Podcast
Counter-Errorism in Diving: Applying Human Factors to Diving
Hosted by Gareth Lock at The Human Diver · EN
Human factors is a critical topic within the world of SCUBA diving, scientific diving, military diving, and commercial diving. This podcast is a mixture of interviews and 'shorts' which are audio versions of the weekly blog from The Human Diver.
Each month we will look to have at least one interview and one case study discussion where we look at an event in detail and how human factors and non-technical skills contributed (or prevented) it from happening in the manner it did.
40episodes
Episodes
Newest firstAll episodes
SH278: Be Curious, Not Judgemental
6d ago00:06:53Tap to summarizeThis episode looks at how quick judgement, especially online, can block learning and make diving less safe. Using a real example of an adaptive scuba training video that received harsh criticism, it explains how people often react without understanding the full context. The episode introduces two key ideas from Human Factors: psychological safety, where people feel safe to ask questions and speak up, and just culture, where the focus is on learning instead of blame. The main message is simple: when people judge, learning stops, but when people stay curious, learning begins. By slowing down, asking questions, and trying to understand why decisions made sense at the time, dive teams and the wider community can make better choices, create safer environments, and build a healthier culture for everyone.Original blog: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/be-curious-not-judgementalLinks: Original Facebook post and video: https://www.facebook.com/share/r/1DnwV8qM1r/Tags: English| Learning, Incidents & Just Culture
Transcribe →
SH277: You are entering water with known problems, and don't kid yourself that it's any different.
1w ago00:11:55Tap to summarizeThis episode explores why people often go diving even when something feels “off,” and how risk usually starts before anyone gets in the water. It explains that danger doesn’t come from one big mistake, but from small pressures like stress, tiredness, rushing, poor communication, and cutting corners that slowly build up and start to feel normal. Over time, these small compromises become habits, and people stop seeing them as problems at all. The key message is that safety isn’t just about following procedures underwater — it’s about noticing when your safety margin is already shrinking on the surface. Real safety comes from having the courage to stop, slow down, and ask not “Can we do this dive?” but “Do we still have enough room for things to go wrong?”Original blog: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/you-are-entering-water-with-known-problemsLinks: Work as Imagined vs Work as Done blog: https://www.thehumandiver.com/blog/Work-as-Imagined-vs-Work-as-DoneTags: English| Safety & Risk Management
Transcribe →
SH276: If there are no silver bullets, build capacity to fail safely
2w ago00:14:57Tap to summarizeThis episode explores what real safety improvement in diving could look like if we stop copying other industries and start designing for the reality of diving itself. It explains that diving is commercial, lightly regulated, and full of everyday trade-offs between safety, money, time, and training, which means risk can’t be removed — only managed. Instead of relying only on rules and checklists, the focus should be on building “margin” into the system: better training time, safer conditions, lower ratios, rested instructors, better decision-making, and a culture where stopping a dive is normal, not failure. The key message is that safety doesn’t come from paperwork alone, but from building real capacity — skills, time, support, learning systems, and honest culture — so people can make good decisions under pressure and prevent small compromises from slowly turning into serious danger.Original blog: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/no-silver-bullets-build-capacityTags: English| Learning, Incidents & Just Culture
Transcribe →
SH275: The death of a child in diver training. There are no ‘silver bullet’ solutions
2w ago00:30:45Tap to summarizeThis episode looks at the tragic death of 12-year-old D.H. during a scuba training dive and explains it not as one person’s mistake, but as a failure of the whole system around her. Using court documents and a safety science approach, the analysis shows how many “normal” things came together — rushed training, poor visibility, tired staff, missing safety equipment, weak rules, money pressure, and lack of oversight — to create a situation where there was no real safety margin left. The key message is that this was not a random accident or a single bad decision, but the result of a system that allowed risky practices to become normal. The goal is not blame, but learning: understanding how everyday routines, shortcuts, and pressures can slowly increase danger, and how changing the system — not just individuals — is the only real way to prevent this from happening again.Original blog: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/learning-from-tragedy-dhLinks: Court filings: https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/26789283-dylanharrisonlawsuit/Purpose of investigation blog: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/what-is-the-purpose-of-an-investigationLearning from Emergent Outcomes and LEODSI: https://www.thehumandiver.com/lfeoPsychological safety: https://lup.lub.lu.se/student-papers/search/publication/9151225Research around “stop work” orders: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/352017590_Deciding_to_stop_work_or_deciding_how_work_is_donehttps://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0925753517308871RSTC guidance and Standards: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kNRrrosDJYsTrade off between performance, cost and resources: https://youtu.be/vtgIwHrUWVQ?list=PLNXuyLsCTX6hHS3newpcROfJ_JiI27q3C&t=555Regulated environments such as military aviation: https://www.mdpi.com/2313-576X/8/2/37Barriers to learning from adverse events: https://lup.lub.lu.se/student-papers/search/publication/9151225Social acceptance of drift: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/normalisation-of-deviance-not-about-rule-breakingWork as Imagined vs Work as Done: https://youtu.be/vtgIwHrUWVQ?list=PLNXuyLsCTX6hHS3newpcROfJ_JiI27q3C&t=962Performance Influencing Factors: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/top-tips-for-diving-instructors-performance-influencing-factorsThe shoot down of two Black Hawks: https://www.mindtherisk.com/literature/150-friendly-fire-the-accidental-shootdown-of-u-s-black-hawks-over-northern-iraq-by-scott-a-snookRebreather Forum 4.0 talk: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nkdVHBDnCjcChallenger and Columbia disasters: https://www.montana.edu/rmaher/engr125/CAIB-History%20as%20a%20cause.pdfLoss of HMNZ Manawanui: https://nzdf.mil.nz/court-of-inquiry-hmnzs-manawanuiThe death of LCpl Partridge: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5d305623ed915d2feeac4a0f/LCpl_Partridge_Service_Inquiry_Parts_1.1._to_1.6_REDACTED_ONLINE_VERSION.pdfThe death of ADR Yarwood: https://www.nzdf.mil.nz/assets/Uploads/DocumentLibrary/Redacted-Death-Able-Diver-COI-Rpt-for-publication.pdfSafety Science for Outdoor and Experiential Learning book: https://www.amazon.com/Safety-Science-Outdoor-Experiential-Education-ebook/dp/B0G99BD12G/ref=sr_1_1The death of Linnea Mills: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/linnea-mills-death-hf-systems-lensTags: English| Learning, Incidents & Just Culture
Transcribe →
SH274: When Do We Stop Asking “Why?”
3w ago00:14:19Tap to summarizeThis episode explores why asking “why did this happen?” after a diving accident is important — but not enough on its own. It explains that investigations often stop too early, not because everything is understood, but because people reach a point that feels comfortable, simple, or easy to fix. Many reports focus on equipment failures or individual mistakes, while deeper causes like pressure, workload, training culture, time limits, and business realities are left out. The episode shows that real learning comes from looking at how normal routines, shortcuts, and everyday decisions shape what people do, not just what went wrong at the end. The main message is clear: the goal of asking “why” isn’t to find someone to blame, but to understand the system well enough to change future behaviour — so the next dive is safer, even under pressure and imperfect conditions.Original blog: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/when-do-we-stop-asking-whyLinks: Learning from Emergent Outcomes and LEODSI: https://www.thehumandiver.com/lfeoSome relevant blogs: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/what-story-gets-told-what-words-are-usedhttps://www.thehumandiver.com/post/when-the-story-hurts-too-muchhttps://www.thehumandiver.com/post/what-is-the-purpose-of-an-investigationReferences:Kletz, T. A. (2006). Accident investigation: Keep asking “why?”. Journal of hazardous materials, 130(1-2), 69-75.Reason, J. (2016). Managing the risks of organizational accidents. Routledge.Reason, J. (1991). Too little and too late: A commentary on accident and incident reporting systems. In Near miss reporting as a safety tool (pp. 9-26). Butterworth-Heinemann.Rasmussen, J. (1990). Human error and the problem of causality in analysis of accidents. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London. B, Biological Sciences, 327(1241), 449-462.Rasmussen, J. (1988). Coping safely with complex systems. In AAAS Annual Meeting 1988.Cedergren, A., & Petersen, K. (2011). Prerequisites for learning from accident investigations–a cross-country comparison of national accident investigation boards. Safety Science, 49(8-9), 1238-1245.Lessons from Longford: the Esso Gas Plant Explosion. Andrew Hopkins. CCH Australia, Sydney. 2000Lundberg, J., Rollenhagen, C., & Hollnagel, E. (2010). What you find is not always what you fix—How other aspects than causes of accidents decide recommendations for remedial actions. Accident Analysis & Prevention, 42(6), 2132-2139.Manuele, F. A. (2016). Root-Causal Factors: Uncovering the Hows & Whys of Incidents. Professional Safety, 61(05), 48-55.Tags: English| Learning, Incidents & Just Culture
Transcribe →
SH273: What story gets told? What words are used? Who gets to the tell the multiple stories?
3w ago00:09:44Tap to summarizeThis episode looks at two very different ways of telling the same tragic story — the death of a 12-year-old girl during a scuba training dive in Texas — and why the way we tell these stories matters for real safety. The first version focuses on blame, emotion, and individual failure, which feels powerful but pushes people toward anger instead of learning. The second version looks at how the whole system shaped what happened, including training pressure, poor visibility, equipment choices, fatigue, class structure, and missing safety checks. Instead of asking “who failed,” it asks how normal practices, routines, and decisions slowly combined to create dangerous conditions. The key message is simple: real prevention doesn’t come from blaming people, it comes from understanding how systems work in everyday conditions — and changing those systems so tragedies like this are far less likely to happen again.Original blog: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/what-story-gets-told-what-words-are-usedLinks: Why hurting prevents changeWhat is the purpose of an investigationSharing stories: https://youtu.be/DRXqeQvRFK0Linnea Mills case: https://youtu.be/lu4tc8gtNioTags: English| Learning, Incidents & Just Culture
Transcribe →
SH272: Seeing what is ‘unseen’: applying human factors to citizen science
4w ago00:09:16Tap to summarizeThis episode explores how divers often overlook the richness of underwater environments they think they already know, and how greater awareness can transform both safety and understanding. Using real examples from rivers, lakes, and glacial landscapes, it shows how underwater spaces are shaped by nature, history, and human activity, even when they look simple on the surface. The episode explains how human factors help divers make better decisions, communicate clearly, and work more effectively as teams, while citizen science gives divers a way to contribute real knowledge to research and conservation. The core message is that when divers learn to look more carefully, every dive becomes more meaningful — improving safety, protecting underwater heritage, and turning ordinary dives into opportunities to learn, discover, and contribute.Original blog: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/seeing-what-is-unseen-scientific-divingTags: Sense-making, Decision-making, & Psychology
Transcribe →
SH271: When the Story Hurts Too Much to Change
Apr 1800:10:02Tap to summarizeThis episode explores why diving accidents involving children create such strong reactions and deep divisions, and how our need for simple explanations often gets in the way of real learning. It explains how people quickly form strong opinions after tragedies, not because they don’t care about safety, but because events like this challenge their beliefs about control, training, and protection. To feel safe again, communities often rush to blame individuals, which brings emotional comfort but blocks deeper understanding. The episode shows how psychology, identity, and group thinking shape these reactions, and why early public stories become hard to question. The key message is that real safety comes from slowing down, asking harder questions, and looking at the wider system — the pressures, culture, and conditions that shape decisions — instead of just asking who is at fault.Original blog: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/when-the-story-hurts-too-muchLinks: The moral dimension of an investigation: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/what-is-the-purpose-of-an-investigationCognitive dissonance: https://thedecisionlab.com/biases/cognitive-dissonanceBlame providing moral comfort: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/what-is-the-purpose-of-an-investigationSuppressing events: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DRXqeQvRFK0The death of Linnea Mills: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/linnea-mills-death-hf-systems-lensTags: English| Learning, Incidents & Just Culture
Transcribe →
SH270: Safe diving starts from the system. Not from the human.
Apr 1500:16:21Tap to summarizeThis episode explores how accidents in diving and other high-risk jobs are often blamed on individuals, even when the real causes are deeper problems in the system, such as pressure, poor communication, lack of support, broken procedures, and unsafe cultures. Using real examples from rescue diving, healthcare, aviation, and emergency services, it shows how “blame cultures” create fear, silence, and hidden mistakes, which makes future accidents more likely. In contrast, “learning cultures” focus on understanding how systems shape behaviour, encourage people to speak up, and treat mistakes as chances to learn rather than punish. The message is clear and practical: safety improves when organisations build trust, psychological safety, and open reporting, so problems can be fixed before they turn into tragedies — because you can’t fix what people are too afraid to talk about.Original blog: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/safe-diving-starts-from-the-system-not-from-the-humanLinks: Report about the search operation (in Polish): https://www.trojmiasto.pl/wiadomosci/Zarzuty-za-smierc-strazaka-Zginal-podczas-poszukiwan-Grzegorza-B-n203080.htmlWhen CRM isn’t implemented (in Polish): https://remiza.pl/nik-grupy-psp-potrzebuja-wsparcia-a-system-reform/2025 Mid-air collision: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2025_Potomac_River_mid-air_collision#Blog about the reasons for undertaking an investigation: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/what-is-the-purpose-of-an-investigationBlameless post mortems: https://sre.google/sre-book/postmortem-culture/Tags: English| Learning, Incidents & Just Culture
Transcribe →
SH269: What Is the Purpose of an Investigation in Diving?
Apr 1100:11:04Tap to summarizeThis episode looks at how diving accidents are often explained in simple ways that blame individuals, instead of exploring the deeper systems and pressures that shape what really happens. It explains that investigations are not just about facts, but about meaning, comfort, and fear after someone has died, which often leads to stories that focus on “human error” instead of learning. Using real examples, it shows how simple explanations may feel reassuring, but they don’t make diving safer. Real prevention comes from understanding how people, training, culture, pressure, equipment, and organisations interact in complex ways. The key message is that safety doesn’t come from finding someone to blame — it comes from changing the conditions that shape decisions and behaviour, so future dives are genuinely safer, not just easier to explain.Original blog: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/what-is-the-purpose-of-an-investigationLinks: Dekker’s four competing purposes: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/1463922X.2014.955554Fatal maritime collision investigation: https://www.gov.uk/maib-reports/collision-between-ro-ro-passenger-vessel-scottish-viking-and-prawn-trawler-homeland-off-st-abb-s-head-scotland-with-loss-of-1-lifeNon-fatal maritime collision investigation: https://dmaib.com/reports/2014/kraslava-and-atlantic-lady-collision-on-1-november-2014Blog about Linnea Mills: https://www.thehumandiver.com/blog/linnea-mills-death-hf-systems-lensIf Only… documentary: https://www.thehumandiver.com/ifonlyLearning from Emergent Outcomes course: https://www.thehumandiver.com/lfeoReferences:Dekker: The psychology of accident investigation: epistemological, preventive, moral and existential meaning-making. 2015. Another link. https://research-repository.griffith.edu.au/items/d0de2c1f-08f8-43b2-9d30-2a4ff6baea09/fullMAIB Report: https://www.gov.uk/maib-reports/collision-between-ro-ro-passenger-vessel-scottish-viking-and-prawn-trawler-homeland-off-st-abb-s-head-scotland-with-loss-of-1-lifeDMAIB Report: https://dmaib.com/reports/2014/kraslava-and-atlantic-lady-collision-on-1-november-2014A fellow graduate from Lund University wrote about this “Why do we ask why? Finding meaning after a violent loss.”Tags: English| Learning, Incidents & Just Culture
Transcribe →