← CONFLICTED
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- [00:05]
A
Wars are not just fought on the battlefield. They're fought in cabinet rooms, in intelligence briefings, and in the quiet calculations of statesmen deciding whether to join the fight or stay out of it. The war with Iran has forced the British government and the French to confront exactly that question. To help us understand this dimension of the conflict, today I'm talking to two great friends of the show. First, the Right Honorable Tom Tugenhot, mp, and then the French journalist Waseem Nasser. Waseem will join me in the second half of the episode to talk about France. In the first half, Sir, Tom tells me how Britain is grappling with the war, from the legal arguments shaping the government's response to the deeper questions about strategy, military preparedness, and what the day after might look like if the Iranian regime falls. I'm Thomas Small. This is my conflicted conversation with Tom Tugenhout.
- [01:29]
B
Hello, Tom. It's so nice to have you back on Conflicted. How are you doing?
- [01:33]
C
Thomas, it's great to see you. And with a very finely trimmed beard, if I may say.
- [01:38]
B
Thank you for noticing. They took 2 inches off the other day and I feel positively shorn.
- [01:44]
C
You're getting ready for the summer, that's what it is.
- [01:46]
B
Now, just to make sure all of our dear listeners remember you, I mean, you need no introduction, I know, but you were the Chair of the Foreign Affairs Select Committee in parliament between 2017 and 2022, and then you were security minister between 2022 and 2024. You remain a Tory MP in Parliament, and so you're really the perfect person to talk to, I think, about first the UK's response to the ongoing war in the Middle East. Obviously, you are not in government anymore. Your party is out of power. So maybe you'll feel particularly free to describe the UK's response to that. Prime Minister Keir Starmer, head of the Labour Party, is leading that response. First of all, how would you describe, perhaps objectively, before we really get into the thick of it, that response?
- [02:37]
C
Well, I mean, I think objectively and politely you can describe it as confused. I mean, this is a policy that has seen us objecting not only to taking part in any action, but also to lending any of our assets to. To the US Israeli attack, but then 24 hours later has said, no, actually, we will take part. So, I mean, I think politely you can say it's confused. I think if I were being harsher, I'd say this is a legalistic approach that has failed to understand that the purpose of government is to defend the interests of The British people not simply to follow rules. The Sabbath is made for man, not man for the Sabbath.
- [03:20]
B
It's certainly true that throughout government ministers and the Prime Minister himself have stressed that any UK action must have a clear legal basis. They keep talking about a legal basis. Now. Perhaps I've been in the Amen Middle east bubble for too long. Perhaps I'm just in the thick of it. It's hard for me at the moment even to understand what that means these days because the old institutions that used to coordinate global action and provide the imprimatur of legality, they seem to be non existent now. I think, you know, the Western alliance under the United States would feel that those institutions are just obfuscating. They would not allow for action. I mean, again, I don't know, maybe I've just drunk the Kool Aid or I have blinders on. What does this mean, legality these days?
- [04:12]
C
It clearly doesn't mean a vote of the UN Security Council that would obviously automatically be vetoed by China or Russia or on the other side of course by France, the United Kingdom or the United States. So it clearly doesn't mean that. What does it mean? It means I think the ability to have a credible explanation in a way that people will understand and sympathize with. And, and I think that's what it, you know, I think that's what international law has come to. Treaties have been eroded in various different ways and they're not being applied in the same way. And so that's, that's really where we are. And I think, I think it's pretty difficult not to argue that Israel and even the United States and I would argue the United Kingdom have the right to self def against Iran, given the amount of violence that Eamonn has listed on conflicted. But actually that I have faced, you know, when I was a soldier, when I was a journalist in the Middle east and then a security Minister in the UK and we spoke about it in the past.
- [05:10]
B
It's another thing that the Prime Minister often mentions. He says that he has learned the lessons from Iraq. He doesn't want the UK to make the same mistakes as were made back then in Iraq. So he invokes the specter of the Iraq war regularly. You served in that conflict? Many people did. Of course. I understand it remains a controversial war to this day. A lot of people think that it was the kind of undoing of much that was good about Western global strength and everything. And there's a conversation to be had there. But what do you think the prime minister means about lessons from Iraq. And what other lessons possibly would someone like yourself have learned from Iraq? Because people who know about the history of the post American invasion of Iraq know that the chaos and carnage that that country descended into following the invasion is to some extent attributable to the actions of the Islamic Republic of Iran.
- [06:08]
D
Right.
- [06:08]
C
So I would say there's his lesson. And my lesson, if you like, the prime minister's lesson, is I don't want to get drawn into a Middle Eastern war. Well, you know what? I think the world agrees on that. Nobody wants to get drawn into a Middle Eastern war. But the reason he's drawing the wrong lesson I kind of made this point in the House of Commons yesterday is nobody's talking about putting soldiers into Iran. These are airstrikes. I mean, they may not be effective, but they are airstrikes. Nobody's sort of even the Americans haven't lined up one of their Marines extraditionary units or any of their armored divisions or anything like that. The things that they've lined up are all air assets. But the lesson he's forgive me, but he's refusing to draw from Iraq is what do you do the day after? There's absolutely no planning for that. Now, you can perfectly legitimately criticize the president of the United States for that, but he's the prime minister of the United Kingdom. He's the leader of one of the world's most powerful countries, and he has a responsibility to look at what the plans for the day after might be. Now, some of those plans will, of course, vary enormously on whether you end up with a military coup or an IRGC coup or Pahlavi or what you know, the range is very great, as we know, and there's a possibility of civil war as well. But if you're not even talking to our local partners, if you're not even talking to Iraq, if you're not even talking to countries in the region about what it is you want to get in quickly to try and stabilize whatever happens next, then I'm afraid you're learning the wrong lesson from Iraq. You're learning the lesson that the west should never be involved, or you're learning the lesson that you should always bow down to IRGC interests, as some people wanted to in 2006. Seven, eight. But you're not learning the important one, which is make sure you have a plan for the day after.
- [07:57]
B
You've been in Parliament now for about 11 years, and in that time you've served in some pretty exalted Roles including Security Minister. You will therefore have connections, personal, professional, across government and beyond into the United States government. Do you have at all an ear to the ground, Tom, at the moment about what America, what Israel, what Gulf partners might be discussing about the day after in Iran? Do you have anything that you can, you know, that you can help us make sense of where this war is inclining towards, you know, Huron conflicted? We understand the context. Amen. Certainly broadly supports the war, but even he, you know, would struggle to articulate clearly what the war aims are and what certainly makes this war very different from any of the wars that I've lived through as an adult, now that 47 years old almost is the degree to which public debate in Congress, in the UN et cetera, has been non existent. It's very strange. I was discussing it yesterday with a friend saying, and again, I don't mean to be hyperbolic here, but to some extent I feel like, well, this is what creeping authoritarianism in liberal democratic governance might be like, where a big war breaks out and you're just trusting the President of the United States and his team to do the right thing, but you don't really know what they're doing. Do you have any concrete sense of what the goal is?
- [09:20]
C
Well, I mean, I think there's been quite a lot of discussion after the event and I would agree with you there. And by the way, you do look older than 47. The, but the, the why. Why, thank you, sir. You will, I presume that's what the profit beard is for. But anyway, the, the reality is that I think there are a series of explanations that I've heard and when I speak in private to friends of mine who are either in the US Administration or on Capitol Hill, there are a series of explanations given different merit, different reliability, but it's quite clear that a large element of this is because they can, because the attacks last year neutralized so much of the air defenses and the regime refused to recognize the change in position and refused to back down. So the United States, I think, is taking the opportunity to remove an organization that it sees, quite reasonably, as one of the most violent exports of terror and hatred around the region and indeed around the world. So I think, if I'm honest, I think that's most of the reason. And the day after, I'm hearing no serious conversations about it. I mean, everybody I speak to says that's somebody else's job, which does not leave me at all reassured because as you and I both know, this could go in any number of different directions. And, you know, if you want to support an individual, I'm not saying you've identified them, but let's say there is an individual you wish to support, either inside or outside the country. What money are they going to have? Where are they going to get the medicines from? How are they going to arm their police? You know, I mean, these are the sort of the next day questions that are not being addressed.
- [11:04]
B
Well, it seems then that we really have not learned the lessons from Iraq and America is kind of blundering again. You know, that's pretty serious stuff. And as far as I'm concerned, that raises for me the likelihood that what we're looking at is a massive Syria civil war situation in Iran, which will be terrible. This is, for me, the worst possible outcome. But returning to your experience in Iraq, explain the role that Iran played in that quagmire. You know, notoriously the IED phenomenon in Iraq, which killed many American and British soldiers and other soldiers of the coalition and many Iraqi civilians. These IEDs were sort of devised by Iran, smuggled into Iraq, employed through militia networks that were organized by the Quds Force, the foreign arm of the irgc. So can you tell us what was it like on patrol back then, knowing these IEDs were there just to remind people that, you know, despite what you often hear, the Islamic Republic of Iran is not actually a peacenik responsible state at all. And it has long been, long been, from the very beginning, long been an enemy of Western powers, the United States, but also the United Kingdom.
- [12:19]
C
Well, let me tell you, towards the end of March, about 23 years ago, I was on patrol and we'd just taken the city of Alamara in southern Iraq, and we were, we were going up to the border with Iran in order to make sure that we had, you know, we were stopped cutting off people who might be trying to regroup and attack us from the Iraqi armed forces. And as we went up there, there were two things that really struck me. The first is we had to cross a minefield. And it was the biggest unmarked minefield that was around at the time. And of course, it dated back to the Iran Iraq war, which had been about what, 20, 25 years earlier than that, sort of 80 to 88, I think it was. And that minefield was completely wild. I mean, you know, as we drove through it, there was somebody on the front sort of pushing through the sand. And, you know, now I do remember the nervousness when one of our wheels slightly tipped something and out popped a tank mine.
- [13:18]
B
Oh, goodness.
- [13:19]
C
And, you know, so it was, it was relatively nerve wracking, but that was the earliest stuff. Anyway, we get, we got to the. We got to one of the crossing points into Iran and there was a guy coming over in a sort of pickup truck, two blokes in the front and a ram in the back. And it was one of those moments, you're looking. I went to go and talk to him and I said, what on earth are you doing? And he said, oh, I've come for the Thursday market. And I was like, forgive me, but bs. I was like, no, no, no, there's always the Thursday market. And it's like, mate, you haven't been able to cross this border in 40 years. What are you talking about? Right. Or 25 years or whatever it was at that point. And it was quite clear what was happening, which was that the IRGC were pushing over Iraqi refugees, Shia Iraqi refugees who'd been in, you know, who'd been in Iran since probably some, at some point through the Iran Iraq war, and they were pushing them back over the border to go and see what was going on. Anyway, that was the first. That was 2003. That was the first time I came across. I mean, it's wrong to call them irgc, but IRGC agents or whatever you want to call them, sure pushed over. Anyway, as the, as things got worse, you know, it became very obvious and we had very clear intelligence of IRGC officers, including all the way up to Soleimani, who you will remember.
- [14:35]
D
Oh, yeah.
- [14:36]
C
Organizing various different attacks against us. Against the US and of course against, mostly, of course, against Sunni Muslims in Iraq. I mean, this is the great irony, of course, of the people who are sort of complaining about violence against the Islamic Republic of Iran today is they claim to be defending Muslims. Like the Islamic Republic has killed more Muslims than any other organization at all in 40 years. 50 years. I mean, it's probably killed more Muslims than every other organization put together over the last 45 years. Yeah.
- [15:09]
B
I mean, the Islamic Republic of Iran is a. Is an interesting beast. And of course our, you know, the Western, the uk US relations with Iran have kind of gone up and down and round and round. I mean, literally two. Two months after you entered parliament in 2015, the, the now notorious Iran nuclear deal that Obama's administration carved out with the Iranian regime was signed. And then Donald Trump came to power and he had declared his intention to basically tear up that bill. There was, there were debates in Parliament. You know, at the time, you were concerned about just tearing up the bill. It seemed like a Reckless thing. Also, I think we must remember at that time, Iran was, and this is very strange to think, an ally to some extent of us in our anti ISIS campaign. So things come up and down in this relationship. But there was that long period that Barack Obama initiated, Donald Trump pushed pause on, President Biden resumed, where the goal was to reach out to Iran diplomatically, to try to bring them into the family of nations, treating them like ultimately they were a rational and a reasonable and pragmatic actor. This is now over. This will never again return. It could never return, given everything that's happened. But how were you navigating your way towards understanding how the Iranian regime is best understood? Because it's a learning curve. When you enter politics and you're sort of dealing with this and that. What's that story like for you?
- [16:40]
C
Well, look, my first experience with the Iranian regime was really in the late 90s in Lebanon when I was dealing with Hezbollah and occasionally had some encounters with IRGC officers who were. Who were the military attaches in the Iranian embassy in Beirut back then. I presume they still are. And those early days, really, you know, I think most of us tried to have a working relationship with Iran. And as you rightly say, as things, you know, as 9, 11 happened, as the US went into Iraq and then when we went into Afghanistan, we did again try and have a working relationship with them because, you know, we can all see the problem, Right? You know, overthrowing the regime in Iran was always going to be not only a tall order just to do it, but once you've done it, it leaves an extraordinary space. It's 90, what, 2 million people over a vast area of Middle east or Central Asia, depending on how you count
- [17:37]
B
it, largely mountainous area or with forbidding deserts, not an easy terrain.
- [17:41]
C
Yeah, it's really, really difficult. And the idea that you can put in, you know, 100,000 or even a million soldiers and govern it is rubbish. You can't. I mean, there's absolutely no way you can do that. Iran can and will only be governed by Iranians. You know, that's not an arbitrary point. It's a simple observation of fact. And so, you know, everybody tried to make it work. Now we've ended up in, forgive me, but I think a very serious situation, a very difficult situation where despite having tried to make it work through the jcpoa, of which, you know, I was extremely critical because I just didn't believe that they'd stick to the deal. And despite trying to work with them in Afghanistan, where we tried in Kabul we tried in various places and they, they were making shape charges that tried to kill us in Helmand. In fact, we, we're pretty sure that one of the two suicide bombers who tried to kill me when I was advising the governor of Helmand was in some way paid or sent by the irgc. You know, so these people have been doing everything they possibly can to make life as difficult for us as possible.
- [18:45]
B
Well, when you were Security Minister, there was some debate in Parliament about whether or not to proscribe the irgc. The Tories were in power then. The UK did not prescribe the irgc. Obviously the UK is signatory to the sanctions against Iran. What was that debate like? Earlier this year the EU designated the IRGC a terrorist organization. And you know, the United States is leaning very hard on that designation to justify this war. The UK still has not prescribed the irgc. What's the thinking there? What was the thinking there when you were there, you know, in government?
- [19:26]
C
Well, let me explain it because it's important to know that prescription doesn't mean the same thing in every country. Right? So first of all, being prescribed in the United States or prescribed in Europe is not as absolute as prescription in the uk. Now I'm sure this is partly due to our own history. So prescription in the old days, from the Northern Ireland days meant that you couldn't even hear the voice of anyone connected to an organization. So they were completely cut off. You couldn't have any financial dealings with them, you couldn't meet them, you couldn't do anything, anything at all. And anybody who did was committing a criminal act. So it was much, much stricter than US prescription or European prescription where diplomats couldn't meet prescribed organizations in various very structured, very carefully arranged ways. But still the second thing is under UK law, the way that we think about it is we say, look, terror can only be committed by non state actors. So terrorist groups like Hezbollah or Hamas or whatever they happen to be, but states governments can only commit war crime. They can't commit terrorism. It's not a useful definition to say that, you know, Germany committed terrorism in the Second World War. No, they committed war crimes. They were organized as a structured state. Now you can disagree with these words if you like, you can disagree with this language if you like, but given that prescription is a way of constraining a non state actor and the IRGC is part of the, the state, it just, it doesn't work in UK legal terms. Now my argument, by the way, that's the argument I got from the civil servants. My Argument to the civil servants was sure, but this is a political message as well and that's why we should prescribe. And so I was always in favour of prescription. Now where we've got to is that if you look at the National Security act that I brought in in 2023, the powers that have been given to the state to protect itself against state backed groups like the IRGC are now stronger even than US prescription. So the reality is actually in purely legal terms, the UK is exerting much more power against the IRGC than the European Union or in some cases than the us. But you're right, it still lacks that political message.
- [21:40]
B
I see. Okay, see it's good to have that clarity. People, people might think wrongly as it turns out, that because the IRGC is not prescribed by the UK that the UK is sort of soft on the irgc. But that's not true.
- [21:54]
C
No, it's not true. The laws constraining the IRGC are actually in many ways much stricter in the UK than they are in Europe. But it doesn't use the word, it uses a different word. They're designated under the National Security Act.
- [22:08]
B
The question of British military preparedness at the moment, there is a lot of talk in the media, a lot of talk, not in the media, but in really, you know, reputable security and defense think tanks. The Royal United Services Institute, for example, has described ammunition equipment and trained personnel depth in the UK military as quote, dangerously hollowed out compared to the stated goals for that military. Somehow over the last 20 years or something, the British ability to project military power has, has declined noticeably. And you know, the Tories were in power for a lot of, a lot of that time. The Tories are meant to be the, the party that, that defends the, the military. So can you first describe the state of the British military now, honestly, and how it got there?
- [23:00]
C
Right, sure. So let's look at what we've got at the moment. For the first time in decades, we have not got a ship either in the Gulf or in the Mediterranean. Now this is the Royal Navy that traditionally has had ships everywhere.
- [23:18]
B
What's also weird about that, sir, is that there is a naval base in Cyprus in the Mediterranean and a naval base in Bahrain in the Middle East. But there are no ships.
- [23:28]
C
That's right. No, it's extraordinary. And you know, let me be apolitical about this. This is something that started in really the mid to late 90s when we took the peace dividend from the Cold War. It then got worse. Even though we were fighting in Sierra Leone and then Kosovo and then Iraq and then in Afghanistan. It got worse during those years. And then. You're absolutely right. In 2010 during the coalition years, and then in 2015, when the conservatives came in, the numbers still didn't go up and we consistently took peace dividends. And I'm afraid this is absolutely part of a growing welfare state and dependency culture and all the rest of it that goes with it. It's to do with a flatlining economy that has largely been flatlining since 2008, and it's to do, therefore, with the inability to maintain things. Now. What's even more striking in the uk, which is often missed, is, you know, we all compare defense budgets around NATO, right? You've got to meet 2% to whatever target. Poland spends 4%. I think Estonia is now spending over 4. I think Lithuania is up to 5. I may have got these numbers slightly wrong, but it's in that sort of order.
- [24:36]
B
Well, they're facing clear and present danger, I suppose.
- [24:40]
C
You know, if you live next to a bear, you buy a long stick. But the reality is that they're not alone in spending more. Other countries like Spain and Portugal are still spending one 1.5%. Now, which one do you think the UK is closer to? Well, you'd think the UK was closer to Poland and all that, wouldn't you? Well, when you knock out the nuclear contribution, which is about 0.7, maybe a little bit more than that, and the effect that has on the wider budget, actually, we're spending about one and a half.
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B
Oh, my goodness.
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C
Unconventional, really.
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B
That's shameful.
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C
Which is tiny. So in reality, when you look at the changing nature of technology and the increase in defense pay, there has been no increase in defense capability in the conventional realm for, I don't know, 10, 15 years, and it's really serious.
- [25:27]
B
Well, what about keeping pace with technological developments? For example, the drone, the shahed, probably shahed type drone that was fired by Hezbollah at the British base in Cyprus. You were present in Parliament last year when a shahed type drone was put on display.
- [25:43]
C
I brought it. I brought it to Parliament.
- [25:45]
B
Okay. You were the man in charge of that. Fine. Okay. So back then it was, look at this drone that Iran is supplying Russia and which is attacking people in Ukraine. Flash forward six months, Britain is being attacked by such a drone from Hezbollah. But in terms of British military preparedness, from what, you know, has there been any proper development of our ability to counter this sort of technology, given how cheaply it is to make that and how expensive it is generally to combat it.
- [26:11]
C
So here's the thing. Yes, there has and actually to be fair, over the last five, ten years there's been. Well, ten years is exaggerating. Sorry, forgive me. Over the last two to five years there's been increasing emphasis on drone technology and there's been increasing interest and that's ramped up a lot because of Ukraine. And by the way, we are learning a lot from Ukraine as well. They're being enormously helpful and that's a fantastic and very important relationship for us. But the reality is that there are two things, as you may know, Basil Little Hart, who was the great mid war strategist who came up with the ideas that were then picked up by the Nazis very embarrassingly of the blitzkrieg and things like that. He came up with a wonderful line that the only thing harder than getting a new idea into the military mind is to get the old idea out. And so we are investing in new weapons capabilities, we are developing new weapons capabilities, but we are still tied down with legacy systems that are enormously expensive and that will likely either be inoperable or in fact be destroyed on the first day of a conflict. So you know, there is a real challenge here in making sure that we are actually better structured to be able to face the threats that we face. And at the moment that's not where we are.
- [27:24]
B
Well, listen, let's wrap this up just quickly and this is crazy. I want to do a whole episode on conflicted about the question of Diego Garcia, the Chagos Islands and all of that because it's extremely complicated and now very controversial. Initially the Prime Minister said that the US could not use their base on Diego Garcia to prosecute the war in Iran. He did change his mind two days ago about that following Iranian attacks against British assets, though he has said only defensive operations should be launched. It's kind of confusing.
- [27:54]
C
It's utterly meaningless.
- [27:55]
B
So what is your back of the fag packet sort of summary of this Chagos Diego Garcia, frankly, in Eamon's terms, clusterfuck. What is going on there?
- [28:06]
C
Well, look, I'm afraid that is the correct term for it because the reality is this is one of those moments where we have sacrificed our own interests on the altar of a dead God. And that dead God is, is the idea of the international rules based system as an absolute rather than as a negotiating point. The reality is, of course we want the international rules based system, of course we want international law. But if we're the only parties that are supporting it, then this is Not a way of enforcing norms across society. It's a suicide pact for those who obey it. And that's no way to go through life. Now we've got to turn this around and to go back to some of the points that we've discussed in the past. One of the geniuses of religious interpretation really started with the Jews. Three, well, more like four, 5,000 years ago, was the ability to learn that if you want to predict the future, you can either do what the pagans were doing, which is rain dances and sacrificing chickens and things like that, or you can develop the rules and you agree the future in advance. And the genius of Jewish theology was that what you did is you predict the future by agreeing it in advance, and that's the law. Now, once you've done that, you then have to temper it with the. With the breath of God effectively with the ability to interpret in different ways. Now, what we're seeing from Starmer is the most puritanical legal interpretation with absolutely no recognition that you have to have human inspiration within it. And I'm afraid that's leading to these extraordinarily daft decisions like that the UK would be breaking the law if it were to defend itself against Iranian missiles, which is completely absurd, or that Israel is in some way aggressive after 47 years of attack by Iran. That, you know, that, that somehow or other, you know, this is. This is deeply wrong. I mean, it's completely absurd. And, and the most most obvious example is Diego Garcia. You know, every deal was done in the 60s. Millions of dollars were spent to buy off the Mauritians. The courts were agreed so they couldn't try cases between Commonwealth countries. Everything was done in a completely legal way. But recognizing the importance of the position. And Starmer is sacrificing that for absolutely nothing at all.
- [30:29]
B
Yes, it is all very dispiriting. There you are in, in, you know, the, in Parliament, the greatest talking shop, political talking shop in the history of the world, working, you know, as a part of this great British state. But it does seem to be in a very sclerotic and unimpressive place at the moment. And as an American who's made his life here, I sort of feel, I don't know, a sort of whimper going out as there's this great opportunity for the UK to, To punch above its weight as it. As it has done for the last several decades, and to help allies prosecute a war that is ultimately trying to, if not completely overthrow, at least hem in a very dangerous regime. And you know, our contribution is pretty pathetic and it's depressing.
- [31:16]
C
Well, I mean, let me put it like this, Thomas. I wouldn't have ordered these attacks in the first place until you had a plan for what you were going to try and shape. Now, I'm not suggesting for a second that you'll achieve it, but if you don't have a plan, you definitely won't achieve it. Right. So you need to have some idea of who you're going to bring together, how you're going to bring them together, what kind of structure you're going to put behind it. But once it started. Are you honestly telling me you don't stand with the 30 or 40,000 dead Iranians who were killed protesting? Are you telling me you don't stand with the women who were murdered for wearing the veil or the others who were murdered for being raped, not for committing any crime, but for being the victims themselves? I mean, it's extraordinary. And now to see, you know, protests going on in the UK and sadly, a few other countries as well, standing with the Iranian regime, it's extraordinary. These are, these are the people who murder Muslims. If you want to stand up for Muslim lives, you oppose Tehran, you oppose the mullahs, you oppose this hatred.
- [32:15]
B
Well, I, I, you know, I do think about this, absolutely every day. You know, we call this podcast Conflicted. And, you know, I am conflicted. It is hard to be conflicted about the malevolence of the Iranian regime, frankly.
- [32:28]
C
Right.
- [32:29]
B
And so I do see many, many millions of people who are educated and they clearly have a totally like 180 degree different view of the world from mine. Just, they're seeing Iran as part, and an important part of a noble effort to undermine the real wicked player in the world, which is the United States and its allies. I just, I know the shadows cast by the American soft imperium. I'm not an idiot. But I still think. Really, really, that's your view. It's so different from mine.
- [33:08]
C
Well, I agree. And then in recent days, our friend Ayman was quite literally under fire by Iranian missiles simply because he happens to live in the uae. Now, the UAE has not taken part in this operation. And then the ignorance, of course, of what's. Anyway, one can go on, Thomas.
- [33:27]
B
Yeah, we know about it. Okay, Sir. Tom Tugendhot, thank you so much for coming back on Conflicted. You really, I think, are the best friend of this show.
- [33:35]
C
Well, I love it. What you're doing is important.
- [33:37]
B
Thanks, Tom.
- [33:38]
C
Cheers. Bye. Bye.
- [33:40]
A
That was Tom Tugendhot laying out the rather confused, even conflicted position that the British government has taken on this war. Next, I speak with French journalist Waseem Nasser. He explains how France sees the conflict and why President Macron may be using this crisis not only to confront Iran, but to reshape Europe's security architecture in a way which places France at the center. After this short break, my conflicted conversation with Waseem Nasser.
- [34:32]
B
Waseem, hello. Great to see you again, man. How's it going?
- [34:36]
D
Fine, how are you? Thomas, thank you for having me again.
- [34:38]
B
My pleasure, I'm fine. I mean, the Middle east is at war. We're all scrambling around here to know what's going on. And there you are in France. And I'm hoping you can help me sort of understand France's geopolitical perspective a bit better. France is often overlooked and misunderstood in the Anglophone world. I mean, I myself am not entirely sure at any given point what to think about France. Would you sort of generally summarize France's geopolitical strategic outlook?
- [35:09]
D
Well, actually, under the presidency of Emmanuel Macron, France is trying to go back to what it used to do, like years ago, meaning finding a third path in between major powers struggle and especially in the Middle East. And of course, with the war, ongoing war in Ukraine, meaning with the disengagement of the United States or wished disengagement from Europe. France actually is trying to play a bigger role in Europe in the wake of making deterrence, meaning nuclear deterrence, wider for European countries, who are the allies actually of France. So we are in the middle of something new. It's a geopolitical turmoil all over the place. And France is actually trying to replace the American umbrella, nuclear umbrella for Europe, and at the same time play a role, a middle, how can I say, a middle way role in the Middle east regarding of course, the Israeli Palestinian issue and of course the ongoing war with Iran.
- [36:12]
B
So France's Middle east policy is actually known as the Arab policy. And this expression dates back first to Charles de Gaulle in the 50s and 60s, and then more recently again to Mitterrand in the 80s and 90s. So the core idea of France's Arab policy is that for France should pursue an independent Middle east policy that is not subordinate to the United States or the sort of Anglo American strategic order. And so France maintains strong ties with Gulf monarchies, especially the Emirates, Qatar and Kuwait, in order to kind of act as a counterweight to Iranian influence to give the Gulf states more room for maneuver with the United States. Is this sort of the way that, that works?
- [37:02]
D
Well, historically, that that is the way it works. Yes, you are, you are right. But so many things happened since that time which contradicts actually this, this idea of this Arab, Arab policy from Paris. For example, even Charles de Gaulle was one of the biggest backers of Israel in the 1967 war. Even France, if you can recall, it's because of France that Israel has the bomb. It's French technology. So there is a lot of ambiguity in this regard. And France of course wants to have its own policy in the area regarding its interests, but also regarding what France thinks is right or not. And remember, for example, France participated in the first war in the Gulf, meaning to oust Saddam Hussein from Kuwait. But France opposed the 2003 war that was led by the United States. And Perez was right at that time. And at the same time, France contributed in the American military effort in Afghanistan, you see. So of course France is trying to play a game, suiting its own interests. And if you see what was said lately regarding the war with Iran, the stand of France is way much closer to American policy than before. And if you noticed when you speak or when you listen to French diplomats, they are always recalling or putting on the table the 1983 attack against the U.S. marines and the French troopers paratroopers in Beirut. And of course, today I was speaking to a very important person in the meaning the State Department and with other journalists. And he talked about the terror campaign that was conducted by Iran in Paris in the 1980s, you see. So they are much closer today to Israeli and American policies. But though they want to have their say and they think that full blown military power or campaigns cannot reach the objectives that are declared today by the US and Israel.
- [39:12]
B
I just want to make sure that our listeners know what you were talking about. So you know, there is a long history of Iranian terrorism against France. You mentioned the 1983 Beirut bombings. These are often associated with the big attack against the United States Marines that killed hundreds of Marines. However, Islamic Jihad, the precursor to the Hezbollah, attacked a French base and 58 French paratroopers were killed. This was done with IRGC support. In 1985 and 1986, there was an urban terrorism campaign in Paris. Cells linked to Hezbollah and the IRGC carried out a series of bombings in public places. Throughout the 90s, there were sort of high stakes assassinations carried out in Paris, including a former Iranian Prime Minister. And More recently, in 2024 and 2025, French intelligence arrested Iranian proxies that were targeting Jews in France and Israeli interests in France. So France knows the threat from Iran
- [40:11]
D
and France today, as we speak, has two still hostages in Iran that succeeded in joining. Two of them succeeded in joining the French Embassy, but they are stuck in Iran, actually. And just one more thing about the 1983 attacks, many people don't know, and I guess many of your listeners don't know, that those were the first suicide bombings against Western troops in the world, way before Al Qaeda, way before the Islamic State, and it was Iran proxies.
- [40:40]
B
Let's talk about this actual war. So it was launched by President Trump and Prime Minister Netanyahu on Saturday 28 February. More or less immediately, the members of the E3 framework, that's France, Germany and the UK, put out a statement expressing concern over Iran's nuclear and ballistic sort of trajectories, but explicitly distanced themselves from the initial military action. So most people have never heard of the E3 framework. And what is very interesting about this is this framework, these three powers, France, Germany and the UK, this framework was set up in 2003 during the Iraq war, specifically to negotiate with Iran over its clandestine nuclear program. Now, my reading of this is that at the time, I remember hardline voices in the US, I'm thinking particularly of Senator John McCain, but others wanted to invade Iran. George W. Bush had included Iran as one of the, quote, unquote, axis of evil. And many voices amongst the neoconservative foreign policy establishment were saying Iran should be next. So I guess the E3 framework was trying to prevent that by adopting a diplomatic approach.
- [41:59]
D
I guess you're right at the time. But as we see now, things are moving fast. So even though France, UK and Germany issued this statement, where we saw that Iran is hitting all over the place, they even tried to hit the incorrect base in Turkey today with a ballistic missile.
- [42:16]
B
That's right, a US base in Turkey was targeted by ballistic missiles, which is very reckless because it might force Erdogan to join this war.
- [42:23]
D
Exactly. This is on one hand, and on the other hand, a UK base was touched in Cyprus while hit in Cyprus. It is UK territory on the one hand, and on the other hand, Cyprus is part of the European Union. So of course, European countries are assessing the situation and they are in a way contributing to the military effort, defensive military effort, regarding bilateral military agreements with the Gulf countries. So they are already actually in the war. But permit me to say, I would put this statement also in a very more actual framework. Meaning if you go back to the speech of Emmanuel Macron regarding nuclear deterrence, the number one partner of France is the UK and the uk, you know, left the European Union. So France is succeeding to drag back the UK in this effort, meaning knowing that the UK is part of the Security Council, UK has the bomb as France and Germany as a third partner. And what is new and what President Macron said, he said that French fighters would be deployed, meaning able to carry nuclear weapons, will be deployed all over the European Union, could be actually deployed all over the European Union. So this is really in policy, in strategic terms and policies in Europe. This is really something very, very, very, very new. And I would put this E3 statement in this frame.
- [43:49]
B
Well, yes, I mean, yesterday in that remarkable bit of theatrics, Macron delivered his speech in front of the French nuclear submarine and then led this huge assembly of kind of French policymakers in the Marseillaise. You know, it was quite stirring, quite remarkable. But by saying that France is willing or perhaps just determined to extend its nuclear umbrella across much of Europe, Macron is seizing this opportunity to kind of further long held ambitions by the French security and military, the French state, frankly, to become the power of Europe. That's what it seems to me. Maybe that's me being anglophone. But this is interesting because on the one hand, since France played such an important role in the E3 advocating diplomacy, diplomatic negotiations to, to neutralize the Iranian nuclear threat, it was this approach that Barack Obama pivoted to in 2008 which led to the, you know, the negotiations over the US Iranian nuclear deal, which the E3 were the main kind of mediators for. So Europe and especially I think France had a lot of buy in to that nuclear deal. Trump obviously tore it apart. And people kind of might think that France on the one hand, is dovish towards Iran in general, but I'm not sure that's fair. Last year, after years of Iran's kind of non compliance with its commitments regarding its nuclear program, the E3 triggered the so called snapback mechanism of UN Resolution 2231 which reimposed sanctions. And then earlier this year, the whole EU declared the IRGC a terrorist organization, which has very much facilitated Donald Trump's ability to at least rationalize this war. So I don't think dovishness towards Iran is correct. And on the other hand, you know, Wasim, France has often seen Macron and Starmer and these, these characters are seen as stuck in the past, emphasizing international law, emphasizing international institutions that Trump and other players, certainly Iran are happy to kind of not use. And yet France is making this very muscular move yesterday saying, nope, we are taking charge of Europe's security. So maybe there's a bit more bite in France's bark than people are saying.
- [46:07]
D
Exactly. You are right. You summed it up in the right way. We are entering a new phase, a new era where France wants to assume the role that was assumed by the US Meaning military and nuclear umbrella for Europe. And in a way, that's what President Trump was asking for since his first term as President of the United States. So they are taking this path, and it's in the interest of France, of course, but also of Europe. And this is why the partnership with UK despite the fraxit, despite all the political turmoil that was caused by the Brexit, is really something important to capitalize on. And of course, when you talk about international institutions, of course we see that the international world order, as it was called, or as it is called, is actually very, very weakened today because it's a play of power. And this is why Macron also is aware of this and the French establishment, because Macron is here today, it's not going to be here next year. And the submarine that he's talking in front of is going to be at the sea in 2036. So we are talking really about strategic decision, where the power play is at play. And France is aware of, very aware of this, because of course, if they don't take this path, they're going to be squeezed and crushed by other power players. And allow me one last thing that many people forget. The world order as we saw it after the Cold War, well, actually is the result of the west winning that war. This is why we had peace, because there is only one power broker, the west, and a solid alliance between Europe and the United States. Today, this alliance is weakened on one hand. And on the other hand, other players want to also have their say. So, of course, the winners of the Cold War, if they want to have a say, they have to assert their power. And meaning the Western world as a whole, meaning the United States and Europe,
- [48:07]
B
Well, Macron is asserting French power, and possibly he's asserting French power in the name of Europe. He really is adopting a very strong position. He announced the redeployment of the Charles de Gaulle nuclear powered aircraft carrier and its frigate. So a big task force, really, from the Baltic Sea, where I suppose it was involved in the Russia Ukraine war, to the Mediterranean.
- [48:29]
D
Actively, actively involved.
- [48:31]
B
That's a big move. Of course, the question is, does this empower Russia? Sort of inadvertently. That's interesting. You know, Europe can't be fighting wars on two fronts. I Think that's a big part of this whole story. But also the United States has for years now been trying to cajole the Europeans to take more initiative and to take care of their own defense, to spend more on defense. The United States is, is a very strange, let's say imperial hegemon, as its left wing critics call it, because it's a kind of imperial hegemon that's been desperate for the Europeans to defend themselves, to build up their military power. However, December's national security Strategy that the Trump administration published made it also clear that the United States still expects Europe to remain a part of the Atlantic world order that is led by America. So is this going to happen or is France charting a more independent course for Europe? Because part of this Iran war that is not spoken about very much is a larger geostrategic contest between the United States and China, which has been using Iran as a kind of bridgehead or trying to create the conditions where Iran can distract America from the Pacific. What is France's strategic buy in to that general contest? France, Europe does not have the same degree of energy independence as the United States, et cetera, does. And in general, France might rely, or Europe might rely on China more than it's willing not to. What's that angle in terms of France?
- [50:00]
D
As far as I know, France is trying to, as I said before, to have like a third pass regarding this, this conflict that might occur between United States and China. But you should know that France is very aware about this competition. And even on the industrial and economic level, there is no more illusions about the competitions that are taking place. I'm just going to give you an example. Many years ago, it is not new. A Chinese engineer, for example, or French engineers that who are married to Chinese nationals, well, are forbidden from strategic facilities, meaning nuclear facilities, even on the civilian domain, you see. So everybody is aware today that the competition is upcoming or is already taking place. But what President Macron said in his speech yesterday to talk about it one more time, he said that what he is constructing or building as an alliance for this advanced deterrence, as he called it, is part of the alliance with the US as part of NATO, is not like declaring NATO dead, you see. But the thing about the U.S. which I can understand fully, is that U.S. wants Europeans to buy us arm, you see, and at the same time they want them to be independent. So it's a big dilemma. It's a big dilemma. While France is the only country in Europe capable of building, for example, a jet fighter from a to Z meaning the Rafael. France and the UK are the only countries who have nuclear power, nuclear weapons and the ability to deliver them. This is only. This is also something very important. So you said France want to have, want to play a role inside Europe as France, of course, because France without Europe doesn't wait much, you know, in the upcoming competition. And I guess that all European countries understood this today. But if you just look very simply at arms deals between European countries and France, well, they are way lower than the deals with the U.S. you see. So I can understand why the U.S. wants Europeans to buy American weapons. But one should also understand what is actually the aim of France in this regard.
- [52:08]
B
So let's return quickly to the actual war and what is possibly likely to happen for France, starting with the Gulf. So France has defense obligations to the uae, Kuwait and Qatar. They have signed bilateral defense agreements with all three of those countries based on military cooperation and giving France basing rights and requires France to consider, I mean, gives an option to defend partners under attack. So all of those countries are under attack. What has France's response been?
- [52:40]
D
Well, France responded militarily with its planes, at least in the UAE during this war. They downed many Iranian drones. You know that the French naval base was attacked in Abu Dhabi. So they did not hesitate to put their planes in the air once the UAE demanded it. You know, because at the first phases of the war, the UAE and the countries you mentioned did not ask France to put up its planes and defend their territory. But that's a done thing now as we speak. And you should remember that before, in the first phase, the 12 days war, France also used its planes in Jordan to down Iranian drones. So France is very active militarily in the region for the simple reason that you explained that they have bilateral agreements, but also because it has a big military presence and big military capabilities in regard of downing drones and downing ballistic. Ballistic missiles, and which are fully used, as we speak, in defending either French military facilities, which are mostly common military facilities with us.
- [53:49]
C
Yeah.
- [53:49]
D
And of course, the countries who ask for this, for this intervention. So France is saying we are using our capabilities in a defensive manner.
- [53:58]
B
What about the Eastern Med? So, you know, Hezbollah, Iranian proxy fired some drones at the UK base in Cyprus. You know, France's colonial history links it to Lebanon to a large extent. What is France's role likely to be? Let's say if the war between Israel and Hezbollah really heats up, properly speaking, will France play an active role? And then there's the Syria dimension as well.
- [54:23]
D
Sure. It's a Very good question. France is present militarily in Lebanon. It is heating up between Hezbollah and Israel. France is present as UNIFIL troops, United nations troops, but also has a presence of its own which is very small but still. So we don't know yet how it's going to unfold. What I can tell you that there is intelligence sharing, very advanced intelligence sharing with the Lebanese army, the Lebanese authority. The same thing is ongoing with Syria. It's an emergent coordination, but it is ongoing. It will be reinforced because of the ongoing war with Iran. This is like, it's not analysis, it's information. So let's, we should wait and see how it's going to really unfold on the ground. But as we speak, intelligence services of the three countries are working together in regard of Iran. Iranian proxy.
- [55:25]
B
Yeah, I mean we've seen reports that the Lebanese state, the Lebanese army is, let's say, finally doing something to neutralize Hezbollah inside Lebanon. Even reports of Hezbollah fighters really unwilling to go south to defend Hezbollah there and are giving up their weapons and turning themselves over. For those of us who have long wished to see a Lebanon free of Iranian proxies, this is I think an optimistic sign that, that progress can be made there. Of course Israel has invaded, so God knows what will happen. I guess France is playing a role in an advisory and an intelligence role in that kind of coordination.
- [56:05]
D
Yes, of course they are playing a role. They are encouraging Lebanese authorities, which as you said, it's a first actually where you have all Lebanese authorities, executive authorities, asking Hezbollah not to use, not to attack Israel from Lebanon. They failed, Hezbollah attacked. But you are talking about really like low scale attacks as we speak. We have Israeli incursions, we have Israeli drones hitting 11 wherever they want. So the situation is actually unfolding and of course France is trying to play a role to help the Lebanese authorities, but we don't know yet. So as you said, yes, some Hezbollah operatives were arrested, were stopped. I don't know if they were arrested, but stopped at least in some areas on some checkpoints. But we don't know yet. We don't have any visibility how Hezbollah will play this card. Will Hezbollah try to make it full blown war with the Lebanese state? What will be the consequences? Does he have the ability to do so? Because he's really weakened today. So we should not like overestimate the capacities of Hezbollah today. And I think it also depends on the response from Israel. If Israel decides to go like militarily on the ground and occupy southern Lebanon. Well, it could give like a kind of alibi to Hezbollah and take off some gods from the hands of the Lebanese state, you see? So it's a really, really complicated, complicated issue. But as you said, it is worth noting that for the first time, you have the Lebanese president, the Lebanese prime minister, the Lebanese executive, the Lebanese military, trying to control or contain at least Hezbollah. And if you listen to the Lebanese media, if you listen to Lebanese politicians, when we are hearing things that we couldn't have imagined be hearing like a year ago.
- [57:56]
B
So how would you describe the lines of communication between Paris and Tel Aviv or Jerusalem? What are the. What kind of, sort of coordination, what kind of cooperation is there between France and Israel?
- [58:09]
D
Well, they talk. I don't know how much they are coordinating. I think that if you go back to what we were saying at the beginning of our discussion, meaning the threat of Iranian terror plots in Europe, I think there is a kind of coordination with Israel about this intelligence coordination. The entire coordination never stopped, despite political declarations from both. Both sides. And as I told you, despite everything we're hearing today, France and European countries are closer than ever to the vision or the policies that are being conducted by Israel, United States, regarding Iran and Hamas and Hezbollah.
- [58:51]
B
Well, finally, I'd just like to ask you about the Red Sea. If the Houthis enter the war in a big way, it could disrupt shipping in the Red Sea, as it did last year. Now, last time, President Trump was openly scornful of Europe's unwillingness or inability to help police the Red Sea. Would that change this time around, do you think? Do you think France would take a more active role in combating Houthi attempts to disrupt shipping in the Red Sea?
- [59:18]
D
Well, it's a very good question, Thomas, because I understand what President Trump declared. But you know, and I know that French brigades contributed actively in downing drones that were heading towards Israel in the Red Sea. We have footage of it. I was the one talking about it when I got the footage on tv. So it was an active, active contribution to the war effort to defend actually, Israel from Houthi missiles and drones. Those are facts, you see. But regarding your question, do the Houthis have the ability to do what they did before today? I don't think so.
- [59:54]
C
Huh.
- [59:55]
B
You think that they. So is this a direct result of America's campaign about a year ago against the Houthis? Of course, it successfully degraded because there, you know, some people say that it was more for show than anything, but you think some strategic objectives were met then.
- [60:09]
D
But of course, look at the situation today. Why aren't they ending entering the dance more active Italy, they could have lost the means or not but for sure they lost the political will to do it at least for now. So of course that's, that's a score. That's an achievement.
- [60:27]
B
Well, Waseem Nasser, I'm going to let you go. Thank you for coming at the last minute to talk about France and France's posture as regards the Iran war going on. It's been extremely illuminating and you know, you really are one of the friends of the show so we're really grateful to you. Thank you.
- [60:42]
D
Thank you, Thomas. Cheers. Bye bye.
- [60:45]
A
That was Waseem Nasser. I'm grateful to him and to Sir Tom Tugenhot for joining me today and for helping me see just a little better through the fog of war. I'm Thomas Small. Conflicted is a message heard Production Our executive producers are Jake Warren and Max Warren. This episode was produced and edited by Thomas Small.