Has The Iran War Shattered US Power In The Middle East? | With Dr Andreas Krieg

Summary

Podcast Summary: "Has The Iran War Shattered US Power In The Middle East?"

History Uncensored | Wake Up Productions
Guest: Dr. Andreas Krieg
Host: Bianca Nobilo
Date: July 16, 2026

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Episode Overview

This episode examines the far-reaching consequences of the 2026 US-Israel war against Iran, focusing on whether it has irreparably damaged American power in the Middle East. Host Bianca Nobilo and Middle East analyst Dr. Andreas Krieg explore the historical underpinnings of US involvement, shifting alliances, the geopolitics of oil, Israel's strategic doctrines, Iran's proxy networks, and post-war narratives shaping the region. The discussion seeks to uncover not just immediate winners and losers, but the deeper historical forces at play and how geography and narrative now shape the new order.

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Key Discussion Points & Insights

1. The End of the US-Led Order?

[00:25] – [02:50]

• Dr. Krieg asserts the current war signals the "end of American empire" and a realization among regional allies that "you can't rely on America."
• Retrospective on US dominance since 1945, starting with the Roosevelt–Abdulaziz pact prioritizing oil security.
• Shifts in US grand strategy:
  • Cold War: Saudi Arabia and Iran as "twin pillars."
  • Post-1979: Iran's revolution ends US reliance on Iran.
  • 1990–2001: Focus on oil and the first Gulf War cement US role, until 9/11 shifts to "war on terror."
  • Iraq invasion seen as a strategic miscalculation, hastening US withdrawal and decline.

"The American empire period is actually a very short one in comparison to other empires."
– Andreas Krieg [02:50]

2. How the Iran War Altered US-Gulf Relations

[05:18] – [07:32]

• Gulf leaders "immensely critical" of the US for disregarding advice and coercing them into participation.
• Conflict made Gulf states' security architecture "collateral damage" in an unwinnable war for US interests.
• US military bases, once seen as shields, became "tripwires or targets," prompting Gulf states to seek security autonomy.

"The realization now is you can't rely on America. You need to diversify your security partnerships."
– Andreas Krieg [07:32]

3. Winners and Losers: An All-Lose Scenario

[08:08] – [09:55]

• While US and Israel showed military might, Iran survived and gained strategic leverage over the Strait of Hormuz.
• The region suffered immense economic loss, with global reverberations; no clear victors, only varying degrees of damage.

"Everyone is a loser in this... there’s no one who could come back and say they've won."
– Andreas Krieg [08:42]

4. Israel's Enduring Strategic Dilemmas

[10:07] – [14:13]

• Israel is said to lack true strategy, relying on military operations to gain momentary security without resolving conflicts.
• Social-psychological trauma and a "bunker mentality" drive perpetual forward defense and self-victimization narratives.
• Israel’s militarization and recurrent efforts to suppress threats often generate new, stronger enemies (e.g., Hamas, Hezbollah).

"Israel has never set itself up to actually end the wars that it has been fighting since its inception."
– Andreas Krieg [10:07]

"It’s perpetual war for the end of war."
– Andreas Krieg [14:13]

5. The True Power of Choke Points: Strait of Hormuz as a "Nuclear Weapon"

[15:56] – [18:12]

• The war demonstrated Iran's capacity to disrupt global trade via maritime chokepoints, arguably more effective than possessing nuclear arms.
• The West lacks military solutions to this new form of strategic leverage.

"The Strait of Hormuz is worse than a nuclear weapon... with major strategic, global strategic impact."
– Andreas Krieg [16:21]

6. Iran’s Axis: The Enduring Proxy Network

[18:40] – [21:18]

• Despite military setbacks, Iran’s proxy networks (Hezbollah, Houthis, Iraqi militias) remain resilient, decentralized, and operational.
• Iran has shifted its doctrine to more actively defend and invest in these proxies.

"Iran is a network state... the network itself is extremely resilient and organic and knows how to bounce back."
– Andreas Krieg [18:47]

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7. Geopolitics Beyond the US, Israel, and Iran: Rise of Multipolarity

[21:18] – [24:45]

• US hegemony is unmistakably in decline; no single power (including China or Russia) is prepared to replace it.
• China and Russia have leveraged US missteps, supporting Iran and letting US influence wane.
• GCC countries are transitioning from being US “partners” to “net contributors.” Israel offers little but military coercion, Iran grows emboldened.

"Where the region will end up is a multipolar environment where no real extra-regional hegemon exists."
– Andreas Krieg [22:12]

8. Weaponization of Narratives

[24:45] – [27:58]

• The conflict is also a "war over narratives"—each player claims some form of victory, regardless of reality.
• Iran has successfully tapped into global anti-Western and anti-Israel networks, sometimes generating unwitting Western support for actions detrimental to their own interests.

"It’s about whose story wins more than anything else."
– Andreas Krieg [25:14]

"Iran has achieved... networks of useful idiots who are not necessarily pro-Iranian, but have been mobilized to embrace anti-Western... and that's being weaponized against us."
– Andreas Krieg [26:32]

9. The Inescapability of Geography

[27:58] – [29:55]

• Geography dictates the region’s order more than ideology: Gulf states must contend with their proximity to Iran.
• A security framework including Iran—rather than one aligned solely against it—appears increasingly necessary, subverting Israel's aims to unite Gulf states against Tehran.

"Geography overrides ideology, overrides narratives over who the enemy is."
– Andreas Krieg [28:23]

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Memorable Quotes

On American Power and Decline:

"The realization now is you can’t rely on America. You need to diversify your security partnerships."
– Andreas Krieg [07:32]

On Israel’s War Doctrine:

"Israel has never properly won a war... it fights the war until it gets to a state where it has a relative period of peace just to prepare for the next war."
– Andreas Krieg [10:07]

On Iran’s Power:

"The Strait of Hormuz is worse than a nuclear weapon... undeterred to completely disrupt not just the economies of the Gulf states, but global economies and supply chains."
– Andreas Krieg [16:21]

On the Resilience of Iran’s Proxies:

"The network itself is extremely resilient and organic and knows how to bounce back."
– Andreas Krieg [18:47]

On Narratives:

"It’s about whose story wins more than anything else. Trump, I think, has lost the story and the plot, even with his own key MAGA constituency..."
– Andreas Krieg [25:14]

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Timeline of Key Segments

• 00:25–02:50: Historical trajectory of US power, with focus on oil and securing the Middle East.
• 05:18–07:32: US-Gulf relations sour post-Iran war; shift to security autonomy.
• 08:42–09:55: Assessment of winners and losers.
• 10:07–14:13: Dissection of Israeli grand strategy and victimhood cycles.
• 16:21–18:12: The Strait of Hormuz as Iran’s potent strategic tool.
• 18:47–21:18: Iran’s enduring and evolving proxy network.
• 22:12–24:45: Decline of US hegemony, multipolarity, and regional power rebalancing.
• 25:14–27:58: The battle for global narratives and risks of Western radicalization.
• 28:23–29:55: The dominant role of geography in shaping regional security calculations.

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Final Thoughts

Bianca Nobilo and Dr. Andreas Krieg provide a rich, nuanced discussion exposing the shifting tectonics of power in the Middle East post-Iran war. The episode highlights not just the strategic and military failures of the United States and Israel, but the deeper, often unseen historical, geographic, and narrative forces redrawing the region’s future. As Dr. Krieg concludes, the new order is multipolar, anchored by hard realities rather than ideology, and shaped by a perpetual, weaponized struggle over narrative as much as territory.

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Transcript

[Andreas Craig]

Introducing Meta glasses. You have questions, They've got answers. Hey Meta, what's the capital of Peru?

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Lima.

[Andreas Craig]

How do you say where's the restroom in Spanish? Donde esta Alvano? Hey, Meta, is a hot dog a sandwich? Technically, no. Spiritually, yes. Hey Meta, what should I do with my life? That's one of life's biggest questions.

[Interviewer]

What do you think?

[Andreas Craig]

Ask anything with the new Meta glasses. This Iran war is really the end of American empire. The realization now is you can't rely on America.

[Interviewer]

For centuries, the Strait of Hormuz has been economically valuable. It's linked to political power as well.

[Andreas Craig]

Strait of Hormuz is worse than a nuclear weapon.

[Interviewer]

What's your view at this stage on the winners and losers?

[Andreas Craig]

Most of the time, Israel has a chaos strategy. I think everyone is a loser in this. The problem is it's a perpetual war for the end of war.

[Interviewer]

Has America and Israel's war in Iran shattered American power? The Middle east? For more than three decades, since the Gulf War of 1991, when a US led coalition drove Saddam Hussein's forces out of Kuwait and appeared to establish a new American led security order, one assumption about the Middle east endured when a major crisis erupted. The United States had the military power to protect its partners, keep vital trade routes open and ultimately shape the end game. Then came 2026. America and Israel struck Iran. Iran widened the war across the Gulf. American bases designed to project power and reassure allies became targets themselves. And the Strait of Hormuz, the narrow stretch of water through which roughly a fifth of the world's oil had been moving, was no longer merely a theoretical vulnerability. The war showed what happens when that vital artery is actually squeezed. Iran has been battered, but it has survived. And even now, the dust is not settling. The Strait is again at the center of confrontation. Commercial ships have been attacked and American strikes on Iran have resumed. But this is a history show, so I'm less interested in who won the latest exchange than in what future historians will say happened here. Because what replaces the old order will not only determine the future of Iran and Israel, it could shape the price of energy, the security of global shipping, the nuclear choices of other countries, and the risk of the next major war. Andreas Craig is an author and fellow at the Institute of Middle Eastern Studies and one of the most incisive analysts of the hidden networks and shifting alliances that shape power across the Middle East.

[Andreas Craig]

The American empire period is actually a very short one in comparison to other empires. If you look at it historically, I'd say the American footprint in the Middle east really starts to appear in around 1945. There's this very infamous meeting between the King of Saudi Arabia, Abdulaziz in Bitter LAKE On a U.S. destroyer, together with Roosevelt, U.S. president at the time. And they're basically coming to some sort of understanding that the US needs access to oil. Saudi Arabia has a lot of oil. America will come in to protect Saudi oil and thereby has kind of prioritized access to Saudi oil. And for most of the Cold War the Middle east has been a front line to basically push back against the ussr. But really what the Americans were looking at was initially a twin pillar policy where they relied on Saudi and Iran to kind of keep the peace in the region. That came to an end rapidly 1979 with the Islamic revolution and Iran then no longer being a reliable pillar of US power and actually turning against the United States. And then from that moment onwards the Americans are saying actually the Persian Gulf is a backyard, we need to secure our supply chains here which are again related mostly to oil. And I think these are the. For most of the period between 45 till probably 1990 it was all about oil, access to energy and about fighting back communism. 1990, that whole communist peril went away. Energy was still there. So post 1990 we obviously have the invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and then the Americans putting hundreds of thousands of boots in the ground in Saudi and later in Kuwait as well to push out Iraq, Iraqi forces of Saddam Hussein. All of that brings about a new era in the 90s which is solely built around oil and access to energy and securing the supply chains for energy. Again a bit of a change, 2001, obviously with 9, 11, it becomes a war on terror and fighting back against, against political Islam. And again the Gulf states are a frontier in this particular as operations start in 2003 against Saddam's Iraq, which I think is probably the second after this crisis now, probably the second worst decision any US president has ever made in the Middle east has been detrimental to US power. And post Iraq, as I said, we see this process of withdrawing of US troops and US influence, particularly military boots on the ground. And we're at the end of this process now.

[Interviewer]

What has Israel and the US's attack on Iran done to America's relationships with Gulf states?

[Andreas Craig]

Every single Gulf decision maker I've been speaking to over the last four months across the board of the six GCC countries have been immensely critical of the United States. Not just the fact that the US completely disregarded all the cautious advice that was given to the US Prior to this intervention, saying that this war will most likely not lead to any sort of success, but actually might be a major strategic disaster. That was one thing. And obviously the Gulf states knew that the Strait of Hormuz would become collateral damage, that they themselves, their national security, would become collateral damage in this war, in a war that was never winnable, that was solely for US interests. And we've seen already since 2024, a kind of a clash between, in Washington between those who are advocating for America first, which is the Gulf countries, and the neoconservatives who are basically pushing for an Israeli first strategy. And that really came to a complete explosion in February. And the first round of this really went to Israel first. And that was a major problem for the Gulf states. But bigger than that was actually the way, not just the decision to go to war, but also the way that the US Conducted this war, the way that the US Disregarded the. The sovereignty of its partners in the region, the fact that they were coercing their partners to get access to bases, to be able to launch operations from bases. When the Gulf states said, no, we do not want you to. We don't want to be part of this. The fact that they were coercing Gulf states to allow their territory for missile strikes on Iran against the will of these Gulf states, that in itself, the way that Trump administration has been using coercion against partners, that is something that completely undermined the very security architecture and the sort of the assumptions that were made in the Gulf about security.

[Interviewer]

And on that point, I've heard you say before that this war had also transformed the way that partners may have felt about having American bases on their territory. Instead of feeling defended or them acting as shields, they were tripwires or targets.

[Andreas Craig]

Absolutely. That's part of the security assumption. The assumption was, as long as you have US Boots on the ground, that will act as a deterrent against Iran or anyone else. And it was the polar opposite. They became sitting ducks because the US had their troops and still have their troops in the Gulf countries. And none of the Gulf countries have now come to the conclusion of saying, let's just kick out the Americans, because that would not solve anything in the short term. The realization now is you can't rely on America. You need to diversify your security partnerships, and you need to invest in sovereignty and autonomy to make sure that you can defend yourselves moving forward.

[Interviewer]

The dust clearly hasn't settled when it comes to this war. But the United States and Israel, they killed senior Iranian leaders, did a great Deal of infrastructure damage showed fairly impressive conventional military ability. But Iran retained an increased leverage over the Strait of Hormuz. Survived. This regime will likely be much harder to deal with. What's your view at this stage on the winners and losers?

[Andreas Craig]

I think everyone is a loser in this. The global economy has lost a lot. Trillions and trillions, hundreds of trillions of dollars, actually, if you look at opportunity costs. You know, if you look at the battlefield operationally, tactically, there were some successes for Israel and the United States. Strategically, a complete disaster for the US and for Israel. I think Israel is more isolated than they've ever been. The US has not been unable to achieve anything they wanted to achieve. The Gulf countries, as I said, became collateral damage in this. They themselves have major. They've been, you know, suffered major losses economically as well. And so we're seeing a major contraction of supply chains and trade in the world. So everyone is losing out. There's no one who could come back and say they've won. I mean, Iran has strategically won, but at what cost? If you look at the regime right now, the. The regime is extremely diversified. It's decentralized. There is a lot of power struggle going on internally. The economy is completely wracked. Hence why the Iranians, if they really want to make this into a success story, they need money now to rebuild their country, because that is something that created an unsustainable sociopolitical and socioeconomic situation for most Iranians.

[Interviewer]

What did you, the US And Israel's decision to go to war in Iran reveal about Israel's strategy and what limits did it expose?

[Andreas Craig]

Israel has no strategy. Israel has never had any strategy. I mean, I've lived in Israel for many years. I've been working with IDF officers on the strategic operation level. As part of my background in professional military education. I can tell you Israelis have a very limited view on strategy because strategy really is a political thing, right? And war is just a means to get to a political end, to an end state of stability and security for Israel. The military in itself is not a lever of power. It's an end in itself. And we've seen that since 1948. Israel has never properly won a war. Not the Six Day War, not the Yom Kippur War, because none of these wars ended the actual confrontation that Israel's confronted with in the Arab world. So Israel doesn't do strategy. It fights the war until it gets to a state where it has a relative period of peace just to prepare for the next war. So Israel has never set itself up to actually end the wars that it has been fighting since its inception. So the strategic flaw that Israel had in Iran was let's disrupt, let's destroy, let's try to see how far we can go to topple the regime. And if in its place there is chaos in Iran, that works for us as well. So most of the time Israel has a chaos strategy because it doesn't end any wars, it just leaves them in limbo. And limbo is good for Israel.

[Interviewer]

Yeah. I listened to an interview with you the other day and I thought you made really interesting points about Israel's self conception and it being in a spiral. I think you may have used the words of self victimization and repeatedly trying to replace any vulnerability that it feels with like forward defence, preempting wars with its neighbors and that that ends up with such counterintuitive and counterproductive results because of the demographics of the region, because of the balance of power of the region. Could you talk a little bit more about that?

[Andreas Craig]

Well, ultimately, Israel is in a cycle, cycle, in a sociopsychological bubble which is built around victimhood. But it's also, if you look at it social, psychologically, in a long term, it's a highly traumatized society. Trauma is a defining element of Israeli identity, also partially Jewish identity, but particularly Israeli identity. You know, if you look at the background of the Holocaust and the victimization of Jews throughout its history, and obviously the narrative that Israel as a small state was created as a David against the Goliath immediately having to fight, and that kind of created a narrative that Israel is always on the defensive, that Israel never can have peace, that Israel always has to fight first, that it has no strategic depth and it's so insecure, permanently insecure, that it has to fight its way out. And that creates a bunker mentality, a mentality of saying it's us against the rest of the world, we cannot trust anyone. And this is, if you look at the narrative in Israel right now, they're blaming Trump for this loss, this strategic loss in Iran against Iran. And now they're saying we can't even rely on the us we can't even rely on Donald Trump. And I'd say probably Donald Trump is the most pro Israel president there ever has been. I mean, he's saying that by himself, but I probably agree with him on that. And so to come and blame him now for not doing what needs to be done, where he actually put his own presidency, his own legacy, US economy on the line for a completely absurd Israeli campaign, Bibi Netanyahu campaign essentially shows that he has been very much in support of Israel all along, and now he's being blamed.

[Interviewer]

It's quite haunting, is it? Isn't it, to see history metabolized into these military ends. And like, at what point does a genuine historical trauma or vulnerability become a situation where you are creating new threats for yourself instead of just dealing with the real and initial ones?

[Andreas Craig]

That's the story of Israel. The story of Israel is one where you've obviously been up against a, you know, a major resistance force from the beginning, where you had a choice to make peace on several occasions. And at times, I agree with Israelis, there wasn't a partner for peace. But there were occasions of the last 30 years for peace that Israel ignored. And every single time that Israel is fighting an enemy, it usually creates an enemy. If you look at its subversion of the social political environment. In Gaza, for example, decades ago when they were fighting Fatah, they basically were quite happy to support the Muslim Brotherhood in Gaza, which ended up being Hamas. And now they're fighting Hamas, which they helped create. Same is true for southern Lebanon. They were trying to fight fight the Palestinians in Fatah in Lebanon during the civil war, and thereby created an enemy in the Shia community, which then became Hezbollah, which is now the other war that they're fighting. And so the problem is it's perpetual war for the end of war. And it's a country that is so highly militarized. And I struggle to see a country which is more militarized than Israel, with men and women serving in the military, with every prime minister having some sort of background in the military. So military leaders are terrible at strategic decision making. They're terrible as political leaders. And the problem that Israel has, there's other military dictatorships, and I'm not saying Israel is a military dictatorship, is that the military cannot rule. And the problem is that the IDF, by extension, rules that country through trauma tapping into insecurity complexes that exist in Israeli society and have only a military solution to what are essentially political problems.

[Interviewer]

One of the the main areas of discussion in terms of threat to Israel and Iranian power in general prior to the war was, of course, would Iran acquire a nuclear weapon? Has the war in Iran in 2026 shown that Iran doesn't need one to cause damage to global economies and exert leverage and pressure?

[Andreas Craig]

Actually, a straight of Hormuz is worse than a nuclear weapon. Not worse in terms of the fallout. But first of all, I still contest the assertion that Iran was pursuing a nuclear weapon. If it wanted to do that. It had many occasions to do it and get there. And it didn't get there. It was a choice. The Strait of Hormuz is a readily used, tactical sort of weapon that you can use with no threshold, with no inhibitions, with major strategic, global strategic impact. So I think what we have created now is an Iran that is conscious able to use a new quote, unquote, nuclear weapon with no threshold whatsoever, undeterred to completely disrupt not just the economies of the Gulf states, but global economies and supply chains. Because mind you, the Strait of Hormuz is just one choke point the Iranians have influence over. The other one is the Bab El Mandeb between Yemen and the Horn of Africa, which the Houthis not necessarily control but could potentially disrupt and have disrupted in the past. And the Houthis being proxies of Iran. So Iran, if you really look at it, of global trade, if you look at the numbers of goods going through both of these choke points, Iran has immense power now. And we don't really, in the west, in Europe, in the United States, we don't have the capability to actually do anything about it militarily. So if you ask me, I think they don't need a nuclear weapon. They've got one that is far more powerful.

[Interviewer]

For centuries, the Strait of Hormuz has been economically valuable, but also always more than that because naturally it's linked to political power as well. How has this war changed the calculus of military planners and also strategists in terms of how to deal with that potential issue, workarounds of the Strait of Hormuz and how that can be managed,

[Andreas Craig]

The Strait of Hormuz, I mean, we always knew. I lived in the Gulf for four years and I've worked with various Gulf militaries and Strait of Hormuz was always one of the scenarios we're planning for. It was always the kind of worst case scenario. But it was in every sort of war game you ever played, it was the Strait of Hormuz would be closed by Iran, either by mining or some other sort of disruption. So nobody can come and say we didn't know about it, everyone knew about it. Everyone warned the President that this was going to happen.

[Interviewer]

I'd just like to get into Iran's proxy network and what it looks like now compared to, let's say, a decade ago.

[Andreas Craig]

The media, mainstream media has been saying for decades, for years, certainly since 2023, they've been saying the axis of resistance is in decline. Israel has defeated it, have adopted The Israeli narrative that basically by hitting Hezbollah hard and Hamas hard, the entire axis is collapsing. I don't think that's true. Iran is a network state. It runs by networks and it delegates statecraft to networks of non state, Hezbollah being the main one. And Hezbollah has been hit hard operationally. It has been hit hard on the political level as well. But ultimately you have to think about Hezbollah not as a pyramid, a hierarchy that can be decapitated. In the same way Hamas is not a hierarchy that can be decapitated. It's a network of different cells that operate in an organic three dimensional space. So there aren't even if horizontal sort of connections between these different cells are being disrupted. The network itself is extremely resilient and organic and knows how to bounce back. And so in this respect, Hezbollah has been hit hard, but it's still extremely operational. Hamas is still there. It's also a network. I would say Hamas is certainly just a shadow of what it was obviously in 2023, just because Israel has been throwing everything it has at it. And certainly Syria, the network, Syria was a very important platform and go between to actually resupply the axis of resistance. But if you look at it, the Houthis, but probably more powerful than they have ever been in Yemen, able as I said, to use the other nuclear weapon on the Bab Al Mandab and disrupt trade if Iran wanted to. And we have no capability of doing anything about this. Hezbollah is still kicking the Hashd Al Shaabi, which is, you know, the PMUs or PMFs in these non state actor networks in Iraq, Iran aligned, are still very much capable and they're still more than just kicking. I think that's going to be the next sort of ground zero for the next confrontation between Iran and Israel. If you look at, take this all together, the network is still there, the axis is still there and Iran is now able to change its attitude. While the axis was there to kind of push defense forward, to make sure that war never comes to the shores of Iran again. Actually Iran has reversed this now and has said we are protecting the axis as they've done in Lebanon with Hezbollah, where they've said we will defend Hezbollah. Hezbollah is not just there to defend the Islamic Republic. So in many ways Iran has doubled down to keep the axis and potentially invest more money which could be coming a lot more money into the axis to rebuild it.

[Interviewer]

If we look at the long view, what has this war done to the superpower balance in the region between the US and China and also the, the regional order in the Gulf itself, because naturally, mainstream media, especially in the west, the focus is the U.S. israel, Iran. Let's talk about the others and what this has changed.

[Andreas Craig]

Yeah, no, that's. That's an important point often overlooked. Priceline negotiator.

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[Andreas Craig]

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[Andreas Craig]

There's a lot of things to say here. So, as I said before, the hegemony, if it existed, US Hegemony is in decline. But there isn't a hegemon on the horizon that's coming. It's also very clear this war has shown that Iran, that China in particular, but also Russia, have not missed an opportunity to let the Americans dig their own grave. And Napoleon once said, you know, don't disrupt your enemy when he's making a mistake. And that's exactly the policy that China and Russia has followed in the region because America made a mistake. And China, all it had to do is give a little bit support and intelligence to the Iranians to kind of help balance this kind of war. Russia, the same thing. They were firmly and are still firmly on the side of the Iranians. So in the great power scheme of things, that has been, if you look at the bandwidth of American power that's been consumed by this war, if you look at the projectiles that needed to be exported into the region from the Pacific and other theaters, it meant America is now so preoccupied with, you know, frankly, a fairly peripheral conflict with Iran and China is. Didn't have to do anything to basically have a net gain from that. I think where the region will end up is a multipolar environment where no real extra regional hegemon exists. Russia and China are not coming in. They are unwilling to play that role. The United States will withdraw from this, from the region gradually. The idea that they're just bringing all their boots back once the bases that Iran destroyed are rebuilt is an illusion. I don't think that's going to happen. And that's not just a Trump problem. That's an American grand strategic decision not to wanting to be dragged into this region. It's going to be one where regional partners will pull the weight and become net contributors to American power. And I would say the GCC is already in a place where they are net contributors to US power, while Israel is basically a net beneficiary of US power. And so things will change and we now, if you're in the Gulf, you have a choice between currently two ambitions to lead the region. One is the Israeli one, which I think is quite illusionary to think that Israel has anything more to offer than coercion and military coercion. So I don't think they're in a hegemonic position, but they certainly act as they see fit. And on the other end of the spectrum, you've got Iran, which now comes out emboldened, run by the IRGC and basically appearing as what I would say is a military dictatorship. And again, using coercion to get their

[Interviewer]

will, switching kids slightly. Your book Subversion, which is brilliant, examines how narratives are weaponized. Naturally, this conflict has provided ample material to feed different narratives, and each key player has a story to tell about how they have been victorious in some sense. Which narratives do you think are the most dangerous to believe in this set of circumstances?

[Andreas Craig]

That's an interesting point. I think this war, this entire conflict now, because we're in this MoU phase of a ceasefire, which is not really a ceasefire, has been relegated into what I would call is a war over narratives. More than anything. It's about whose story wins more than anything else. Trump, I think, has lost the story and the plot, even with his own key MAGA constituency, certainly lost America, has certainly lost Europe and the Middle East. Iran is not necessarily winning, but Iran has done something, and this is, for me, is quite dangerous. And it has created or has tapped into networks of anti American, I would say mostly left wing, potentially far left sort of networks in Europe and across the Western world who always had an anti imperialist, anti American, anti British sort of standpoint. And these sort of networks are now cheering on for Iran. They're cheering on for Iran hitting tankers and vessels going through the Strait of Hormuz, which are actually delivering goods that are benefiting the very same people who are clapping for it. One of the worst things I've seen on a video, I think a year ago or so, was during one of the major protests here for Palestine in London, where you've had, you know, people clapping and cheering for the Houthis, hitting another ship, hitting another vessel, which is goods that are usually coming from Asia to Europe. So, you know, and what Iran has achieved is creating networks of useful idiots, as I would call them who are not necessarily pro Iranian, but have been basically mobilized to embrace anti Western and mostly starting off from an anti Israel position and tapping into what I would consider to be the greatest problem in the west right now is that we as Western countries haven't done enough to call Israel out. We've been sometimes even complicit in what Israel has been doing in Gaza and that's now being weaponized against us. And so much so that it will lead to a potential, what I would see a considerable risk of radicalization, particularly on the far left for Iran. Iran is not our partner. Iran has not the interest of Western people in mind. Also, Iran doesn't necessarily have the interests of Palestinians in mind or other Arabs. Iran thinks about Iran. The IRGC is a self interested network. It has run the country as a business and every decision that they're making is they're making it for their own financial survival. So I think we have to be very careful not to conflate criticism of Trump with cheering for Iran. And the Iranians have been very good at weaponizing narratives in that way and creating very unlikely support in Western constituencies.

[Interviewer]

I'd like to finish by going beyond history even further back to geography. Because when you've talked about the actors in this region before, you've spoken about them as prisoners of geography. How much of the current regional order, competition and conflict is dictated by factors that no government or ideology can change.

[Andreas Craig]

We're realizing now that ideology, despite the fact that nobody likes the Iranians, nobody in the Gulf sits there and says, oh, the Iranians are great guys. I love the Islamic Republic, I like Shia Islamism. They've realized come to the realization that the neighbor 100 kilometers to their north, for most of them across the small pond of the Persian Gulf, Iran is a neighbor they cannot ignore, even if they disagree fundamentally with its ideology and its posture, while Israel is a country that's far away and they don't share the same geography. And ultimately, as they're all abutting states to the Persian Gulf and they all have the Strait of Hormuz as the main artery of trade, they're realizing that geography overrides ideology, overrides narratives particular over who the enemy is. It all completely reconstituted in many ways the ontology of security, the way the Gulf states look at security, they understand that the way forward has to be one where Iran has to be engaged, even if you like it or not, if you disagree with them or not. And I think all of the GCC countries collectively have come to the realization that something needs to change and potentially a security framework, including Iran, is the way forward, which is the exact polar opposite that Israel wanted to create when it went into this war. Because the hope in Israel was that the Gulf states would rally around Israel against Iran. And likely what we're going to see down the line is an engagement entanglement between Iran and the GCC and potentially against Israel.

[Interviewer]

Andreas Craig, that was fascinating. It had the effect of a brain floss for me. So thank you so much for joining me.

[Andreas Craig]

Thanks for having me.

[Interviewer]

Thank you. It's the goal of this show to uncover the history behind today's headlines, those deeper patterns of power, geography, empire and human nature that are shaping the world around us. So if you do want to understand not just what happened, but why it happened and what it tells us about what's likely to come next, you are in the right place. Subscribe so you never miss an episode. It makes a huge difference to the channel at this stage, and it also means, hopefully you'll see the world differently and everything will make a lot more sense. See you next time.