In his book Retreat from Moscow, David Stahel relates:

If the German troops retained a general measure of faith in their commanders, this is not to say it came without qualifications. The most common complaint was the absence of winter clothing, which by early December 1941 was a criticism that had been dragging on for two months. The extent of the problem justified, in the starkest of terms, a questioning of faith in the German leadership.

….

According to Colonel Wilhelm von Rücker, attached to the planning staff of the quartermaster-general's office, "a few hundred additional trains would have had to be sent" to meet the needs of the troops for the coming winter. Not only was there not the transport capacity for winter equipment, but also other high-priority matériel, such as fuel and ammunition, were already failing to arrive in the required quantities, and the quartermaster-general had to have known this.

By November 13 Wagner had had a complete change of heart and acknowledged there were nowhere near enough trains reaching Army Group Center, meaning the urgently requested winter clothing could only be transported to the front at the expense of other supplies

Now I can understand if you’re saying what has this got to do with Bradley, the GI’s General and the war in North Western Europe. I’m going to have to tell you that the answer is everything. Tell me if the American position with the American troops in Europe in late 1944 sounds similar.

Tag words: Retreat from Moscow; David Stahel; Bradley; GI General; Hank Cox; The General Who Wore Six Stars; ComZ; frostbite; Major General Robert Littlejohn; Eisenhower; Ardennes offensive; David Irving; The War Between the Generals; Carlo d’Este; A Genius for War; Nigel Hamilton; The Battles of Field Marshal Montgomery; Otto Skorzeny; Patton; 12th Army Group; trench foot;