutely. And what a venomous, poisonous 38 years that were for not only his own people, but for the rest of the region. It's the passing of an era.
- [03:47]
B
Iran has confirmed his death in a really incredible assassination strike carried out by Israel. We will talk about that downstream. We're going to give an obituary of sorts of Khamenei, which really means, dear listener, in a way, an obituary of the Islamic Revolution. What we are seeing now, it seems to me, at least in this war, is the death of the Islamic Revolution that was launched in 1978 and which succeeded in 1979 of taking over Iran, and which has played such a important, its critics would say, destabilizing role in history ever since. But it's a big moment that we're living through. It is the end of the Islamic Revolution. I'd like to talk about that. But first, Eamon, you know, you've given us a sense, obviously there have been strikes against the gcc. Israel has suffered Iranian strikes. Iran has suffered tremendous strikes from the US and, and Israel. Now, the GCC is very much mobilizing for war itself. There's debates about are the UK involved, to what extent are they involved? What is France going to do? So first, what has happened now? It's two and a half days into this war. What's already happened?
- [05:00]
C
The first thing we started to notice is that they attacked seven countries immediately. I'm talking about the IRGC here. They attacked Israel, Jordan, and of course, five countries of the gcc, which is Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and of course, in the second day after that, Oman, which was very surprising given that how Oman was fighting to prevent this war and to advocate for peace with Iran. And it wasn't a one off. In total, three times they were attacked. So that's why we were absolutely surprised by the ferocity of their retaliation. And it wasn't like, I mean, a simple retaliation. So so far I can tell you that in the past 60 hours since the war started or less, we here in the United Arab Emirates received roughly about 180 ballistic missiles and 650 drones. And this is in the matter of two and a half days. It's like as unprecedented. Of course, the vast majority, like 96% of them were intercepted thanks to the professionalism and bravery of the air defense here. My home country, Bahrain was not as lucky. It was an interception rate of 91% and there were many fatalities there as well as many ground impacts. Qatar got hit in its natural gas production facilities when the war started. The war started around for me in Dubai around 10 o' clock in the
- [06:38]
B
morning on Saturday, 28th of February.
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C
Exactly. So I was just texting and preparing myself and my work colleagues at Cruikshank and Dean, like, you know, basically our intelligence company. And so basically we were talking about like, you know, what do we put out as an update for the clients. I joked with my colleagues and I said, how about we tell them now that the war started? And they were joking with me and they were saying, ah ha ha, Ayman. I said, no, no, no, seriously guys, the war started. And they said, what do you mean the war started? I said, seriously, you know, I'm just receiving so many text messages from friends who have family in Tehran telling me that massive explosions happening there, you know, and definitely it is the war starting. Within five minutes we started seeing it like, you know, basically on the screens. And so we started alerting the clients. But four hours later, at 2pm Dubai time, I've heard the very distinct childhood memory and of course my jihad day's memory thuds of ballistic missiles. And until then, my absolute advice to clients is that they won't dare attack Dubai. Maybe Abu Dhabi, but not Dubai. That's what I used to say. I went outside and I saw the plumes of interceptions. So I ran inside and we started talking. And the first thing I said for them to attack Dubai like this, did they attack anywhere else? Yes, they attacked Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Abu Dhabi and reports of missiles over Riyadh. The first word that came out of my mouth to my colleagues was, oh my God, they must have eliminated a very big fish. Someone Big died, maybe the President, maybe Shamkhani, you know, maybe others, but someone big died. And as a result, they are retaliating in this lashing out manner. And of course, when in the seventh hour, eighth hour, tenth hour, and I'm hearing about the threats and of course by the 10th hour, the second wave of attacks on Dubai started. And I was like, what the actual, I mean, what's happening here? It's like the thudding, the explosions, the sound of the missiles going up to intercept. We hear explosions in the Palm Jumeirah and the Fairmont Hotel. And then Burj Al Arab that day, oh my God, my favorite hotel in the world basically was hit. And then just very near where I live basically is a beautiful, a shopping district called CityWalk, which was hit. And I can see the plumes of smoke like in the, basically from where I live because it's only like in a seven minutes drive.
- [09:11]
B
You know, it's interesting, I was wondering, you know, in the run up to this war, the Gulf states made a big show of being opposed to intervention. They were trying diplomatically to cover themselves. But you know, people who are in the know know for sure that behind the scenes many important Gulf countries are in constant conversation with the United States and its allies, including Israel. And so in a way, by Aragchi calling up the foreign ministers of the gcc, it's kind of like pulling off the mask and saying, okay, no more bullshit. We know what the world is really like. We know on whose side you stand. So you're implicated, we're going for you.
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C
If you remember that episode where you and I just roughly about maybe 10 days before the conflict took place, you and I, we talked about the narrative that is being manufactured around the IRGC and how removal of the IRGC would actually improve the behavior of the regime. But that was a narrative for a certain faction within the War department in
- [10:18]
B
the U.S. so this was a narrative targeting a faction within the War Department of the US that was hesitating about going to war. So they needed, needed encouragement. Because, you know, I was going to ask you about this. In fact, I've been receiving text messages, including one from my dear brother in America saying Thomas Amen told us that the strategy was going to be to get rid of the IRGC because they're a terrorist organization, but leave the state intact. No decapitation against the Supreme Leader, no mass execution or assassinations of the leadership. It was simply going to be a strategy aimed at removing the IRGC from the field and attacking IRGC assets like the proxies. That's it. Well, within like literally 45 seconds of this war, that was proved to be untrue. What changed?
- [11:10]
C
I think what changes? The fact that the, the other counter narrative within the administration, one which is very pretty much supported by the Israelis, which is that the Islamic Republic's regime is like a beehive. And we talked about it before, you remember, we said that there will be an argument for decapitation. So we did argue for both. We argued like in the irgc, and we argued decapitation and the irgc. And so we talked about it in that prior episode. We said that the Islamic Republic system is like a beehive and Khamenei is the queen bee. And I said the B stands for bitch. You know, so he is. So he is queen bitch or queen bee.
- [11:54]
B
He was. We have talk in the past tense now.
- [11:58]
C
Yeah. You know, can you believe it? It's 38 years habit. Like an. I mean, man. Old habits die hard. So in, in. In this situation, they decided that if they remove the queen bee out of the equation, there would be chaos in the beehive, and that's what they wanted to achieve. So the, the absolute strategy then was no, you have to combine both. And there is no getting around the fact that even if you remove the irgc, it will not lead to the improvement of the regime behavior. Because the Ayatollah can't just decree another irgc, can recreate the irgc, because he is the queen bee. He can just basically produce more fanatics. And so as a result, the decision was made that he must go. That very morning of Saturday, like 8 o', clock, I started debating with my colleagues at Cruikshankandeen that this company we have. And so we started debating, is war imminent or not? Are we going to see Trump allowing the diplomacy track to take place? And the answer from my colleagues was maybe. And I was saying no, I don't think diplomacy is going to prevail. I have a feeling it will be tonight or tomorrow night. That's what I said. I never thought for the life of me that they will attack on daytime. And this is exactly what was leading to the demise of Khamenei and all that who were with him at that moment because he thought that no one will attack during the daytime.
- [13:34]
B
That's right. So let's just go straight into the assassination itself. As you say, the Iranians, like most people, assumed that if the war was launched or when it was launched, it would be launched at night. It wasn't it was launched in the daytime, in the morning. And from what I understand, and I'm sure you have a lot more information on it and I'd love to hear it. Khamenei and a senior coterie of very, very important leaders in the Islamic Republic were meeting together that morning in Khamenei's compound, effectively in his house. The CIA, the American intelligence organization had managed to infiltrate that compound, that, that location and were able to communicate to the Mossad and verify that that morning at that time in that place, the Supreme Leader and all these senior leaders would be present. And so Israel said, let's go. And it happened. So in a way, probably, maybe, you know, only shortly before the Supreme Leader's whereabouts were confirmed by US intelligence, did anyone know that the war was going to start then and there. Have I understood that correctly? And then the Israelis sent like, I've, I've seen on the Internet like 30 bunker busting bombs and attacked the compound with them to make sure that Khamenei was dead. So what actually happened, we all know
- [14:53]
C
like basically how these things happen. Like, I mean they confirmed that Khamenei is going to be there at his house, at his house at the time he will be meeting the head of the National Defense Council, literally the head of all the armed forces, basically, which is Ali Shemkhani. He will be meeting the head of the IRGC Pakpour, he will be meeting the head of the army itself, Amir Khatami. So basically he will be meeting many of these grandees and of course with him his potential successor, his son, Mushtaba Khamenei. And with him was also Lacan, I mean his daughter and his son in law and his wife. So they give the go ahead because this is a target of opportunity. It's very reminiscent of the fact that in 2003 the war was supposed to start on the 21st of March. This is the Iraq war against Saddam Hussein. But they brought it forward by 48 hours. So they attacked on the 19th of March because a target of opportunity presented itself when they had intelligence that Saddam Hussein was going to be in a farm south of Baghdad. And so they attacked with a hundred Tomahawk missiles just to make sure they get him. And of course he wasn't there. It was a faulty intel. But in this case since 2003, the technology has evolved considerably. You know, it's like 10 light years ahead now and so they can tell if someone is truly there or not. And so they went after him, after Khamenei. And as A result, of course, he died. Now, they delayed the announcement almost, you know, roughly maybe 18 hours. But during these 18 hours, it was a hell to pay for, you know, almost a thousand ballistic missiles and a thousand drones were launched, you know, on Israel, on Jordan, and on the five GCC countries, minus Oman. And in the first 24 hours. And then it started to escalate here. And this is when you see, like in that. That when I started hearing the explosions all across Dubai and everything, which basically was more sound than actual damage, to be honest. But nonetheless, it created that sense of fear at the beginning. You know, if it wasn't for the professionalism of the authorities here, like, you know, basically it would have been panic. But thank God, no panic. But I said to my colleagues, and because some of us live near each other in the city, you. And we met in a cafe and we said, like, you know, man, what 12 hours we had, they wouldn't have done that unless if a big fish has been fried. And of course, like, I mean, during the first day when we were talking to our sources, and this is in the seventh hour of the war, I received a valuable information from a friend of mine who work in the Foreign Minister's office of one of the foreign ministers here in the gcc. And he said, you won't believe what that effing, Effing. Abbas Arakchi, the Foreign Minister of the Islamic Republic, said he was threatening our foreign minister. He was saying this. He was saying that unless the war ends within 24 hours, we will target the Straits of Hormuz and we will bring the traffic there to a standstill. And if we can't, you know, stop the war within 24 hours, then we will target energy production facilities in the region.
- [18:36]
B
And they sure as hell have made good on that threat.
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C
Absolutely. They attacked Aramco today. It's a facility that is very close
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B
to my heart, the Rastanora facility. It's a massive oil refining and oil processing facility. Massive, massive, massive. There on the Gulf Coast.
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C
Seven years. My dad worked there. Seven years between 1975 and 1982. You know, he. He died in 1983. So, you know, so for me, like, basically that was almost the weekend home. That's like, basically where we used to go for fun and, you know, his workplace. So that place was hit today, you know, on the 2nd of March, and that caused a shutdown of the refinery.
- [19:17]
B
Well, we now know what has happened because the Iranians have told us, I think, you know, Lari Jani, one of the last men standing There has made it clear that since Khamenei's assassination the IRGC have effectively gone off piste. They are doing what they want to do. They are not being led anymore by central government at all. This became particularly clear when Oman was attacked yesterday. I think people thought, wow, even Oman, it was the one GCC state that hadn't been attacked on day one. And you know, it had been a mediator in the talks. It has very close relations with Iran. Some people accused it of at the last minute trying to influence things by, by putting its ore in. And you know, it must have felt weird to that even Oman is being attacked and people thought the IRGC is doing its own thing. That's why a city like Dubai is being attacked. And I think Lara, Johnny has, has confirmed this.
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C
In fact, Abbas Alokshi himself confirmed it.
- [20:13]
B
Well, you were talking about how, you know, in the War Department in the US there was this debate about which strategy do we adopt. Clearly they adopted the Israelis preferred strategy of regime decapitation. And you know, if the CIA was the one who actually had infiltrated the compound and was able to give the go ahead, clearly the Israelis and the Americans have been working together on that strategy for a while. I mean, it's hard for me to see through the smoke here whether the IRGC strategy was always just propaganda, whether, you know, whether Israel's preferred strategy was always going to dominate because the Trump administration is basically doing what Israel wants. You know, I've also also heard that now you see on the Internet that actually mbs, the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia had called the White House in the hours before the war launched urging a war. I wonder if GCC leaders would have preferred the IRGC only strategy or whether they're actually quite happy, you know, despite all of the downstream effects for themselves in the long term, they're happy for regime decapitation. Help me understand the strategic calculus or is it just random? Is it just total chaos now? Is there no strategic calculus?
- [21:26]
C
Look, there were really a big debate between Israelis and Israelis, between the War Department and the CIA, between Rubio Hegseth, you know, Stephen Miller, who's the deputy chief of White House, who was very against the war and of course JD Vance who is very cautious. You see like in the, you know, there were factions everywhere there are factions and even among Netanyahu's cabinet there were people who were fearing, look, you know, let's go for the IRGC thing, you know, going after the Ayatollah and decapitation, this could lead to chaos in the region, which it did, to be honest, you know, we are living in chaos right now. But the question is, many of the proponent of this, they're saying, no, no, no, no. It will be managed short term chaos. Let us opt for the short term pain for the long term gain. And the answer from some people was, what if Hezbollah and the Houthis intervene? Good, let them intervene. So there was the minimalist and the maximalist, you know, factions there. You know, some people said, look, if we're gonna do it, let's do it all.
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B
And were there minimalist and maximalists in the Gulf as well?
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C
Of course. I mean, Qatar and Oman, one didn't want it at all, didn't want anything to happen.
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B
Okay, they're the minimalists. What about the maximalists?
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C
Well, I think, in my opinion, the, the UAE and Saudi Arabia, where, you know, deep down, knowing that, look, if you really want to do it, you either do it properly, you know, permanently, or don't do it at all. Don't leave us with any remnants of the regime that will take revenge on us later. So one way or another, a chemotherapy has to apply to that cancer tumor in the region. And therefore, let's go through the short term pain for the long term gain. My fear as amandine, is the fact that this is a war that I waited for for years because I knew it was going to come. And somehow now this has happened. You know, I'm looking at it and thinking, let us hope that, you know, that what is done is done now. So let us hope that we can manage the chaos and bring it to a conclusion. So Hezbollah, the Houthis, along with the IRGC and along with the structure of the Islamic Republic, are brought down permanently and without leading to significant chaos that would last months rather than weeks. I'm optimistic. I think maybe it will last for weeks. But if I'm really, really, really honest between the optimistic me and the honest me, this could go on for a few months. Not in the same intensity. Not in the same intensity, but we will see, you know, shifts. Now we are truly not in the fog of war. It's worse than that. This is a fog of war with the smoke of fires and the ashes of volcanoes all mixing together and we can barely see through it.
- [24:53]
B
Well, Aemond, at the end of this episode, we're gonna game plan the future a bit. We're gonna go now for a quick ad break. When we get back, we'll talk about the Ayatollah Khomeini RIP and his life. A little obituary if you like, for the Supreme Leader of Iran, who is, you know, in heaven. He's enjoying, I guess, amen. His 72 virgins, do you think, is that probably where he is right now?
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C
Might be. But there is a problem here, basically. I mean, his wife just now, just an hour ago succumbed to her wounds. So I think he only had, you know, 48 hours to enjoy the virgins, like, basically now his wife, like, basically joined him up there, you know, that's it, like. And basically his joy is over.
- [25:36]
B
Oh dear. Well, a heaven has turned to hell as the, as the wife barged into the room. Anyway, we'll have a quick ad break and when we get back, we're going to talk about Khamenei and his life and times. We'll be right back. We're back. Eamon. Let's talk about Ali Khamenei. Ali Hosseini Khamenei was born in 1939 in Mashhad, Iran. So he died aged 87. He was born into a clerical family and received a traditional Shiite religious education. His family was very pious. And Ali Khamenei was from a very early age shaped by not just Shi', ism, but a kind of radical revolutionary Shiism, such as it was back then. During his formative years, he was influenced by clerical figures close to his family who opposed Iran's constitutionalist experiment. And I think this is important because as dear listeners will remember, in 1906 and 1907, Iran experienced what is called the Constitutional Revolution, this broad based uprising across the country that brought together clerics, merchants and intellectuals to oppose the Qajar monarchy and its traditional absolutism. So it was a sort of liberalizing effort. And eventually the Qajar Shah was compelled to accept a new constitution or a constitution for the first time, which established the Majlis, a kind of elected parliament and limited the power of the monarch. So it was sort of a constitutional monarchy governed by the rule of law. This was a big development. Eventually the Qajar Shah himself, to some extent in alliance with Russia, at some points, with Britain, at other points, overturned the Constitutional revolution. And it never really got off the ground, although the Majlis existed. And even during the Pahlavi era, the memory of the Constitutional Revolution was very important. And the claims of the Medjlis to represent the people of Iran was always there. Now, Khamenei was part of a Shiite tendency that always rejected the Constitutional Revolution as being anti religious, anti Sharia. So from a young age he was dedicated to a more Sharia, compliant way of running Iran as he understood it and became politically active in opposition to the Pahlavi monarchy. He was aligned with revolutionary Islamist currents including, and this is important, and I always like to remind people of this, including a huge affection for Sayyid Qutb. You know, Ayman, it's safe to say that Sayed Qutb, the great Muslim Brotherhood ideologue, the great Sunni Muslim Brotherhood ideologue influenced Ali Khamenei hugely.
- [28:50]
C
Exactly. During the present years of Khamenei when he was in the presence of the Shah due to his subversive activities against the Shahs in Urul, he actually spent his years in prison translating, in the 1960s and 70s, translating three books of Sayyid Qutb from Arabic into Farsi.
- [29:11]
B
This encounter with Sayyid Qutb had a lasting impression on him. He had already translated some volumes of Sayyid Qutb when he was arrested. I think perhaps that's one of the reasons why he was arrested. Clearly the Pahlavi state realized that they were dealing with a true subversive here, someone who was, you know, basically making a Shia version of Sayyid Qutb's radical Islamist Takfiri ideology. When he was in prison, he translated those three books and then he arranged for his brother to translate a 4 4th book. So the infusion into the Islamic Revolution of Iran, the infusion of Kutbist ideas is directly attributable to Ali Khamenei. You know, and I think I just want people to understand this because when you see pictures of him, especially in recent years, he looks old and always slightly gentle and like, you know, grandfatherly. And sometimes you think, is this really the kind of radical Islamist ideologue who has been the brains behind Iran's foreign policy for 40 years almost and all of its wars and destabilizing proxy networks and things. And the answer is yes.
- [30:24]
C
One of the things I always tell people, you know, especially negotiators when you go and negotiate and I've been involved in negotiations before, especially hostage releases and stuff like that, like, you know, with the nasties of people. But I always tell people, especially from left leaning or academic leaning institutions in the west do not separate the individual from the institution and the structure they represent. Because, and to give you an example, I spent times with Zarqawi. In fact, I spent many weeks with Zarqawi, the Butcher of Iraq.
- [31:06]
B
The most bloodthirsty new listeners may not know. So Abu Musab al Zarqawi was the leader of Al Qaeda in Iraq after the American invasion, basically. And, and, you know, he. He moved the dial, really, of Islamist atrocities way further towards the unspeakable. He is a, you know, he's a famous psychopath, frankly. At least that's what it seems like to people like me. And you spent weeks with him.
- [31:31]
C
Him, exactly. I spent weeks with him. And my God, basically, what a lovely person he was. And this, you know, and the same thing with Osama bin Laden. What a lovely person he was. And Ayman al Zawahiri, he loved to crack jokes and, you know, wasn't, you know, what was, you know, a boring company, but nonetheless, like, you know, basically, you know, someone you wouldn't think would hurt a fly, you know, or kill a chicken.
- [31:51]
B
No, Eamon, before I let you go, I've got to say, now I'm scared because you like to crack jokes. You are a very pleasant company. You seem like you could never hurt a fly, but one day it's all going to come out and I'm going to realize that you've been the mastermind behind everything the whole time. Well, you're digging your own grave here. You've just described yourself. Okay, so now what's wrong with people like that, Eamon?
- [32:20]
C
Well, the problem with people like that is the fact that, that untrained interlocutors, untrained negotiators, they meet these people from Hamas, from Hezbollah, from the Iranian Islamic regime, you know, and from the Houthis, and they are at awe at how these people are not monsters. I meet them, I have, you know, rice and chicken with them. You know, basically I have coffee with them. They are just people who want to live according to the way they like. You know, they have their way of thinking. And why are we persecuting them for that? This is the problem is the fact that, you know, listen to me, idiot. You naive, adorable idiot. You know, you are not supposed to separate the individual you see in front of you from the structure and the institution that he or she represents. And therefore, you know, when we look at Khamenei, you know, what a, you know, gentle face he got. The same with bin Laden. Gentle face. But we are not supposed to look at the individuals. We are supposed to look at the institution that they represent because it represents what is inside their mind, not what the facade of that face hides.
- [33:32]
B
And especially in the case of Ali Khamenei, because he played a huge role in constructing the institutional and ideological framework of the Islamic revolution and the Islamic Republic of Iran. A huge role. Even before 1970, 9 his writings, the sermons that he published, the translations of Sayyid Qutb and others that he, that he did, they all show that he was obsessed with the future of Shi'. Ism. He had a messianic view, always did, about the future of Shi'. Ism. He was obsessed with the evilness of Western modernity, especially the United States, who for him was truly the Great Satan and Israel was the Little Satan because it was attached to, to the United States. An Israel focused antipathy actually came a bit later. First it was the United States and Western modernity and that justice would only ever, ever be served and the Mahdi would only return if a genuinely Islamic political order was established. He was a real believer. After the 1979 Islamic Revolution, he very soon became a significant figure amongst Khomeini's inner circle. And during the Iran Iraq War, he along with his, in fact, I think at that time, friend, certainly colleague Rafsanjani, they rose higher and higher and higher in the ranks, became closer to Khomeini and were together, each man, Rafsanjani and Khamenei, they were together constructing the new state that was really emerging as that war unfolded over those eight years. And then when Khomeini, the Ayatollah Khomeini, the first supreme leader died in 1989, it was, you know, it was interesting. Khamenei and Rafsanjani were at that point the two bigwigs really of the revolution. And from what I understand, and maybe Eamon, you know better, but from what I understand, there was this agreement between them that Khamenei would become the Supreme Leader and Rav Sanjani would become the president. But that would also be the time when the constitution shifted towards elevating the role of the presidency over the Supreme Leader role. And Rafsanjani went into this arrangement again, from what I understand, thinking that he and Khamenei were on the same page about this. But within two or three years it became clear that Khamenei had lied to his erstwhile friend and had always had absolute rule in his own mind. And in fact, you know, stabbed Rafsanjani in the back and increased the power of the Supreme Leader so that by the mid-90s, say the whole apparatus of the state, all of it, despite many, many layers of confusing bureaucracy and we've talked about it unconflicted, but all of the state was focused on his will alone.
- [36:27]
C
Remember the office of the Supreme Leader eventually, by around 1999, to counter the rise of Mohammed Khatami the reformist president at the time, encompassed all the three powers. So the office of the Ayatollah, the Supreme Leader, encompassed the executive, judicial and legislative authorities. It's unbelievable. And added to it also a strong, loyal military command of the irgc, which
- [37:02]
B
was, as we've said many times, slowly, slowly taking over the Iranian economy. Ali Khamenei, he had a reputation for austerity. He had a simple life, we are told. I think, Eamon, am I right? He and his family also got fabulously rich over the last 40 years. Maybe that's not true, in my opinion.
- [37:24]
C
Basically, no. He didn't have a taste for luxury. Let's put it this way, truth be told, okay? However his kids did.
- [37:32]
B
It's always the kids. So the apple fell far from the tree as far as that goes. Indeed. Well, one thing that is true about Ali Khamenei, RIP is that he was ideologically intransigent. He really believed in the revolution. He really believed that at any moment the Mahdi would return. He believed this stuff. Only if you keep that in mind can you understand the policy positions that Iran routinely adopted during Khamenei's long period of supreme leadership in that country. He never bent. He never bent. He never once considered softening the ideological position of the regime, reforming the regime properly reaching reasonable, pragmatic accommodations with neighboring states, with the United States, etc. Never, ever, ever. He kept his eye on the prize the whole time. And it was probably fixated on that prize. Amen. The very moment that Israeli bunker busters assassinated him three days ago.
- [38:40]
C
Indeed. He always believed himself to be the, you know, the carrier of the banner, you know, the holder of the banner for the Mahdi. You know, at the end of the day, that's a problem, like, you know, with eschatology, Thomas, those people who always believe in a savior about to come. And in this case, nobody was there to save him. Nobody was there to save him, and especially from himself or to save the Iranian nation from his delusions.
- [39:12]
B
Well, what leadership is left in Iran have appointed a new interim supreme leader, the Ayatollah Alireza Arafi, who was born in 1959. So he's 66 years old. He was also born into a clerical family, is a real cleric. He's basically a legalist, a theologian even. In 2015, he was appointed, appointed head of all of Iran's seminaries. That was the first major step on his way to promotion into the Supreme Council and the Governing Council and all these weird councils they have in Iran. He is considered Eamon, a Khamenei loyalist, which suggests that the ideological hardliners, to the extent anyone is in charge in Iran right now, are in charge. And that therefore we can foresee the IRGC's current rather aggressive posture doing what it likes to continue.
- [40:07]
C
Exactly. Because at the end of the day, there are four people controlling Iran right now. There are four people like, you know, so you have the Ayatollah Arafi, who is now, let's call him the spare supreme leader. And then you have the head of the judiciary who is extremely bloodthirsty. You know, he's the one who handed over tens of thousands of death sentences like over the years.
- [40:29]
B
And I have to raise my hand and say that in our emergency episode on Saturday, I said that that man had been assassinated. That's what I read on the Internet. It seems that he escaped assassination somehow. He's still alive.
- [40:41]
C
He's still alive. They targeted him when they hit the Revolutionary Court, but he already was out of that building by the beginning of the attack. And then of course, we have the head of the judiciary, we have the new ayatollah, two very hard liners. And then we have the President, Masoud Bezoskian, who is soft reformist. So these three form the interim council. So these three rule together. But then parallel to them is almost like attached to them is the fourth wheel. Let's say these are the three wheels. So we have the fourth wheel here, you know, the four wheel government, basically, which is Ali Larijani, who is now trying basically to as this president of the National Security Council of Iran. He's the one who oversaw the formation of this council of three, you know, the head of the judiciary, Ayatollah Rafi, and of course the president. So the IRGC are pushing so hard to empower the two people who are the head of the judiciary and the Ayatollah against the president and against Larajani, even though Narajani, despite the fact that he was always friendly with Hassan Rouhani, the reformist president who signed the jcopa, like, you know, I mean, agreement, the former nuclear agreement with Obama. And he and Obama had that kind of bromance, you know, in New York in 2015, you know, but nonetheless, they don't trust Larjani that much, even though he moved to the hard line you know, ever since. Because why the. In principle, they don't want to empower the president's office. And they are lucky that Pazashkian is in this position right now. And so therefore Ayatollah Rafi at the moment, could we could hear that he will be confirmed as the permanent Supreme Leader anytime over the next two weeks. So that's my first prediction. The second prediction is the fact that President Pezashkian might be relieved from his position and might be replaced by either the head of the judiciary or by Larajani in order to cement the idea that the office of the Ayatollah will always remain there. Because why? The IRGC at the moment is fighting for a state life and its grip over power. They want to make sure that under no circumstances the office of presidency is supreme to the office of the Supreme Leader. It must always remain the case because they owe an allegiance, not to the President. The president is a humble functionary. The real power must reside within that mystical religious position as outlined by the Article 5 of the Iranian constitution. Article 5, you know, stipulates that the head of the state, the real head of the state is Imam Mahdi. You know, a person who's not been seen for 1200 years, I must add, however, you know, in his absence, in his occultation, as it says in the constitution, someone need to deputize on his behalf. So you see, again, they try to, to, you know, elevate someone, you know, just like Khomeini and Khamenei. Arafi most likely is going to be now the Supreme Leader, the Ayatollah, the Grand Ayatollah, you know, of the Islamic Republic. However, he is lacking one particular, you know, qualification. He is not a sayyid. His turban is white, is not black. You know, and anyone who is aware of Shia Islam understand that those who wear white turbans are commoners and those who wear black turbans are sayyids, meaning
- [44:30]
B
that they are descendants of the Prophet Muhammad.
- [44:34]
C
First of all, there are, you know, I do believe personally there are no such thing as descendants of the Prophet Muhammad. You know, no such thing.
- [44:40]
B
Well, the King of Jordan is going to have some strong words with you, Eamon.
- [44:45]
C
I don't know. I call him.
- [44:46]
B
And the King of King of Morocco.
- [44:49]
C
Morocco, yeah. No, no, I can say to them, you are not from Al Bayt. There is no such thing as Al Bay, basically. But you are descendants of the Sharifs of Mecca. That's the best I can tell them. Apart from that, basically, as the Quran clearly stated, Muhammad was a father of no one of your men.
- [45:06]
B
That's what the royalist Muslims in Britain are very proud of. The fact that our king has the blood of the Prophet Muhammad running in his veins or so they believe through a princess, an Andalusian princess that married into the British royal family many, many centuries ago. Anyway, anyway, we're off Piste aan. Let me put you back on track. So you're saying that the new Ayatollah Arafi, he doesn't have a black turban, so won't they just give him one? I mean, they can give, they can do what they like. They can wave their hands, can't they?
- [45:33]
C
Ah, yeah, but after, you know, he is 66, I think now, like in, basically. So it's very tough, you know, to just, you know, retro, retrospectively give him a new ancestry, you know, that just doesn't work. But nonetheless, because of the favorable position and because of the fact that he is opposed to any talks right now with the us and he believes, passionately believes, that the only way for this war to end is for the US to seek unconditional ceasefire with the Islamic Republic saying, that's it, we give up. We have no demands. It has to be a ceasefire with no demands on the Islamic Republic. That's the only way the war will end. Man, they are high on their supplies. And I can tell you something, Thomas, it's not only they have highly enriched uranium, they have highly enriched drugs and narcotics.
- [46:27]
B
Also, here's the thing. Your two forecasts there assume that Israel's assassination wave is over. But surely some of these men possess Kiyan, the head of the judiciary, Arafi himself, et cetera. They could be on the chopping block at any moment. They must be looking up at the skies, wondering when the next, next missile is going to come down. Or do you think maybe Israel's wave of assassinations is over and that adds that. That leads to a bigger question, Eamon. What has been going on in Iran? I see images of big plumes of smoke in Tehran, lots and lots of strikes still being carried out. We've been focusing on the Iranian reprisals, their counter strikes, which, let's be honest, haven't been totally devastating. Most of their attempts have been shot down. You know, Rastanora was on fire. That's very distressing. Some civilians have died in the gcc. Yes, a large cagerie of civilians have died in Israel. So I'm not saying it's nothing, but let's focus on the people of Iran. They're the ones who are really being hit.
- [47:28]
C
Well, of course, I mean, the situation in Tehran, in Tabriz and Isfahan and Shiraz, in Bandar Abbas, of all places, actually in Ahwaz, you know, and soon In Mashhad. You know, we haven't seen Mashhad hit yet, but that's on the menu soon. Yes, Tehran is being absolutely pounded to the floor like basically with destroying all of the ministries, telecommunication, judiciary, intelligence, interior, the courts, the IRGC headquarters, the military headquarters, defense installations, all of these things basically. And it's all over the country. Plus nuclear facilities in Qom, even the city of Kom where the seminaries are, a nuclear facility was hit there. Also, the facilities in Natanz were hit again with the potential for, according to the International Atomic Energy Agency press release recently, that there could be risks of radioactive contamination going around. So Iran now is being hit by tens of thousands of tons basically of explosives. But as a close Iranian friend, you know, told me, she said, well, look, Ayman, this is a chemotherapy that needs to be done, needs to be applied in order for us to be a free nation from superstition and from tyranny and from, you know, the rule of people who are riff raffs who found themselves with some power, you know, we have to get rid of them. And so unfortunately, I mean, chemotherapy is, you know, necessary here. I'm not belittling like any basically how many civilians will be killed there, you know, is going to be in the hundreds and the thousands in fact. But remember, this is a regime that killed 32,000 of their own people in a matter of two days in the 8th or 9th of January. The question is basically if we apply the strategy of short term pain for the long term gain.
- [49:25]
B
Well, short term it may be, or it may be long term pain. We don't know how long this war is going to go on. Iran's proxy networks have been suspiciously quiet so far. What are we going to see? Let's start with Hezbollah.
- [49:38]
C
Well, Hezbollah, rather foolishly, in the early hours of 2 March, launched several missiles into Israel and also launched several drones, you know, on separate occasions against the British military base in Limassul in Cyprus. Wow. I mean, basically like they are trying to expand, you know, the theater of the war by exporting chaos. Hezbollah is in no position to ex on Israel whatsoever. But they did it as a last gasp of a wounded fox, you know, in order to attract, you know, the international community's attention towards the chaos, you know, that Iran is capable of, or appear to be capable of spreading across the region. As for the Houthis, their entire military positioning as of now indicate they are preparing for a closure of the Babel Mandam Strait within the next 48 hours and that we will see an Intervention from the Houthis, which would lead like reprisals. And they might send drones and ballistic missiles towards Israel too. We will see that. And you know, between you and me, you know, what I saw, you know, this morning from Hezbollah, I would label it as the shortest ever suicide note in history.
- [51:01]
B
And Katab, Hezbollah in Iraq, well, they
- [51:05]
C
sent drones against Kuwait and they sent mostly drones against Erbil in Iraq and Kurdistan, causing significant damage there, actually, on the US facilities and oil facilities in the airport, which the US Replied by attacking them, them with heavy airstrikes, especially in their main military base just south of Baghdad called Jarf Al. And so we are going to see a significant intervention by them. But then the question here is, what will happen? I believe Iraq is already a war zone. I believe Lebanon now is a war zone and soon it will be Yemen. But it was, in my opinion, part of the calculation. It's not like basically that the US And Israeli war planners did not take that into consideration and put together the way to deal with these situations when they arise.
- [52:07]
B
Well, that leads me to the question of the GCC's reaction to all of this. I think they're very aligned. Saudi Arabia opened its airspace to US Military action yesterday, I think, or maybe early this morning. It all kind of blends together. I'm sure it blends together for you, dear Eamon. But what is going to happen with the gcc and really what kind of capabilities does the GCC have? If they all came together and they said, look, as one, we're joining this war, we're going to attack Iran alongside America and even Israeli forces, what could they do?
- [52:47]
C
My understanding is the fact that the Saudis are willing now to go and attack Iran's oil facilities. You attack our oil facilities, we attack yours. As simple as that. You attack Qatar's gas facility, we attack your gas facilities. It will be a tit for tat. And that's how the Saudis are framing their strategy as far as they understand. And they will execute the strategy within the next 12 to 24 hours. They have no regime, changed their mind. They will leave it to the Americans and the Israelis to execute that from their point of view. Don't attack our infrastructure or we attack yours. As simple as that. Because why? In order to stop this unnecessary disruption of airspace, they are attacking airports. So the Saudis will, along with the Emiratis, will attack several airports there for sure. If they attack water facilities, they'll attack water facilities. If they attack oil. Oil facilities, they will attack oil facilities. That's what's going to happen.
- [53:45]
B
So it's a tit for tat strategy there. And the GCC does have the military capabilities to sustain such a strategy for long enough.
- [53:54]
C
You remember the Saudis sustaining a whole campaign in Yemen, bombardment from the air for eight years, along with the Emiratis. Don't worry about them. They have enough firepower to do that.
- [54:07]
B
Okay, maybe you can help me understand what is a very strange thing, which is is the United Kingdom's response so far to this war. What is going on there? Eamonn Keir Starmer, the Prime Minister is obviously a fairly enigmatic stroke, weak, perhaps even idiotic sort of fellow. It's hard to tell sometimes. You. You just don't know. But I also know because I have friends in the region, including you, I know just how integrated UK military and intelligence are in the larger Middle Eastern security kind of apparatus. So surely they are doing things. What is really going on?
- [54:43]
C
Well, here Stammer is, as you said, a weak, idiotic fellow. His knowledge of the region is extremely superficial. His understanding of politics here, you know, is beyond ridiculously, you know, shallow. And that's the handicap we have here. Keir Starmer knows that he is leading a party that is so infiltrated by the Muslim Brotherhood, that is so afraid of the rather overly radical Muslim population of the UK Afraid of them. For example, if it was Rishi Sunak, if it was Boris Johnson. Oh, my God, if it was Boris Johnson Johnson, he would have said, I'm sending the troops, like, you know, there, and I'm gonna send, like, I mean, the RAF and, you know, and we will deal, you know, shoulder to shoulder with Trump and all that.
- [55:39]
B
There'd be a different sort of idiot in charge.
- [55:41]
C
But anyway, but, yeah, but at least, like in a. Basically, a brave idiot is. I don't know, maybe a brave idiot
- [55:48]
B
is a dangerous idiot. But anyway, I understand what you're saying.
- [55:51]
C
Exactly. So why? Because three times Hezbollah is putting UK troops in danger deliberately, without any UK provocation whatsoever. So the least he could do is just like, you know, to show some backbone and go to his people and say, a terrorist organization is attacking our troops. Like, you know, basically, we will respond accordingly. No, he said, under no circumstances we will participate in this war.
- [56:20]
B
Donald Trump is annoyed with Keir Starmer, especially over the Prime Minister's refusal to allow United States to use its base on Diego Garcia.
- [56:29]
C
Well, actually, Keir Starmer finally made a U turn over the past several hours, and he is allowing the US the use of Diego Garcia because, oh, I hadn't Heard that. Exactly. And the reason is because how could he justify in front of the United States Congress. Forget Trump, in front of the United States Congress that your own military base and your own troop, and this is a sovereign military base, it's part of the UK Actually, that military base in Cyprus is actually effectively a sovereign piece of the United Kingdom. So your own sovereign territory was attacked and you don't have even the guts to defend it and you don't even want to participate in the war and you deny us even the means to retaliate against those who are attacking your troops. Are you that coward? So of course he have to give the Americans some bones. So basically he went and say, as a matter of retaliation, I'm going to allow the U.S. the use of Diego Garcia. So, okay, fine, basically, at least something. But even then his own labor members, especially the radical Muslim labor members, will eat him alive for this. As well as the left wing, you know, led by Ayatollah Jasbollah from outside of the party. I'm talking here about Jeremy Corbyn and his faction and everything. And those who are Diana Abbott or whatever. Like those like, basically like, I mean, you know, rabid leftist, but nonetheless, you know, I tell you something, you know, even, even, even if these drones were to make mincemeat of British pilots and soldiers on the tarmac of that base, still the British leftists and British radical Muslims would still say, what are we doing in Cyprus? We should have left the hell a long time ago. You know, it's our fault. You know, so they will still come up with this narrative. They are sick minded people.
- [58:28]
B
Now this is probably a really stupid question, Eamon, and you, you know, you're going to laugh at me, but you know, I'm looking at the Middle East. If I zoom way out and I see three countries with, with enormous militaries, Egypt, Turkey and Pakistan. And you know, quite conveniently they ring Iran. I mean, Turkey is very close, Pakistan is very close. Although there's a terrible desert between it and where the real action lies. But nonetheless, three huge Muslim armies. Why aren't they getting involved? I mean, honestly, let's. I just. Part of me, because this is about the future as well. And in my heart I think civil war in Iran is still very possible and still very much to be avoided. It would be terrible. It would be way worse than Syria. Right? So come on, Erdogan, come on, Sisi, come on Pakistan. Go in there, conquer the place, set up something better and then leave. Why aren't they getting involved? They have actual armies.
- [59:31]
C
Well, the problem is with Erdogan, you know, he is Mr. What's in it for me? And that's the problem with erdogan. He is Mr. What's in it for me? How do you deal with the slimy, you know, character like that? That's the first thing for Pakistan. They already indicated to Saudi Arabia that they will come to their aid, military aid, if they ever need it. But the way that Pakistan will fight alongside Saudi Arabia is different. They will not invade Iran from that side because there is no point. Basically, it's all desert and there is nothing there. And the action is like a thousand kilometers away. It's strategically stupid. So what would Pakistan do is that they will send Special Forces, they will send their very highly qualified pilots of the Pakistani Air Force and some of their airplanes to participate in defending the skies, you know, and also at the same time participate in flying, you know, the sorties, you know, for the Saudi Air Force, which sometime have a problem with 24 hour shifts within a long, sustained military air campaign. So the Pakistanis will come and help this way. That's how they will do it. The Egyptians, they don't want the regime in Iran to fall whatsoever. In fact, basically, they were alongside the Omanis and the Qataris were desperate for no regime fall whatsoever.
- [60:59]
B
You've explained why that's the case. Because they play a very important role in the GCC's deterrence strategy. The GCC pays them good money to be there behind their backs in case Iran attacks. Well, I don't know if you've noticed, Eamon, Iran has attacked. So isn't it time for the GCC to call in, like, the favor? Like, hey, we've paid all this money. It's time for you to help us out.
- [61:21]
C
Oh, no, they know that Sisi is useless. They know that. They know that. They know, like, you know, basically that his promises of help against the Houthis turned into nothing.
- [61:30]
B
Sisi by name, sissy by nature, huh?
- [61:33]
C
Exactly. And so he's a weak and decisive man and he just, you know, doesn't want to get involved in anything. You know, he want his pristine army to remain pristine. An army for show, an army army for, you know, military parade, and that's it. And so as far as, you know, come to think of it, like, you know, basically, many people saying, oh, the Egyptian army is the best of the best. Well, the Saudi military has far more fighting hours, you know, basically, and flying hours, you know, basically, than the entire military in the militaries of Egypt. And Iran combined, like, you know, so basically that's why the problem with, you know, Assisi is the fact that he is useless.
- [62:13]
B
Okay, well, Eamonn, I know you've got to go because you have big meetings with some top Gulf decision makers and diplomats. But before I let you go, just quickly, honestly, right now, best guess, where's the Middle east going to be in a year's time? What is the more medium term future going to be?
- [62:34]
C
Like a year time? I can't even look a month's time, man. You know, I don't know what will happen in the second phase.
- [62:41]
B
Okay, is Iran going to be embroiled in a 15 year civil war?
- [62:45]
C
No. No.
- [62:46]
B
Okay.
- [62:47]
C
Generally they are smarter than that. They don't have histories of long civil wars like in a. Basically they are smarter than that.
- [62:53]
B
Okay, so no civil war, you would say, in, in Iran?
- [62:57]
C
No, I didn't say no civil war. I said like there could be like, you know, basically jostling for power and you know, but there is no desire by any great power in the region or globally, including the us, China and Russia, or their neighbors, Pakistan, Turkey, Saudi and others to see a fragmented Iran. They want a unified Iran, and that's for sure. But you know, that will push towards a unified, you know, usually like in the civil wars happen primarily these days because of external interference, you know, people pushing you different directions. But there is a unanimous desire by all of Iran's neighbors and by the global powers that Iran should never fragment post Khamenei, post irgc.
- [63:40]
B
Okay, Is this war going to put Israeli normalization back on track across the whole region, do you think?
- [63:50]
C
Yes, yes, I hope so. I finally hope so. Because, you know, when Saudi pilots and Israeli pilots are actually bombing the same country, like, I mean, you know, well, I would say not the country, they are bombing the same regime. We have to distinguish between the Iranian people and Iran itself as a nation from the regime. So when we have the Israeli pilots and Saudi pilots bombing the same regime and the same terror group known as the irgc, we do indeed have hope resurrected again.
- [64:22]
B
Okay, well, Ayman Dean, I'm going to let you go for your meetings. I hope you get more than four hours of sleep tonight because, you know, I'm sure you need it after all of the excitement you've been under. Stay safe, my friend. And thank you again for all of your information and all of your analysis. We are all, all of us, dear listeners, are grateful to you.
- [64:40]
C
Thank you. Thank you so much. Stay safe everyone, and we will talk very soon.
- [64:45]
B
Take care. Conflicted is a message heard. Production Our executive producers are Jake Warren and Max Warren. This episode was produced and edited by Thomas Small SA.