Slow Burn – The Road to the Iraq War | Episode 6: "Big, if True"

Date: June 2, 2021
Host: Noreen Malone
Guests & Key Voices: Bill McLaughlin (CIA), Margaret Henoch (CIA), Robert Draper (writer), Bob Drogin (journalist), Andy Liepman (CIA/WinPAC)

Overview

This episode of "Slow Burn" peels back the layers of how flawed and unvetted intelligence—centered on the infamous Iraqi source known as "Curveball"—became the linchpin in the U.S. government's public case for war against Iraq. By tracing the internal hesitations and red flags ignored at the highest levels of the intelligence community and Bush administration, the episode illustrates how wishful thinking, bureaucratic inertia, and political pressure culminated in one of history’s most consequential deceptions.

Key Discussion Points & Insights

1. Building the Case for War

• Key Event:
  • In late December 2002, George W. Bush requested the CIA make its strongest case for war with Iraq ([01:00]).
• CIA’s Task:
  • The President was less interested in the factual accuracy of intelligence and more in the persuasiveness of presentation:

    “Everyone in that room, including me, strongly believed that Iraq did have WMD. It was not a subject that came up for discussion. The discussion centered around whether we could make the presentation more effective.” – Bill McLaughlin ([02:45])

• “Slam Dunk” Moment:
  • The infamous phrase by CIA Director George Tenet wasn’t a certainty about facts, but about the “sale” of the case ([03:11]).

    “He wasn’t talking about the facts. He was talking about the sale.” – Noreen Malone ([03:11])

2. Colin Powell’s UN Speech: Pivotal & Doomed

• Powell as Closer:
  • Powell, trusted across party lines, was chosen to deliver the final, most convincing public argument ([05:10]).

    “Powell would achieve maximum credibility as the deliverer of this case in a way that nobody else would.” – Robert Draper ([05:10])

• Internal Doubts:
  • Powell, upon reviewing the intelligence, found it shoddy and demanded a complete redo. Condi Rice denied him more time, forcing a rushed vetting process ([05:47]).
  • Margaret Henoch at the CIA marked up the Powell draft:

    “You cannot use this. There is no way to verify this. It’s not even sort of leaky. It’s a gigantic sieve with a hole in it.” – Margaret Henoch ([07:16])

• Powell’s Commitment:
  • Despite last-minute qualms, Powell presented at the UN, staking his reputation ([08:05]).

    “Every statement I make today is backed up by sources, solid sources. These are not assertions. What we’re giving you are facts...” – Colin Powell ([08:16])

3. The Legend of Curveball

• Who Was Curveball?
  • Rafid Ahmed Alwan al-Janabi, a chemical engineer seeking asylum in Germany, spun a story of mobile biological weapons labs—his accounts became critical U.S. intelligence ([11:19]).

    “When the Americans began looking at his files, they said, this must be it. This is perfect. We have an eyewitness.” – Bob Drogin ([13:20])

• Problems With the Story:
  • The U.S. never spoke to Curveball directly; Germans filtered all information, limiting cross-examination and hiding doubts ([13:32]).
  • Curveball’s stories became more vague over time, and he was unreliable in his personal life ([14:39]).
  • By September 2001, German intelligence formally dropped him as a source, but post-9/11, his tales were resurrected at the highest levels ([15:29]).

4. Intelligence Failure and Confirmation Bias

• “Too Good to Check” Syndrome:
  • Curveball’s specificity set him apart from other sources, making his testimonies seductively credible ([16:02]).

    “Human intelligence doesn’t get any better than this.” – Bill McLaughlin ([16:02])

• Analytical Flaws:
  • The U.S. had no means to vet Curveball, relying on secondhand material and wanting to believe it all ([16:54]).
  • Contradictory evidence was dismissed as proof of Saddam’s cunning, not the source’s unreliability:

    “Their inability to find the trucks became proof that they must exist. That showed how sinister and how diabolical Saddam Hussein was.” – Bob Drogin ([17:39])

• Institutional Pressure:
  • Intelligence that fit previous assumptions was overweighted, dissenting signals were ignored ([20:10], [20:49]).

5. CIA Internal Dissent Ignored

• Margaret Henoch’s Investigations:
  • Henoch’s team found:
    • No biographical vetting of Curveball ([26:09]).
    • No evidence supporting his credibility ([26:30]).
    • Common-sense questions about how a person involved in top-secret weapons would escape Iraq alive ([26:55]).
  • She confronted colleagues about Curveball’s implausibility, only to be dismissed ([27:43], [28:14]).

    “How do you know that’s not where he found it [the Internet]?” – Margaret Henoch ([28:14])

• Her Memo:
  • Warned that Curveball was embellishing to secure asylum ([29:02]).

    “[Curveball] was more forthcoming… when he needed resettlement assistance. Now that he does not need it, he is less helpful, possibly because when he was being helpful, he was embellishing a bit.”

• The Ignored Warning:
  • Henoch realized her alarm had been overridden when President Bush referenced mobile weapons labs in the State of the Union ([29:44]).

6. How the Lie Shaped the War

• Inspectors Find Nothing:
  • UN inspections in Iraq post-Powell’s speech found no evidence of WMDs ([30:43]).
• “Mobile Labs” Discovered?
  • Two Iraqi trucks found after the invasion were misidentified—ammonia traces proved to be urine, and the trucks made hydrogen for weather balloons ([33:06]).

    "Someone just took a leak in the trucks." – Noreen Malone ([33:06]) "Curveball's entire story was a hoax. It was a con. It was a fraud.” – Bob Drogin ([34:39])

• Curveball’s Motivation:
  • Fabricated for asylum and better life in Germany—later boasting about his impact ([34:39], [35:05]).
• Other False Claims:
  • Yellowcake uranium claim (based on forged documents) and alleged aluminum tubes were both debunked ([35:53]–[36:58]).

7. Aftermath, Regret, and Responsibility

• Staff Regrets:
  • Margaret Henoch:

    “There were too many shortcuts. There were too many people who weren’t versed in the craft. There were too many people who were too eager to make their bosses happy. It was a goat grope.” ([37:15])

• Bill McLaughlin’s Reflection:

  “At the time, it didn’t seem strange to me, but my views have changed entirely… The real intention of this thing was to sell a policy.” ([37:50])

• The Human Toll of Groupthink:
  • Final note: George Tenet, in a reflective exchange with Henoch, confessed regret about following his "heart" ([38:25]):

    “You really have to do whatever you decide to do, you have to follow your heart.” – Tenet
    “I wish I had.” – Tenet ([38:25]–[39:02])

Notable Quotes & Memorable Moments

• “He wasn’t talking about the facts. He was talking about the sale.” – Noreen Malone ([03:11])
• “You cannot use this. There is no way to verify this. It’s not even sort of leaky. It’s a gigantic sieve with a hole in it.” – Margaret Henoch ([07:16])
• “Curveball’s entire story was a hoax. It was a con. It was a fraud.” – Bob Drogin ([34:39])
• “There were too many shortcuts. There were too many people who weren’t versed in the craft... It was a goat grope.” – Margaret Henoch ([37:15])
• “The real intention of this thing was to sell a policy.” – Bill McLaughlin ([37:50])
• Powell to McLaughlin after the invasion:

  “Now find the weapons of mass destruction.” – Colin Powell ([31:55])
  (Delivered with anger—not a joke, underscoring his sense of betrayal)

Timestamps for Key Segments

• CIA Prepares Bush's Case for War: 01:00–03:39
• Selection of Colin Powell and His Reluctance: 05:10–06:35
• Drafting the UN Speech & Henoch’s Objections: 07:16–07:52
• Powell Addresses the UN: 08:05–09:10
• Who Was Curveball? / German Intelligence: 11:19–15:29
• Curveball Info Gains Traction in DC: 15:29–16:41
• Confirmation Bias/Analytical Flaws: 17:22–20:35
• Curveball Domination in the NIE: 20:59–21:53
• Internal Dissent: Henoch’s Investigations: 25:23–29:02
• Ignored Warnings & State of the Union: 29:44–30:10
• UN Inspections Find Nothing: 30:43
• The “Mobile Labs” Hype and Debunk: 32:31–33:47
• Curveball’s Motivation & Debunking Other Claims: 34:39–36:58
• Reflections & Regrets: 37:15–39:02

Conclusion

Through testimony, archival audio, and first-hand accounts, "Big, if True" dissects the faulty logic, bureaucratic failings, and political incentives behind one of the most infamous intelligence failures in American history. It’s a cautionary tale of how wishful thinking and political pressure can override professional skepticism—leading not just to individual careers ruined, but to war.