← CONFLICTED
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- [00:01]
A
This episode is brought to you by White Claw Surge. Nice choice hitting up this podcast. No surprises. You're all about diving into tastes everyone in the room can enjoy. Just like White Claw Surge. It's for celebrating those moments when connections have been made and the night's just begun. With bold flavors and 8% alcohol by volume. Unleash the night. Unleash White Claw Surge.
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B
Please drink responsibly.
- [00:24]
A
Hard seltzer with flavors. 8% alcohol by volume. White cloth seltzer works Chicago, Illinois. Hello, dear listeners. I'm back. Thomas Small here with you. Eamon, there you are. Looking well rested, I must say.
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B
Absolutely.
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A
After what has been a few pretty harrying days there for all residents in the uae. This war. This war is not stopping.
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B
Well, it's not stopping at all. But thank God for all our dear listeners, the oracle of Arabia and the prophet of doom and gloom is here.
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A
Well, you say doom and gloom, but. But, you know, everyone woke up today to find out that the war did stop for a certain somebody. I'm talking about Ali Larijani, who Israel has confirmed was assassinated last night.
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B
Oh, yeah, my bro Larry. He's dead now. Oh, dear bro Larry. See you in hell.
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A
No, no, no, no, no. We mustn't take delight in the death of a fellow human being, Eamon.
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B
Indeed. Except, like, you know, he took delight in the death of many of his fellow and delighted in the deaths of so many Syrians, Yemenis, Iraqis. You know what, Lakina, basically, I would be just a little bit delighted. I know, Lakina, basically, we are not supposed to. We are supposed to be humane, but sometime it is humane to delight on the death of those who were so inhumane.
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A
Well, Ali Larijani, RIP he's been removed from the battlefield. The real question that has swirled around people, people's minds, especially following our great episode from last week about Mujta Bahamane and all the eschatological ideas that swirl around him. A lot of people are wondering, where the hell is this new supreme leader? Is he dead? Is he alive? Is he in a coma? Is he compos mentis? Is he really in charge? Is he a puppet? Amen. Is Mojtaba Khamenei actually like alive and well and running Iran?
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B
Oh, he is in the mini occultation according to some of his followers. I'm not kidding. Seriously, it's been there. I mean, apart from the fact that we have serious Iranian newspapers suggesting that he wasn't chosen by the 88 members of the Council of Experts in Fact, he was anointed by none other than the Mahdi himself. And therefore he entered into that mini occultation. They call it Al ghaybasoora, the small hiding. Yeah, yeah, minor occultation. That's what it means. And it's like, oh my God, you know, it means maybe he is dead or compass Mentis, or, you know, it doesn't matter. Like it means he is properly hiding. And, you know, they are trying to shield him, you know, from being taken out because they need his legend as the Khorasani. They need his legend as the eschatological figure, the messianic savior to remain, to keep rallying the troops to a rather lost hopeless cause. I mean, man, I don't know how highly enriched the narcotics in Iran right now, but it seems like it's being consumed in mass these days among the leadership, of course.
- [03:56]
A
Well, Eamonn, in this episode of Conflicted, we will not be talking about Mujtaba Khamenei, nor talking about eschatological themes at all. We're going to shift our focus to geography a bit and focus on the Strait of Hormuz, its history, the long history of geostrategic rivalry over the Strait and Kharg island, also very geostrategically important, which recently, you know, a lot of strategic minds have been thinking hard about.
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B
And I'm so delighted, Thomas, that I will be joining you on this geographical journey as long as you get, you know, basically all of your facts about the Straits of Hormuz. Straight.
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A
Terrible, terrible, terrible.
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B
Couldn't resist. Couldn't resist.
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A
Eamon. Let's get right into it, Eamonn. Did you know that the Strait of Hormuz is not just geostrategically important from the perspective of international power, politics and trade routes and things, but it is theologically important. About 20,000 years ago, the earth was in what's called the last glacial maximum. So it was essentially a massive ice age. And sea levels were about 120 meters lower than today. At that time, what is now the Persian Gulf was a big marshy alluvial basin crossed by four major rivers. The Tigris, the Euphrates, the Karun, which is in Iran, and Wadi Batan, which is an extinct river in what is now Saudi Arabia. These four rivers flowed down into the Indian Ocean, drained through what is now the Strait of Hormuz into the Gulf of Oman. Now, as the ice age ended, sea levels began to rise. And between 14,000 and 8,000 years ago, so over that quite long 6,000 year period, the Indian Ocean progressively pushed back through the Strait of Hormuz and essentially flooded this basin, turning what was probably a rich and verdant and well habited lowland into the modern Gulf. Now what's interesting about this, and you know, we like to talk about the deep past and we like to talk about a bit of theology on conflicted. What's interesting about this is some scholars suggest that maybe, just maybe this experience of the slow flooding of this massive verdant alluvial valley might be what is, you know, culturally remembered in the story of Noah's flood, which, you know, does seem to have emerged first in Mesopotamia and then became more widely known. Isn't that interesting? So the point being that, you know, concern over this part of the world, the Strait of Hormuz, and possible, you know, geographical or sort of global catastrophe about it is as old as mankind.
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B
In fact, you know, Thomas, the civilization of SUMER, which existed 7,000 years ago, they put together this myth about like Utnapishtim, you know, the man who warned his people about a impending flood and he built an ark. So it's very, in a very close story, like, I mean, to the biblical and the Quranic storytelling and in the fact that Somart was just a civilization. On the convergence, you know, of the Euphrates, the Tigris and the Karun rivers into what is now known as Ahwar, not Ahwaz Ahwar, which is the marshes, you know. And so, you know, so in my opinion, like, you know, I think maybe that informed the flooding of the Gulf. So I can't believe the fact that the Gulf might be geographically the youngest large body of water, you know, salt water in the world.
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A
Yes, no, that's interesting. We think of it as having great antiquity, but possibly it is in fact just a child, which may be why people on either side of it have been fighting over it like toddlers forever.
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B
Exactly.
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A
And that's the main theme of today's episode in a way, this constant geostrategic rivalry over the Strait of Hormuz and access to the Gulf. I mean, right now we're all, you know, we're focused on the war and we're focused on all the possible catastrophic downstream consequences of this war. But I think it does help to just take a breath and be reminded that everything we're seeing play out right now has played out many times before.
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B
Absolutely.
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A
Because of the importance of access to, to Mesopotamia through the Strait of Hormuz.
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B
And that's why Thomas, you know, we need to always stress to our dear listeners that the obvious like the bleeding obvious that geography is destiny, as Ian Morris, you know, basically, like, argued in his wonderful book Geography is Destiny. I mean, it's like, you couldn't have it, you know, put better than this. And I recommend that book highly, you know, because it talks about, you know, how geography shape, you know, of course, without any hesitation. Like, I mean, that's obvious, but, you know, it shapes the, you know, the destiny of the nations. It's just geography. But it is not just geography, as Thomas will explain.
- [09:40]
A
Right, now, let's start with history, and we're gonna go back to the Middle Ages first. So Hormuz was originally a city on the mainland on the Persian side, the Iranian side of the Gulf coast, the. At the mouth of the Minab River. So Minab has been in the news because there's a town of that name now a bit up that river, where on the very first day of this war, a missile struck a school inside an IRGC compound, killing lots of schoolgirls. Tremendous controversy over that. We don't need to go into that here. So people know this word Minab. Well, that's the name of a river. That river's source is in Kerman, in the Iranian plateau, and it flows southward, cutting a valley into what is otherwise the very forbidding Lower Zagros Mountains. So this valley, for a long, long, long time, has been crucial in communications, trade, transport between the vital inner Iranian plateau and the coast. So it's this one really navigable stretch of the Lower Zagros. So the Minab river, very important. And at the mouth of the river was a city called Hormuz, a port city that flowed, you know, into the Indian Ocean through the Gulf of Oman. Now, in the 11th century, a Persianate dynasty that basically controlled the Abbasid caliph. You know, it's sort of taken over the Abbasid Caliphate, the dynasty of the Buyids.
- [11:10]
B
Although in Arabic, we have. Just for the benefit of the Arabic listeners, the Buyids are actually the Buways, you know, just for the benefit of our Arab listeners to know who we're talking about.
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A
So this Persianate dynasty, the Buwahis, the buyids, in the 11th century, it cracked up, as was often happening. You know, this is part of this story. Iran is both extremely important and always very volatile, going quickly from extreme power to sudden chaos, extreme power to sudden chaos. And the periods of chaos have real big effects for all of the neighboring areas, just like what we're seeing now, dear listeners.
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B
Absolutely, absolutely.
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A
I don't know if you've noticed, but Iran is entering a period of extreme Chaos. So when in the 11th century, the Buya dynasty cracked up, a vacuum of power opened up in the Persian Gulf. Cause they could no longer project their power there. And an Omani called Mohammed Dhiramkou. I don't know how to pronounce it. You probably know Ayman Muhammad Dhiramku.
- [12:11]
B
Hey, Mohammed Diramku. Muhammad Daramku.
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A
Muhammad Daramku. From Oman, he crossed the strait and established himself as the ruler, the king, in fact, of Hormuz. Now, nominally his dynasty was a vassal of Iranian rulers across the mountain. But this dynasty, in the middle of the 13th century, cut ties with its overlords in the interior and really became an independent kingdom. The Kingdom of Hormuz, which. Which straddled both sides of the Gulf.
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B
Exactly. And it was an Arab kingdom from Oman. You know, they traced their origins to Al Azd. So they are as these basically of Yemen. So talk about. The connections between Yemen and Persia extend very long time ago.
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A
Let's talk about demographics right up front and center here. Arab communities have lived on both sides of the Gulf for as long as there are any historical accounts. So Arabs are certainly not recent arrivals on the northern Persian Gulf coast. And Arabs and Iranians always coexisted on both sides of the coast. In fact, that's the point. The coast was the Persian Gulf. The Arabian Gulf is like a lake. And people lived all around the lake. And it more brought them together. They were more similar to each other on both sides. Arabs and Persians and Lari and Baloch and Africans. Like, lots of people lived there. And they had a. They had one culture.
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B
Yes, absolutely. Like, I mean, to the point where if you, you know, for example, like, you know, go to Bahrain. Bahrain, for example, like, I mean, 2,750 years ago, there were, you know, the kingdom of Delmon, which was a. And, you know, a Persian at Arab or Arabized Persians. You never know, like, you know, basically. But, you know, it's just fascinating. And it is like, you know, basically on the other side of the Gulf from Iran. This is why, like, we have to establish the fact that the demographics, the music, the culture, you know, the songs, you know, the food, the spices, you know, you know, all of this, like, you know, is extremely, you know, close, absolutely close between all the sides, you know, basically of the Gulf, the shoria.
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A
And it is a mixture of Arabian and Iranic peoples and languages and influences. It's a mixture, and it has been forever now, because geography is destiny in general. The vast majority of the time, the whole Arabian Persian Gulf ring was dominated by a power in the Iranian plateau. We have to be honest about this. The Zagros mountains are like a sheer rock wall that grant whoever controls them, and that person will invariably be based on the plateau beyond them. Yes, it grants them this high ground that gives them total, a much stronger ability to dominate the land below. And this is true from the Sasanian period, you know, even before from the. From the ancient Persian period when Alexander the Great was conquering the Persian Empire, he sent navigators to explore the Strait of Hormuz to try to grab it, to keep it very, you know, to keep it in his camp because, you know, it was so strategically important there. But also it was hard to keep it in the Sasanian period, the great Persian dynasty that was opposed to the Romans, they fought for centuries. You know, it was able to wrest control of both coasts from the mercantile ports along the coasts, which were all in control at the time of Arabian, you know, dynasties. It controlled them, though, for hundreds of years. So in general, Iranian power has always dominated the goal.
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B
Exactly. And actually, if you look at during the Sassanian period, which of course came roughly about 200 years after Christ, you know, all the way until the fall at the hands of the advancing Arab Muslim armies. But prior to that, most of these, you know, ports in Jebel, you know, ancient Jebel, basically, like in Saudi Arabia, which many Saudis don't know, it was a Christian, you know, stronghold.
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A
Oh, yes. Well, there are monasteries all around the Persian Gulf. We'll talk about that a bit later.
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B
Exactly. And then there were Christian monasteries also in Bahrain. But also in the most important one, we will talk about it also, a lot is the kingdom of Julfar. You know, for people who don't know what Julfar is, it's the Ras Al Khaimah, the emirate of Ras Al Khaimah. This is a very important emirate. You know, people, like, always talk about Abu Dhabi, Dubaiwi, you know, if they are generous, they might know about Sharjah. But really not many people know about Rak Rak R A K Rak, which is Ras Al Khaimah. Ras Al Khaimah was basically, like named after Queen Ziba, which is basically like a name. And she had a tent at the top of the mountain. That's what a khayma is, and that's why it's called Ras Al Khaimah. You know, the top of the tent.
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A
The tent, yeah, yeah.
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B
And she had the tent at the top of the mountain to actually, you know, to signal her dominance or the dominance of her People, you know, over the Gulf, you know, coast and Julfar, you know, had a very important tribe. And we will mention it later, it will be more important. But it's a tribe that had important influence across the islands of the Gulf, you know, which is the tribe of Zaab, you know, so there is a wadi in Ras Al Khayma. It's called Za', b, you know, and as Zaabis, who straddle both Rasahma and Abu Dhabi, had a great influence there. We will talk about them as we advance in the episode.
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A
So the kingdom of Hormuz, and they
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B
were Christians originally, by the way. They were Christians originally, you know, and
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A
then converted to Islam based on Christian theology. We're all Christians originally, Ayman. I believe Muslims have a very different view about that question.
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B
Hallelujah, my brother. Hallelujah.
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A
Okay, anyway, the kingdom of Hormuz straddled both sides of the Gulf, as I say, but then in the late 13th century, so we're in the late 1200s, the 1290s, chaos in the Iranian center was induced by the Turco Mongol conquest of Iran. And once again, great political insecurity resulted. And the ruling dynasty, that dynasty of the kingdom of Hormuz had to decamp from that old town of Hormuz to the island of Jarun, which was renamed Hormuz. So right now, if you look on a map, there is an island just by the strait called Hormuz. That island was named after the older city. So the kingdom moved to the island to protect itself in the chaos and eventually paid tribute to the new Mongol Ilkhanate dynasty on the mainland. But again, was very autonomous. And the wealth and splendor of the island kingdom of Hormuz became legendary.
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B
Come on. Of course, Lakhana. I mean, the island that straddled the waterway, the narrow waterway, which saw the flow of spice, you know, again. Oh, my God, I feel like I'm in an episode of Dune here.
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A
You know, actually, that reminds me, Eamon. And I cannot believe that I didn't bring this up last week when we were recording the episode of Mujtabachamaneh. But the whole thing is very, very Dune. My God.
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B
Yeah, exactly.
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A
Prophecies being seeded in advance in order to affect political change and. And people bringing those prophecies, you know, they're making them happen in order to. So that they can happen. Like it's a. It's just Dune.
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B
Exactly. I feel like, you know, the Council of experts are the Bene Gesserits, except they are like in the men instead of women. Exactly.
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A
So the spice was flowing via the kingdom of Hormuz.
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B
Exactly. Because the spice was coming from India, from Sri Lanka, you know, from Sri Lanka, they used to import very highly sought after spice, which is cinnamon. You know, so just the trade in cinnamon alone used to bring. Which is the ounces. Like, basically, if you talk about gold ounces, it used to bring something like between 40 and 60,000 gold ounces to the kingdom of Hormuz, you know, just by bringing in, you know, the cinnamon and then selling it to the rest of the empires, like, you know, basically that were there from the, you know, Byzantines to the Europeans and all of that. Like, all through the Straits of Hormuz, it goes into Basra, and from Basra into, you know, what used to be Baghdad, because it was destroyed by then, and then from there through the Euphrates river to the Anatolian Plateau, and from there, oh, my God, like, you know, basically to the rest of Europe, even. It used to go all the way to Novgorod.
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A
Absolutely. Up the Volga River.
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B
Yeah, exactly. Like in Kyiv and, you know, the Kingdom of the Rus. Can you believe it? You know, it's like the Russians had spies, you know, from the Straits of Hormuz since 800 years ago.
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A
One thing that's sort of different now in those trade dynamics is that whereas for most of history, the Strait of Hormuz was important for imports from outside because of the discovery of oil. It's mainly important now for exports.
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B
Exactly.
- [21:37]
A
From the Middle east outwardly. So that's a change. But. But what is not a change is that all, you know, attention was focused on the Gulf because of its trade. Trade. It's important to global trade. And that was certainly the case when, in the year 1507, Europeans first arrived. So this is another important thing to stress, that for hundreds of years now, European power has been intimately interconnected with local power centers around the Gulf to mutual advantage in order to keep trade flowing. And the first Europeans to arrive were the Portuguese. They built a fort on the island of Hormuz. They installed a military garrison there, but they kept the Hormuzi kings in power as nominal rulers. The kingdom became a Portuguese protectorate. And for over a hundred years, this relationship suited the Hormuzi kings because their ability to project power in the Gulf actually increased by being backed by the Portuguese. And I think, Eamonn, to this day, it's important to realize that local power players in the Gulf to this day are allied with Western powers because it is mutually advantageous. They're not just like puppets or bootlickers of the West. It's because it is good policy.
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B
Exactly. Because at the end of the day, like, if you remember, go to any country in the Gulf, with the exception of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, but really Bahrain and UAE and Oman and many islands that are now under the control of Iran, you will find the remnants either intact or, you know, basically like ruined Portuguese castles and forts. You know, there is one that is beautifully intact actually to this day in Bahrain, and it's called the Castle of the Portuguese, you know, and so it's in Bahrain, like, I mean, and so it was straddling the entire coast of the Gulf, the entirety of the Gulf, like, and it was, you know, more or less like an almost a Portuguese lake for A while, almost 100 years, as you said, you know. And yes, you see, the Arabs basically liked it until they no longer liked it.
- [23:56]
A
Well, the reason they no longer liked it, or in fact it really wasn't up to them, was because perfidious Albion got involved. The English, who were then the upstarts and great rivals of the Portuguese, they allied with a newish and growing Iranian dynasty, the Safavids.
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B
Oh, yes.
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A
So the English allied with the Safavids and Portugal was forced out of Hormuz. Safavid power increased. And so once again the wheel turned. And for a while, the Iranian plateau dominated the Gulf, in this case the Safavid empire. The port of Bandar Abbas then became much more important, and Hormuz's importance really diminished relative to Bandar Abbas, which is still a very important port for the Iranian plateau today.
- [24:49]
B
Exactly. And this is, I think, where we see also the entry of the Dutch and then after that, the English again. And then, like, I mean, we will see this playing like, you know, the, the. The great maritime powers of Netherlands, of which is, you know, the Dutch East India Company, you know, practically as well as the English East India Company, as well as, you know, the Portuguese. We will see them like, in a. Basically like, I mean, fighting over dominance within the Gulf, you know, sometimes allied with the Persians, sometime allied with the Arabs, you know. Yeah, we see it.
- [25:23]
A
And at the same time, that cycle of chaos and strength on the Iranian plateau continued. So in 1722, the Safavid state suddenly collapsed after a devastating invasion of that empire by Afghan Pashtuns. And in the wake of the collapse of Safavid power, the Gulf coasts were once again embroiled in chaos. And in this context, an episode occurred that you very much like Aemon, it's really something out of Game of Thrones, it's the real Red Wedding, the jagged peninsula. Now, you know, part of Oman that projects into the Strait of Hormuz is called Musandam. That had been a part of the kingdom of Hormuz. And in general, for a long time, Oman, including Muscat, was tied into the Safavid imperial zone. So when the Safavids collapsed, this caused a civil war to break out in Oman. And one half of that civil war invited Persians to intervene, at which point a man called Ahmed bin Said, then a provincial governor of the Omani town of Suhar, rose in prominence.
- [26:41]
B
So Ahmad bin Said took advantage of the fall of the Safavid empire when Nader Shah invaded the Safavid empire from Afghanistan in 1737. And this is when the Omanis started to, you know, the Omani Arabs, they started to push against Persian rule, and they pushed them all the way to Suhar. You know, Suhar was in the news recently because the irgc, like, in a sentence, drones against it, you know, against the port there. But it is a very important port city, you know, just on the northern edge of the Gulf of Oman, which basically is the straddling the other side of the Hormuz Strait from the Arabian Persian Gulf. So this is where you see, like, you know, that, you know, Ahmed bin Said pushed and pushed and pushed and basically pushed Taqi Khan. Taqi Khan was the Persian, the last Persian, you know, kind of like, I mean, governor, you know, of Oman. He pushed him all the way into the fort of suhar. And after nine months of siege, you know, finally in 1744, Taqi Khan decided to surrender. So, but the surrender basically was done in a way in which, okay, there are 7,000 Persian garrison. You know, they wanted to make sure, like, the Omanis wanted to make sure that they will never, you know, but if they allow them safe passage to Persia, they might come back and, you know, fight again another day. So Ahmad bin Said, in a castle called Barka, he invited them, you know, for this beautiful, you know, feast. So it is called the Feast of Barka. That's the episode in the Feast of Barka, which would later be known as the Red Feast of Barca, because that's a real red wedding, basically. Like, and forget what happened in that season three of Game of Thrones, this is the real red wedding here.
- [28:37]
A
During the feast, and this was all planned in advance. A prearranged signal was given and out jumped some Omani fighters.
- [28:47]
B
Exactly. And then the slaughter began. Thousands of Persian commanders and soldiers were massacred their bodies were thrown to the sea. And it was the end of really the last effective Persian military rule in that part of the Arabian peninsula.
- [29:10]
A
So this is the origin story of the Al Bu Said dynasty, which has ruled Oman ever since, since 1744. This meant Ahmed bin Said was elected imam after he so successfully resisted the Persians slaughtering everyone. And in some accounts of this red wedding of Barca Amon, the whole population rose up and took revenge against the Persian garrison for years of occupation. So all the people in the area participated in the slaughter of their Persian overlords. And I think, you know, it's another reminder that Iranian power, always seeking to project itself from those mountains across the Gulf and into Arabia, has always been resented by the Arabs against whom that power was projected, who, you know, fight back. This is as old as time and we're seeing it now, but it's not new.
- [30:04]
B
Exactly. And this is why when people keep asking like, oh, you know, what are we going to do? I mean, come on, guys, like, basically we've been living this for two and a half thousand years. I mean, this is history repeating itself again and again and again and again. Just calm down. Once we have basically a good, decent government in the plateau in Iran, it will reflect basically on a decent relationship across the Gulf. But if we have an antagonistic, aggressive government in Tehran and the plateau there, unfortunately we are not going to get much love from across the mountains. We're going to get lots of ballistic missiles and drones. In the past, it used to be ships and spears and arrows and everything. Nothing changed except the technology.
- [30:55]
A
Nothing changes. Well, when the Safavid empire was weakened by that invasion from Afghanistan and the Persian Gulf area was thrown into chaos, Bandar Abbas was part of that chaos. And the Dutch East India Company, which had an outpost in Bandar Abbas, were kicked out. So they had to leave Bandar Abbas and what they did is they sailed up the Gulf to an island which they captured and fortified. And this island is called Haarg Island. Very important because it's now in the news. Haarg island, which is about a third the size of Manhattan island. So, you know, not huge but not tiny, is a very important and very ancient, you know, place. It has a source of fresh water on the island itself, which makes it somewhat unique, meaning that there was always some crop cultivation there. It has a beautiful, beautiful archaeological site of a late 6th century Christian monastery. I mean, the photos of it really make my imagination sing. It just, you can see, it's so clear, there's a basilica, you See the columns? And you can imagine exactly what it was like because, you know, until the 14th century, and people forget this, until the 14th century, there were thriving Christian populations all around the Gulf.
- [32:21]
B
Exactly. However, the. Do you remember we talked about Azabi tribe, you know, and talked about the, you know, from Ras Al Khaimah. They inhabited many islands in the Gulf, including, you know, Abu Musa, you know, the one of the three islands disputed between the UAE and Iran, which controlled by Iran right now. And then, you know, not only like, you know, basically they settled Abu Musa, they sailed up north, and before even the Dutch showed up. When the Dutch showed up, they found there are Arab, you know, basically tribe there from Beni Zab, who came all the way from Ras Al Khaimah, you know, in the uae, which now today is a uae. At that time, it used to be called Ras Al Khaimah. And so they, you know, of course, colonized them for a while. But by 1765, Mana az Zaabi, you know, one of the celebrated Arab warriors, you know, basically kicked out the Dutch in a big revolt from the island and drove them away. The irony here is in Iranian imagination, Mana Zabi is celebrated as a Persian
- [33:33]
A
hero because he kicked out the Europeans.
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B
He is immortalized in Persian imagination as that Persian warrior who kicked out the foreign yoke out of Persian land. Guys, just stop it with this, like, I mean, historical vandalism.
- [33:54]
A
It's a reminder that the sort of culture, the ethnographic composition of the Persian Arabian Gulf littoral is mixed between Iranian and Arab. Now, it's true, the Zab tribe did establish a principality on the Iranian side of the Gulf, projected its power around that area, including Kharg Island. They did kick the Dutch out, it's true. And then they ruled independently for three years before the central power on the Iranian plateau strengthened again and a new Iranian dynasty, the Zend dynasty, conquered them. So once again, back and forth, back and forth, back and forth. It never ends. And the Europeans came back. It never ends. The British arrived in strength in the 19th century. Oh, yes, took Kharg Island. And the island was so strategically important. From its position at the north of the Gulf, it was famed for the skill of its sailors. Apparently, the best pilots for ships could be hired in Kharg Island.
- [34:54]
B
Yeah, I mean, for me, Kharg island, you know, traditionally we are part administratively, you know, basically, because that's how the British made it, you know, because of their alliance, like, I mean, with the, you know, Qajar dynasty. Later, of course, they, you know, and later with The Pahlavis, like, you know, basically like, I mean they, they made it, you know, part of the Bushar kind of like in the basically province kind of like, I mean they put it there next to it, you know, so it was, there was Ahwaz province, there was Bushahar province. There was many lurs, many Arabs. And I'm talking this because many people don't understand or don't know that my grandfather in fact like basically was, you know, in the British Army. You know, part of. I talked about the story before in earlier episodes, you know, he fought in the battle of alcohol with General Gordon when he went Baghdad to Baghdad. So basically he's been there fighting in Iraq since 1915. So one of the positions he was awarded, basically he was a Consul General for his Majesty's government in Bushahar overseeing parts of the, the affairs of the Kharg Island. So talk about.
- [36:05]
A
Yeah, amazing. Eamon, goodness gracious, you've got your finger in every goddamn pie. A genetic marker. You, your family have just left some DNA. Every nook and cranny of the Middle East. Now obviously, dear listeners, obviously Harg's modern strategic importance is overwhelmingly about oil.
- [36:26]
B
Oh yes.
- [36:27]
A
So you know, in the early 1950s Kharg began its rise as Iran's principal export terminal. It was connected by submarine pipeline to huge oil fields on the mainland. And more pipelines were built throughout the 70s and by 1973 really it was like a major offshore loading terminal for Iran to fill supertankers with their oil.
- [36:55]
B
And the reason is again geography, because the island is so suitable as a deep water port. It's natural. Basically you see the island as soon as, basically you step literally three, four steps into the water and then boom. Basically you could drop 60 meters easy. So there is that kind of. The island was blessed with deep water natural. So from the Iranian side it's like, why do we have to build a deep water port on the other side where it will cost basically an arm and a leg and a kidney possibly. So why do it when the island is there? Build the submarine pipeline, it's only 30 kilometers less than 20 miles and then that's it. It became very strategic. And that's why Saddam Hussein used to target it so heavily during the Iran Iraq Scud missiles and with his French supplied Exocest missiles, which not only wreaked havoc on Kharg island oil terminals, it also wreaked havoc on the British navy halfway across the world in the battle of the Falklands. Bloody French. They were supplying everyone like Saddam you know, General Galtieri of Argentina.
- [38:18]
A
Well, as President Trump said yesterday in a press conference, he rated President Macron's performance in the current war as 8 out of 10. Pretty good, he said, but you know, they are the French, which I thought was pretty, pretty remarkable thing to say. So anyway, dear listeners, that's the history of this area. Haarg Island, Hormuz, the Strait of Hormuz, just to lay out its geostrategic importance, obviously, but also the fact that it has been fought over. These places have been fought over for centuries, for millennia, with all the same players. A power in the Iranian plateau, local Arab powers around the coast, and European powers seeking a piece of the trade pie that the Persian Gulf has always been for the world. So we're going to take a quick break and when we get back, Eamon is going to tell us about how all of this relates to the present and how questions over America's ability to open the Strait of Hormuz and America's possible ability to capture Kharg island will play very shortly in this ever evolving war. We'll be right back. We're back. We're talking about the Persian Arabian Gulf, we're talking about the Strait of Hormuz, we're talking about Haarg island. In the context of the current war, Eamonn, basically, at the moment, the United States has two strategic objectives, proximate strategic objectives as regards the Gulf. One is to open the strait to get oil flowing again properly, and the other, I think, is to capture Haarg island in order to put maximum pressure on the regime. My first question for you though is what does it mean when people say that Iran has closed the strait? Like literally, what has Iran done? Because sometimes it seems that basically they're just threatening to attack ships and therefore ships aren't going through it.
- [40:35]
B
Okay, look, let me put this in an easy to digest context as to what does it mean to close the Strait of Hormuz. As far as the IRGC was concerned, they had three different ideas of how to do it, and each one really basically is talking about the level of closure. So they wanted to go for the full closure. Initially, the idea was to push some old tankers that were anchored near Bandar Abbas and Kushim island and Hormuz island to push them, you know, basically to navigate them into the strait, you know, maybe five of them in total.
- [41:24]
A
I remember, basically to build a fence there. A fence of ships?
- [41:27]
B
Yes. The idea is that like, I mean, the depth of the water there is about 60 meters and so when you sink two ships on top of each other, you create a barrier of up to 40 meters, 50 meters. And so basically like, you sink them, you torpedo them, you position them in place, you torpedo them with their mini submarines, the Ghadir class submarines. These are mini ones. Each one carry two torpedoes. And then that's it, you sink them. You create a steel barrier there and you close it completely.
- [41:57]
A
And supertankers and battleships could never get through the strait then. It was too narrow. It's too, let's see, shallow.
- [42:03]
B
Exactly. The first day, all of these ships were sank and the submarines that were supposed to do that were destroyed. So it's like from day one, the Americans were wise. They went and they bombed the hell out of them. That's the first thing.
- [42:21]
A
Okay, then let me stop you, because a lot of people are saying now, I mean, again, journalists, top journalists are parroting this idea that the Americans went into this war without having considered the possibility that the IRGC would close the Strait of Hormuz. Now, on the face of it, this is clearly idiotic. These things have been war gamed literally for decades. But you're saying quite the opposite. Not only had they thought about it, but they, as their first point of attack, they had done something about it.
- [42:52]
B
Yeah, I don't know, like, there is a tendency, you know, online, you know, basically like, I mean, from armchair generals, you know, who never, like, you know, basically saw a single day of battle, never basically like anywhere at the receiving end of, you know, a bullet, let alone like, you know, basically a cruise missile, you know, like I did before. You know, it's like they, they don't. They have the tendency to think that American generals are idiots and somehow like, you know, basically if, you know, you know, basically, you know, if you haven't met an American general before, and I met many of them before, as I have explained to you many times, Thomas, before, like in a. Basically like, I mean, and, and they are a different class of people. They know what they're doing. They are not basically going to go into a battle unless I have rehearse and rehearse and rehearse and rehearse. And they are entering this battle alongside Israeli generals supported by Israeli intelligence. So can you imagine Israeli American alliance, basically? I mean, this is the first proper war, by the way, in the history of the two countries where they enter into a battle together. Can you believe it?
- [43:56]
A
It.
- [43:57]
B
Many people don't even realize that. So when you put these two minds together, you know, American ingenuity, military genius, like basically you put it like, you know, with the Israelis and their intelligence and their understanding of the region and their amazing AI, you know, technology which is not the AI we use like basically, you know, to make cat videos. No, I mean basically like, I mean these are AI tools that can basically like, I mean generate multiple scenarios with multiple plans. Actually, Thomas, I sent you our own reports from within our own Co. Gaming, six weeks before the conflict. What are the scenarios of closing? And I gave you lucky. It will be sinking of ships. The Americans will deal with that. It will be like sending the submarines into the strait, the mini submarines. The Americans killed the submarines before they even left. It's like they accounted for every possible scenario. And I will go into the next scenario now.
- [44:59]
A
Yeah, so here's the question. Since on day one they sank those ships and they destroyed the submarines that were going to sink the ships, if you like, why then has Iran been able to close the strait?
- [45:15]
B
I will go into it now. So the hard physical closure of the Straits of Hormuz has been thwarted because to remove these shipwrecks from the bottom of the strait will take months and therefore they have done it with the minimum effort. That's it. They don't have to do anything after that. They don't need to man the strait anymore, you see. So the worst case scenario has been avoided by the US military. Kudos to them, seriously. Basically they really got it right from day one. So the next scenario of closure is the high speedboats which The IRGC amassed 370 of them around Chabahar, which is on the Gulf of Oman, Bandar Abbas, Kushim Island, Abu Musa and many others. On the second, the third and the fourth day they were all destroyed. They were sitting ducks as far as the US Air Force was concerned. They were hunted down one by one. They were destroyed in mass when they were anchored together. They had no hiding place. So the second scenario of having basically these speedboats coming and attacking ships en masse has been eliminated. Then you have the other mini submarines and the other mid size boats which looks like catamarans. Basically they were attacked because they were the third scenario laying the mines. So they were mine laying ships now. They were, you know, they laid about 12 mines now in order to close the strait completely. You need at least a thousand mines to be honest, basically. So 12 mines is just a harassment rather than basically a proper closure. So they avoided that by destroying first the mine storage facilities, the mine laying ships and submarines. And they avoided the ability of the Iranians to mass mine, not in A small mines here and there, but to mass mine the strait. So the third scenario has been avoided. However, all the three scenarios were really the worst case scenarios. And then we go into the aerial closure scenario which is the aerial harassment.
- [47:49]
A
So this is where Iran can fire missiles at ships.
- [47:53]
B
Exactly. Which is the anti ship cruise missiles and the drones. The anti ship Cruise missiles, almost 90% of them have been destroyed. So again in the first seven, eight days of the war they were hunted. That's why we see considerable amount of activities in Bandar Abbas. How much bombardment Bandar Abbas got, it's like I think basically a thousand ton of explosives, A thousand targets there were hit. It's like it's really got the worst possible hit. Like then you navy was shattered, the docks were shattered, the storage facilities, you know, the launch pads for the cruise missiles. The only thing left for them now is the last soft closure option which is the drones. Now here is the issue. Drones are not easy to track and destroy. They are tiny, you know, basically in comparison they are the size of a car. You know, they can be carried on the back of a car and they can be launched easily from anywhere. And Iran got 84,000 of them. That's the problem here is the fact that you know, if you see, you already said it yourself Thomas, you look at the Strait of Hormuz and you see the sheer mountains on the Iranian side, you know, and how this high ground give them, you know, give the IRGC significant advantage. They can fire from there, they can monitor from there. They don't need radars, they need only good binoculars. And that's it, that's all they need, you know, and from there they can identify ships, you know, with their serial numbers and then basically send the drone and the drone will find them and the drone will cause damage. And that is basically where we have a problem is the fact that a ship carrying 1 million barrel of oil, 2 million barrels of oil, so a 1 million barrel of oil, basically you multiply this by 100 and how much is that be? Basically that will be $100 million floating in cash over the sea. How much insurance you have to pay for it is what determines the problem is not the drones themselves, they are a big headache, but also the fact that no insurance company in the world will ever insure you for the 40 kilometer passage that you will do from the entry to the exit of the strait.
- [50:23]
A
Okay, so I think you have demonstrated that the idea that the Americans went into this war without a plan about Hormuz is just poppycock. Obviously they had a plan. They executed that plan to the T, to the letter, and they significantly degraded Iran's ability to close the strait. However, this drone problem persists. My question for you, though, Eamon, is how much leverage does Iran actually have when it comes to firing drones at oil tankers? Because if there's a major oil spill in the Gulf, for example, which would happen if a supertanker was attacked or sunk, right? Well, that would very much hurt Iran. Iran relies on desalination plants on its side of the Gulf as much as Arabs rely on desalination plants on their side of the Gulf. So if there's a major oil spill or several major oil spills in the Gulf, like millions and millions of barrels of oil, wouldn't that damage Iran as much as anyone else? So what kind of leverage do they actually have?
- [51:26]
B
Well, unfortunately, when you deal with a rational, illogical regime that basically say, well, if I go, you go. If I sink, you sink. If I die, you die, holding the whole of the Gulf region hostage, that's a problem. Remember, basically, that. Do you remember when I told you why I am on the Arabian Gulf fence rather than the Persian Gulf fence, is because of the fact that it's a population issue for Iran? They don't give a damn about basically, the population in the Gulf, how many people they have. Bandar Abbas, Ban Khomeini, and Bushahar. That's it. These are the only three cities. And the biggest of them was what, 300,000 at best. Bandar Abbas. That's it for them. The Gulf is just really like, you know, basically a passage, a place, you know, basically, like, I mean, to, you know, to load ships into whatever. Like, you know, basically it's a port. But look at how many mega cities, mega cities are actually on the Gulf. Look at Kuwait City. Four million people. Look at, you know, Damam, you know, Andahran, Khubar, my hometown. Like, you know, basically, like, you know, you're talking about 2 million people. Look at Bahrain. You know, you have, you know, one and a half million people. Look at Doha, half a million people. Look at Abu Dhabi, 3 million people. Look at Dubai, 4 million people. And then the metropolis of Sharjah and ajman, like, in 2 million people, you know, it's like millions upon millions, like, you know, basically living there. And they are all Arabs, you know, basically on the other side, like, in hardly a million, like, in a billion basically live in the Persian side of the Gulf. And so for me, I see that the Gulf Arabs are far more invested in the Gulf. Than the Persians, like, invested in the Persian Gulf, if you see what I mean here. That's why I fall on that side. But this is why, for them, when it comes to leverage, they feel that it's the Arabs who will hurt far worse than us, therefore keep attacking, and they don't care if there is a major oil spillage.
- [53:26]
A
Okay, so before we talk about what America is going to do to neutralize this drone threat in order to force the strait properly open, let's talk about the ways in which structures have been put in place to bypass the strait. I saw that as far back as 2008, the Times of London reported that Dubai was studying plans to build a $200 billion mega canal that would allow oil tankers to bypass the Strait of Hormuz. Now, there is no such canal, but it shows that for a long time now, the Arab side of the Gulf has been thinking very hard about how to neutralize the threat of Iranian closure. Now, what there is is the port of Fujairah just outside the Strait of Hormuz on the Gulf of Oman. So this is a UAE facility, a critical exit point for about 1 million barrels per day. Now, I think it is currently closed because of an Iranian attack. But there is also petroline, and this is really a marvel of engineering.
- [54:33]
B
Indeed. The petroline, also known in Saudi Arabia as the East West Line, was built by his late Majesty King Fahad, one of the wisest kings to ever rule Saudi Arabia. He recognized during the oil terminal oil tanker war between Saddam and the Islamic Republic that this could hurt Saudi Arabia. And the ability of Iran to close the Strait of Hormuz is no longer theoretical. It's actually like, potential probability. So he ordered the building of a pipeline that can carry 7 million barrels per day from Saudi Aramco in the east all the way to the west of the country in the city of Yambour and in the city of Rabah. So we have two oil terminals there in Raber and Yamburg that could basically potentially supply 7 million barrels of oil a day, which is roughly today around what Saudi Arabia explains. Saudi Arabia produce about 11 million every day. 10 and a half million, 3 million go to local consumption. 7. 7 and a half go for export. So it's just barely enough for export at current level. So that I think many people within the royal family of Saudi Arabia now must be kissing the picture of his late Majesty King Fahad, saying, may Allah rest your soul in peace. Abu Faisal, as they call him, Abu
- [56:01]
A
professor, just to give the listener a proper understanding of what that means. I mean, this pipeline which stretches from the Saudi Gulf coast all the way to the red Sea, it's 1,200 kilometers long, that's 750 miles. It's a serious piece of engineering there across really formidable deserts, through the mountains. It was a real investment in security for from Iranian attack.
- [56:29]
B
Exactly. So when many people, I mean, telling me online, you Arabs, basically, you Gulf Arabs, you are just low IQ people, you are basically, you never understand the Iranians. The Iranians are smarter than you. And I'm like, guys, just stop it with this idiocy. The fact of the matter is that we have invested billions upon billions of dollars to build alternatives to save us, not from your smartness, but from your idiocy. And to be able basically to call upon this investment right now and to profit, actually, I mean, 7 million barrels a day, to be able to export them right now, that is actually 7 million barrels, that is $700 million a day. Just think about it.
- [57:20]
A
And you can see the satellite maps of the tankers of the world redirecting themselves from the Gulf to the Red Sea.
- [57:26]
B
Exactly.
- [57:27]
A
Now this raises the very real threat of the Houthis. Ayman.
- [57:32]
B
The Houthis are like, I mean, you know, in a very difficult position. They want to enter the war because that's their duty. As far as they see, they, they feel the heavy weight of the eschatology, the Amani, you know, to close the triangle of the Yamani Khorasani and the Sofyani, as we have talked about it before in the Mushtabahenei's episode. But also they need to be real. If they hurt anything on the western seaboard of Saudi Arabia, the might of Saudi Arabia and also the might of the Yemeni tribes who are not under the control of the Houthis will descend upon them, you know, like hell. You know, let's put it this way. The Saudis this time are not going to wage an air war only. It's going to be a pincer movement, both land, sea and air war, you know, basically like against the Houthis. It's not going to be a joke like the last time in the past. The Saudis basically were like weary, you know, of, you know, because they were constrained by so many Western countries, which
- [58:42]
A
they would not be constrained by now. I mean, the Americans would aid the Saudis properly in fighting the Houthis if the Houthis attack shipping in the Gulf at this moment.
- [58:52]
B
Exactly. The Houthis are told in no uncertain terms that you will be signing your own death certificate should you enter the conflict. Because this time the Saudis are going to basically send their own land forces, you know, to aid the land forces of the Yemeni government, you know, which is now, by the way, completely now unified. And, you know, standing behind the Saudi line because the Saudis threw like in a. Basically some chicanery, like in a. Basically, you know, remove the Emiratis, like, you know, from the. You know, and their allies, like in a. Basically from power there. We talked about it before.
- [59:29]
A
Well, and also that force, the National Shield Force, which the Saudis had been building up for a few years, was unleashed in December and January, and it achieved some pretty good results, as you say, countering threats to Yemeni government unity and consolidating that there. So, you know, the Houthis have something to worry about.
- [59:51]
B
Exactly. Now they will face the Saudis from the north. They will face the Saudi Yemeni alliance from the east, from Marib side. And they will face, of course, like, you know, basically the Yemeni army from the south, from Aden and Eban and Taz and Lahjan, all of these places and Hejj. So this is why I'm just saying that the Houthis are in real dilemma right now. How do you enter the war? Do you enter the war only against Israel and just like, I know, attack only shipping, selectively avoid Saudi ones? Or if you attack a Saudi ship, what you get? Because at the moment, the Houthis are firing, at the moment, drones against Saudi Arabia, 120 so far. But all of this basically covertly, all of this basically without a declaration basically of entry into the conflict, they have a decision to make, and they don't have many days left. They really have to make that decision within the next 10 days. Do you enter the conflict or not? If not, then they have to enter into peace talks with the Yemeni government. If they do enter the conflict and they do hurt those oil vessels heading towards the west of Saudi Arabia, because it is within their range. It is within their range to send their drones against cruise missiles and ballistic missiles, which they have thousands of, against these terminals. If they do hurt these terminals, forget this about the Saudis, even the Israelis and the Americans are gonna basically turn their fire basically on the Houthis.
- [61:30]
A
Okay, let's move back to the Gulf and talk about Hag Island. We're gonna lay out Hag island and then we'll talk about the American strategy as you can understand it, Eamonn, as it's evolving to get control of the Gulf properly. So in 2024, about 1.6 million barrels per day of Iranian oil was passing through Kharg Island. So it is the main export terminal for Iran. Most of that oil going to China and still going to China. Iran is currently exporting oil because even America's attacks on the island the other day did not target the oil infrastructure on the island. So it's a very strategically important site. It is where Iran's Shadow Fleet, the Ghost Armada, the Dark Fleet, which it has been building up really since 2018 especially Iran, has been heavily dependent upon foreign owned and a foreign flagged tanker fleet. And Kharg island is the number one pickup point. So 9 in 10 barrels end up in China. And this Shadow fleet has had 70 vessels in 2018. Now at the beginning of the war, there were about 600. So Kharg island is very important to Iran. How will the Americans take Kharg, Eamon?
- [62:57]
B
Well, it's very simple. I mean, they are already sending the Tripoli, the USS Tripoli and its Marine Force Force, 5,000 strong. They can basically land there and they are basically on their way. They could be there within a week or 10 days. They could just easily walk in and take it. I mean, there is no resistance anymore there. They bombed every military target there.
- [63:18]
A
Okay, but let me just immediately say they might take it easily, but could they hold it? Kharg is close to the mainland and remember those mountains? It was heavily bombed during the Tanker War phase of the Iranian Iraq war. Iraq attacked Kharg a lot, but Iran repeatedly repaired the facilities and improvised new methods to load the oil and gas. So it's not like Haarg is just there for the taking. It would be hard to keep it without attacks from the Iranian side.
- [63:47]
B
No, it will be a cakewalk. Look, when I tell you it will be a cakewalk, it will be a cakewalk and I'll tell you why. First of all, they will take it. And before they take it, the other side of the mainland, the shore of the mainland, all the mountain ranges in the mainland, all of them will light up as soon as basically the Americans are about to take it. And there will be a massive armada, air armada above them to identify the sources of fire and subdue them immediately. And even if you try to throw a stone later, basically you will be discovered because they will put all the necessary equipments there. They will have the awacs, the early warning systems, and they will take the island and they will make sure if an ant moves on the shore of the mainland, on the other side of the island, it can be detected. So, yes, there will be, like, drones coming. They will try to fire a lot of missiles from here and there and everywhere. But the reality is, basically, I mean, how accurate their hit will be. They don't have satellites, they don't have surveillance drones to identify targets. And so they will be firing blindly, basically, at the island. And the US Will have with them C Rams. They will have the Aegis system, because the Navy will move and they will have the air defense Aegis system in place to intercept drones and to intercept ballistic missiles. So they will have significant amount of air defense cover as well as significant amount of air cover. And the Iranians will be firing blind. And that's why the idea is that they will take the island and they will keep it, and there is nothing Iran can do about it except firing blindly.
- [65:38]
A
And having taken Kharg island, the Americans will use it to put maximum pressure on the regime, saying, do you want it back? Do you want your oil to be shipped to the world? Well, play ball. So I can sort of see that side of the argument, and I guess it's incorporated into a larger strategy involving Hormuz as well. Getting the strait open again. I mean, Trump has called to his allies, to America's allies, many of whom he offended over the last 12 months, which may now be coming back to Biden in the butt. I don't know. But he's expecting the, you know, the. The countries of the world to help America keep the strait open. He would like Japan, he would like European countries, he would like Australia, Canada, to send battleships and other means of helping. Helping to patrol the strait. Most of them have said no.
- [66:29]
B
Let me tell you something. First of all, basically all of these countries are missing the big picture here. And I will come to it now. But I will tell you something. President Trump and the US Military, most likely, among the things they would be bringing into Kharga island, they will be bringing a nice ceremonial tent with a nice ceremonial desk or a meeting table to prepare basically for this table to be the site for the signing of the surrender of Iran. So on this island, in that tent, whoever representing Iran at that time, a broken Islamic regime, will have to come and sign basically the terms of the ceasefire, which will be, one, the opening of the Straits of Hormuz. Second, the handover of every single gram of the 460 kilograms of highly enriched uranium to American custody. Three, the handover of every single centrifuge device that they have for the purpose of enrichment of uranium. All of this will be part of the terms and it will be all be signed in Harg Island. You want Harg island back again, you come and sign your surrender there. Nothing else basically will suffice. Many people will be laughing at what I'm saying right now. Just wait for it. Just like I predicted everything else before. I'm telling you, this is exactly what at least the Americans in a basically like in our thinking right now, that's what they want because they want a visible victory. You know, this is the off ramp that they need. They will take something dear to Iran and they will only return it once there is, you know, basically a visible victory, an opening of the strait. But the most important thing, the nuclear materials are handed over like trophies to the new Roman Empire. As simple as that. And it's Roman Emperor, you know, you know, Julius Trumpus. So apart from the theatrics here, why we see, you know, many nations, like, they basically are weary about it. First of all, like, basically many people are saying, oh, shame on the French and the British, you know, and the Germans, you know, and the Koreans. And I will say, no, guys, don't judge these countries harshly. The UK and France are providing air cover for the GCC right now and a significant air cover. There are 24 Rafale fighter jets fighting right now basically over the space of the UAE and Qatar, protecting both countries from incoming drones from Iran. So kudos to Macron at least on this. Basically in a front, even Keir Starmer, who I can't stand at all, everyone knows what I think about him, but he sent 12 RAF fighter jets to Bahrain and to Kuwait in order to help these two countries also withstand attacks from Iran. And Also he sent four additional RAF Eurofighters and four F35 RAF jets to protect the skies over Jordan. So kudos to Stammer as for Giorgia Meloni and Chancellor Mears of Germany and to our deep, amazing friends and deeply appreciated friends in South Korea. They sent a lot of ammunitions for the purpose of intercepting, you know, ballistic missiles and cruise missiles. The Koreans send a lot of their Chungong interceptors. Giorgia Meloni sent considerable amount of ammunitions that are mounted on the Apache helicopters and the fighter jets that intercept the drones. She sent them to the Saudi Air Force, to the United Arab Emirates Air Force to Kuwait Air Force. So thank you, Giorgio Meloni. And the same thing goes to the Germans. They did the same by sending considerable amount of defensive measures, including the skyguard Oerlikon system, which also protect against drones at terminal phase. So the problem comes Basically, with the maritime issue, Trump feel that, okay, you are helping your own allies in the gcc, you know, but he is thinking about this from a cynical point of view. You don't want to lose the very lucrative fighter jets deals that these countries already signed or about to sign with the GCC. The UK don't want to lose the 54 fighter jet deal, additional Eurofighters to Saudi Arabia, so they are sending this to the GCC. The French don't want to lose the 140 plus deals on order or future orders with the UAE, Qatar and Oman for the Rafales. And of course, the Eurofighter also is not just only British, it is also German and Italian. So you see here where, so Trump is thinking about it like basically from. You are just there for your interest, not basically to help the U.S. you're helping your allies who you want to basically continue selling arms to. The same with South Korea, by the way, South Korea is gonna do a deal on the KF21 fighter jets with both Saudi and the UAE. So that's why they are sending more and more of their Tiangong air defense interceptors. So Trump is like, ah, it's like, what are you doing here? I mean, you are trying to steal US Share in the arms market post war. No, no, no, no. If you really want to help, help in the real arena, in other words, where you risk it. What you are doing is pampering your potential customers. You are not basically taking the fair share of risk. And that's why Trump is absolutely upset. So he's saying, this is an international waterway. We, as the US been patrolling the oceans since World War II. We are the only mighty navy that has protected international trade from piracy and from chaos over the seas for seven and a half decades. You might as well be grateful for it, you ungrateful git. And come on board and yeah, okay,
- [73:17]
A
that's what Trump's saying. We understand that. But how are the allies going to replace respond? So far they're saying, well, no.
- [73:24]
B
So far they're saying no because they feel that really there is no need. It's a soft closure, Mr. Trump. You know, if it was a hard closure, we're more than happy to help. However, recently the British said, look, no need to send the warships. We can send underwater drones to blow up the 12th mines, you know, basically that the Iranians, you know, put beneath Hormuz and we will do it. Is that help enough, Mr. Trump? So of course, basically he wants optics. You know, it's like, no, send the ship. But nonetheless, The British are sending, you know, basically a team, you know, and their new technology of underwater drones to blow up like, you know, basically like, you know, I mean, the, the mines could the British again, you know, because if it was a hard closure, then that would have been the ultimate violation, you know, of the freedom of the navigation, you know, treaty, international treaty. And the other nations will come to help, but so far other nations felt that it's only drones, you know, so it's still a kind of like a nuisance rather than basically an actual war that will call upon us to come because, you know, nothing has reached the point where the treaty can be triggered.
- [74:49]
A
Well, Eamon, it sounds from what you're saying then that you're feeling quite optimistic at the moment about the course of this war from the perspective of the United States and Israel's chances for winning it. And you sort of feel it's. I'm getting the sort of vibe from you that catastrophic expectations are possibly exaggerated and things are more or less in hand. Getting control of Haarg island will be a cakewalk. You said. It seems like getting, you know, returning the Strait of Hormuz to open traffic is, you know, gonna happen as well. So how do you feel about the course of the war? And what about the big question that overhangs all of these considerations? The price of oil?
- [75:35]
B
The price of oil will stabilize once we have, I mean, the day that we see the headlines that Iran accepts the terms of ceasefire as presented by, you know, the Americans, by the way, I'm just telling you this day will happen. Just don't expect it to be anytime soon. There will be a war of attrition. There will be like, you know, basically a sort of a low intensity war of attrition and siege and blockades and stuff like that. But at some point, whoever is in charge in Iran will come forward and say we are accepting the ceasefire terms and they will come and sign it in that tent in Kharg island and that will be it. And the price of oil will drop by 20% overnight. So, you know, because that's it. Now I know many people will say like in a, you know, but come on, Ayman, like in a. Basically like in an Iranian surrender. Like, you know, are you out of your mind?
- [76:39]
A
Especially after everything you told us last week about the eschatological dimension of their calculations, about they're really true believers, they think the Mahdi's coming back.
- [76:49]
B
Ah, yes, exactly. That's why, like, you know, basically I'm saying that, you know, it's don't expect it anytime soon. But at some point Mujtaba will die and with him all of this eschatological dreams will die with him. And that's basically when a more pragmatic political class within the current regime will wake up to the reality that and start asking for terms and start negotiating this time in good faith because they have no other alternative. Because what's going to happen is that this war is going to have multiple phases and even multiple pauses, pauses between each phase. And in each phase we will see the levers of pressure being turned up against the regime and the people. We will see targeting of certain infrastructure. We will start to see bridges, power stations. We'll start to see other forms of infrastructure being targeted and to continue the process of elimination. They are not only eliminating leaders right now, even checkpoints, even to establish a checkpoint right now in Iran by the Basij and the IRGC is a life shortening exercise. If you have a death wish, go and man a checkpoint. Because the hundreds of drones, American and Israeli in the sky are killing them. So basically even ordinary soldiers are being hunted down just at the moment they establish a checkpoint. Because these are the symbols of authority for how long can this be sustained from the Iranian side? Not that long. At some point something is going to give and the, you know, we can start to see the cracks in that dam. It's a dam and it's cracking.
- [78:56]
A
Well, you know, Amen. Another long episode of conflicted. We tried to do what we do. We brought the historical context to bear and then you gave us your always really illuminating analysis based on facts, based on actual conversations that I promise you, dear listeners, Amen is regularly having with very important decision makers. I might even want to say on both sides of the divide, but certainly on the American side of the divide, Eamonn, you know what's going on? And I think what really is impressed upon me because when I, unless I'm talking to you, buddy, I just have to rely on the goddamn mainstream media and on X and on these think tanks and all the sort of stuff that's being pumped out. And you know, talking to you is refreshing because you know how much of that media narrative, especially the mainstream sources like CNN and others, they just are getting it wrong. They're stoking anxieties, they're creating a misconception about how this war is being prosecuted by the Americans as if it was a whimsical, you know, move without anything, you know, prior thinking or strategy, as if the American, you know, general class are Just morons who don't understand anything about what they're doing. As if Israel is simply, you know, bloodthirsty, cynical monsters trying to, you know, hide Netanyahu's legal problems. Like, this is all such rubbish. What we're actually seeing for the first time in a long time is an old fashioned imperial war.
- [80:39]
B
Yes.
- [80:40]
A
Where the imperial hegemon, the state that keeps the waterways open globally the heir of the maritime Atlanticist order which the Portuguese established, the Dutch inherited, the English perfected, and the Americans won for themselves during the Second World War. That power is prosecuting a carefully designed imperial war to keep a competitor, a rival, a wrecker in check. That's what we're actually seeing, and we haven't seen anything like it for a long time.
- [81:15]
B
You illustrated it so elegantly and eloquently here, Thomas. You exactly hit it right on the head. Like, I mean, it's absolutely right. And you see, the problem is in the run up to the war, and even during the war war, the mainstream media are fed a diet of leaks. You know, it's like a leak from here, a leak from there, you know, from factions from. And most of them are designed for, you know, to sow confusion among the enemy ranks as well as confusion among like, you know, basically the American public. And this is the problem with, you know, having a diet of leaks in a vegetarian diets usually like, you know, basically leave you like, and I mean completely leak. Sorry. Yeah, but you know, in all seriousness, like, you know, basically, like, I mean, if, if, if, if all your information are coming from leaks, you know, there is no other sources of like, basically protein and carb or anything. Like, you know, basically you're gonna have a poor judgment because it's a poor diet. And at the end of the day, you know, here in the region, you know, it's like the visibility here is so much better. Like in a. Being here is like we can see the battle lines drawn, we started to hear the drums of war beating. Do you know when, Thomas, just days, a mere days after October 7, when people tell me that it's all about Epstein files, it's all about Bibi being out of prison. And I just couldn't help saying, oh, you poor, adorable little naive souls, you know, you're little naive minds. You have no idea what you're talking about because this war was decided on the 11th. This war was decided on the 11th of October 2023, just four days after October 7th. And it was decided somewhere in London. I'm not gonna go and talk about like in a. Basically who, how, where and how. It's actually like the idea snowballed into D.C. and into other, other centers of. I would say, like in the basically invisible power. But I'm telling you, it doesn't matter if it was Bibi Netanyahu or Yair Lapid or Naftali Bennett who was the Prime Minister of Israel. It doesn't matter if it was Kamala Harris who won the elections back in 2024. At the end of the day, this war was going to happen by hook or crook. The script is the same. The cast would have been different and the theatrics would have been different, but the war would have happened regardless.
- [83:49]
A
You know, I think we can help people understand this by, you know, reminding people that there is an imperial world order that is now very venerable. You might hate it, but you can't deny that it exists. And it has existed for a long time. We mentioned in this podcast episode when that world order was beginning to be created when the Portuguese arrived in the Persian Gulf in 1507. 1507, amen. Over 500 years ago. It's a very, very venerable imperial world order. It still exists. And again, you might hate it, but it is the backbone of, of everything. It is the reason why we have the prosperity that we have. And everyone knows this except a small number of radical anti imperialists, so called, for whom the Islamic Republic of Iran, despite whatever, you know, negative sides it has, was essentially a positive thing because it stood athwart that Imperial Order as the chief torchbearer of the resistance. And everyone must understand that. Fine, if you want to play that game, if you want to stand athwart the imperial world Order that has existed for over 500 years, go for it. But the 7th of October was the moment when the resistance, when that weird global confraternity of Islamists, leftists, green activists, etc. When they made a serious mistake. Because the attacks on that day were not the normal kind of gadfly rhetorical, poking the empire here and there. It was a sign that things could go so far as to seriously destabilize that global order, especially in a period of growing multipolarity, when that world order is already in a transition phase, feeling weak, needing to renegotiate things with rising powers, obviously, especially China. So in this context, you have to understand what's going on. The war in Iran is the latest in a series 500 years old of imperial wars that the Atlantic maritime global Order that everyone who knows anything knows is essentially good for the prosperity of the world is waging to defend itself. This is just what's going on. We have to grow up and realize it.
- [86:36]
B
Yeah, absolutely. Absolutely, Absolutely. I couldn't agree more, Thomas. You put it absolutely right for everyone. Everyone must drill it into their head that at the end of the day, there are lines drawn in the sand for the leaders of the Islamic Republic. And when they crossed it on 7 October, whether by wittingly or unwillingly, they have set in motion series of events. It started from the house of a prominent person in London on the 11th of October, 2023. And from there it cascaded into what we see here right now. This war was ordained there and then it was going to happen because it was decided that day there and then. The current regime in Iran must go one way or another. It doesn't matter if it was at the hands of Bibi Netanyahu and Augustus Rampas. You know, at the end of the day, it was going to happen regardless of who. Who was occupying the seat of power in D.C. or in Israel.
- [87:45]
A
Okay, dear listeners, that's it. This is a very long episode. Keep listening to us at Conflicted because we will keep reminding you that the events you experience today in the news, the events that are unfolding now, are all easily and importantly nested within a larger historical context. You might feel anxious, you might feel like the world is going to end. You might feel like you're living in unprecedented times. But that is not the case. It's just the next, the next round of an ever Turning Wheel. And we're here to tell you that story. That's it. Thank you, Eamon. Thank you very much. Godspeed, everyone. Take care.
- [88:20]
B
Thank you, everyone.
- [88:22]
A
Conflicted is a message heard Production Our executive producers are Jake Warren and Max Warren. This episode was produced and edited by Thomas Small. With its two juicy beef patties and three slices of melted cheese topped with tangy Big Arch sauce. The Big Arch is what happens when you start making a McDonald's burger and never stop. The Big Arch, the most McDonald's McDonald's burger yet for a limited time.