Jay Dyer (8:45)
Specifically, the relationship between the two natural wills and operations or energies in the two natures. This, of course, is because the sixth Ecumenical Council dealt extensively with debating the monothelites on the question of Christ and the Incarnation having two wills and two energies proper to those natures. So I would argue, as St. Gregory Palmas does against Barlaum, and as St. Maximus the Confessor did against against Pyrrhus the Monothelite, that the nature grace question and the question of the essence and energy's distinction in the Incarnation is even clearer when we understand that there's no dialectics. So there's no dialectics in the relationship between nature and grace. There's no dialectics between the relationship of Christ's human nature and energy participating in the divine nature and energy. So in other words, the uncreated energies of God. It's not just a question of God's relationship creation, but it's also solidified dogmatically and theologically in the 6th Ecumenical Council when it deals with this specific question. If you read the debate between Saint Maximus and Pyrrhus, you'll see that Maximus relies throughout in that 150 page treatise on this being a real distinction. This real distinction allows for God to remain transcendent in his essence and yet come down to us and allow us to participate in his uncreated glory and life. Jesus says in John 17 that he came to give us the same glory that he shares with the Father from all eternity. That glory, that light is not created, is in fact uncreated. And it's not something that just is postponed to an intellectual vision in the afterlife or the beatific vision. And in fact it's something that's participated in here and now. And we know that by the fact of the Incarnation. In fact, when the Fathers at the sixth Ecumenical Council and at the fifth by the way, talk about the Incarnation, they speak of the humanity of Christ as being deified via the Incarnation. Again, this process is done by the uncreated energies which proceed from the divine nature. Certainly, although they're not the exact same as the divine nature, in our view, that is the means by which the humanity of Christ participates in the divine life. That's explicitly stated, quoting from St. Gregory of Nyssa and St. Gregory of Nazianzus and the theological orations at the Fifth and Sixth Council. So it's repe. Reaffirmed. We also have statements at the Council of Ephesus citing Saint Cyril of Alexander against Nestorius, that the bread and the wine in a similar way, participate in these divine energies. There are multiple references to these same ideas in the liturgies of the east, all which talk about the operations of God. The baptismal rite, for example, talks about calling down the energies of God into the baptismal font. And again, it's all just based on our Christological understanding, which we see as, again, dogmatically stating in the sixth and fifth Council that the energies deify the humanity. So that model of deification of Christ's humanity is the model for the individual believer, the individual baptized Christian, as they participate in God through the Church, through the sacraments. And that participation is a real participation, but it's a participation in the uncreated glory, an uncreated light, uncreated grace of God, not a created grace. So I would contrast this with what's later dogmatized, so not just theoretically or philosophically speculated upon in Aquinas in terms of how there might be a relationship between this absolutely simple essence and created beings, or this absolutely simple essence and the one person of the Trinity somehow becoming incarnate. Rather, it is the question of the Roman dogmas. And the Roman dogmas do eventually state, and I think I'm vindicated by this, not just in my reading of what's at the Roman councils, particularly like Trent or Vatican I, where dogmatic divine simplicity is stated pretty clearly. You also have the outworkings of this in terms of creative grace. You know, Trent has, if I recall, going from memory, a condemnation of different speculations about what kind of grace and justification is actually given in baptism. And one of the things that's condemned is the idea that it's not created grace. So in other words, the grace that is stamped upon our soul, the sanctifying grace, is a created effect. And of course this is again, in that sort of Aristotelian causal format of God, the cause and that we receive the effects of that cause, but the. The effects that we receive are in fact created. And I would argue that the reason that Rome has this issue is precisely because eventually in the dogma, the uncreated, created or Excuse me, The uncreated grace, essence, energy, distinction doctrine was eventually lost. So it was perfectly fine in terms of up until the 6th, 7th, 8th Council, if you count the 8th, our 8th, that is where it was stated explicitly. But it eventually, I would say after the rise of Frankish dominance, Charlemagne, the Carolinians, you eventually have this dogma kind of being lost and forgotten in Roman Catholic theology, pretty much settles into a pretty ossified, solidified doctrine of what divine simplicity is. So there are a lot of errors. I'm going to close up here with this opening statement. I think that's the main. The main point. We would say that there's a lot of errors that kind of flow out of this that you can tease out. And so my first clarification is that I'm not debating whether Thomas had good intentions. I'm not debating whether Thomas and other places in the Summa said things correctly. I'm not here to debate Augustine's intentions or Anselm's intentions, but rather just specifically whether or not the things that are stated, say, in Book one of Summa Theologica and in Book one of the Summa Contradentiles, about what divine simplicity is, if that actually makes sense with and comports with what is stated elsewhere about how there is a real distinction of persons. Because to us, it doesn't seem that there could be a real distinction of persons if distinction implies composition or division. In fact, that's a direct borrowing from Plotinus. It's Plotinus who first said, while following other Greek philosophers before him, that all consideration of distinction implies division or composition. And for us, we see that as many times refuted, particularly in the Christological heresies, but also in the trilogical formations of the early Church. So for us, all of these questions are linked. The doctrine of God, how he relates to creation, also the doctrine of Christology, the doctrine of the sacraments and the doctrine of eschatology are all intimately connected in ecclesiology in terms of how we view the essence, energy, distinction, and whether we believe that it's possible or not. So when it comes to Aquinas conclusions, I'll say that for my later critique. Given the fact that, for example, I don't see how creation can be a free action of God if we accept his doctrine of divine simplicity and the idea that all the actions of God are absolutely isomorphically identical to the essence of God, I don't see how we can say that there's a real incarnation if God is an absolutely simple essence, or, for example, how we would avoid Patroposianism. If God is an absolutely simple essence, in other words, that one hypostasis of the Trinity couldn't enter into a mode of being that the others do not. So for example, the Father is not crucified, the Father does not become incarnate, it's only the Son. But if God is an absolutely simple essence in which the the distinctions imply composition or division, it becomes difficult to see how there is a real incarnation, how God's actions within time and space are real actions signifying the divine power. For example, it's common amongst the early Fathers to speak of Christ's human nature being evident when he cries or when he eats. But we see the Fathers also making a strong argument for the divine power operant in Christ or through Christ, when he walks on water, when he does miracles, when he raises the dead, those are actions proper to the divine nature. And they're real powers entering into time and space from the divine nature itself. Now, we don't believe the divine nature enters into time and space, but in fact that it that it is possible for the uncreated to enter into time and space because of our belief in the essence energy distinction. And I'll close with. I would say our strongest case in that regard is the fact that for us, the theophanies of the Old Testament up until Augustine in book three of on the Trinity is when it's first question. The Eastern Fathers never questioned the belief that it is not created holograms or angels that are present, for example in Exodus 3 of the burning bush or in Exodus 23 where God says I will put my name in my angel, the angel of the Lord. It is consistently believed that these theophanies are of the pre incarnate presence of Christ himself. Thomism and Augustinian debates and discussions on the Trinity or questioning of this led to the possibility that led to the conclusion that it's difficult to see how an absolutely simple trinitarian essence could manifest within time and space. Therefore, we have to accept that these are just angelic created forms. We don't believe that they're angelic created forms. And neither do the Church Fathers who argue that these are, these are, this is the Logos manifesting within time and space. How is that possible? It's possible because of the essence energy distinction. So I will close with that as my opening statement and let you speak.
