Podcast
Counter-Errorism in Diving: Applying Human Factors to Diving
Hosted by Gareth Lock at The Human Diver · EN
Human factors is a critical topic within the world of SCUBA diving, scientific diving, military diving, and commercial diving. This podcast is a mixture of interviews and 'shorts' which are audio versions of the weekly blog from The Human Diver.
Each month we will look to have at least one interview and one case study discussion where we look at an event in detail and how human factors and non-technical skills contributed (or prevented) it from happening in the manner it did.
53episodes
Episodes
Newest firstAll episodes
SH291: What the Data Told Us: Fear, Trust, and the Stories That Never Get Told. Part 2 of 3.
4d ago00:13:26Tap to summarizeThis blog explains how a mixed-methods study explored why divers struggle to share honest, learning-focused stories about incidents. Using a large international survey, focus groups, and expert interviews, the research found that storytelling is strongly shaped by organisational culture, fear, and trust. Many divers—especially instructors—fear legal consequences, criticism, or damage to their reputation, which stops them from speaking openly, particularly in public settings. At the same time, there is confusion about key ideas like what counts as an “incident,” what “risk” really means, and what a “just culture” looks like, with very few divers linking incidents to learning. The study also showed that when stories include more context, people are less likely to judge and more likely to learn, but most divers are not taught how to do this. Overall, the findings suggest the diving community knows that sharing near-misses and building a just culture would improve safety, but lacks the trust, understanding, and organisational support needed to make that happen.Original blog: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/msc-part-2-the-data-and-resultsLinks and references: British Diving Safety Groiup: https://bdsg.org.uk/Chan, W. T.-K., & Li, W.-C. (2023). Development of effective human factors interventions for aviation safety management. Frontiers in Public Health, 11, 1144921. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpubh.2023.1144921EC. (2014). Regulation (EU) No 376/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3 April 2014. European Commission.Reason, J. (2016). Managing the risks of organizational accidents. Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315543543Tags: THD-English| THD-Learning, Incidents & Just Culture
Transcribe →
SH290: What Happens Underwater, Stays Underwater — And That's a Problem. Part 1 of 3
1w ago00:12:34Tap to summarizeThis episode introduces the problem behind learning in diving safety, using the 2020 death of Linnea Mills to highlight how incidents are often caused by deeper system issues, not just individual mistakes. While near-misses and accidents happen regularly in diving, most are never shared or analysed, meaning valuable lessons are lost. Unlike industries such as aviation or healthcare, diving lacks strong reporting systems, regulation, and reliable data, so decisions are often based on uncertainty rather than evidence. Existing reports tend to focus on immediate causes like equipment failure or diver error, but miss the wider social, organisational, and environmental factors that shape outcomes. The episode argues that meaningful learning comes from “context-rich” stories that explain not just what happened, but why it made sense at the time. Drawing on safety research from other industries, it highlights the need for a stronger reporting culture, psychological safety, and system-level thinking to improve learning and prevent future incidents.Original blog: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/msc-part-1-the-problem-spaceReferences: Dekker, S. (2017). Just culture: Restoring trust and accountability in your organization (3rd ed.). CRC Press, Taylor & Francis Group.Drupsteen, L., & Guldenmund, F. (2014). What is learning: A review of the safety literature to define learning from incidents, accidents and disasters. Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management, 22(2), 81–96. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-5973.12039EC. (2014). Regulation (EU) No 376/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3 April 2014. European Commission.Gigerenzer, G. (2014). Risk savvy. Viking. https://www.amazon.co.uk/Risk-Savvy-Make-Good-Decisions/dp/1846144744Lock, G. (2011). The application of the Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) to improve diving safety. https://drive.google.com/file/d/1Iz3qRRyo2NjdiBGbPcRhj14NoCTuuM4/view?usp=share_linkMills v Gull Dive Center PADI (2022). https://www.scribd.com/document/555406095/Mills-v-Gull-Dive-Center-PADI-2nd-Amended-ComplaintOrlady, H. W., & Orlady, L. M. (2017). Human factors in multi-crew flight operations (1st ed.). Routledge.Reason, J. (2016). Managing the risks of organizational accidents. Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315543543Snowden, D. (2002). Complex acts of knowing: Paradox and descriptive self-awareness. Journal of Knowledge Management, 6(2), 100–111. https://doi.org/10.1108/13673270210424639Waring, J. J. (2005). Beyond blame: Cultural barriers to medical incident reporting. Social Science & Medicine, 60(9), 1927–1935. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2004.08.055Tags: English| Learning, Incidents & Just Culture
Transcribe →
SH289: Chac Mool - Diving Deeper into a Triple Fatality with Human Factors
2w ago00:24:20Tap to summarizeThis episode examines a 2012 triple fatality at Cenote Chac Mool in Mexico using a Human Factors approach, showing how accidents are rarely caused by a single mistake but by a combination of small, interacting factors. A guide took two recreational divers beyond safe limits into an overhead cave environment without a continuous guideline, and all three ran out of gas and died. Instead of simply blaming the guide, the analysis explores how things made sense at the time, including authority gradients that stopped the divers from questioning decisions, fatigue from multiple dives, pressure to show something impressive, and increasing task load in a complex environment. Using the PETTEOT framework, the case highlights how people, environment, equipment, organisational culture, and time pressures combined to reduce safety margins until there was no capacity left to recover. The key lesson is that safety depends on understanding these system interactions, building psychological safety so people can speak up, and reinforcing clear rules and preparation to prevent small, “normal” deviations from turning into fatal outcomes.Original blog: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/chac-mool-triple-diving-fatalityLinks: Full CREER manual: https://creer-mx.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/Manual-for-Cenote-Dive-Guides-vs010324.pdfThe Thumb rule: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/top-tips-for-diving-instructors-psychological-safety-and-the-thumb-ruleLearning from Emergent Outcomes course waiting list: https://www.thehumandiver.com/lfeoTags: English| Learning, Incidents & Just Culture
Transcribe →
SH288: The 'Obvious Thing' Nobody Noticed
2w ago00:15:22Tap to summarizeThis episode explores the fatal case of 18-year-old Linnea Mills to show how visible hazards can go unnoticed when an instructor lacks the mental capacity to recognise them. Linnea was overweighted, unable to inflate her drysuit, and using equipment that couldn’t provide enough lift—risks that seem obvious in hindsight but were missed due to a combination of inexperience, time pressure, unfamiliar gear, and commercial expectations. Using models like ECOM and COCOM, the episode explains how an instructor’s attention can be consumed by immediate tasks, leaving no capacity to monitor the bigger picture or reassess whether a dive should proceed. This isn’t about blaming an individual, but understanding how systems, workload, and limited experience can overwhelm decision-making. The key lesson is that effective instructors don’t just rely on skill, but on preparation—setting clear plans, checks, and limits before the dive—to protect their ability to recognise problems when it matters most.Original blog: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/the-obvious-thing-nobody-noticedLinks: Part 1: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/the-picture-went-darkThe Linnea Mills case: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/linnea-mills-death-hf-systems-lensTags: English| Sense-making, Decision-making, & Psychology
Transcribe →
SH287: When the Picture Goes Dark
3w ago00:16:25Tap to summarizeThis episode explores why divers don’t truly “lose” situation awareness, but instead run out of the mental capacity needed to maintain it. Through the story of James on a challenging wreck dive, it shows how increasing demands—like current, task focus, and effort—can quietly narrow attention until the bigger picture is lost, even when skills and training are sound. Using two human factors models, COCOM and ECOM, the discussion explains how control shifts from broad, strategic thinking to narrow, reactive behavior as workload rises, and how different layers of awareness—from basic task execution to overall planning—can break down under pressure. It highlights that mistakes are often not about poor decisions, but about limited cognitive resources in the moment. The episode also emphasizes the importance of good preparation, clear decision thresholds, teamwork, and deliberate pauses to manage workload, while showing how reflection after the dive helps improve future performance. Ultimately, it reframes the difference between novice and experienced divers as the ability to manage attention and maintain the bigger picture, not just technical skill.Original blog: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/the-picture-went-darkLinks: A 2026 study in Safety Science by Woltjer and colleagues: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0925753526000822Part two: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/the-obvious-thing-nobody-noticedTags: English| Sense-making, Decision-making, & Psychology
Transcribe →
SH286: The Shortcut That Gets You Home — and the One That Doesn't
3w ago00:10:22Tap to summarizeDivers make many decisions quickly, often without realising it, by using heuristics—mental shortcuts that help us act fast when time and information are limited. These shortcuts are essential and often effective, especially with experience, but they can also lead to predictable errors called biases when used in the wrong situation. Common examples include relying too much on recent experience, sticking to an original plan despite changing conditions, or only noticing information that supports what we already believe. In diving, where conditions vary and feedback is often limited, these biases can quietly increase risk. The key is not to avoid intuition, but to understand when it might be misleading and to slow down when needed. Tools like checklists, realistic training, and open team communication help balance fast thinking with more careful decision-making, improving safety and helping divers make better choices underwater.Original blog: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/shortcuts-errors-and-the-gapLinks: Gigerenzer’s push for people to be “risk savvy”: https://www.jasoncollins.blog/posts/nudging-citizens-to-be-risk-savvyBlog about the Scylla wreck tragedy: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/scylla-wreck-penetration-leodsiBlog about the IJN Sata incident: https://wreckedinmyrevo.com/2023/11/16/close-call-on-the-ijn-sata-palau-120-fsw/Tags: English| Sense-making, Decision-making, & Psychology
Transcribe →
SH285: When Skill Alone Isn't Enough: The Resilient Performance Model
4w ago00:11:45Tap to summarizeDiving operations rarely fail because people lack skill; they fail when skilled individuals are not supported by the systems around them. The Resilient Performance Model from The Human Diver explains that performance comes from the interaction of three areas: technical skills, non-technical skills like communication and decision-making, and the wider context such as culture, workload, and resources. When one of these areas is weak or missing, problems appear—such as highly skilled divers working in silence, well-coordinated teams lacking critical skills, or strong systems where people feel unable to challenge decisions. True resilience happens when all three are aligned, allowing teams to adapt when things go wrong and still achieve safe outcomes. The key lesson is that improving safety isn’t just about better training or stricter procedures, but about creating an environment where people can speak up, make good decisions under pressure, and learn from both successes and failures to improve over time.Original blog: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/resilient-performance-modelTags: Commercial Diving
Transcribe →
SH284: LEODSI and PETTEOT: A Systems Approach for Understanding How Diving Really Works
4w ago00:12:10Tap to summarizeWhen something goes wrong in diving, people often ask “who made the mistake?”, but that question usually oversimplifies what really happened and stops us from learning. The Learning from Emergent Outcomes framework (LEODSI) takes a different approach by looking at diving as a system, where outcomes are shaped by many interacting factors rather than one person’s actions. It examines seven key elements—people, environment, tasks, equipment, external pressures, organisation, and time—to understand how decisions made sense in the moment and how conditions combined to produce the result. Instead of blaming individuals, LEODSI focuses on why events unfolded the way they did, recognising that both successes and failures come from the same system. By using this approach in everyday debriefs, not just after incidents, divers and teams can learn more effectively, improve safety, and make meaningful changes that reduce risk in the future.https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/what-is-leodsi-petteotLinks: Learning from Emergent Outcomes course: https://www.thehumandiver.com/lfeoTags: Learning, Incidents & Just Culture
Transcribe →
SH283: You're Accountable. You're Responsible. You're It!
May 3000:17:40Tap to summarizeThis piece explores how diving incidents are often misunderstood by focusing too quickly on blame rather than learning. It explains the important difference between responsibility (who was involved) and accountability (who answers for the outcome), showing that incidents are usually caused by a chain of decisions, pressures, and system factors—not just one person’s mistake. By comparing “blame questions” (who is at fault?) with “learning questions” (why did it make sense at the time?), it highlights how real improvement comes from understanding the conditions that led to an error. Through examples like missed safety checks, risky habits becoming normal, ignored concerns, and unreported near-misses, the text shows how blame cultures stop people speaking up and allow problems to grow. Instead, it argues for a learning-focused approach where divers, instructors, and organisations reflect on decision-making, encourage honest reporting, and examine the wider system. The key message is that accountability should not be about punishment, but about creating an environment where people can speak openly, learn from mistakes, and prevent future incidents.Original blog: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/youre-accountable-youre-responsible-youre-itLinks: Blog about the Scylla wreck incident: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/scylla-wreck-penetration-leodsiIJN SATA case study: https://wreckedinmyrevo.com/2023/11/16/close-call-on-the-ijn-sata-palau-120-fsw/Blog about Linnea Mills: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/linnea-mills-death-hf-systems-lensPDF guide: https://drive.google.com/file/d/1Ugx0lQM5am2gQ9rJa4aCq39JBukGZyLK/view?usp=sharingRuth Parris: https://www.linkedin.com/in/ruth-parris-76a53635/Ruth’s thesis: https://lup.lub.lu.se/student-papers/search/publication/9186204Tags: English| Learning, Incidents & Just Culture
Transcribe →
SH282: Isolation Amplifies Drift: When Remote Operations Make Small Deviations Invisible
May 2700:11:25Tap to summarizeThis blog by Michael John Snow explores how small equipment issues on a remote expedition vessel can gradually become accepted as “normal,” not because of poor decisions, but because of how isolated systems work. In these environments, teams are skilled and focused on keeping operations running, especially when guests, tight schedules, and limited support make stopping costly. With fewer external checks and less immediate feedback, minor irregularities are often monitored rather than acted on, and over time they fade into the background. This process, known as normalization of deviation, slowly shifts what is seen as acceptable without anyone clearly deciding to take a risk. When a problem finally forces action, it can look sudden, but it is usually the result of many reasonable choices made over time. The key message is that this isn’t about individual failure, but about system design: isolation reduces challenge, delays response, and makes it easier for risk to build unnoticed. To manage this, the blog argues that remote operations need stronger structures—like clear governance, tracking, and shared visibility of equipment performance—so that small issues stay visible and are addressed before they become bigger problems.Original blog: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/isolation-amplifies-driftLinks: Governance mechanisms: https://remoteassetgovernance.com/frameworkTags: English| Operations & Procedures
Transcribe →